Competition is the law of the market. It allows the emergence of the exact price, which is often referred to as "fair price". It means and requires that agents on the market are both mobile, that is to say free to exercise their will, and atomized, that is to say, not grouped together. This is true for those who offer a good or service, the offerers, as well as for those seeking to acquire them, the applicants: the bidders seek to attract the applicants so that they buy them the goods and services that they propose.  Bidders are in competition with each other.

In the competitive market, buyers are indulging in their natural infidelity: even if they have previously bought a product from an A supplier, they will be able to turn away from him in favor of a B supplier if the latter offers them a product more attractive in terms of quality or price. Price is the main signal and information provided by the suppliers on the market to excite this competitive mobility of the offerers. Thus, free competition accelerates market liquidity, the circulation of goods and services, raises the quality of products and services and lowers prices. It is therefore a moral and virtuous system, as Adam Smith wanted, a system which is the fruits of individual vices. That is why everything that will inject "viscosity" into the system will be countered by Competition Law as "non-virtuous": not only frontal coordination on prices but for example, exclusivity clauses, agreements by which companies delay their entry on the market or intellectual property rights which confer on the patentee a monopoly.

Admittedly, Competition Law can not be reduced to a presentation of such simplicity, since it admits economic organizations which deviate from this basic model, for example distribution networks or patent mechanisms on which, inter alia, is built the pharmaceutical sector. But the impact is probative: in the sphere of Competition Law, if one is in a pattern that is not part of the fundamental figure of the free confrontation of supply and demand, he has to demonstrate the legitimacy and efficiency of its organization, which is a heavy burden on the firm or the State concerned.

Thus, in the field of Regulation, if regulatory mechanis were to be regarded as an exception to competition, an exception admitted by the competition authorities, but which should be constantly demonstrated before them by its legitimacy and effectiveness in the light of the "competitive order", then public organizations and operators in regulated sectors would always face a heavy burden of proof. This is what the competition authorities consider.

But if we consider that regulated sectors have a completely different logic from competitive logic, both from an economic and a legal point of view, the Law of Regulation refers in particular to the notion of public service and having its own institutions, which are the regulatory authorities, then certain behaviors, in particular monopolies, are not illegitimate in themselves and do not have to justify themselves in relation to the competitive model, for they are not the exception ( Such as the public education or health service).

► Référence complète : A.-M. Ilcheva, "Condamnation de Shell aux Pays-Bas : la responsabilité climatique des entreprises pétrolières se dessine", D. 2021, pp. 1968-1970

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► Résumé de l'article : Après une brève description de l'affaire en cause au principal, l'auteure explicite dans un premier les fondements du jugement dit "Shell". Elle explique que l'action engagée était fondée sur le droit de la responsabilité civile délictuelle néerlandais, plus précisément le "duty of care" de l'article 6:162 du code civil néerlandais, lequel amène le juge, afin d'établir le fait générateur, à apprécier le comportement de l'entreprise défenderesse au regard du standard de comportement de la personne prudente et raisonnable. Sont également mobilisés par le juge des travaux scientifiques (rapport du GIEC), des normes de droit international (CEDH) et des normes de droit souple (Principes directeurs de l'ONU), afin de caractériser tant le fait générateur que le dommage (notamment futur). Dans un second temps, l'auteure envisage la portée de ce jugement, frappé d'appel au moment de la rédaction de son article. Elle souligne que le juge s'est appuyé sur la notion d'entreprise, permettant ainsi de contourner l'obstacle traditionnel lié à la personnalité morale, et qu'il a retenu ici une responsabilité préventive, tournée vers le futur. Elle termine en mettant en avant les conditions nécessaires pour que ce jugement soit effectif et constate que l'effort demandé à l'entreprise est plus important que celui préconisé par les rapports d'experts.

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Droit et économie, tome 37, ed. Sirey, 1992, 426 p. 

Read the table of contents.

Read the summaries of the articles in english. 

See the presentation of others volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

►Full Reference: Delalieu, G., La loi sur le devoir de vigilance des sociétés multinationales : parcours d’une loi improbable, Droit et Société, 2020/3, n°106, p.649-665.

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►English Summary of the Article (done by the Author): (Corporate Duty of Vigilance in France: The Path of an Improbable Statute). This article offers an analysis of the resistance encountered by defenders (NGOs and trade unions) of the French Law on Corporate Duty of Vigilance. These actors sought to behave as institutional entrepreneurs deploying intense advocacy and lobbying efforts to successfully have this bill tabled, examined, and ultimately passed by the French government. Considering this case, the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship” is discussed and then relativized using Machiavelli’s notion of “Fortuna,” to describe the “improbable” adoption of this statute. The results tend to put into perspective the importance that individual actors, including collective ones, can have in the explanation of institutional change, in favor of a multilevel analysis of change (micro, meso, macro).

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► Full Reference: O. Douvreleur,  "Compliance and Judge ruling only on points of Law", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published. 

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► Article Summary (done by the Journal of Regulation): Compliance maintains with the judge complex relations, and even more with the judge ruling only on points of Law  (in France, the Court de Cassation in the judicial order, the one who, in principle, does not know the facts that he leaves to the sovereign appreciation of the judges ruling on the substance of the disputes. At first glance, compliance is a technique internalised in companies and the place occupied by negotiated justice techniques leave little room for intervention by the judge ruling only on points of Law

However, his role is intended to develop, in particular with regard to the duty of vigilance or in the articulation between the different branches of Law when compliance meets Labor Law, or even in the adjustment between American Law and the other legal systems, especially French legal system. The way in which the principle of Proportionality will take place in Compliance Law is also a major issue for the judge ruling only on points of Law.

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📘 read the general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published

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The goal for which a mechanism, a solution an institution or a rule is adopted, instituted or elaborated, is in principle external to them. Knowledge of this goal is a tool to better understand them and is only that.

On the contrary, in Regulation Law, the goal is the heart itself. By definition, Regulation Law is a set of instruments that articulate to take their meaning in relation to a goal. Moreover, these instruments are legitimate to represent a constraint only because they realize a goal which is itself legitimate. The interpretation of Regulation Law is based on the aims pursued: the reasoning is teleological.

This teleological nature explains that efficiency is no longer merely a concern - as for ordinary legal mechanisms, but rather a principle of Regulation Law. It explains the welcome, especially through the European Union Law of the theory of the useful effect. This link between rules, which are only means, and aims, refers to the principle of proportionality, which requires that constraints and exceptions be applied only when they are necessary, proportionality being the form off the classic principle of necessity.

Because the aim is the center, it must be expressed by the author of the Regulation standards, and this is all the more so if they are of a political nature, being not limited to mitigating technical failures of markets. This goal can be varied: the management of systemic risks, but also the consideration of the fundamental rights of people, the preservation of the environment, public health, civilization, education, etc. The silence of the legislature, which limits itself to the making of rules whereas these are merely instruments, without explicating the goal whereas the latter is a political decision, is a fault in the legislative art.

Moreover, in order that the person who applies the Regulation norm, in particular the Regulator and the Judge, has no excessive margin for interpretation and does not substitute for political power, the author of the Regulation norm needs to aim specifically for one goal : in this way, the one who applies the norm will be constrained. Or, if the author targets several purposes, then he must articulate them in relation to each other, by hierarchizing them for example. If he fails to do so, the institution which applies the regulatory standards will itself have to choose the purpose and exercise a power which he does not possess.

This express designation of purpose has been made for the European Banking Union,  this Regulation and Supervision construction, whose primary aim is to prevent systemic risks and resolve crises. Similarly, the purpose of the Regulation of essentiel infrastructures is to provide third parties access to the network. Similarly, in the case of a transitional regulation introduced following liberalization, the aim is to establish competition, the principle of which has been declared by the liberalization law. When this is not clearly stated, there is a lapse in the legislative art.

► Full Reference: J.-B. Blanc, "La loi, source de l’Obligation de Compliance" ("The Law, source of the Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, "Régulations & Compliance" Serie, to be published

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'Obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Summary of this contribution  (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer - present or future - or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism.

This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system.

But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law  when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory  Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture.

Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed.

When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization.

Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.

First of all, the Regulation and Compliance Law is difficult to understand in others languages than English, through translation, for example in French.  This corpus of rules and institutions suffers from ambiguity and confusion because of its vocabulary of Anglophone origin, in which words or expressions that are similar or identical have not the same meaning in English and, for example, in French..

To every lord all honor, this is the case for the term "Regulation".

In English, "regulation" refers to the phenomenon which the French language expresses by the term "Régulation". But it can also aim at the complete fitting of what will hold a sector reaching a market failure and in which regulation is only one tool among others. The expression "regulatory system" will be used with precision, but also the term "Regulation", the use of the capital letter indicating the difference between the simple administrative power to take texts ("regulation") and the entire system which supports the sector ("Regulation"). It is inevitable that in a quick reading, or even by the play of digital, which overwrites the capital letters, and the automatic translations, this distinction of formulation, which stands for a lower / upper case, disappears. And confusion arises.

The consequences are considerable. It is notably because of this homonymy, that frequently in the French language one puts at the same level the Droit de la Régulation ("regulatory law, Regulation") and the réglementation (regulation). It will be based on such an association, of a tautological nature, to assert that "by nature" the Regulatory Law  is "public law", since the author of the reglementation (regulation) is a person of public law, in particular the State or Independent administrative authorities such as Regulators. There remains the current and difficult justification for the considerable presence of contracts, arbitrators, etc. Except to criticize the very idea of Regulatory Law, because it would be the sign of a sort of victory of the private interests, since conceived by instruments of private law.

Thus two major disadvantages appear. First of all, it maintains in the Law of Regulation the summa divisio of Public and Private Law, which is no longer able to account for the evolution of Law in this field and leads observers, notably economists or international Institutions, to assert that the Common Law system would be more adapted today to the world economy notably because if it does indeed place administrative law, constitutional law, etc., it does not conceive them through the distinction Law Public / private law, as the Continental system of Civil Law continues to do.

Secondly, no doubt because this new Law draws on economic and financial theories that are mainly built in the United Kingdom and the United States, the habit is taken to no longer translate. In other languages, for example, texts written in French are phrases such as "le Régulateur doit être  accountable".

It is inaccurate that the idea of ​​accountability is reducible to the idea of ​​"responsibility". The authors do not translate it, they do not recopy and insert it in texts written in French.

One passes from the "translation-treason" to the absence of translation, that is to say to the domination of the system of thought whose word is native, here the U.K. and the U.S.A.

One of the current major issues of this phenomenon is in the very term of "Compliance". The French term "conformité" does not translate it. To respect what compliance is, it is appropriate for the moment to recopy the word itself, so as not to denature the concept by a translation. The challenge is to find a francophone word that expresses this new idea, particularly with regard to legal systems that are not common law, so that their general framework remains.

► Référence complète : B. Lecourt, "Des obligations d'information en matière de droit de l'homme et d'environnement au devoir de vigilance", in B. Lecourt (dir.) Lebvre - Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes et commentaires", 2025, pp

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📗lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Le devoir européen de vigilance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Full Reference: R. Sève, "L'Obligation de Compliance et les mutations de la souveraineté et de la citoyenneté" ("Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, forthcoming.

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📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published.

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► English Summary of this article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : The contribution describes "les changements de philosophie du droit que la notion de compliance peut impliquer par rapport à la représentation moderne de l’Etat assurant l’effectivité des lois issues de la volonté générale, dans le respect des libertés fondamentales qui constituent l’essence du sujet de droit." ("the changes in legal philosophy that the notion of Compliance may imply in relation to the modern representation of the State ensuring the effectiveness of laws resulting from the general will, while respecting the fundamental freedoms that constitute the essence of the subject of law").

The contributor believes that the definition of Compliance is due to authors who « jouer un rôle d’éclairage et de structuration d’un vaste ensemble d’idées et de phénomènes précédemment envisagés de manière disjointe.  Pour ce qui nous occupe, c’est sûrement le cas de la théorie de la compliance, développée en France par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche dans la lignée de grands économistes (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) et dont la première forme résidait dans les travaux bien connus de la Professeure sur le droit de la régulation. » ( "play a role in illuminating and structuring a vast set of ideas and phenomena previously considered in a disjointed manner.  For our purposes, this is certainly the case with the theory of Compliance, developed in France by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche in the tradition of great economists (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) and whose first form was in her well-known work on Regulatory Law").

Drawing on the Principles of the Law of the American Law Institute, which considers compliance to be a "set of rules, principles, controls, authorities, offices and practices designed to ensure that an organisation conforms to external and internal norms", he stresses that Compliance thus appears to be a neutral mechanism aimed at efficiency through a move towards Ex Ante. But he stresses that the novelty lies in the fact that it is aimed 'only' at future events, by 'refounding' and 'monumentalising' the matter through the notion of 'monumental goals' conceived by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, giving rise to a new jus comune. Thus, "la compliance c’est l’idée permanente du droit appliquée à de nouveaux contextes et défis." ("Compliance is the permanent idea of Law applied to new contexts and challenges"). 

So it's not a question of making budget savings, but rather of continuing to apply the philosophy of the Social Contract to complex issues, particularly environmental issues. 

This renews the place occupied by the Citizen, who appears not only as an individual, as in the classical Greek concept and that of Rousseau, but also through entities such as NGOs, while large companies, because they alone have the means to pursue the Compliance Monumental Goals, would be like "super-citizens", something that the digital space is beginning to experience, at the risk of the individuals themselves disappearing as a result of "surveillance capitalism". But in the same way that thinking about the Social Contract is linked to thinking about capitalism, Compliance is part of a logical historical extension, without any fundamental break: "C’est le développement et la complexité du capitalisme qui forcent à introduire dans les entités privées des mécanismes procéduraux d’essence bureaucratique, pour discipliner les salariés, contenir les critiques internes et externes, soutenir les managers en place" ("It is the development and complexity of capitalism that forces us to introduce procedural mechanisms of a bureaucratic nature into private entities, in order to discipline employees, contain internal and external criticism, and support the managers in place") by forcing them to justify remuneration, benefits, and so on.

Furthermore, in the words of the author, "Avec les buts monumentaux, - la prise en compte des effets lointains, diffus, agrégés par delà les frontières, de l’intérêt des générations futures, de tous les êtres vivants - ,  on passe, pour ainsi dire, à une dimension industrielle de l’éthique, que seuls de vastes systèmes de traitement de l’information permettent d’envisager effectivement." ("With the Monumental Goals - taking into account the distant, diffuse effects, aggregated across borders, the interests of future generations, of all living beings - we move, so to speak, to an industrial dimension of ethics, which only vast information processing systems can effectively envisage").

This is how we can find a division between artificial intelligence and human beings in organisations, particularly companies, or in decision-making processes.

In the same way, individual freedom does not disappear with Compliance, because it is precisely one of its monumental goals to enable individuals to make choices in a complex environment, particularly in the digital space where the democratic system is now at stake, while technical mechanisms such as early warning will revive the right to civil disobedience, invalidating the complaint of "surveillance capitalism".

The author concludes that the stakes are so high that Compliance, which has already overcome the distinctions between Private and Public Law and between national and international law, must also overcome the distinction between Information and secrecy, particularly in view of cyber-risks, which requires the State to develop and implement non-public Compliance strategies to safeguard the future.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Concevoir l'Obligation de Compliance : faire usage de sa position pour participer à la réalisation des Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance" ("Conceiving the Compliance Obligation: Using its Position to take part in achieving the Compliance Monumental Goals"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, "Régulations & Compliance" Serie, 2024, to be published

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📝read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this contribution has been built, with  more developments, technical references and hyperlinks. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 

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► English summary of this contribution: Rather than getting bogged down in definitional disputes, given that Compliance Law is itself a incipient branch of Law, the idea of this contribution is to take as a starting point the different regimes of so many different compliance obligations to which laws and regulations subject large companies: sometimes they must apply them to the letter and sometimes they are only penalised in the event of fault or negligence. This brings us back to the distinction between obligations of result and obligations of means.

Although it might be risky to transpose the expression and regime of contractual obligations to legal obligations, starting from this observation in the Compliance Evidentiary System of a plurality of obligations of means and of result, depending on whether we are dealing with this or that technical compliance obligation, we must first classify them. It would appear that this plurality does not constitute a definitive obstacle to the creation of a single definition of the Compliance Obligation. On the contrary, it makes it possible to clarify the situation, to trace the paths through what is so often described as a legal jumble, an unmanageable mass of regulations.

Indeed, insofar as the company obliged under Compliance Law participates in the achievement of the Monumental Goals on which this branch of Law is normatively based, a legal obligation which may be relayed by contract or even by ethics, it can only be an obligation of means, by virtue of this very teleological nature and the scale of the goals targeted, for example the happy outcome of the climate crisis which is beginning or the desired effective equality between human beings. This established principle leaves room for the fact that the behaviour required is marked out by processes put in place by structured tools, most often legally described, for example the establishment of a vigilance plan or regularly organised training courses (effectiveness), are obligations of result, while the positive effects produced by this plan or these training courses (efficacy) are obligations of means. This is even more the case when the aim is to transform the system as a whole, i.e. to ensure that the system is solidly based, that there is a culture of equality, and that everyone respects everyone else - all of which come under the heading of efficiency.

The Compliance Obligation thus appears unified because, gradually, and whatever the various compliance obligations in question, their intensity or their sector, its structural process prerequisites are first and foremost structures to be established which the Law, through the Judge in particular, will require to be put in place but will not require anything more, whereas striving towards the achievement of the aforementioned Monumental Goals will be an obligation of means, which may seem lighter, but corresponds to an immeasurable ambition, linked with these Goals. Moreover, because these structures (warning platforms, training, audits, contracts and clauses, etc.) only have meaning in order to produce effects and behaviour leading to changes converging towards the Monumental Goals, it is the obligations of means that are most important and not the obligations of result. The judge must also take this into account.

Finally, the Compliance Obligation, which therefore consists of this interweaving of multiple compliance obligations of result and means of using the Entreprise's position, ultimately aims at system efficiency, in Europe at system civilisation, for which companies must show not so much that they have followed the processes correctly (result) but that this has produced effects that converge with the Goals sought by the legislator (effects produced according to a credible trajectory). This is how a crucial economic operator, responsible Ex Ante, should organise itself and behave.

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Référence complète : Queinnec, Y et Constantin, A., Devoir de vigilance. Les organes de gouvernance des entreprises en première ligne, in Le Big Bang des devoirs de vigilance ESG : les nouveaux enjeux de RSE et de droit de l'homme, doss., Revue Lamy Droit des Affaires, n°104, mai 2015, p.68-74.

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► Référence complète : Association des professionnels du contentieux économique et financier (APCEF), La réparation du préjudice économique et financier par les juridictions pénales, 2019.

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Lire le rapport : 

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The term "breach" is new in Law. In the legal order, the term "fault" is that which is retained to designate the behavior of a person who deviates from a rule and must be sanctioned, because by this act he has manifested a fraudulent intention which may is reproached to him. But the legal notion of fault, which was central in the classic Law of civil liability and was essential in criminal liability Law has the major drawback of calling for proof: that of the intention to "do wrong". This seems all the less adequate when it comes to assessing the behavior of organizations, such as companies, whose behavior and power must be controlled more than the faulty behavior of their leaders sanctioned.

This is why both to lighten the burden of proof concerning natural persons, in particular those with the power and the function of deciding for others (managers, "senior executives") and to better correspond to the distribution of the power of The action, which is now held by organizations, in particular companies, are "failures" and no longer faults or negligence which constitute the triggering events triggering their liability or justifying repression.

It is more particularly an administrative repression, the end of which is not to sanction misconduct but to effectively protect the regulated sectors. The sanction for breaches is therefore both easier, because it is always necessary to prove the intention, and more violent, because the sanctions attached can relate to a share of the profits withdrawn, to a share of the turnover. business of the operator or can take the form of commitments by the operator for the future, a very restrictive and new form of sanction that the compliance technique has inserted into the law.

Thus the breach can be defined as a behavior, even an organization which is away from the behavior or the situation that the author of a text has posed as being that which he posits as adequate. This definition, which is at the same time broad, abstract, teleological and prescription, which makes it possible to apprehend not only behaviors but also structures, makes the sanction of breaches a daily tool of Regulatory Law.

Référence complète : Lalande, P.-A., Le pouvoir d’injonction au service de la réparation du préjudice écologique : une mise en œuvre de l’office du juge administratif en matière climatique, Actu-Juridique, 9 décembre 2021.

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Lire l'article. 

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Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.

La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.

Lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Contentieux Systémique Émergent (Emerging Systemic Litigation), Paris, LGDJ, "Droit & Économie" Serie, to be published

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📚Consult all the other books of the Serie in which this book is published

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► General Presentation of the Book : 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

The State's traditional view is that it serves the general interest through its public services, either directly (by its administrations, or even by public enterprises), or by delegation (eg through the concession mechanism). Public service is generally defined in a functional way, ie through public service missions that the organization must perform, such as providing public transport or caring for the population whatever (Eg in France by the public firm the SNCF). The liberalization of those public sectors, the primary reference to the market as a means of achieving the general interest, the primary reference to competition and the play of the European Law has destroyed this intimacy between public service, general interest, public enterprise and State.

Today, in a dialectical game, the Regulation keeps this concern for public service missions in balance with the competition, in a competitive context and under the control of a Regulator. The system is more complex and challenging because it creates new difficulties, such as information asymmetry or less easy integration of long-term planning, but it is better suited to an open and globalized economy.

Control is a concept so central in Regulation that, in the difficult exercise of translation, the English term of "Regulation" or the expression "Regulatory system" are often translated, for example in French,, by the French word "control" (contrôle). Indeed, the Regulator controls the sector for which he  is responsible. This control is carried out ex ante by the adoption of standards of behavior, whether the Regulator prohibits behavior or obliges the operators to do so. In addition, the Regulators exercises his control powers through the power to approve companies entering the sector or the power to certify certain types of products sold on the markets for which he is responsible. In addition, he continuously monitors the sectors for which he is responsible since his function is either to construct them to bring them to maturity or to remain in balance between the principle of competition and another concern, for example to ensure that they do not fall into a systemic crisis.

These ex ante controls radically distinguish the regulatory authority from the competition authority, which intervenes only ex post. Finally, the regulatory authority controls the sector in ex post: in this he works on a temporal continuum, sanctioning the failings he finds on the part of the operators to the prescriptions he has adopted himself. he often has the power to settle disputes if two operators compete in a dispute between them and bring it before him.

This control function specific of the regulatory authority, which it often shares with the traditional administration and which opposes it to the activity of the competition authority and the courts, is made difficult by its possible lack of independence. Indeed, because the Regulator is a State boddy, if the regulator has to control a public operator, it may risk being captured by the government, since the whole organization of the regulatory system must therefore ensure its independence not only statutory but also budgetary in relation to it. This risk of capture is permanent not only because of the government but also because of the sector. Secondly, control can be inefficient if the regulator lacks adequate, reliable and timely information, risk generated by information asymmetry.

To fight against this, according to the childish image of the stick and the carrot, we must at the same time give the regulator powers to extirpate information that the operators do not want to provide, the texts never ceasing to give regulators new powers, such as perquisitions power ou sanction ou settlemeent. Symmetrically, operators are encouraged to provide information to the market and the regulator, for example through leniency programs or the multiplication of information to be inserted in company documents. Finally, there is a difficult balance between the need to combat the capture of the regulator and the need to reduce the asymmetry of information since the best way for the latter to obtain information from the sector is by frequent attendance by operators: , This exchange that they accept very willingly is the open voice to the capture. It is therefore an art for the regulator to keep operators at a distance while obtaining from them information that only untended relationships allow him to obtain.

Moreover, the Compliance Law which is in the process of being put in place is intended to resolve this major difficulty, since the operator becomes the primary agent for the implementation of the Regulation Law, whose aims are internalized in the " crucial " and global operators perator, operator crucial and global, the Regulator ensuring the effective structural change of the operator to realize these goals of this Global Regulation Law.

Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📕In parallel, a book in French L'Obligation de compliance, is published in the collection "Régulations & Compliance" co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz. 

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📚This book is inserted in this series created by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche for developing Compliance Law.

 read the presentations of the other books of this Compliance Series:

• further books:

🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📘Compliance Probation system, 2027

• previous books:

​🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed), 📘Compliance Juridictionnalisation, 2023

🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021

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► go to the general presentation of this 📚Series ​Compliance & Regulation, conceived, founded et managed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, co-published par the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant. 

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🧮the book follows the cycle of colloquia 2023 organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners.

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► general presentation of the book: Compliance is sometimes presented as something that cannot be avoided, which is tantamount to seeing it as the legal obligation par excellence, Criminal Law being its most appropriate mode of expression. However, this is not so evident. Moreover, it is becoming difficult to find a unity to the set of compliance tools, encompassing what refers to a moral representation of the world, or even to the cultures specific to each company, Compliance Law only having to produce incentives or translate this ethical movement. The obligation of compliance is therefore difficult to define.

This difficulty to define affecting the obligation of compliance reflects the uncertainty that still affects Compliance Law in which this obligation develops. Indeed, if we were to limit this branch of law to the obligation to "be conform" with the applicable regulations, the obligation would then be located more in these "regulations", the classical branches of Law which are Contract Law and Tort Law organising "Obligations" paradoxically remaining distant from it. In practice, however, it is on the one hand Liability actions that give life to legal requirements, while companies make themselves responsible through commitments, often unilateral, while contracts multiply, the articulation between legal requirements and corporate and contractual organisations ultimately creating a new way of "governing" not only companies but also what is external to them, so that the Monumental Goals, that Compliance Law substantially aims at, are achieved. 

The various Compliance Tools illustrate this spectrum of the Compliance Obligation which varies in its intensity and takes many forms, either as an extension of the classic legal instruments, as in the field of information, or in a more novel way through specific instruments, such as whistleblowing or vigilance. The contract, in that it is by nature an Ex-Ante instrument and not very constrained by borders, can then appear as a natural instrument in the compliance system, as is the Judge who is the guarantor of the proper execution of Contract and Tort laws. The relationship between companies, stakeholders and political authorities is thus renewed.

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🏗️general construction of the book

The book opens with a double Introduction.  The first, which is freely accessible, is a summary of the book, while the second, which is substantial, deals with the future development of the compliance obligation in a borderless economic system.

The first part is devoted to the definition of the Compliance Obligation. 

The second part presents commitments and contracts, in certain new or classic categories, in particular public contracts, and compliance stipulations, analysed and qualified regarding Compliance Law and the various relevant branches of Law.

The third part develops the responsibilities attached to the compliance obligation.

The fourth part refers to the institutions that are responsible for the effectiveness, efficiency, and efficacy of the compliance obligation, including the judge and the international arbitrator. 

The fifth part takes the Obligation or Duty of Vigilance as an illustration of all these considerations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION : OVERVIEW

Section 1 ♦️ Main Aspects of the Book L'Obligation de Compliance, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ Conceiving the unicity of the Compliance Obligation without diluting it, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

TITLE I.

IDENTIFYING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

CHAPTER I: NATURE OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 ♦️ Will, Heart and Calculation, the three marks surrounding the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ Debt, as the basis of the compliance obligation, by 🕴️Bruno Deffains

Section 3 ♦️ Compliance Obligation and Human Rights, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

Section 4 ♦️ Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship, by 🕴️René Sève

CHAPTER II: SPACES OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 ♦️ Industrial Entities and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Etienne Maclouf

Section 2 ♦️ Compliance, Value Chains and Service Economy, by 🕴️Lucien Rapp

Section 3 ♦️ Compliance and conflict of laws. International Law of Vigilance-Conformity, based on recent applications in Europe, by 🕴️Louis d'Avout 

TITLE II.

ARTICULATING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION WITH BRANCHES OF LAW

Section 1 ♦️ Constitutional dimensions of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Stéphane Mouton

Section 2 ♦️ Tax Law and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Daniel Gutmann

Section 3 ♦️ General Procedural Law, prototype of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 4 ♦️ Corporate and Financial Markets Law facing the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Anne-Valérie Le Fur

Section 5 ♦️ The Relation between Tort Law and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Jean-Sébastien Borghetti

Section 6 ♦️ Environmental and Climate Compliance, by 🕴️Marta Torre-Schaub

Section 7 ♦️ Competition Law and Compliance Law, by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

Section 8 ♦️ The Compliance Obligation in Global Law, by 🕴️Benoît Frydman

Section 9 ♦️ Transformation of Labour Relations and Vigilance Obligation, by 🕴️Stéphane Vernac

Section 11 ♦️ Judge of Insolvency Law and Compliance Obligations, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Barbièri

TITLE III.

COMPLIANCE : GIVE AND TAKE THE MEANS TO OBLIGE

CHAPTER I: CONVERGENCE OF SOURCES

Section 1 ♦️ Compliance Obligation, between Will and Consent: obligation upon obligation works, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ What a Commitment is, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 3 ♦️ Cybersecurity and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Michel Séjean

Section 4 ♦️  Place of Hope in the Ability to Apprehend the Future, by 🕴️

Section 5 ♦️ Legal Constraint and Company Strategies in Compliance matters, by 🕴️Jean-Philippe Denis & Nathalie Fabbe-Costes

CHAPTER II: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 ♦️ Reinforcing Compliance Commitments by referring Ex Ante to International Arbitration, by  

Section 2 ♦️ The Arbitral Tribunal's Award in Kind, in support of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Eduardo Silva Romero

Section 3 ♦️ The use of International Arbitration to reinforce the Compliance Obligation: the example of the construction sector, by 🕴️Christophe Lapp & 🕴️Jean-François Guillemin

Section 4 ♦️ The Arbitrator, Judge, Supervisor, Support, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

Section 5 ♦️ How International Arbitration can reinforce the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Laurent Aynès

TITLE IV.

VIGILANCE, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

CHAPTER I: INTENSITIES OF THE VIGILANCE OBLIGATION, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM

Section 1 ♦️ Systemic Articulation between Vigilance, Due Diligence, Conformity and Compliance: Vigilance, Total Share of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Financial Operators, by 🕴️Anne-Claire Rouaud

Section 3 ♦️ Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Banking and Insurance Operators, by 🕴️Mathieu Françon

Section 4 ♦️ Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Digital Operators, by 🕴️Grégoire Loiseau

Section 5 ♦️ Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Energy Operators, by 🕴️Marie Lamoureux

CHAPTER II: VARIATIONS OF TENSIONS GENERATED BY THE VIGILANCE OBLIGATION, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM

Section 1 ♦️ Rethinking the Concept of Civil Liability in the light of the Duty of Vigilance, Spearhead of Compliance, by 🕴️Mustapha Mekki

Section 2 ♦️ The transformation of governance and due diligence, by 🕴️Véronique Magnier

Section 3 ♦️ Technologies available, prescribed or prohibited to meet Compliance and Vigilance requirements, by 🕴️Emmanuel Netter

CHAPTER III: NEW MODALITIES OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION, HIGHLIGHTED BY THE VIGILANCE IMPERATIVE

Section 1 ♦️ How the Vigilance Imperative fits in with International Legal Rules, by 🕴️Bernard Haftel

Section 2 ♦️ Contracts and clauses, implementation and modalities of the Vigilance Obligation, by 🕴️Gilles J. Martin

Section 3 ♦️ Proof that Vigilance has been properly carried out with regard to the Compliance Evidence System, by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

TITLE V.

THE JUDGE AND THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 ♦️ Present and Future Challenges of Articulating Principles of Civil and Commercial Procedure with the Logic of Compliance, by 🕴️Thibault Goujon-Bethan

Section 2 ♦️ Mediation, the way forward for an Effective Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Malik Chapuis

Section 3 ♦️ The Judge required for an Effective Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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►Full Reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, "Droit de la compliance et Contentieux systémique" (Compliance Law and Systemic Litigation), in Chroniques Droit de la Compliance (Compliance Law Chronicles), Recueil Dalloz, 6 November 2025 

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on which this article is based, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks

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►read the English presentation of the previous chronicles:

• "Compliance et conformité : les distinguer pour mieux les articuler", 2024
• "La loi, la compliance, le contrat et le juge: places et alliances", 2023
• "Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance", 2022
• "L'aventure de la compliance", 2020
• "Compliance et personnalité", 2019
• "Théorie juridique de la cartographie des risques", 2019

►read the English presentation of the whole chroniques

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►English summary of this article: Legal systems have changed, and Compliance Law, in its uniqueness, reflects this change and plays a powerful role in it. Through new sets of compliance rules, particularly at European level, in areas such as data protection (GDPR), anti-money laundering (AMLA), climate balance protection (CS3D) and banking and financial system sustainability (Banking Union), techniques (always the same) have been developed and imposed on large companies, which must implement them: alerts, mapping, assessment, sanctions, etc. These new regulatory frameworks only make sense in relation to their ‘Monumental Goals’: to detect systemic risks Ex Ante and prevent crises so that the systems in question do not collapse, but ‘sustain". All the legal instruments in the corpus are normatively rooted in these Monumental Goals, which are the core that unifies Compliance Law (I).

Judges are the guardians (II) of this new and highly ambiguous normative framework, which relies on the practical ability of companies to do just that. They ensure that the technical provisions are applied teleologically in each of these compliance blocks, and that the regulatory frameworks are mutually supportive, for it is always the same systemic goal that all compliance regulations serve: to ensure that systems (banking, financial, climate, digital, energy, etc.) do not collapse, that they are sustainable, and that present and future human beings are not crushed by them but, on the contrary, benefit from them. This unity is still little perceived, as regulations pulverize this profound unity of compliance law in the myriad of changing provisions. Entrusting the "regulatory mass" to algorithms increases this pulverization, making the whole increasingly incomprehensible and therefore impossible to handle.  Acknowledging the judge's rightful place, i.e. at the heart of the matter, will enable us to master this new branch of law. But it's not the judge's job alone to restore clarity to a whole covered in the dust of his own technicality.

The systemic object of Compliance Law is transferred to Litigation. Indeed, the Litigation that emerges from the new Compliance Law is also fundamentally new, by transitivity. Indeed, the aim of Compliance Law is to make systems sustainable (or sustainable, or resilient, the vocabulary varies). The result is litigation which is itself "systemic litigation" (III), most often initiated by an organization against a systemic operator. The place and role of each are transformed (IV).

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► Full reference : M.-A. Frison-Roche, The invention of the 'right to a child'. The consequences of contractual practice as a source of filiation, working document, Sept. 2024 - Oct. 2025.

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🎤This working document forms the basis of a presentation entitled, "Le "droit à l'enfant" est-il concevable, pourquoi et avec quelles conséquences" (Is the 'right to a child' conceivable, why and with what consequences", in Les nouvelles filiations. Diifférentes perspectives (New parentage. Different perspectives." held at the Paris Court of Appeal on 12 September 2024.

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📝Revised, this working document forms the basis of the article to be published in the dossier "Les nouvelles filiations. Regards croisés" (New parentage. Different perspectives), Act. jur. Dalloz Droit de la famille (in French).

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► Summary of this working document  :  Every legal system is built on concepts that form its pillars. Filiation is one such concept. A cas-law solution, presented as pragmatic and casuistic, can overturn this concept. Whether one agrees with it or not, it must first be acknowledged and assessed. Through a series of rulings on surrogacy, notably a ruling by its First Civil Chamber granting exequatur to a judgment recognising the filiation established by surrogacy between a child and persons with no biological link to the child and without recourse to adoption, the French Cour de Cassation has introduced the possibility of creating parentage by contract. This not only changes the concept of filiation but also changes the very structure of the French legal system, which is based on the distinction between persons and things. One may agree or disagree with this, but it must be said. Since the judge gives force to such a contract establishing filiation, with the foreign judge simply recognising it and the French judge ensuring only that the contract is balanced, the prospect opens up of a society in which individuals will be able to contractually create institutions at their disposal, within the private normative space of the contract, with the State's only function being to give effect to their right to legal recognition of their unique "project". Parentage is only a first example. Thus constructed on what was "inconceivable", i.e. a "right to a child", thanks to the contractual power to which the State should lend its force a posteriori, the judge makes parentage resulting from a contract technically "admissible" and opens up a contractually governed society.

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🔓read the working document below⤵️

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► Full reference : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "From the obligation of compliance to the obligation of vigilance: the role of the judge," in From Compliance to Vigilance, 2025, pp.

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📝read the article reproducing the debate (in French)

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► Article summary : The 

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