Food for thoughts

► Référence complète : M. Mekki, "Peut-on repenser la responsabilité à l’aune du devoir de Vigilance, pointe avancée de la Compliance ?", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, à paraître

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : L'auteur développe les tensions que l'Obligation de Vigilance engendre sur le concept même de responsabilité. Répertoriant toutes les manifestations, très diverses, de la Vigilance, selon les domaines, il observe que se forme une logique téléologique de prévention et de gestion des risques systémiques, ce qu'est la compliance, sans doute remède à un État impuissant, s'appuyant sur une grande pluralité des normes.

La question est de savoir si l'on peut passer de ces droits spéciaux mais d'un esprit commun à un droit commun transformé. Les premières décisions rendues à propos de la loi de 2017 répondent par la négative, mais la question est ouverte.

Il faut alors revenir sur le concept même de responsabilité, qui pourrait accueillir un mécanisme général de Vigilance. Ce concept est très flexible et présente l'adaptabilité requise pour accueillir la logique de compliance. En effet, la responsabilité, classiquement ex post peut passer ex ante, à travers la notion de dette, non plus juridique mais éthique, car les entreprises doivent être "dignes de confiance".

La responsabilité préventive vise alors à restaurer l'équilibre des systèmes dans la poursuite des Buts Monumentaux, pour l'efficacité et l'efficience des systèmes. La responsabilité se mixte de subjectivité et d'objectivité, le risque devenant central (par rapport à la faute), le litige dépassant l'intérêt des parties, la remédiation devenant le sujet central dans un procès en responsabilité à repenser : le dialogue doit y être au centre, entre les juridictions, entre les entreprises et les parties prenantes, dans un office du juge adapté.

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The economic theory of incentives implicitly assumes that an operator can not be compelled to act against his will, or at least that it is more efficient to offer him advantages in such a way that he does what he wants . In this, this conception is opposed to the traditional conception of Law, which posits, on the contrary, that subjects obey the order dictated by the legal norm.

But in globalized markets, operators have the tools to disobey and the asymmetry of information diminishes the power of control of the Regulators, which raises doubts as to the effectiveness of the legal constraint: it is not enough that the Law orders. In these circumstances, texts, regulators and judges must produce conditions that encourage agents to adopt behaviors that are consistent with the aims sought by the Regulators because the operators themselves have an interest in them.

Thus, whilst regulatory systems in any sector become increasingly repressive, even in liberal economies, it is not so much to punish the perpetrator but to incite others who are tempted to commit crimes, To abandon them. It is the system of exemplarity. This thought prior to Beccaria participates in the re-feoadization of the Law, demonstrated by Pierre Legendre, associated with the decline of the State and to which the Regulation fully participates. Judgeshave little inclination to handle repression in this way, which creates a clash between Criminal Law and Regulatory Law, which nevertheless puts repression at its center.

In the same way, Regulatory Systems must inject positive incentives, for example rewards for communication of information, which encourages delation, or incentives done by the regulator for the network manager make investments in the maintenance of it, against the immediate interest of its shareholder. Finally, all patent law and economics are now thought of as an incentive to inn/en/article/innovation/ovate. But, some incentives have proven perverse such as stock-options or bonuses. As a result, new texts seek to regulate these.

Référence générale, Cohendet, M.-A. et Fleury, M., Droit constitutionnel et droit international de l'environnement, Revue française de droit constitutionnel , PUF, » 2020/2, n°122, p.271-297. 

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Résumé de l'article : 

► Full Reference: J.-B. Blanc, "La loi, source de l’Obligation de Compliance" ("The Law, source of the Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, "Régulations & Compliance" Serie, to be published

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'Obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Summary of this contribution  (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Référence complète : S. Manacorda, "La dynamique des programmes de conformité des entreprises : déclin ou transfiguration du droit pénal des affaires ?", in A. Supiot (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, p. 191-208.

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► Résumé de l'article : 

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Full Reference: Auteur, "Titre", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The author takes up the hypothesis of a Compliance Law defined by its Monumental Goals, the realisation of which is entrusted to "crucial operators" and confronts it with Tax Law. The link is particularly effective since these operators possess what governments need in this area: relevant Information.

Going further, Compliance Law can give rise to two types of obligations on the part of these operators, either towards others operators who need to be monitored, corrected or denounced, or towards themselves, when they need to make amends.

In the first part of this contribution, the author shows that Compliance Obligation reproduces the mechanism of a Tax Law which, for large companies, is embroiled in a process of increasing Globalisation. It enables Governments to aspire to the "Monumental Goals" of combating tax optimisation and impoverishing governments, victims of the erosion of the tax base, in the face of the strategies of companies that are more powerful than they are themselves, by using this very power of firms to turn it against them. Companies become the willing or de facto allies of governments, particularly when it comes to recovering tax debts, or assist them in their stated ambition to achieve social justice.  In this way, the State "manages" Tax Law by cooperating with companies.

In the second part, the author outlines the contours of this business Compliance Obligation, which is no longer simply a matter of paying tax. Beyond this financial obligation, it is more a question of mastering Information, particularly when multinational companies are subject to specific tax reporting obligations and are required to reveal their tax strategy, presumed to be transparent and coherent within the group : this legal presumption gives rise to obligations to seek information and ensure coherence, since a single tax strategy is not self-evident in a group.

The author emphasises that companies have accepted the principles governing these new compliance obligations and are tending to transform these obligations, particularly Transparency, into a communication strategy, in line with the ESG criteria that have been developed and a desire for fruitful relations with stakeholders. Therefore the tax relations developed by major companies are being extended not only to the tax authorities, but also to NGOs, by incorporating a strong ethical dimension. This is leading to new strategies, particularly in the area of Vigilance.

The author concludes: "A n’en pas douter, l’obligation de compliance existe bel et bien en matière fiscale." ("There is no doubt that the Compliance Obligation does exist in tax matters").

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Référence complète : J.-Ch. Roda, "La preuve de la bonne exécution de la Vigilance au regard du système probatoire de Compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, à paraître

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Full Reference: L. Aynès, "How International Arbitration can reinforce the Compliance Obligation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The author takes as his starting point the observation that International Arbitration and Compliance are a natural fit, since they are both a manifestation of globalisation, expressing an overcoming of borders, with arbitration being able to take on the Compliance Monumental Goals, since it has engendered a substantially global arbitral order.

But the obstacle lies in the fact that the source of arbitration remains the contract, with the arbitrator exercising only a temporary jurisdiction whose mission is given by the contract. Yet the advent of the global arbitral order makes this possible, with the arbitrator drawing on norms that may include the Compliance monumental goals and corporate commitments. In so doing, the arbitrator becomes an indirect organ of this emerging compliance law.

The contribution then suggests a second development, which could make the arbitrator a direct organ of compliance. For this to happen, the arbitrator must not only compel the fulfillment of an obligation to act, as is already the case with provisional measures, but also have a broader conception of the conflict for which a solution is required, or even free himself somewhat from the contractual source that surrounds it. This may well be taking shape, mirroring the profound transformation of the judge's office.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Référence complète : Th. Goujon-Bethan, "Les enjeux présents à venir de l’articulation des principes de procédure civile et commerciale avec la logique de compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, à paraître

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'Obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : L'auteur montre que le Code de procédure civile, parce qu'il est exceptionnellement bien conçu et dirigé, peut répondre à l'ampleur de la transformation que le Droit de la Compliance apporte.

Le Droit de la Compliance est normativement ancré dans ses Buts Monumentaux : ceux-ci sont portés en tant que tels devant le juge dans des "causes systémiques".

Or, le Code de procédure civile distingue, et les travaux des auteurs du Code comme ceux de la doctrine le montrent, qu'il faut distinguer le litige et le conflit. En effet, dans une "cause systémique" telle que le Droit de la Compliance les emporte nécessairement (climat, protection des internautes, égalité effective des êtres humains, durabilité des systèmes bancaires, etc.) ce sont des parties qui sont en litiges, tandis que le conflit embrasse lui les systèmes eux-mêmes et d'autres entités.
La procédure doit intégrer non seulement le litige mais encore le conflit. Cela implique notamment que l'on s'occupe non seulement du litige, mais encore du conflit, lequel ne s'éteint pas nécessairement avec le litige, et ne trouve pas les mêmes solutions que celles demandées par le litige. C'est notamment dans cette dernière perspective, essentiellement dans une procédure de "Cause Systémique de Compliance" que les techniques de médiation, d'amicus curiae, d'un juge qui se situe ex ante, etc., s'imposent. Elles sont disponibles à travers des articles du Code de procédure civile : il suffit que les juges, comprenant ce que sont les "Causes Systémiques de Compliance" s'en saisissent.

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► Référence complète : J.-Ph. Denis et N. Fabbe-Costes, "Contrainte légale et stratégie des entreprises en matière de Compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, à paraître

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'Obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : 

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► Référence complète : B. Haftel, "La façon dont l'impératif de Vigilance s'ajuste aux règles juridiques internationales", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, à paraître

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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Cette bibliographie indicative vise des :

• ouvrages généraux

 

• ouvrages abordant la Régulation et la Compliance bancaire et financière à l'occasion d'un autre sujet principalement traité

 

• sites pertinents pour l'étude du Droit de la Régulation bancaire et financière

 

• ouvrages et articles portant spécifiquement sur la Régulation et la Compliance bancaire et financière

 

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Le droit processuel, modèle de l'Obligation de Compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, à paraître

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📝lire l'article

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🚧lire le document de travail bilingue sur la base duquel cet article a été élaboré, doté de développements supplémentaires, de références techniques et de liens hypertextes

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article : Des réflexions commencent à être disponibles pour décrire les relations à construire entre le Droit processuel et l’Obligation de Compliance, ne serait-ce que pour rendre compte du contentieux émergent en matière de compliance, le Droit de la Compliance se juridictionnalisation. Mais cela ne nous apprend rien de spécifique car tout ce qui est happé par un procès est de ce fait mêlé de droit processuel.

Il apparaît même qu’à première vue le Droit de la Compliance n’engendre aucune obligation processuelle, puisqu’il est conçu pour se développer en Ex Ante, évitant à l'entreprise le juge, la compliance by design devant perfectionner cet allégement, la présence de tout procès n’étant qu’un échec, en soi et par les délais et les incertitudes qui y soient par nature associés. C'est même souvent dans l'espoir d'être à l'abri de tout procès que les entreprises affirment pouvoir "se conformer" à toutes les réglementations, à tout instant, en tous lieux, à travers toutes les personnes dont elles répondent. Cela est évidemment impossible. Si cela était, les entreprises seraient alors condamnées par avance à l'occasion de tous les procès possibles, leurs sanctions étant demandées par chacun, procureur public ou procureur privé. Mais c'est confondre Droit de la Compliance et la "conformité", laquelle n'est qu'un outil de cette nouvelle branche du Droit. 

Il ne suffit pas de dire qu'il convient alors de respecter les droits de la défense et l'accès au juge, ce dont nul ne prétend, ou devrait prétendre, se défaire.

L'objet de cette étude est plus de mesurer en quoi le contentieux lorsqu'il porte sur le Droit de la Compliance, c'est-à-dire la charge pour les grandes entreprises de participer à la concrétisation de buts monumentaux en alliance avec les autorités étatiques, ce dont l'obligation de vigilance est la pointe avancée, est transformé de ce fait, créant des obligations processuelles non seulement nouvelles mais d'un nouveau type à la charge des uns comme des autres.

En effet, pour l'instant l'on admet comme à regret la logique processuelle, la présence des juges, et non pas seulement des organes de poursuite (procureurs et collèges des Autorités de régulation et de supervision), et des avocats en défense et non pas seulement en négociation, pour respecter l'Etat de Droit, sorte de tribut que l’on verse, dose d’inefficacité dans l’efficacité, dressant alors les disciplines les unes contre les autres, ici le Droit d’un côté, l’Economie et la Gestion de l’autre. Le plus souvent, on en reste là, soit pour l’admettre et faire un équilibre, soit pour le regretter et attendre de savoir quelle logique l’emportera, entre les droits et obligations processuels d’une part et les droits et obligations de compliance d’autre part.

Il convient au contraire de récuser cette logique de vases communicants.

En effet, le Droit de la Compliance est le prolongement du Droit de la Régulation, qu’il déploie au-delà des secteurs et des frontières, dont la normativité est ancrée dans les Buts Monumentaux fixés par les Autorités politiques et publiques qui visent à ce qu’à l’avenir les systèmes ne s’effondrent pas, voire s’améliorent pour que les êtres humains qui en dépendent n’en soient pas broyés mais au contraire en bénéficient.

Il en résulte un « contentieux systémique de la compliance » dont il résulte des principes processuels spécifiques. Il convient tout d’abord de préciser ce qu’est une « cause systémique », notion que j’ai proposée en 2021, et à laquelle correspondent les cas qui sont aujourd’hui portés devant les tribunaux. La spécificité de ces contentieux systémiques émergents de compliance, qui sont des contentieux objectifs, proches de ce que connaît le contentieux administratif, ce qui justifie notamment pleinement la présence du ministère public et pose la question de savoir s’il existerai un « juge naturel » de ce contentieux systémique de la compliance, ont des conséquences processuelles majeures, notamment sur les droits et obligations processuels : notamment le droit d’être partie à l’instant, même si l’on est partie au litige, ce qui est le cas des parties prenantes.

Il en résulte une nouvelle alliance entre l’Obligation de Compliance et le Droit processuel, qui engendre des obligations de compliance de nature processuelle au sein même du Droit de la Compliance. Il convient en effet de ne plus scinder l’Ex Ante et l’Ex Post, mais d’emprunter des principes de compliance pour les insérer dans les procédures juridictionnelles, comme le conçoit le Haut Conseiller François Ancel (passage de l’Ex Ante vers l’Ex Post), tandis qu’il convient d’insérer des principes processuels dans les obligations de compliance au sein des entreprises (passage de l’Ex Post vers l’Ex Ante), comme l’a montré l’ouvrage sur La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance. Cela est particulièrement illustré  à propos de l’Obligation de Vigilance, pointe avancé de l’Obligation de Compliance.

Cela est particulièrement pertinent à propos de trois Obligations processuelles qui désormais doivent structurer les obligations de compliance dans les comportements des entreprises et des parties concernées indépendamment même de tout procès, le juge éventuellement saisi devant vérifier leur accomplissement de part et d'autre et les favoriser, ce qui engendre pour lui un office Ex Ante : l’obligation de discuter (principe du contradictoire), l’obligation d’information (système probatoire) et l’obligation de démontrer (principe de la motivation).

Dans cette évolution non seulement l'obligation processuelle de donner accès, d'organiser des voies de recours, d'écouter l'autre, obligation processuelle qui peut être réciproque surtout lorsqu'il s'agit d'écouter l'autre et de prendre en considération ce qu'il dit, trace devant en être trouvé dans la motivation (par exemple du plan de vigilance), l'obligation processuelle trouve alors sa nature profonde : le prototype de l'obligation de compliance.

Cette alliance change à la fois le Droit de la Compliance et le Droit processuel, puisque cela change plus largement l’office du juge, qui doit veiller à l'effectivité de ces obligations processuelles dans un continuum entre l'Ex Post et l'Ex Ante. Mais cette question de l’office du juge est l’objet d’une contribution autonome.

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► Full Reference: E. Maclouf, "Industrial Entities and Compliance Obligation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): 

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Référence complète : M. Caffin-Moi, "L’imprégnation des branches du droit par les mécanismes de compliance : le contrat", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), Compliance et contrat, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", à paraître

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📕lire une présentation de l'ouvrage, Compliance et contrat, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fair par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : L'auteure commence par montrer que les contrats sont de plus en plus présents dans le Droit de la Compliance, celui-ci n'étant plus ce qui est seulement exprimé par des lois d'ordre public, tandis que le contrat ne porterait que les intérêts privés de deux parties particulières. Elle expose comment concrètement aujourd'hui, et chaque jour davantage, les contrats sont utilisés comme un instrument de diffusion de la Compliance, la Vigilance étant exemplaire de cela, les textes incitant les entreprises à le faire, la CS3D mettant "le contrat à l'honneur" par la mise en place de "cascades contractuelles", le contrat agissant à la fois en surface et en profondeur.

Mais il ne faut pas que le contrat soit un moyen de restreindre la responsabilité, et l'on trouve des points de "friction" entre Contrat et Compliance.

Tout d'abord, parce que les réglementations, voire la jurisprudence, obligent les entreprises à contracter, par exemple avec des fournisseurs de rang 2, ce qui est une atteinte à la liberté de ne pas contracter.

En outre, les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance institutionnalisent une relation contractuelle qui peut être déséquilibrée, voire engendrer une concurrence déloyale si une entreprise s'y plie et l'autre pas, la Compliance conférant de plus des prérogatives exorbitantes à l'entreprise.

Pour ne pas provoquer trop de conflits, et l'auteure souligne que le premier est certainement celui sur la compétence juridictionnelle entre le tribunal de commerce et le Tribunal judiciaire de Paris, il faut impérativement un dialogue des juges.

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The United States established regulatory authorities at the end of the 19th century: starting from the principle of the market, they tempered it by setting up regulators, after noting market failures, for example in terms of transport, in the event of economically natural monopolies or essential facilities. The tradition of the European Union is the reverse since the States, in particular the French State, have considered that sectors of general interest, deemed unsuitable for the competitive pattern because not corresponding to the operational pattern of the meeting of supply and demand, and to serve the missions of public services, were to be held by the State, either directly by public establishments, or by public enterprises under the supervision of the ministries.

Evolution in Europe came from community Law. Indeed, after the Second World War, the idea was to build a market which was to be "common" to European countries so that they could no longer wage war on each other in the future. To achieve this goal, the borders between them were lifted thanks to the principles of free movement of people, goods and capital. In the same way, the defense by each of the States of its own national companies by State aid has been prohibited so that any company, even foreign, can enter its territory, so that a common internal market can be established. Finally, a competition Law was necessary to prohibit companies and States from hindering the free functioning of the market, which would have slowed down or even stopped the construction of this internal market, which was an essentially political goal of the Treaty of Rome.

To carry out this political goal, the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, previously called the Court of Justice of the European Communities - CJEC - until the Treaty of Lisbon) have prohibited any behavior of agreement or of abuse of a dominant position, even on the part of public enterprises, as well as any state support (except in the event of a crisis). Likewise, in perfect political logic, but also in perfect contradiction with European national traditions, European texts, regulations or directives have liberalized previously monopolistic sectors, first of all telecommunications and then energy. This was the case for telecommunications with the 1993 directive, the 1996 directive for electricity and the 1998 directive for gas.

Because of the hierarchy of standards, the States, except to be sued before the Court of Justice by the European Commission in action for failure, were obliged to transpose by national laws these European texts. Thus, by force, community law, both through general competition Law, but above all to achieve its political goal of building a single and initially peaceful internal market, has triggered in Europe a system of economic regulation in all network industry sectors, a system which was nonetheless foreign to the culture of the Member States. This was not the case with banking and insurance regulations, sectors which have always been threatened by systemic risk, and as such have been regulated and supervised by national central banks for a very long time.

Community Law has for 30 years plunged into national Law while ignoring them, which could also be profitable, and on the basis of competition Law, the political dimension of the European project having been forgotten, no doubt over time as the War itself faded from people's minds.

The effects of globalization and the financial crisis have constituted a new turning point in Community Law which, since 2010, has been built no longer to modify national Laws - and destroy them in part - but to build a new Community Law which should neither to Competition Law nor to National Law: Community Regulation Law, which makes room for individual rights and attempts to build over time a system that is robust to crises. Thus, by texts of the European Union of 2014, both a Banking Union and a new Law on Market Abuse is being built, which aims to establish a common law for the integrity of financial markets.

One of the challenges is what could or should be reconciliation between the two Europe, an economic and still not very social Europe on the one hand and the Europe of Human Rights, which is based on the European Convention on Rights of Man. This is not on the agenda.

Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

► Full Reference: R. Sève, "L'Obligation de Compliance et les mutations de la souveraineté et de la citoyenneté" ("Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, forthcoming.

 

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📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published.

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► English Summary of this article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : The contribution describes "les changements de philosophie du droit que la notion de compliance peut impliquer par rapport à la représentation moderne de l’Etat assurant l’effectivité des lois issues de la volonté générale, dans le respect des libertés fondamentales qui constituent l’essence du sujet de droit." ("the changes in legal philosophy that the notion of Compliance may imply in relation to the modern representation of the State ensuring the effectiveness of laws resulting from the general will, while respecting the fundamental freedoms that constitute the essence of the subject of law").

The contributor believes that the definition of Compliance is due to authors who « jouer un rôle d’éclairage et de structuration d’un vaste ensemble d’idées et de phénomènes précédemment envisagés de manière disjointe.  Pour ce qui nous occupe, c’est sûrement le cas de la théorie de la compliance, développée en France par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche dans la lignée de grands économistes (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) et dont la première forme résidait dans les travaux bien connus de la Professeure sur le droit de la régulation. » ( "play a role in illuminating and structuring a vast set of ideas and phenomena previously considered in a disjointed manner.  For our purposes, this is certainly the case with the theory of Compliance, developed in France by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche in the tradition of great economists (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) and whose first form was in her well-known work on Regulatory Law").

Drawing on the Principles of the Law of the American Law Institute, which considers compliance to be a "set of rules, principles, controls, authorities, offices and practices designed to ensure that an organisation conforms to external and internal norms", he stresses that Compliance thus appears to be a neutral mechanism aimed at efficiency through a move towards Ex Ante. But he stresses that the novelty lies in the fact that it is aimed 'only' at future events, by 'refounding' and 'monumentalising' the matter through the notion of 'monumental goals' conceived by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, giving rise to a new jus comune. Thus, "la compliance c’est l’idée permanente du droit appliquée à de nouveaux contextes et défis." ("Compliance is the permanent idea of Law applied to new contexts and challenges"). 

So it's not a question of making budget savings, but rather of continuing to apply the philosophy of the Social Contract to complex issues, particularly environmental issues. 

This renews the place occupied by the Citizen, who appears not only as an individual, as in the classical Greek concept and that of Rousseau, but also through entities such as NGOs, while large companies, because they alone have the means to pursue the Compliance Monumental Goals, would be like "super-citizens", something that the digital space is beginning to experience, at the risk of the individuals themselves disappearing as a result of "surveillance capitalism". But in the same way that thinking about the Social Contract is linked to thinking about capitalism, Compliance is part of a logical historical extension, without any fundamental break: "C’est le développement et la complexité du capitalisme qui forcent à introduire dans les entités privées des mécanismes procéduraux d’essence bureaucratique, pour discipliner les salariés, contenir les critiques internes et externes, soutenir les managers en place" ("It is the development and complexity of capitalism that forces us to introduce procedural mechanisms of a bureaucratic nature into private entities, in order to discipline employees, contain internal and external criticism, and support the managers in place") by forcing them to justify remuneration, benefits, and so on.

Furthermore, in the words of the author, "Avec les buts monumentaux, - la prise en compte des effets lointains, diffus, agrégés par delà les frontières, de l’intérêt des générations futures, de tous les êtres vivants - ,  on passe, pour ainsi dire, à une dimension industrielle de l’éthique, que seuls de vastes systèmes de traitement de l’information permettent d’envisager effectivement." ("With the Monumental Goals - taking into account the distant, diffuse effects, aggregated across borders, the interests of future generations, of all living beings - we move, so to speak, to an industrial dimension of ethics, which only vast information processing systems can effectively envisage").

This is how we can find a division between artificial intelligence and human beings in organisations, particularly companies, or in decision-making processes.

In the same way, individual freedom does not disappear with Compliance, because it is precisely one of its monumental goals to enable individuals to make choices in a complex environment, particularly in the digital space where the democratic system is now at stake, while technical mechanisms such as early warning will revive the right to civil disobedience, invalidating the complaint of "surveillance capitalism".

The author concludes that the stakes are so high that Compliance, which has already overcome the distinctions between Private and Public Law and between national and international law, must also overcome the distinction between Information and secrecy, particularly in view of cyber-risks, which requires the State to develop and implement non-public Compliance strategies to safeguard the future.

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► Full Reference: L. Rapp, "Compliance, Chaines de valeur et Économie servicielle",  ", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, forthcoming

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📕read the general contribution of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published

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► English summary of this contribution  (done par its author) :  Based on an analysis of the value chains of companies in the space sector and their recent evolution, this contribution examine the role, place and current transformations of compliance policies and strategies in the context of an industrial transformation that has become essential: the transition from an industrial economy to a service economy.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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The Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) is the legal form that the legislator has most often chosen to build regulatory authorities. The IAA is only its legal form, but French law has attached great importance to it, following the often formalistic tradition of public law. They are thus independent administrative authorities, especially in the legal systems of continental law like France, Germany or Italy.

The essential element is in the last adjective: the "independent" character of the organism. This means that this organ, which is only administrative so has a vocation to be placed in the executive hierarchy, does not obey the Government. In this, regulators have often been presented as free electrons, which posed the problem of their legitimacy, since they could no longer draw upstream in the legitimacy of the Government. This independence also poses the difficulty of their responsibility, the responsibility of the State for their actions, and the accountability of their use of their powers. Moreover, the independence of regulators is sometimes questioned if it is the government that retains the power to appoint the leaders of the regulatory authority. Finally, the budgetary autonomy of the regulator is crucial to ensure its independence, although the authorities having the privilege of benefiting from a budget - which is not included in the LOLF - are very few in number. They are no longer referred to as "independent administrative authorities" but as "Independent Public Authorities", the legislator making a distinction between the two (French Law of 20 January 2017).

The second point concerns the second adjective: that it is an "administrative" body. This corresponds to the traditional idea that regulation is the mechanism by which the State intervenes in the economy, in the image of a kind of deconcentration of ministries, in the Scandinavian model of the agency. If we allow ourselves to be enclosed in this vocabulary, we conclude that this administrative body makes an administrative decision which is the subject of an appeal before a judge. Thus, in the first place, this would be a first instance appeal and not a judgment since the administrative authority is not a court. Secondly, the natural judge of the appeal should be the administrative judge since it is an administrative decision issued by an administrative authority. But in France the Ordinance of 1 December 1986 sur la concurrence et la libéralisation des prix (on competition and price liberalization), because it intended precisely to break the idea of ​​an administered economy in order to impose price freedom on the idea of ​​economic liberalism, required that attacks against the decisions of economic regulators taking the form of IAA are brought before the Court of Appeal of Paris, judicial jurisdiction. Some great authors were even able to conclude that the Paris Court of Appeal had become an administrative court. But today the procedural system has become extremely complex, because according to the IAA and according to the different kinds of decisions adopted, they are subject to an appeal either to the Court of Appeal of Paris or to the Conseil d'État (Council of State) . If one observes the successive laws that modify the system, one finds that after this great position of principle of 1986, the administrative judge gradually takes again its place in the system, in particular in the financial regulation. Is it logical to conclude that we are returning to a spirit of regulation defined as an administrative police and an economy administered by the State?

Finally, the third term is the name itself: "authority". It means in the first place an entity whose power holds before in its "authority". But it marks that it is not a jurisdiction, that it takes unilateral decisions. It was without counting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the judicial judge! Indeed, Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to an impartial tribunal in civil and criminal matters. The notion of "criminal matter" does not coincide with the formal traditional concept of criminal law but refers to the broad and concrete factual concept of repression. Thus, by a reasoning which goes backwards, an organization, whatever the qualification that a State has formally conferred on it, which has an activity of repression, acts "in criminal matters". From this alone, in the European sense, it is a "tribunal". This automatically triggers a series of fundamental procedural guarantees for the benefit of the person who is likely to be the subject of a decision on his part. In France, a series of jurisprudence, both of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Conseil d'État (Council of State) or the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) has confirmed this juridictionnalization of the AAI.

► Référence complète : G. J. Martin, "Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, à paraître

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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Le plan est  actualisé chaque semaine au fur et à mesure que les leçons se déroulent en amphi.

Il est disponible ci-dessous.

 

Retourner à la présentation générale du cours.

 

 

(Avant le début des enseignements de Droit de la Régulation bancaire et financière, un aperçu du plan général du Cours avait été mis à disposition.)

► Full Reference: V. Magnier, "The transformation of governance and due diligence", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The author develops the tensions caused by Compliance Law and the Duty of Vigilance on corporate governance.

The French "Sapin 2" law targets corruption, while the French "Vigilance" law has a broader scope in terms of risks and the entire value chain. It is logical that this should create tensions in terms of governance, given the monumental goals involved. Companies need to take ownership of the powers delegated to them, which means rethinking their governance and the way in which they exercise their corporate mandates, with the corporate interest, the judge's compass, having to be combined with the adoption of new standards of behaviour formalised voluntarily by ethical charters in line with international standards. On this voluntary and supervised basis, the company must adapt its structure and then contractualise these norms.

This ethical approach has an impact on the role of corporate organs, not only in terms of transparency and risk prioritisation, but also proactively in terms of the adoption of commitments whose sincerity will be verified, as reflected, for example, in corporate governance codes (cf.in France the AFEP-MEDEF Code), the setting up of ad hoc committees and the presence of stakeholders, who will be consulted when the vigilance plan is drawn up.

She stresses that this creates tensions, that dialogue is difficult, that business secrecy must be preserved, but that stakeholders must become Vigilance watchdogs, a role that should not be left to the public authorities alone.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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La régulation est née de la nécessité de prendre en compte la spécificité des secteurs, souvent en accompagnement de la libéralisation de ceux-ci.

Mais, en premier lieu, des biens de différents secteurs peuvent être substituables. Ainsi, l’on peut se chauffer aussi bien au gaz qu’à l’électricité, la concurrence intermodale rendant moins pertinente la segmentation de la régulation du secteur de l’électricité et la régulation du secteur du gaz. Pareillement, un contrat d’assurance-vie est à la fois un instrument de protection pour l’avenir, un produit relevant donc de la régulation assurantielle, mais aussi produit financier placé auprès des consommateurs par des entreprises de banque-assurance, relevant donc de la régulation bancaire et financière. Cette intimité de la régulation par rapport à la technicité interne de l’objet sur lequel elle porte ne peut être effacée.

L'interrégulation qui va se mettre en place est d'abord institutionnelle. C’est pourquoi, une alternative s’ouvre : soit on fusionne les autorités, et  ainsi la Grande Bretagne par la Financial Services Authority (FSA) a, dès 2000, fusionné la régulation financière et bancaire, ce que la France n’a pas fait (tandis que la France a fusionné la régulation des assurances et la régulation bancaire à travers l’ACPR). Ainsi, la première branche de l’alternative est la fusion institutionnelle, au risque de constituer des sortes de Titans, voire de reconstituer l’État. Soit on établit des procédures de consultation et de travaux communes, pour faire naître des points de contact, voire une base de doctrine commune contre les régulateur. L’autre branche de l’alternative consiste à respecter ce rapport initial entre régulation et secteur et de prendre acte des liens entre les secteurs à travers la notion proposée de « inter-régulation ». Cela suppose alors de mettre en place des réseaux entre des autorités demeurées autonomes, mais qui s’échangent des informations, se rencontrent, collaborent sur des dossiers communs, etc. Cette interrégulation peut d’abord être horizontale lorsque des autorités de plusieurs secteurs collaborent, par exemple l’autorité de contrôle prudentiel et l’autorité des marchés financiers, ou l’ARCEP et le CSA. Elle peut être aussi de type vertical lorsque les autorités de secteurs nationaux collaborent avec des autorités étrangères ou des autorités européennes ou internationales, comme le prévoit le processus Lamfalussy en matière financière (élargi aux secteurs de la banque et des assurances) ou le processus de Madrid en matière énergétique par lesquels chaque régulateur nationaux se rencontrent et travaillent en commun, avec et autour de la Commission européenne (technique de la comitologie).

L'interrégulation qui est ensuite notionnelle, un "droit commun" de la régulation s'élaborant, commun entre tous les secteurs. Ce "droit commun" (droit horizontal) est venu après la maturation des droits sectoriels de la régulation (droits verticaux). Il s'élabore de fait parce que les objets régulés se situent à la frontière de plusieurs secteurs, voire ignorent celle-ci : par exemple les produits financiers dérivés sur sous-jacent agricole ou énergétique. Plus encore, les "objets collectés" engendrent de l'interrégulation dans l'espace numérique. Ainsi, alors même qu'il est possible qu'Internet, donne lieu à une "interrégulation" avant de donner lieu à une régulation spécifique, celle-ci pouvant justifier que l'on se passe de la première. 

► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "Compliance Obligation and Human Rights​", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The author asks whether human rights can, over and above the many compliance obligations, form the basis of the Compliance Obligation. The consideration of human rights corresponds to the fundamentalisation of Law, crossing both Private and Public Law, and are considered by some as the matrix of many legal mechanisms, including international ones. They prescribe values that can thus be disseminated.

Human rights come into direct contact with Compliance Law as soon as Compliance Law is defined as "the internalisation in certain operators of the obligation to structure themselves in order to achieve goals which are not natural to them, goals which are set by public authorities responsible for the future of social groups, goals which these companies must willingly or by force aim to achieve, simply because they are in a position to achieve them". These "Monumental Goals" converge on human beings, and therefore the protection of their rights by companies. 

In a globalised context, the State can either act through mandatory regulations, or do nothing, or force companies to act through Compliance Law. For this to be effective, tools are needed to enable 'crucial' operators to take responsibility ex ante, as illustrated in particular by the French law on the Vigilance Obligation of 2017.

This obligation takes the form of both a "legal obligation", expression which is quite  imprecise, found for example in the duty of vigilance of the French 2017 law, and in a more technical sense through an obligation that the company establishes, in particular through contracts.

Legal obligations are justified by the fact that the protection of human rights is primarily the responsibility of States, particularly in the international arena. Even if it is only a question of Soft Law, non-binding Law, this tendency can be found in the Ruggie principles, which go beyond the obligation of States not to violate human rights, to a positive obligation to protect them effectively. The question of whether this could apply not only to States but also to companies is hotly debated. If we look at the ICSID Urbaser v. Argentina award of 2016, the arbitrators accepted that a company had an obligation not to violate human rights, but rejected an obligation to protect them effectively. In European Law, the GDPR, DSA and AIA, and in France the so-called Vigilance law, use Compliance Lools, often Compliance by Design, to protect human rights ex ante.

Contracts, particularly through the inclusion of multiple clauses in often international contracts, express the "privatisation" of human rights. Care should be taken to ensure that appropriate sanctions are associated with them and that they do not give rise to situations of contractual imbalance. The relationship of obligation in tort makes it necessary to articulate the Ex Ante logic and the Ex Post logic and to conceive what the judge can order.

The author concludes that "la compliance oblige à remodeler les catégories classiques du droit dans l’optique de les adosser à l’objectif même de la compliance : non pas uniquement un droit tourné vers le passé, mais un droit ancré dans les enjeux du futur ; non pas un droit émanant exclusivement de la contrainte publique, mais un droit s’appuyant sur de la normativité privée ; non pas un droit strictement territorialisé, mais un droit appréhendant l’espace transnational" ("Compliance requires us to reshape the classic categories of Law with a view to bringing them into line with the very objective of Compliance: not just a Law turned towards the past, but a Law anchored in the challenges of the future; not a Law emanating exclusively from public constraint, but a Law based on private normativity; not a strictly territorialised Law, but a law apprehending the transnational space".

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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