► Référence complète : Agence française anticorruption (AFA), Guide du contrôle comptable anticorruption, 2022. 

____

► Lire le guide

____

📧 Lire le commentaire fait par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche de ce guide. 

_______

► Full Reference : Agence française anticorruption - AFA (French Anticoruption Agency), Presentation of various regulatory frameworks for promoting business integrity across the world, Study, May 2023.

____

📜read the study

________

► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "Compliance et Arbitrage. Essai de problématisation" ("Compliance and Arbitration : Problematisation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 265-279. 

____

📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

____

► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021. 

In the book, the article will be published in Title II, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage.

____

► Summary of the article (done by the author): Under the consideration of the "Compliance Juridictionalisation", it is necessary to study in the links between Compliance and Arbitration. The arbitrator is a judge, he is even the natural judge of international trade. Arbitration is therefore naturally intended to meet compliance which transforms the action of companies in an international context. However, the links between compliance and arbitration are not obvious. It is not a question of providing firm and definitive answers, but rather, and above all, of asking questions. We are at the start of reflection on this topic, which explains why there is, for the time being, little legal literature on the subject of the relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. It doesn't mean there aren't connections.  Quite simply, these relations may not have come to light, or they are in the making. We should research  the existing or potential bridges between two worlds that have long gravitated separately: Compliance on the one hand, Arbitration on the other. The central question is: is or can the arbitrator be a compliance judge, and, if so, how?

In any event, the Arbitrator is thus in contact with matters requiring the methods, tools and logic of Compliance. In addition to the prevention and suppression of corruption, three examples can be given.

• Arbitration has been facing economic sanctions (notably embargoes) for several years. The link with Compliance is obvious, insofar as texts providing for economic sanctions are often accompanied by compliance mechanisms, as in the United States. The arbitrator is concerned as to the fate he reserves in the treatment of the dispute with the measures of economic sanctions.
• Competition Law is a branch that came into contact with Arbitration from the end of the 1980s. The arbitrability of this type of dispute is now established and arbitrators apply it regularly. At the same time, Compliance has also entered Competition Law, admittedly more strongly in the United States than in France. The existence, absence or insufficiency of a compliance program aimed at preventing violations of the competition rules are thus circumstances which may assist the arbitrator in the assessment of anti-competitive behavior.
• Environmental Law is also concerned. There is environmental Compliance, for example with regard to the French law of March 27, 2017 on the duty of vigilance. Companies are thus responsible for participating in the protection of the environment, by internalizing these concerns in their internal and external operations (in their sphere of influence). As soon as an arbitrator is in charge for settling a dispute relating to Environmental Law, the question of the relationship to Compliance, from this angle, naturally arises.

It is therefore the multiple interactions between Compliance and Arbitration, actual or potential, which are thus open.

________

► Full Reference: A. Bruneau, "L'entreprise juge d'elle-même : la fonction compliance dans la banque" ("The company judge of itself: the compliance function inside the bank"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 115-131. 

____

📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

____

► Summary of the article (done by the author): First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples

Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance.

In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as "Sapin 2" requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk.

Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution.

Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law.

Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the "judge-judged": following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients.

__________

Référence complète : Jaune, R., Règles pénales et administratives de la lutte anticorruption : l'influence des normes étrangères et internationales, Revue française d'administration publique, 2020/3, n°175, p.645-659.

____

Référence complète : Agence française anticorruption (AFA), Rapport d'activité 2021, mai 2022, 68 p.

____

Lire le rapport

French Anti-corruption Agency, Notice on the French Anti-corruption Agency Guidelines to help public and private sector entities to prevent and detect bribery, influence peddling, extorsion by public officials, illegal taking of interest, misappropriation of public funds and favoritism, 12th of January 2021

Read the guidelines

Full reference: AFA, Commission des sanctions (sanctions commission), Société I. SA, Decision n°19-2, July 7, 2021

Read the decision (in French)

► It is in its "Risk and Compliance" section that the Wall Street Journal, by its article of June 18, 2021 (➡️📝Europe's Chief Prosecutor Has 300 Cases on Her Plate Already), presents the first steps of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, since June 1, 2021.

This inclusion presupposes that it is through a Compliance Law perspective that this new body must be understood, in order to understand and anticipate its action.

►In this perspective :

➡️📧Frison-Roche, M.-A., European Public Prosecutor's Office comes on stage: the company having itself become a private prosecutor, are we going towards an alliance of all prosecutors?, June 2, 2021

➡️ 💬Frison-Roche, « Le parquet européen est un apport considérable au Droit de la Compliance » (“The European Public Prosecutor's Office is a remarkable contribution to Compliance Law"), June 14, 2021

I. AN ACTION THAT WILL FOCUS ON FIGHTING THE MEANS USED TO DAMAGE THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The article of the Wall Street Journal takes the form of an interview with the European Prosecutor. Her responses also confirm the consubstantial link between European Public Prosecutor's Office and Compliance Law.

It is remarkable that she immediately says that she hopes the treatment of many cases, especially on healthcare and infrastructure sectors: "Our expectation is to have more cases, especially in the healthcare system, in public procurement, infrastructure, and also in agriculture ".

However, the 2017 European Regulation which established the European Public Prosecutor’s Office said that its "mandate" is to prosecute offenses affecting the "financial interests of the European Union", without being hampered by the cumbersome procedures for cooperation between States while these offenses are most often cross-border.

But one could think that, knowingly taking the means (corruption, money laundering) for the goal, the European Public Prosecutor's Office would immediately pursue not only the defense of the financial interests of the Union (admittedly financial interests damaged by corruption or money laundering) but these facts themselves: thus the European Public Prosecutor's Office works with the European Supervisory Authorities, in particular banking and financial authorities, which fight in Ex Ante against these offenses and prevent them.

II. AN ACTION THAT FOCUSES ON SECTORS NOT LEGALLY REGULATED IN EX ANTE BY SECTORAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

Moreover, it will be noted that the European Prosecutor is targeting three economic sectors which are not "regulated sectors" in the legal sense of the qualification, that is to say not monitored by a sectoral Regulatory and/or Supervision Authority: Health, Infrastructure and Agriculture.

Thus, the power of Regulatory Law, which relies in its Ex Ante, and its weakness, which derives from the pre-required existence of a sectoral Authority, is compensated: the action of the Public Prosecutor's Office is not limited to legally regulated sectors.

While Competition Authorities are mandated (➡️📅La concurrence dans tous ses états, June 25 and 26, 2021) to protect the competitive functioning of the markets, a Public Prosecutor's Office can deal with any infringement without having to determine a market.

For instance, Infrastructures don't constitute pertinent markets but can constitute fields for criminal activities, such as corruption or money laundering, justifying Compliance Law mechanisms. 

What the new European Prosecutor is aiming for, namely Health, Infrastructures and Agriculture, have undoubtedly been damaged both by the sole primacy of the Competition perspective and by a Criminal Law constrained by the difficult inter-State cooperation, even though they are not subject to a supranational Ex Ante Regulation.

The European Public Prosecutor's Office aims to directly improve this, through Entreprises acting in Health, Infrastructures and Agriculture. 

_________

► subscribe to the French Newsletter MaFR ComplianceTech®

Full reference: Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (French Banking Regulator), Commission des sanctions (Commission of sanctions), 24th of February 2021, ING Bank France, procedure n°2020-02

Read the decision (in French)

In this decision, the ACPR Sanctions Commission condemns IGN Bank France to a reprimand and a financial penalty of 3 million euros because of the inadequacy of its measures to fight corruption, money laundering and financing of terrorism.

Extract from the decision summarizing ING France's breaches of its Compliance obligations to fight against corruption, money laundering and financing of terrorism:

"At the time of the on-site check, ING France's risk classification was incomplete and ineffective (grievance 1) and its system for monitoring its business relations (complaint 2) and their operations (grievance 4) presented serious deficiencies, as well as its organization and procedures for fund transfers (grievance 3). The updating of customer knowledge was insufficient (grievance 5), as were the detection of PEPs and the implementation of measures due diligence for this category of clientele (grievance 6). For the implementation of its due diligence obligations, numerous shortcomings were noted, whether these were breaches of the obligation to carry out a reinforced examination (grievance 7) or breaches of the obligation to send Tracfin a DS, initial (grievance 8) or additional (grievance 9). Finally, the detection of persons subject to an asset freezing measure was not fully effective (grievance 10) " (our translation of the decision which is only available in French).

Référence complète: Gauvain, R. et Marleix, O., Evaluation de la loi n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique, dite « loi Sapin 2 », Commission des Lois, Assemblée nationale, 16 décembre 2020

Liste des personnalités auditionnées par la mission d'évaluation

Le 20 janvier:

• Françoise Dreyfus, professeure émérite de science politique de l’université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
• Michel Sapin, ancien ministre de l’Économie et des finances

Le 27 janvier: 

• Elsa Pilichowski, directrice de la gouvernance publique à l'OCDE,
• Mathilde Mesnard, directrice adjointe des affaires financières et des entreprises à l'OCDE
• Patrick Moulette, chef de la division de la lutte contre la corruption à l'OCDE
• Julio Bacio Terracino, chef de la division de l’intégrité dans le secteur public à l'OCDE

Le 28 janvier: 

• Éric Alt, vice-président de l’association Anticor
• Patrick Lefas, président de Transparency International France
• William Bourdon, président-fondateur de l’association Sherpa
• Chanez Mensous, chargée de contentieux et plaidoyer au sein du pôle flux financiers illicites chez Sherpa

Le 10 février:

• Fred Einbinder, ancien directeur juridique d’Alstom
• Nathalie Etzenbach-Huguenin, secrétaire générale et membre du comité exécutif de Solocal
• Valérie- Esther Penda, référente éthique chez Solocal 
• Maxime Duclaux, directeur relations institutionnelles, RSE, éthique, risques chez Solocal 

Full reference: Coeurquetin, R., Comparaison mécanique des versions 2017 et 2020 des recommendations de l'Agence Française Anti-corruption sur la cartographie des risques de corruption, October 2020, 9 p. 

Read the mechanical comparison (in French)

To go further on the question of risk mapping, read Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's working papers: Drawing up Risk Maps a an Obligation and the Paradoxe of "Compliance Risks" and Anchor Points of the Risk Mapping in the Legal System

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Interregulation: way of "cooperation protocol"​ between Regulatory Bodies. Example between French Financial Markets Authority and Anticorruption Agency, Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 22nd of September 2020

Read by freely subscribing other news of the Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation

Summary of the news: 

Although Regulation Law was born from the notion "sector", constant interferences between sectors and frequent interactions between some sectors and more general questions common to different sectors, make interregulation necessary. Compliance Law being the extension of Regulation Law, this interregulation mechanism is also necessary in Compliance Law. 

This interregulation can take many legal paths like letters exchanges between regulators, the creation of a network of regulators and supervisors at the world level or about some specific question or the adoption of a "cooperation protocol" as the AMF (French Financial Market Regulator) and the AFA (French Anticorruption Agency) did on 16th of September 2020 to reinforce their respective fight against corruption, against market abuses and for the protection of investors. 

This cooperation protocol between the AFA and the AMF has the following subjects:

• A more efficient methodology concerning the research and the analysis of corruption and market abuses.
• A more efficient prevention of corruption and market abuses.
• A better capacity to give recommendations of new regulations to the Legislator.
• A more rigorous monitoring of international works on the topic. 
• A more coherent information for the public.

Are regulators the new teachers? 

Full reference: Agence Française Anticorruption (French anticorruption agency), Département de l'appui aux acteurs économiques (Support to economic actors department), La politique cadeaux et invitations dans les entreprises, les EPIC, les associations et les fondations (Gifts and invitations policy for firms, public firms, associations and fondations), Guide pratique 2020 (Practical Guide 2020), 11th of September 2020, 14 p.

Read the practical guide in French

► Référence complète : Dreyfuss, S., Remplacer la culture de la corruption par une culture de la compliance : l’Europe prend ses responsabilités pour son propre avenir, Le Grand Continent, août 2020. 

____

📝 Lire l'article. 

Référence complète : Agence Française Anticorruption (AFA), Rapport Annuel 2020 pour 2019. 

Lire le rapport. 

Full reference : Ayed,W., Verdun,F., La fonction conformité anticorruption dans l’organisation selon l’Agence française anticorruption, in La semaine juridique, Entreprises et Affaires, JCP, E, LexisNexis, n°17-18/1206, 25 avril 2019, pp.38-44.

Sciences Po students can read the article via the drive, folder  "MAFR - Régulation - Compliance"

Référence complète : ICC Netherlands, Integrity, A Valuable Proposition, ICC’s International Integrity and Anti-corruption Conference 2018, décembre 2018, La Haye, pp. 1-38.

Lire la brochure ayant servi de base à la conférence prononcée.

► Référence complète : Kaleski, N., Les entreprises face au défi de l’anticorruption. La question de la création de valeur, Institut Friedland, déc. 2018.

____

► Lire l'étude. 

________