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► Référence complète : F. Ancel et M.-A. Frison-Roche, Droit de la compliance, École nationale de la magistrature (ENM) en collaboration avec l'Ecole de Formation du Barreau (EFB), 1 et 2 février 2024, Paris, grand amphithéâtre de l'ENM. - 🌐consulter sur LinkedIn une présentation générale de cette manifestation, renvoyant à une présentation de chaque intervention - ► Présentation de l'enseignement : L'objectif de ce colloque de deux jours est de permettre aux magistrats et aux avocats d'appréhender les enjeux, les objectifs et les méthodes qui définissent le Droit de la Compliance tel qu'il se pratique dans les entreprises. Les intervenants illustreront la judiciarisation croissante, qui s'articule avec difficulté avec la dimension supranationale, voire l'indifférence aux territoires, par exemple lorsque les contentieux portent sur des enjeux systémiques climatiques ou numériques : il en résulte un renouvellement de l’office du juge et du rôle des avocats. Cela est à confronter avec le renouvellement du rôle et du fonctionnement des entreprises elles-mêmes. L'analyse en est faite sous l’angle du droit civil, notamment le droit des contrats et le droit de la responsabilité. Sont également abordés le Droit des sociétés, le Droit répressif, mais aussi la façon dont le système juridique intègre désormais par des techniques de Compliance la gouvernance, la régulation, les enjeux climatiques, numériques et le bon fonctionnement des marchés financiers. - ► Construction de l'enseignement  : Ce colloque se déroule en deux temps. La première journée est conçue comme une présentation des grandes thématiques par lesquelles le Droit de la Compliance traverse les branches du Droit classique. Interviennent donc plutôt des professeurs de Droit qui synthétisent successivement les branches du Droit et mettent en perspective la façon dont les impératifs de Compliance font naître des situations nouvelles, des difficultés nouvelles, des solutions nouvelles. Cela permet à la seconde journée de développer des questions pratiques, des questions d'actualité et de mettre en débat des questions controversées entre des personnes qui sont de sensibilités diverses. Interviennent à ce titre plutôt des magistrats, des membres d'autorités de régulation, des avocats, des membres d'associations, etc. - ► Modalités d'inscription : l'enseignement est ouvert à l'ensemble des magistrats judiciaires et consulaires, ainsi qu'aux avocats. Les inscriptions se font directement auprès de l'Ecole nationale de la magistrature ou auprès de l'EFB. - ► Interviennent :   🎤François Ancel, Conseiller à la Première Chambre civile de la Cour de cassation 🎤Thomas Baudesson, Avocat au Barreau de Paris, associé du cabinet Clifford Chance 🎤Guillaume Beaussonie, Professeur à l’Université Toulouse 1 Capitole 🎤Jacques Boulard, Premier Président de la Cour d’appel de Paris 🎤Marie Caffin-Moi, Professeure à l’Université Paris Panthéon-Assas 🎤Malik Chapuis, Juge au Tribunal judiciaire de Paris 🎤Lucie Chatelain, Responsable contentieux et plaidoyer, association SHERPA 🎤Jean-Benoît Devauges, Directeur Juridique, Ethique et Gouvernance des entreprises, MEDEF 🎤Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Professeure de Droit de la régulation et de la Compliance, Directrice du Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) 🎤Arnaud Gossement, Avocat au Barreau de Paris, associé du cabinet Gossement Avocats 🎤Thibault Goujon-Bethan, Professeur à l’Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3  🎤Christophe Ingrain, Avocat au Barreau de Paris, associé du cabinet Darrois Villey Maillot Brochier 🎤Isabelle Jegouzo, Directrice de l’AFA 🎤Anne-Valérie Le Fur, Professeure à l’Université Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines 🎤Charlotte Michon, Avocate au barreau de Paris, associée du cabinet Charlotte Michon Avocat 🎤Jean-Baptiste Racine, Professeur à l’Université Paris Panthéon-Assas 🎤 Jean-Christophe Roda, Professeur à l’Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3 🎤Jérôme Simon, 1er Vice-Procureur Financier - 🧮lire ci-dessous le programme construit et organisé par François Ancel et Marie-Anne Frison-Roche ainsi que des comptes-rendus de chaque intervention⤵️ - 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur Instagram 🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Droit de la compliance : tour d'horizon », in F. Ancel et M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), Droit de la compliance, École nationale de la magistrature (ENM) et École de Formation professionnelle des Barreaux du ressort de la cour d'appel de Paris (EFB), Paris, 1er février 2024 - 🧮consulter le programme complet de cette manifestation - 🌐consulter sur LinkedIn une présentation générale de cette manifestation, renvoyant aux comptes-rendus de chaque intervention - 🧱consulter la fiche de direction scientifique de cette manifestation, rendant compte des différentes interventions - 🔲consulter les slides servant de support à l'intervention - 🎤consulter une présentation de la  conférence "Compliance et Responsabilité civile : comprendre et raison garder", prononcée dans le même colloque - ► Présentation de la conférence : Le Droit de la compliance est mystérieux en soi, parce qu'il constitue une branche du Droit encore en formation¹🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Naissance d'une branche du Droit : le Droit de la Compliance, à paraître., qu'on sent sa présence et sa puissance mais qu'on le cerne avec difficulté. Il le faut pourtant car il se saisit des faits les plus importants, voire les plus dramatiques et porte en lui les ambitions les plus grandes. Les magistrats et les avocats doivent eux- aussi « faire l'effort » de participer à « l'aventure du Droit de la Compliance », parce que celui-ci atteint, voire bouleverse l'ensemble des matières, et parce que Procureur, Juge et avocat y jouent un rôle grandissant²🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, 2023.. Parce que cette conférence a pour fonction d'introduire les deux journées d'un colloque conçu pour les magistrats et les avocats, elle se contente de faire ici un « tour d'horizon », afin que l'on puisse ne pas se perdre dans toutes ces réglementations changeantes, multiples et tentaculaires, des dispositifs à portée mondiale, des ambitions politiques qui imprègnent cette branche du Droit nouvelle. C'est pourquoi, sans entrer dans aucun des sujets, il s'agit d'ouvrir 4 façons d'entrer dans ce qui constitue une branche du Droit en train de naître sous nos yeux : 1. Saisir le Droit de la Compliance par les « réglementations » 2. Saisir le Droit de la Compliance par les « outils »³🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕Les outils de la Compliance, 2020. 3. Saisir le Droit de la Compliance par les « méthodes » 4. Saisir le Droit de la Compliance par les « buts »⁴🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022.   Les 4 voies d'accès sont légitimes car les 4 dimensions s'articulent dans le droit positif. Mais plus le Droit positif se consolide et plus c'est la normativité par les buts qui apparaît. Cette normativité par les buts permet alors de distinguer le Droit de la Compliance du mécanisme de « conformité » aux réglementations, qui est un outil des systèmes de compliance, mais qui n'est que cela. Cette perspective téléologique donne aux règles la normativité, voire l'unicité et la simplicité sans laquelle l'ensemble n'est pas humainement maîtrisable. Les buts sont communs à tous les branches du Droit concernés (contrat, responsabilité, pénal, procédure, société, travail, environnement, international) et rend aussi la Compliance humaniste, la « conformité » n'étant que de l'obéissance. Ces Buts sont monumentaux et l'Europe les porte plus et mieux que les autres zones du monde⁵🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019.. - 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur Instagram 🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Compliance et Responsabilité civile : comprendre et raison garder », in F. Ancel et M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), Droit de la compliance, École nationale de la magistrature (ENM), en collaboration avec l'École de Formation professionnelle des Barreaux du ressort de la cour d'appel de Paris (EFB), Paris, 1er février 2024 - 🧮consulter le programme complet de cette manifestation - 🌐consulter sur LinkedIn une présentation générale de cette manifestation, renvoyant aux comptes-rendus de chaque intervention - 🧱consulter la fiche de direction scientifique de cette manifestation, rendant compte des différentes interventions - 🔲consulter les slides servant de support à l'intervention - 📝Cette conférence et le document de travail qui en est la base sont à corréler à l'article à paraître dans l'ouvrage 📕L'obligation de Compliance  - 🎤consulter une présentation de la conférence "Droit de la Compliance : tour d'horizon", prononcée dans le même colloque - ► Présentation de la conférence : Il est difficile, voire artificiel, de séparer la présentation du rapport entre le Droit de la Compliance et la Responsabilité civile de la considération qu'occupent dans la Compliance la Responsabilité pénale, les sanctions, et toute l'organisation contractuelle. Mais, ne serait-ce que pour des contraintes de temps, il en sera fait ainsi. La méthode choisie consiste à partir de décisions rendues soit au titre du Droit de la Compliance, branche du Droit en émergence dont il a été fait un "tour d'horizon"📎¹🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🎤Droit de la Compliance : tour d'horizon, 2024., soit au titre des Droits spéciaux de la responsabilité, comme le Droit des sociétés (mais là aussi le champ d'analyse est immense), soit au titre du Droit commun de la responsabilité civile. C'est souvent celui-ci qui est privilégié.  Il apparaît toujours que Responsabilité civile et Droit de la compliance sont à la fois intimes et ont des rapports difficiles. Pour les comprendre, avant de partir dans des croisades dans un sens ou dans un autres, il faut techniquement voir ce qu'il en est des responsabilités attachées à l'application des « réglementations de compliance » qui s'imposent à des opérateurs économiques, lesquels contractualisent les obligations légales qui en résultent et dont les tiers peuvent également se prévaloir de manquements au titre de la responsabilité civile. C'est le  premier temps de l'analyse. L'on cite beaucoup la technique de Vigilance. Même si celle-ci est la pointe avancée de la Compliance, il faut aussi regarder ce qu'il en est du RGPD, de Sapin 2, de l'Anticorruption, etc.  Or, la responsabilité civile n'est pas la même selon que l'obligation, légale ou/et contractuelle, par rapport à laquelle elle s'articule au titre du fait générateur, engendre selon les cas, selon les textes et selon les personnes, une obligation dite de moyens ou une obligation de résultat. Il faut donc se garder de propos trop généraux en la matière et s'il est un principe à garder à l'esprit, notamment à l'esprit du Juge, c'est que, sauf à ce qu'un texte ou une clause en dispose autrement, une obligation est une obligation de moyens. Cette question essentielle renvoie à la nécessité de mieux cerner ce qu'est l'« obligation de compliance », qui consiste à prévenir et à détecter, l'opérateur économique faisant ses « meilleurs efforts » au regard des buts monumentaux dans lesquels les diverses réglementations (trouvant ainsi leur unité) s'ancrent normativement. La dimension probatoire Ex Ante apparaît alors au premier plan. Dans un  deuxième temps de l'analyse, continuant à prendre appui sur des décisions de justice, il convient de mesurer les « points de contact » entre ces « responsabilités spéciales de compliance » et le Droit commun de la responsabilité civile. En effet, parce qu'il s'agit d'un mouvement profond qui traverse l'ensemble du système juridique exprimant une demande sociale qui distingue le Droit occidental du reste du monde, le Droit commun de la responsabilité porte depuis longtemps une dimension préventive et vise d'une façon différente des opérateurs en raison non seulement de leur puissance, mais encore de leur « mission ». Cela ressort expressément de la jurisprudence, ces points de contact ne justifiant pas que l'on oppose les deux branches. Cela ne serait que si l'on confondait le Droit de la Compliance avec son instrument qu'est la « conformité » et si l'on inventait des principes nouveaux dans un Droit commun que des heurts pourraient advenir. Précisément et dans un  troisième temps de l'analyse, pouvant venir aux principes aujourd'hui en jeu, il convient de rappeler que tandis qu'il n'existe pas une obligation générale de compliance dans le Droit commun impliquant de détecter et de prévenir pour soi-même et pour autrui tout manquement à toute réglementation applicable susceptible de nuire à autrui, il existe un principe de liberté, comme le rappelle régulièrement le Conseil constitutionnel. Sauf à changer de système juridique pour ne plus faire des personnes que des assujettis obéissant à toute réglementation et le donnant à voir, le juge n'ayant plus pour rôle que de le punir pour ne pas l'avoir fait. En effet , le principe de Liberté demeure le socle et du Droit commun de la responsabilité (et non de la répression, comme en droit chinois) et du Droit spécial de la compliance (et non de la conformité, comme en droit chinois). Il apparaît en conclusion que par l'évolution de la Responsabilité civile, notamment du fait de l'esprit d'un Droit de la Compliance qui s'y articule, l'on observe un double mouvement : le mouvement d'une responsabilité Ex Post vers une responsabilité Ex Ante📎²🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝La responsabilité Ex Ante, 2022 ; 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝La responsabilité ex ante, pilier du droit de la compliance, 2022, et le mouvement d'une Responsabilité vers une Responsabilisation. Pour accompagner ce mouvement, des alliances se nouer et doivent être favoriser, ce qui met le Droit de la Compliance face au Droit de la Concurrence, alliances souvent noués par contrat et pour lesquelles l'office du juge est renouvelé, notamment à travers les techniques de médiation. - 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur Instagram 🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

► Référence complète : M. de Pinieux, « L’enrichissement injustifié et la réparation des atteintes aux droits humains causées par l’entreprise mondialisée : perspectives d’Outre-Manche », RLDA, n° 200, février 2024, pp. 30-33 - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteure) : "L’arrêt Limbu v. Dyson Technology Ltd, en date du 19 octobre 2023, bien que décevant au regard de la solution retenue par le juge anglais, n’en demeure pas moins intéressant à bien des égards. Tout d’abord, il interroge la possibilité de recourir à l’enrichissement injustifié dans le contentieux des entreprises et des droits humains. Il permet ensuite de révéler certains effets pernicieux du Brexit, tout particulièrement le retour du forum non conveniens et la possibilité qui en découle pour les juridictions anglaises de ne pas traiter ce type de litige. Il invite enfin à apprécier l’efficacité des outils permettant de faire face au travail forcé au sein de l’entreprise mondialisée.". - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, 464 p. - 📕Parallèlement, un ouvrage en français, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, est publié dans la collection coéditée par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz.  - 🧮Cet ouvrage vient à la suite d'un cycle de colloques 2021 organisés par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et des Universités qui lui sont partenaires. - ► Présentation générale de l'ouvrage : Sanctions, controls, appeals, deals: judges and lawyers are everywhere in the Compliance mechanisms, creating unprecedented situations, sometimes without a solution yet available. Even though Compliance was designed to avoid the judge and produce security by avoiding conflict. This jurisdictionalisation is therefore new. Forcing companies to prosecute and judge, a constrained role, perhaps against their nature. Leading to the adaptation of major procedural principles, with difficulty. Confronting arbitration with new perspectives. Putting the judge at heart, in mechanisms designed so that he is not there. How in practice to organize these opposites and anticipate the solutions? This is the challenge taken up by this book. - Ce volume s'insère dans la ligne des ouvrages qui, dans cette collection en langue anglaise, sont consacrés à la Compliance. 📚Lire la présentation des autres ouvrages de la Collection portant sur la Compliance : les ouvrages suivants : 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2024  les ouvrages précédents : 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021 - ► Résumé de l'ouvrage : There have always been Judges and Lawyers in Compliance Law, in particular because this branch of Law is an extension of Regulatory Law in which they have a core place. This results from the fact that the decisions taken in respect of Compliance are contestable in Court, including Arbitration, those issued by the Company, such as those of States or Authorities, the Judge in turn becoming what Compliance Law is effective. The novelty lies more in the phenomenon of « jurisdictionalisation », that is to say that the trial model penetrates all Compliance Law, and not only the Ex Post part that it includes. Moreover, it seems that this jurisdictionalisation influences the non-legal dimension of Compliance. This movement has effects that must be measured and causes that must be understood. Advantages and disadvantages that must be balanced. If only to form an opinion vis-à-vis Companies that have become Prosecutors and Judges of themselves and others… : encourage this « Jurisdictionalisation of Compliance », fight it, perhaps influence it? In any case, understand it! - 🏗️Construction générale de l'ouvrage : The book opens with a double Introduction. The first, which is freely accessible, consists of a summary of the book, while the second, which is substantial, deals with the need to bring the Judge and the Lawyer into line if Compliance Law is to be the hallmark of States governed by the Rule of Law. The first Chapter is devoted to what is specific to Compliance Law: the transformation of companies into Prosecutors and Judges of themselves, and even of others.   The second Chapter examines the interference between General Procedural Law and Compliance techniques. The third Chapter measures the influence of the reasoning and requirements of Compliance Law in methods of dispute resolution where it has not, with a few exceptions, been present, but where it has a great future: arbitration.  Because trials and judgements are indissociable, because legal techniques and the Rule of Law must not be dissociated, and because Compliance techniques could paradoxically be the weapon used to dissociate them, because the power to judge and the procedures surrounding it must not be dissociated, because Compliance and the Rule of Law must therefore be conceived and practised together, the rise in power of one being a sign of the rise in power of the other, and not the price of the weakening of the Rule of Law, the fourth Chapter deals with the role of the Judge in Compliance. - ► Appréhender l'ouvrage à travers la table des matières ci-dessous et les résumés de chacun des articles :    DOUBLE INTRODUCTION 🕴️​M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Main Aspects of the book Compliance Jurisdictionalisation 🕴️​M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Reinforce the Judge and the Lawyer to impose Compliance Law as a characteristic of the Rule of Law    I. THE COMPANY ESTABLISHED PROSECUTOR AND JUDGE OF ITSELF BY COMPLIANCE LAW 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝The « Judge-Judged ». Articulating Words and Things in the face of Conflicts of Interest 🕴️C. Granier, 📝Reflections on the existence of companies’ jurisprudence through Compliance matters 🕴️L.-M. Augagneur, 📝The jurisdictionalisation of reputation by platforms 🕴️A. Bruneau, 📝The compagny judges itself: the Compliance function in the bank 🕴️J.-M. Coulon, 📝Compliance law in the construction industry and the contradictions, impossibilities and deadlocks that companies face 🕴️Ch. Lapp, 📝Compliance in companies: the statues of process 🕴️J. Heymann, 📝The Legal Nature of the Facebook « Supreme Court » 🕴️D. Latour, 📝Internal investigations within companies 🕴️A. Bavitot, 📝Shaping the company through negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements. French perspective 🕴️S. Merabet, 📝Vigilance, being a judge and not judge   II. PROCEDURAL LAW IN COMPLIANCE LAW 🕴️​N. Cayrol, 📝Procedural Principles in Compliance Law 🕴️F. Ancel, 📝Compliance Law, a new guiding principle for the Trial? 🕴️B. Sillaman, 📝Taking the Compliance U.S. Procedural Experience globally 🕴️A. Linden, 📝Motivation and publicity of the decisions of the Restricted formation of the French Personal Data Protection Authority (Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés – CNIL) in a compliance perspective 🕴️S. Scemla, & 🕴️D. Paillot, 📝The difficulty for Compliance Enforcement Authorities to comprehend the Rights of the Defence in compliance matters 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Adjusting General Procedural Law to Compliance Law by the nature of things   III. ARTICULATION BETWEEN COMPLIANCE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 🕴️J.-B. Racine, 📝Compliance and arbitration. An attempt at problematisation 🕴️E. Silva-Romero & 🕴️R. Legru, 📝What place is there for compliance in investment arbitration? 🕴️​M. Audit, 📝The arbitrator's position on compliance 🕴️E. Kleiman, 📝The objectives of compliance confronted with the actors of arbitration   IV. THE JUDGE IN COMPLIANCE LAW 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝The Judge, the Compliance Obligation and the Company. The Compliance Evidence System 🕴️J. Morel-Maroger, 📝The application of compliance standards by European Union judges  🕴️S. Schiller, 📝A single judge in the event of an international breach of compliance obligations? 🕴️O. Douvreleur, 📝Compliance and Judge of the Law 🕴️F. Raynaud, 📝The Administrative Judge and Compliance 🕴️E. Wennerström, 📝Some Reflections on Compliance and the European Court of Human Rights - 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur Instagram 🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "The « Judge-Judged ». Articulating Words and Things in the face of Conflicts of Interest", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 69-93 - 📝lire l'article (en anglais) - 🚧lire le document de travail bilingue sur la base duquel cet article a été élaboré, doté de développements supplémentaires, de références techniques et de liens hypertexte   📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article  (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : Since the topic of this article is part of a chapter devoted to the Company established as Prosecutor and Judge of itself by Compliance Law, chapter aiming to use the relevant qualifications, it is appropriate therefore to worry about the adjustment of words and things, of the way in which the relationship between ones and the others evolve, and of the more particular question of knowing if this evolution is radical or not when one speaks of « judge ». because « judging » is a word that the Law has disputed with other disciplines, but that it has appropriated not so much to confer more powers on those who act in its name, for example that who supervise and punish, but on the contrary to impose limits, since to the one who judges it has put the chains of the procedure under foot, thus making bearable for the other the exercise of such a power. This is why those who want the power to judge would often want to not have the title, because having de jure the title of judge is being subject to the correlated regime, it is to be submitted to procedural correctness. It is therefore to better limit that the Law sees who judges, for obliging this so-powerful character to the procedure. But the Law also has the power to appoint a judge and to fix the contours of all the characters in the trial. He usually does it with clarity, distinguishing the ones of the others, not confusing them. This art of distinction has constitutional value. Thus, not only the one who judges must be named « judge » but the procedural apparatus which goes with this character and which constitutes a way of doing things and fundamental rights, are not « granted » by kindness or in a second step: it is a block. If you didn't want to have to endure procedural rights, you didn't have to want to be a judge. Admittedly, one could conclude that the procedure would therefore have become « substantial »; by this elevation, it is rather a fashion of saying that the procedure would no longer be a « servant »: it is a kind of declaration of love for the procedure, as long as one affirms that at the acts of judging , or investigating, or prosecuting, are « naturally » attached the procedural rights for the one who is likely to be the object of these powers. Compliance Law, in search of allies to achieve the Monumental Goals for the aims of which it was instituted, will require, or even demand, private companies to go and seek themselves, in particular through investigations. internal or active vigilance on others, for finding facts likely to be reproached to them. Compliance Law will also require that they prosecute those who have committed these acts. Compliance La will again demand that they sanction the acts that people have committed in their name. This is clearly understood from the point of view of Ex Ante efficiency. The confusion of roles is often very efficient since it is synonymous with the accumulation of powers. For example, it is more efficient that the one who pursues is also the one who instructs and judges, since he knows the case so well… Besides, it is more efficient that he also elaborates the rules, so he knows better than anyone the « spirit » of the texts. This was often emphasized in Regulatory Law. When everything is Information and risk management, that would be necessary … But all this is not obvious. For two reasons, one external and the other internal. Externally, the first reason is that it is not appropriate to « name » a judge who is not. This would be too easy, because it would then be enough to designate anyone, or even to do it oneself to appropriate the regime that goes with it, in particular for obtain a so-called legitimate power for obtaining that others obey even though they are not subordinate or from them they transmit information, even though they would be  competitors: it would then be necessary to remember that only the Law is able to appoint judge ; in this new Compliance era, companies would be judges, prosecutors, investigators!  Maybe, if the Law says it, but if it didn't, it would be necessary to come back to this tautology … But are we in such a radicalism? Moreover, do judges have « the prerogative » of judgment and the Law has not admitted this power for companies to judge for a long time? As soon as the procedure is there in Ex Ante and the control of the judge in Ex Post? The second reason, internal to the company, situation on which the article focuses, is that the company investigates itself, judges itself, sanctions itself. However, the legal person expressing its will only through its organs, we underline in practice the difficulties for the same human being to formulate grievances, as he/she is the agent of the legal person, adressed to the natural person that he/she himself/herself is. The two interests of the two are not the same, are often opposed; how the secrets of one can be kept with respect to the other, represented by the same individual? … It is all the mystery, even the artifice of legal personality that appears and we understand better that Compliance Law no longer wants to use this strange classical notion. Because all the rules of procedure cannot mask that to prosecute oneself does not make more sense than to contract with oneself. This conflict of interest is impossible to resolve because naming the same individual X then naming him/her Y, by declaring open the dispute between them does not make sense. This dualism, which is impossible to admit when it comes to playing these functions with regard to corporate officers, can come back to life by setting up third parties who will carry secrets and oppositions. For example by the designation of two separate lawyers for the human being agent and the human being representative of the legal person, each lawyer being able to have secrets for each other and to oppose each other. These spaces of reconstitution of the so « natural » oppositions in procedure between the one who judges and the one who is judged can also take the technological form of platforms: where there is no longer anyone, where the process has replaced the procedure, there is no longer any human judgment. We can thus see that the fear of conflicts of interest is so strong that we resign ourselves to saying that only the machine would be « impartial », a derisory conception of impartiality, against which it is advisable to fight. This then leads to a final question: can the company claim to exercise the jurisdictional power to prosecute and judge and investigate without even claiming to be a prosecutor, an investigating judge, or a court? The company's advantage would be to be able to escape the legal regime that classical Law attaches to its words, mainly the rights of the defense and the rights of action for others, the principle of publicity of justice for everyone, which expresses the link between procedure and democracy . When Facebook said on June 12, 2021 « react » to the decision of May 5, 2021 adopted by what would only be an Oversight Board to decide « as a consequence » of a 2-year suspension of Donald Trump's account, the art of qualifications seem to be used in order to avoid any regime constraint. But this art of euphemism is very old. Thus the States, when they wanted to increase repression, presented the transformation of the system as a softening of it through the « decriminalization » of Economic Law, transferred from the criminal courts to the independent administrative agencies. The efficiency was greatly increased, since the guarantees of the Criminal Procedure ceased to apply. But 20 years later, Words found their way back to Things: under Criminal Law, slept the « criminal matter », which requires the same « Impartiality ». In 1996, a judge once affirmed it and everything was changed. Let us therefore wait for what the Courts will say, since they are the masters of qualifications, as Article 12 of the French Code of Civil Procedure says, as Motulsky wrote it in 1972. Law has time. - 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur Instagram 🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

► Reference complète : C. Granier, « Reflections on the existence of companies’ jurisprudence through Compliance matters », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 95-107 - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteure) : Because Compliance shakes up established frameworks, Compliance forces to look at certain concepts in a new light, which until then seemed to be well tamed. This is particularly the case with the notion of « Jurisprudence ». Recent developments in Compliance indeed raise questions about the possible existence of « jurisprudence » (case law) that would be produced by companies during the implementation of compliance procedures. At first glance, the concept of « business jurisprudence » may appear unnatural because case law is traditionally understood as the fruit of the office of the Judge and, more particularly, of the State Judge. However, the observation that the company can position itself as a Judge with regard to itself and others in the context of the implementation of Compliance legitimately raises the question of the possibility for the latter. to produce case law. The example of Facebook's supervisory board and the first decisions rendered by this body increases the legitimacy of this crucial question. Thinking about the concept of « Jurisprudence of companies » implies to compare the process of emergence of the case law standard emanating from the Judge with the process of emergence of a « Jurisprudence » that would be produced by companies during their « jurisdictional functions ». On the material level, an analogy between State case law and company case law seems conceivable. It then remains to overcome an obstacle of an organic nature: can an institution other than the judge be understood as producing case law? In view of contemporary developments in Law and the practical interest that exists in designing business case law, it seems appropriate to adopt a broader view of case law, which is detached from the traditional organic criterion. It therefore seems that it is possible but above all that it is necessary to think about the concept of « business case law » in order to highlight a new facet of the normative power of companies in the context of compliance, in particular with a view to its supervision. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Réference complète : L.-M. Augagneur, « The jurisdictionalisation of reputation by platforms », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 109-125  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : The large platforms are in the position of arbiter of the reputation economy (referencing, notoriety) in which they themselves act. Although the stakes are usually low on a unit basis, the jurisdiction of reputation represents significant aggregate stakes. Platforms are thus led to detect and assess reputation manipulations (by users: SEO, fake reviews, fake followers; or by the platforms themselves as highlighted by the Google Shopping decision issued by the European Commission in 2017) that are implemented on a large scale with algorithmic tools. The identification and treatment of manipulations is itself only possible by means of artificial intelligence tools. Google thus proceeds with an automated downgrading mechanism for sites that do not follow its guidelines, with the possibility of requesting a review through a very summary procedure entirely conducted by an algorithm. Tripadvisor, on the other hand, uses an algorithm to detect false reviews based on « fraud modeling to identify electronic patterns that cannot be detected by the human eye ». It only conducts a human investigation in limited cases. This jurisdictionality of reputation has little in common with that defined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (legal origin, contradictory procedure, independence, application of the Rules of Law). It is characterized, on the one hand, by the absence of transparency of the rules and even of the existence of rules stated in predicative form and applied by deductive reasoning. It is replaced by an inductive probabilistic model by the identification of abnormal behaviors in relation to centroids. This approach of course raises the issue of statistical bias. More fundamentally, it reflects a transition from Rule of Law, not so much to « Code is Law » (Laurence Lessig), but to « Data is Law », that is, to a governance of numbers (rather than « by » numbers). It also comes back to a form of collective jurisdictionality, since the sanction comes from a computational apprehension of the phenomena of the multitude and not from an individual appreciation. Finally, it appears particularly consubstantial with compliance, since it is based on a teleological approach (the search for a finality rather than the application of principles). On the other hand, this jurisdictionality is characterized by man-machine cooperation, whether in the decision-making process (which poses the problem of automaticity bias) or in the contradictory procedure (which poses, in particular, the problems of discussion with the machine and the explicability of the machine response). Until now, the supervision of these processes has been based essentially on the mechanisms of transparency, a limited adversarial requirement and the accessibility of appeal channels. The French Law Loi pour une République Numérique (« Law  for a Digital Republic »), the European Legislation Platform-to-Business Regulation and the Omnibus Directive, have thus set requirements on the ranking criteria on platforms. The Omnibus Directive also requires that professionals guarantee that reviews come from consumers through reasonable and proportionate measures. As for the European Digital Services Act, it provides for transparency on content moderation rules, procedures and algorithms. But this transparency is often a sham. In the same way and for the moment the requirements of sufficient human intervention and adversarial processes appear very limited in the draft text. The most efficient forms of this jurisdictionality ultimately emerge from the role played by third parties in a form of participatory dispute resolution. Thus, for example, FakeSpot detects false Tripadvisor reviews, Sistrix establishes a ranking index that helped establish the manipulation of Google's algorithm in the Google Shopping case by detecting artifacts based on algorithm changes. Moreover, the draft Digital Services Act envisages recognizing a specific status for trusted flaggers who identify illegal content on platforms. This singular jurisdictional configuration (judge and party platform, massive situations, algorithmic systems for handling manipulations) thus leads us to reconsider the grammar of the jurisdictional process and its characteristics. If Law is a language (Alain Sériaux), it offers a new grammatical form that would be that of the middle way (mesotès) described by Benevéniste. Between the active and the passive way, there is a way in which the subject carries out an action in which he includes himself. Now, it is the very nature of this jurisdictionality of compliance to make laws by including oneself in them (nomos tithestai). In this respect, the irruption of artificial intelligence in this jurisdictional treatment undoubtedly bears witness to the renewal of the language of Law. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : E. Kleiman, « The objectives of compliance confronted with the actors of arbitration », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 335-355.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : International arbitration, which remains the preferred method for the resolution of disputes arising from international commercial relations, has been overtaken by compliance, the manifestations of which are everywhere: arbitral institutions, arbitrators and courts exercising curial supervision of the international regularity of awards are regularly called upon to take into account rules of compliance. Compliance has undeniably got a hold on the arbitration community.  Being operators in an unregulated activity, arbitral institutions and arbitrators must generate trust; their ability to effectively self-regulate is a prerequisite for the success of arbitration and requires transparency and exemplarity.  This self-imposed compliance is nowadays consubstantial to arbitration and is illustrated in such classic fields as prevention of conflicts of interest and control of arbitrators' availability, but also in the more recent domains of parity and diversity as well as reduction of the carbon footprint.  Moreover, compliance has caught up with the ex post control of the international regularity of arbitral awards in matters involving allegations of corruption and money laundering.  There is room for debate, particularly in France, because of the porosity of the boundaries between the methods that are specific to those mandatory rules of compliance that intend to prevent the most serious offences, and the methods that are specific to the establishment of the constituent elements of such crimes before criminal courts.  This is an important issue, especially as the increasingly imperative nature of climate change and human rights regulations will extend the scope of these overlaps between compliance methods and the control of arbitral awards. Arbitration is also taking over compliance.  Arbitrators are called upon to rule on controversies arising from economic activities that are related to compliance: contracts relating to the implementation of preventive measures in the fields of anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and human rights as well as transactions relating to the reduction of the carbon footprint and climate change, etc.  Moreover, compliance is also an arbitrable matter and arbitrators must apply or take into consideration the observance or disregard of rules of compliance when adjudicating commercial or investment disputes. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : A. Bavitot, « Shaping the Company through Negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements. French Perspective », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 203-215 - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : Negotiated justice is "the situation in which the criminal conflict is the object of a trade in the etymological sense of the term negotio, i.e. a debate between the parties to reach an agreement". Thus, the French legislator has succumbed to globalized mimicry by creating the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public (Public Interest Judicial Agreement), first in matters of probity and then in environmental matters. What is the nature of this deal of justice? Validated by a judge's order, it does not entail any declaration of guilt, has neither the nature nor the effects of a judgment of conviction and is not registered in the judicial record. Possible at the investigation stage as well as at the pre-trial stage, the Public Interest Judicial Agreement is original in that it makes it possible to avoid either the prosecutor's proceedings or the judge's wrath. A detailed study of the agreements signed shows that in order to negotiate in the best possible way, the company can and must shape itself. The company will shape the facts of its agreement, shape its charge and, finally, shape its sentence. The article offers a concrete analysis of these three dimensions of corporate shaping to better approach understanding the legal nature of negotiated criminal justice agreements. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : J.-M. Coulon, « Compliance law in the construction industry and the contradictions, impossibilities and deadlocks that companies face », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 147-154  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law, co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. During this colloquium, the intervention was shared with Christophe Lapp, who is also a contributor in the book (see the summary of the Christophe Lapp's Article). In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to:  L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law ). - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : The construction industry is not a regulated sector. Its market is made up of a superposition of territorial strata which are all relevant markets, to which corresponds a specific microcosm of companies. Finally, the temporary association between companies for the purposes of carrying out a project or a work is consubstantial with this sector. The penetration of Compliance in this sector is inevitably very heterogeneous and results from both exogenous factors (other partners within temporary associations, influence of economic operators from other sectors of activity, capital providers and lenders, incitations from professional organizations) the endogenous (submission to a Financial Regulatory Authority because the company is listed ; application of the laws on duty of vigilance, and French Law called « Sapin 2 »). For example, subject to all these factors combined, the Bouygues group is particularly sensitive to compliance. Not only internal « legislator », the Bouygues group finds itself in turn « prosecutor and judge » both of itself and of others. Indeed, leading an investigation, filing a complaint, triggering an ethics alert, making use of the leniency program, this group is, however, no other than a sort of assistant for the Prosecutor. In addition, scrutinizing its stakeholders, sanctioning its employees, resorting to a Convention Judiciaire d'intérêt public (judicial agreement in the public interest) or negotiating its sanction within the framework of a procedure instituted by a multilateral bank, it fulfills the function of a judge. Legislator, prosecutor, judge, the Bouygues group is faced with a paradox, in a way encouraged to exercise “sovereignty”, yet it does not benefit from the attributes attached to it or from the unwavering support of the competent Public Authorities. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : Ch. Lapp, « Compliance in Companies: The Statutes of the Process », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 155-166  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law) , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. During this colloquium, the intervention was shared with Jan-Marc Coulon, who is also a contributor in the book (see the summary of the Jean-Marc Coulon's  Article). In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to:  L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law). - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : The Company is caught in the grip of Compliance Law, the jaws of which are those of Incitement (1) and Sanction that the Company must apply to ensure the effectiveness of its processes to which it is itself subject (2 ). First, the Company has been delegated to fabricate reprehensible rules that it must apply to itself and to third parties with whom it has dealings. To this end, the Company sets up « processes », that is to say verification and prevention procedures, in order to show that the offenses that it is likely to commit will not happened. These processes constitute standards of behavior to prevent and avoid that the facts constituting the infringements are not themselves carried out. They are thus one of the elements of Civil Liability Law in its preventive or restorative purposes. Second, the sanction of non obedience of Compliance processes puts the Company in front of two pitfalls. The first  dimension place the company, with regard to its employees and its partners, in the obligation to define processes which also constitute the quasi-jurisdictional resolution of their non-compliance, the company having to reconcile the sanction it pronounces with the fundamental principles of classical Criminal Law, constitutional principles and all fundamental rights. The processes then become the procedural rule. The second dimension is that the Company is accountable for the effectiveness of the avoidance by its processes of facts constituting infringements. By a reversal of the burden of proof, the Company is then required to prove that its processes are efficient. at least equivalent to the measures defined by laws and regulations, the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence Française Anticorruption – AFA), European directives and various communications on legal tools to fight breaches of probity, environmental attacks and current societal concerns. The processes then become the constitutive element, per se, of the infringement. Thus, in its search for a balance between Prevention and Sanction to which it is itself subject, the Company will not then be tempted to favor the orthodoxy of its processes over the expectations of the Agence Française Anticorruption – AFA, regulators and judges, to the detriment of their efficiency? In doing so, are we not moving towards an instrumental and conformist Compliance, paradoxically disempowering with regard to the Compliance Monumental Goals of Compliance? - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète: J. Heymann, « The Legal Nature of the Facebook “Supreme Court” », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 167-182 - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Le résumé ci-dessous décrit un article qui fait suite au colloque L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance, coorganisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et la Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. Ce colloque a été conçu sous la direction scientifique de Marie-Anne Frison-Roche et Jean-Christophe Roda et s'est déroulé à Lyon le 23 juin 2021. Dans l'ouvrage, l'article sera publié dans le Titre I, consacré à  L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance. - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : Taking place in the general theme aiming at making “words and things coincide”, the article offers some thoughts on the “conditions of the discourse” – in the sense in which Foucault understood it in his Archéologie des sciences humaines – relating to the phenomenon of “jurisdictionalization” of Compliance. The thoughts are more specifically focusing on the nature of the so-called “Supreme Court” that Facebook instituted to hear appeals of decisions relating to content on the digital social networks that are Facebook and Instagram. Is this really a “Supreme Court”, designed in order to “judge” the Facebook Group? A careful examination of the Oversight Board – i.e. the so-called “Supreme Court” created by Facebook – reveals that the latter, in addition to its advisory mission (which consists of issuing policy advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies), exercises some form of adjudicative function. This is essentially conceived in terms of compliance assessment, of the content published on the social networks Facebook or Instagram with the standards issued by these corporations on the one hand, of content enforcement decisions taken by Facebook with the Law on the other hand. The legal framework of reference is yet rather vague, although its substantial content seems to be per se evolutive, based on the geographical realm where the case to be reviewed is located. An adjudicative function can therefore be characterized, even if the Oversight Board can only claim for a limited one. The author can ultimately identify the Oversight Board as a preventive dispute settlement body, in the sense that it seems to aim at avoiding any referral to state courts and ruling before any court’s judgement can be delivered. Some questions are thus to be raised, relating with both legitimacy and authority of such a Board. But whatever the answers will be, the fact remains that the creation of the Oversight Board by a private law company already reveals all the liveliness of contemporary legal pluralism. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Reinforce the Judge and the Lawyer to impose Compliance Law as a characteristic of the Rule of Law », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 39-65 - 📝lire l'article (en anglais) - 🚧lire le document de travail bilingue sur la base duquel cet article a été élaboré, doté de développements supplémentaires, de références techniques et de liens hypertextes -   📘lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Cet article constitue l'introduction du livre.   ► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance) : One can understand that the compliance mechanisms are presented with hostility because they seem designed to keep the judge away, whereas there is no Rule of Law without a judge. Solid arguments present compliance techniques as converging towards the uselessness of the judge (I). Certainly, we come across magistrates, and of all kinds, and powerful ones, but that would be a sign of imperfection: its ex-ante logic has been deployed in all its effectiveness, the judge would no longer be required… And the lawyer would disappear so with him… This perspective of a world without a judge, without a lawyer and ultimately without Law, where algorithms could organize through multiple processes in Ex Ante the obedience of everyone, the « conformity » of all our behaviors with all the regulatory mass that is applicable to us, supposes that this new branch of Law would be defined as the concentration of processes which gives full effectiveness to all the rules, regardless of their content. But supposing that this engineer's dream is even achievable, it is not possible in a democratic and free world to do without judges and lawyers. Therefore, it is imperative to recognize their contributions to Compliance Law, related and invaluable contributions (II). First of all, because a pure Ex Ante never existed and even in the time of the Chinese legists¹ L’empire chinois n’a semble-t-il jamais apprécié les juges, ne leur faisant place que sous la forme de serviteurs purs de l’Etat, qu’ils soient des enquêteurs, des punisseurs et de gardiens de l’ordre public. Sur cet aspect du Droit chinois, v. … ; sur cette période particulièrement sanglante des légistes, où le principe de « certitude » de la législation a été portée à ses nues, v. …, people were still needed to interpret the regulations because a legal order must always be interpreted Ex Post by who must in any case answer the questions posed by the subjects of law, as soon as the political system admits to attributing to them the right to make claims before the Judge. Secondly the Attorney, whose office, although articulated with the Judge's office, is distinct from the latter, both more restricted and broader since he must appear in all cases where the judicial figure puts himself in square, outside the courts. However, Compliance Law has multiplied this since not only, extending Regulatory Law, it entrusts numerous powers to the administrative authorities, but it also transforms companies into judges, in respect of which the attorneys must deal with. Even more so, Compliance Law only takes its sense from its Monumental Goals²🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Les buts monumentaux de la compliance, 2022.. It is in this that this branch of the Law preserves the freedom of human beings, in the digital space where the techniques of compliance protect them from the power of companies by the way that the Compliance Law forces these companies to use their power to protect people. However, firstly, it is the Judges who, in their diversity³Cette présente étude est générale. Pour une étude plus analytique, v. 🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A., « Le rôle du juge dans le Droit de la Compliance », in 🕴️Frison-Roche, M.A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la compliance, 2023. , impose as a reference the protection of human beings, either as a limit to the power of compliance tools⁴🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), 📕Les outils de la compliance, 2021.  or as their very purpose. Secondly, the Attorney, again distinguishing himself from the Judge, if necessary, reminds us that all the parties whose interests are involved must be taken into consideration. In an ever more flexible, soft and dialogical Law, everyone presenting himself as the « advocate » of such and such a monumental goal: the Attorney is legitimate to be the first to occupy this place. - 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur Instagram 🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

► Référence complète : S. Scemla & D. Paillot, « The difficulty for Compliance Enforcement Authorities to comprehend the Rights of the Defence in compliance matters », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 263-272. - 📘lire la présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par les auteures) : Since 2016, French companies subject to the provisions of the so-called “Sapin 2” Law must implement eight stringent anti-corruption measures, such as a risk mapping, a whistleblowing procedure or a third-party due diligence procedure. To ensure their compliance with these obligations, the Sapin 2 law created the Agence française anticorruption – AFA (French Anti-Corruption Agency), which had been assigned three missions: firstly, to help any person prevent and detect corruption; secondly, to control the quality and effectiveness of the anti-corruption programs deployed by the companies; and thirdly, to sanction any breaches, through its Sanctions Committee. As pointed out by the French Conseil d’État, the powers devolved to the administrations have multiplied and became stratified. While the Conseil d'État suggests to improve both the conduct and the effectiveness of administrative controls by harmonising their practices and simplifying their prerogatives, it is urgent to remedy the numerous procedural failures that undermine the rights of defence. In fact, the AFA exercises various powers when undertaking its controls. Some of these powers are not provided for by the Law, and most of them infringe fundamental rights and freedoms among which the adversarial principle and the freedom not to self-incriminate. For instance, the AFA does not necessarily draft minutes of the interviews it conducts, thus depriving the interviewee of the possibility to challenge the statements reported by the AFA to the Sanctions Committee. From a more structural point of view, the scope of the AFA's mission is extremely broad. The Law allows the AFA to request the communication of "any professional document or any useful information", without defining the notion of usefulness. Also, the AFA considers that the entity cannot benefit from the legal privilege that would cover their documents, and considers that an entity who voluntarily hands over a document, without expressing any reserves, waives its right to the benefit of its legal privilege. Apart from the severe consequences that could arise if another proceedings was to be initiated by a foreign authority, the concept of « voluntary handover » does not faithfully reflect the reality. Indeed, the controlled entities only cooperate under the threat of being prosecuted on the basis of an obstruction to the control, which compels them to communicate documents even when facing the risk of contributing to their own incrimination. These many procedural deficiencies encountered during AFA controls must therefore be reformed, as recommended by the Conseil d’État, so as to require the authorities to take into account the rights of the defence. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : J. Morel-Maroger, « The application of compliance standards by European Union judges », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 397-407.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : Compliance rules are intended to pursue objectives of public interest – or monumental goals – and thereby in principle modify and guide the behaviour of economic operators. In order to achieve these objectives, the full spectrum of norms are used in compliance matters. What is and what should be the role of the judges of the European Union in the development of compliance rules ? As in domestic law, the legality of compliance standards developed by regulatory authorities has been challenged. It will first be necessary to analyse what control the judges of the European Union have over these rules. The question arises essentially as regards the rules of soft law, the challenge of which can be considered in two ways : by way of an action for annulment and by exception by way of a preliminary ruling. But beyond the control of the legality of compliance rules exercised by European judges, they also contribute to their application. The effectiveness of compliance rules depend above all on them being followed by those to whom they are addressed, and economic operators are undoubtedly the first actors of its success. But the judges of the European Union, competent to settle disputes concerning the application of European Union law between the Member States, the European institutions, and individual applicants, may be also be involved in ensuring the effectiveness of European compliance rules and in interpreting them. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : N. Cayrol, « Procedural Principles in Compliance Law », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 231-243.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance) : We could be satisfied with examining the reception of the principles of general Procedural Law in compliance litigation and the distortion that compliance techniques justify in procedural mechanisms. But the innovation that constitutes this emerging branch of law that is Compliance Law justifies going to more fundamental. From this perspective, the pertinent question is the very legitimacy of procedural principles in this branch of law, in that Procedural Law is built on the notion of “Litigation” while Compliance Law deals with situation so enormous, concerning for example the fate of the planet, that this notion of litigation appears inadequate, and consequently the procedural law would be too limited in compliance matters. If, however, this perspective is maintained of Compliance Law facing, in an almost warlike perspective, the greatest current challenges, general Procedural Law needs to be redesigned, in its very definition. Indeed, compliance trials call into question the future of systems and it is as such that they hold the entities, for instance the enterprises, that are at the heart of these systems. It is in this that liability trials are more “accountability” trials, allowing the judge to demand actions for the future, trials by which commitments are made and the “intentions” of the persons involved are challenged and required. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Reference complète : A. Bruneau, « The company judges itself: the Compliance function in the bank », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 127-145 - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Summary of the article :  First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance. In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as « Sapin 2 » requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk. Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution. Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law. Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the « judge-judged »: following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients. -   🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : A. Linden, "Motivation and publicity of the decisions of the Restricted formation of the French Data Protection Authority (Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés – CNIL) in a compliance perspective", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 257-262.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): In the event of a breach of the personal data protection rules, the restricted formation of the French personal data protection Commission (CNIL) pronounces fines, injunctions of « compliance » or calls to order. It can order the publication of these measures, which can be contested before the French High Administrative supreme court (Conseil d'État). It is essential that these decisions be justified, not only in order to respect this principle of law but also concretely to obtain the public concerned, being very heterogeneous, understand them, the educational role of the CNIL also being applicable. The principle of publicity is handled with nuance, the data controllers often requesting a closed door and, in fact, very few public attending the hearing. The publicity of decisions is in itself a sanction. The publication may moreover not be total or may only have a time, anonymization often allowing the balance between necessary pedagogy and preservation of interests, the CNIL taking great attention to the very modalities of publication, even if it cannot control the circulation and the media use which is then made of it. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : J.-B. Racine, « Compliance and arbitration. An attempt at problematisation », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 289-304.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié   - ► Le résumé ci-dessous décrit un article qui suit une intervention dans le colloque Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). Ce colloque a été conçu par  Marie-Anne Frison-Roche et Jean-Baptiste Racine, co-directeurs scientifiques, et s'est tenu à Paris II le 31 mars 2021.  Dans le livre, l'article sera publié dans le Titre III, consacré à : Compliance andArbitration. - ► Résumé de l'article : Under the consideration of the « Compliance Jurisdictionalisation », it is necessary to study in the links between Compliance and Arbitration. The arbitrator is a judge, he is even the natural judge of international trade. Arbitration is therefore naturally intended to meet compliance which transforms the action of companies in an international context. However, the links between compliance and arbitration are not obvious. It is not a question of providing firm and definitive answers, but rather, and above all, of asking questions. We are at the start of reflection on this topic, which explains why there is, for the time being, little legal literature on the subject of the relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. It doesn't mean there aren't connections.  Quite simply, these relations may not have come to light, or they are in the making. We should research  the existing or potential bridges between two worlds that have long gravitated separately: Compliance on the one hand, Arbitration on the other. The central question is: is or can the arbitrator be a compliance judge, and, if so, how? In any event, the Arbitrator is thus in contact with matters requiring the methods, tools and logic of Compliance. In addition to the prevention and suppression of corruption, three examples can be given. Arbitration has been facing economic sanctions (notably embargoes) for several years. The link with Compliance is obvious, insofar as texts providing for economic sanctions are often accompanied by compliance mechanisms, as in the United States. The arbitrator is concerned as to the fate he reserves in the treatment of the dispute with the measures of economic sanctions. Competition Law is a branch that came into contact with Arbitration from the end of the 1980s. The arbitrability of this type of dispute is now established and arbitrators apply it regularly. At the same time, Compliance has also entered Competition Law, admittedly more strongly in the United States than in France. The existence, absence or insufficiency of a compliance program aimed at preventing violations of the competition rules are thus circumstances which may assist the arbitrator in the assessment of anti-competitive behavior. Environmental Law is also concerned. There is environmental Compliance, for example with regard to the French law of March 27, 2017 on the duty of vigilance. Companies are thus responsible for participating in the protection of the environment, by internalizing these concerns in their internal and external operations (in their sphere of influence). As soon as an arbitrator is in charge for settling a dispute relating to Environmental Law, the question of the relationship to Compliance, from this angle, naturally arises. It is therefore the multiple interactions between Compliance and Arbitration, actual or potential, which are thus open. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -