► Référence complète : J.-Ch. Roda, "La preuve de la bonne exécution de la Vigilance au regard du système probatoire de Compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, à paraître

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La crédibilité" ("Credibility"), in Les techniques probatoires adéquates dans le Contentieux Systémique Émergent (Appropriate Evidentiary Techniques in Emerging Systemic Litigation), in cycle of conference-debates "Contentieux Systémique Émergent" ("Emerging Systemic Litigation"), organised on the initiative of the Cour d'appel de Paris (Paris Cour of Appeal), with the Cour de cassation (French Court of cassation), the Cour d'appel de Versailles (Versailles Court of Appeal), the École nationale de la magistrature - ENM (French National School for the Judiciary) and the École de formation des barreaux du ressort de la Cour d'appel de Paris - EFB (Paris Bar School), under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, October 14, 2024, 11am.-12.30pm., Paris Court of Appeal, Cassin courtroom

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🧮see the full programme of this event

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► English Summary of the conference : 

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► Full Reference: Les techniques probatoires adéquates dans le Contentieux Systémique Émergent (Appropriate Evidentiary Techniques in Emerging Systemic Litigation), in cycle of conference-debates "Contentieux Systémique Émergent" ("Emerging Systemic Litigation"), organised on the initiative of the Cour d'appel de Paris (Paris Cour of Appeal), with the Cour de cassation (French Court of cassation), the Cour d'appel de Versailles (Versailles Court of Appeal), the École nationale de la magistrature - ENM (French National School for the Judiciary) and the École de formation des barreaux du ressort de la Cour d'appel de Paris - EFB (Paris Bar School), under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, October 14, 2024, 11am.-12.30pm., Paris Court of Appeal, Cassin courtroom

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► Presentation of the conference: 

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🧮Programme of this event: 

Sixth conference-debate

LES TECHNIQUES PROBATOIRES ADÉQUATES

DANS LE CONTENTIEUX SYSTÉMIQUE ÉMERGENT 

(APPROPRIATE EVIDENTIARY TECHNIQUES

IN EMERGING SYSTEMIC LITIGATION)

Cour d’appel de Paris, salle Cassin

Presentation and moderation by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Professor of Regulatory and Compliance Law, Director of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC)

🕰️11am.-11.10am. 🎤La crédibilité (Credibility), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Professor of Regulatory and Compliance Law, Director of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC)

🕰️11.10am-11.30am. 🎤Les différentes techniques probatoires quand un système est impliqué dans un litige (The various evidential techniques when a system is involved in a dispute), by 🕴️Thibault Goujon-Bethan, Professor of Law at Jean-Moulin Lyon 3 University, director of the Centre patrimoine et contrats, director of the IEJ de Lyon

🕰️11.30am.-11.50am. 🎤Ce que des entreprises font et les preuves disponibles qui en résultent (What firms are doing and evidence available as a result), by 🕴️Nathalie Fabbe-Costes, Professor of management at Aix-Marseille University 

🕰️11.50am.-12h30pm. Debate

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🔴Registrations and information requests can be sent to: inscriptionscse@gmail.com

🔴For the attorneys, registrations have to be sent to the following address: https://evenium.events/cycle-de-conferences-contentieux-systemique-emergent/ 

⚠️The conference-debates are held in person only, in the Cour d’appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal).

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► Référence complète : Cass. Soc., 18 oct. 2023, n° 22-18.678

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🏛️lire l'arrêt 

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► Full Reference: Ch. Lapp, "La compliance dans l'entreprise : les statuts du process" ("Compliance in the company: the statues of processes"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p.141-150. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law) , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. During this colloquium, the intervention was shared with Jan-Marc Coulon, who is also a contributor in the book (see the summary of the Jean-Marc Coulon's  Article).

In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to:  L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law ).

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): The Company is caught in the grip of Compliance Law, the jaws of which are those of Incitement (1) and Sanction that the Company must apply to ensure the effectiveness of its processes to which it is itself subject (2 ).

First, the Company has been delegated to fabricate reprehensible rules that it must apply to itself and to third parties with whom it has dealings. To this end, the Company sets up "processes", that is to say verification and prevention procedures, in order to show that the offenses that it is likely to commit will not happened.

These processes constitute standards of behavior to prevent and avoid that the facts constituting the infringements are not themselves carried out. They are thus one of the elements of Civil Liability Law in its preventive or restorative purposes.

Second, the sanction of non obedience of Compliance processes puts the Company in front of two pitfalls. The first  dimension place the company, with regard to its employees and its partners, in the obligation to define processes which also constitute the quasi-jurisdictional resolution of their non-compliance, the company having to reconcile the sanction it pronounces with the fundamental principles of classical Criminal Law, constitutional principles and all fundamental rights. The processes then become the procedural rule.

The second dimension is that the Company is accountable for the effectiveness of the avoidance by its processes of facts constituting infringements. By a reversal of the burden of proof, the Company is then required to prove that its processes are efficient. at least equivalent to the measures defined by laws and regulations, the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence Française Anticorruption - AFA), European directives and various communications on legal tools to fight breaches of probity, environmental attacks and current societal concerns. The processes then become the constitutive element, per se, of the infringement.

Thus, in its search for a balance between Prevention and Sanction to which it is itself subject, the Company will not then be tempted to favor the orthodoxy of its processes over the expectations of the Agence Française Anticorruption - AFA , regulators and judges, to the detriment of their efficiency?

In doing so, are we not moving towards an instrumental and conformist Compliance, paradoxically disempowering with regard to the Compliance Monumental Goals of Compliance?

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Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'efficacité de la compliance illustrée par l'affaire Youporn, entretien avec Olivia Dufour, 21 juin 2022.

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💬 Lire l'entretien 

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► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Conceiving Power, Working Paper, December 2021

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📝 This Working Paper serves as the basis for an article to be published in the collective book drawn up in tribute to Professor Emmanuel Gaillard. 

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► Working Paper summary: In 1985, Emmanuel Gaillard's central work came out under the title Le pouvoir en droit privé  (The Power in Private Law)📎!footnote-2418, but when it was defended in 1981, his thesis directed by Dean Cornu was entitled La notion de pouvoir en droit privé (The notion of Power in Private Law) 📎!footnote-2419.

Let's give full force to the original title of the thesis.  

The deletion of the term notion perhaps implies that by defining something the essential is done, that there would be something of a pleonasm in aiming at The notion of Power and The Power, as Law likes to economise on words.  

But it was indeed a renewed, simpler and more powerful conception of the notion of Power, containing the entire regime necessarily imputed, that this work imposed, henceforth illuminating positive Law. Emmanuel Gaillard's definition, on the other hand, goes beyond Private Law. We would gladly have argued in favour of retaining the heading for the term Notion, proposing instead to dispense with the reference to Private Law alone ....

Perhaps it was because the concept is so vast that in this seminal thesis its scope was restricted to Private Law, since the author already had to account for the sheer multiplicity of manifestations in this part of the legal system; Or perhaps it was because the concept of 'Power' is so familiar in Public Law that it would have needed less definition in Public Law (which, moreover, is so diversely proposed in this more political area, which is already careful on principle to distinguish between powers, which must always be plural in order to be separated), and that it was therefore reasonable to want to arrive at a single concept of Power in Private Law, where the notion of subjective rights is more familiar. 

However, Emmanuel Gaillard's definition of Power as a prerogative placed, by legal rule or contract, in the hands of the person invested with them for the benefit, at least in part, of others, covers both Public and Private Law. This even contributes to the solidity of this thesis and explains why it flourishes today in legal systems where the distinction between Private Law and Public Law is weakening.

The power of this definition lies in its simplicity. Simple and brave minds are often the most fruitful. As Dean Gérard Cornu points out in his preface, the author, in particular because he bases himself more on positive law, for example that relating to the powers of corporate officers, does not get bogged down in discussions between authors only to end up preferring one over the other. He arrives at a definition that is close to our everyday experience: the one we experience when we collect an envelope on behalf of someone else and the agent asks us in what capacity we claim to be doing this on his behalf. We then show him our 'power', the legal power to do so for the benefit of the person to whom the letter is addressed, and can thus exercise the power to withdraw the letter, even though it is personal. When legal and common sense come together, it is a good omen, not only in terms of form, because everyone can understand it and the Law must remain comprehensible, but also in terms of substance, because everyone must be able to control the exercise of a power that is exercised for and over others. For this letter addressed to someone else, the person who has been able to take it by virtue of the power conferred on him/her, could just as easily open it and read it, then destroy it or give it to the worst enemy of the person to whom it was addressed. In Power, there is always might to do, and the danger to others that Power contains therefore. 

This highly legal definition of Power not only distances the holder from his/her own interests, but also channels the Power thus granted to the person who benefits from it. In this respect, Emmanuel Gaillard not only distinguished between Power and subjective right, but also identified the right amount of power required for this power to effectively fulfill this 'Mission', through the notion of abuse of power, when the holder uses for other beneficiaries this power that was conferred on him/her for this sole purpose.

What is more, this concept makes it possible to distinguish Power from discretionary force, because the holder of Power thereby exercises factual , by acting for others, deciding for others, deciding on others. Because Power is inseparable from might, but might must remain the means of power and no more, the Law shall produce the antibodies that are not only the theory of abuse of power but also an Ex Ante responsibility that accounts must always be rendered, either to the other for whom everything is done or to a third party. For this third party is often there from the outset, the guardianship judge for example: because the Power was put in place because of the beneficiary's weakness, both in himself/herself and because of the situation, an impartial and disinterested third party is needed to ensure proper execution from the outset, without there even being a dispute. In this respect, how useful this thesis is for thinking about what Supervision is today!  

This thesis, so clear, so simple and so strong, goes beyond Private or Civil Law. It is both much more restrictive than the more factual and political definition of Oower, which would be the ability to do something, and much broader than the usual definitions, since it embraces and legitimises de jure all situations where a person acts legally for the benefit of another.  Dean Cornu shows, moreover, in two sentences that such a notion of power also captures the office of the judge, who has power over others only to serve them 📎!footnote-2420. The definition corresponds to the mission of one who has power only to fulfill his office. It suits so well the conception we have today of Administration, especially if it takes the form of independent authorities.

Moreover, Power thus contains its own limit in its very definition, since others are present in it: the holder has power only to serve others. From then on, it is only a power because it is a kind of Charge. Emmanuel Gaillard immediately uses the term: "Un individu se voit confier une charge qu'il exerce dans un intérêt au moins partiellement distinct du sien propre"  ("An individual is entrusted with an office which he exercises in an interest at least partially distinct from his own") 📎!footnote-2422. Dean Carbonnier, who reformed the legislation in this area 📎!footnote-2456,, emphasised that the guardian has a public duty because the State entrusts him/her with a child. In the same way parental authority is a charge on the parents for the benefit of the children. More generally, Power is a burden that the Law places on a person to satisfy the interests of another.

This definition offered by Emmanuel Gaillard in 1981, anchored in Private Law only insofar as it is the entire legal system, is premonitory of the Regulatory and Compliance Law as it unfolds today. It would be enough to continue the Gaillard's sentences, as if they had been half-written, to finish them 40 years later and find in them the mechanisms of Supervision of companies by public authorities which are now in place not to reduce their power but to ensure that they exercise it for the benefit of others 📎!footnote-2457. The whole evolution of Company Law and Financial Law is here. Between the lines of this thesis, which develops the notion of duty 📎!footnote-2421, we can also see what positive Law is developing today, in particular through the 'duty of Vigilance', this personal responsibility for the benefit of others (I).

The definition of Power thus conceived contains within itself its regime and enables us to anticipate it better today: because the holder exercises Power only for others, at least partially, he is consubstantially accountable for it, responsibility being only one form of this accountability; because this service must be effective and others must benefit fully from it, because unlike the subjective right which allows the holder freely not to use his might, Power has never been the 'most absolute' availability to use his/her might: it is even the opposite. It is the expression of a Power assigned to a purpose, compelling the holder to use his/her Power to that end.  But it is equally necessary for the holder to have all the might to do so, otherwise the very notion of 'Power' is meaningless. This is the definition that should be given to the principle of Proportionality: the person on whom the Power rests must have not more power than is necessary, but all the power necessary to achieve the Monumental Goals for which the Power has been entrusted to him/her, so that others may derive full benefit from it (II). 

In today's positive Law, the definition of Power as a Duty is found not only in Private Law but also in Public Law, not least because pure might, i.e. those that do not account for the use of their might, are in decline while concern for others is on the increase. The days of discretionary powers are over, and the increased independence of those who exercise Power over others requires them to be accountable. Beyond this Accountability, the personal Responsibility of those who have the Power to serve others is being established. But, no doubt because the Law is slow to evolve, the correlative idea that the holder of Power must have all the powers required to carry out his/her mission is less entrenched:  As Emmanuel Gaillard has shown, the Law has only gone part of the way in sanctioning excesses of power, when the holder uses his/her power for other goals, but it has not yet clearly established that the holder - sometimes forced - of a Power is legitimate in using all the means required to achieve the result for which this Power, i.e. a charge and a duty, has been conferred on him/her.  

No doubt we need to read Emmanuel Gaillard's thesis again in all its potential, to imagine the reading we could do today of what he could have written as if on blank pages that would write themselves, a magical thesis where everything is already there, a thesis so short (250 pages) and so beautiful, so dense that it already contains the Law of the Future. The Law of the Future 📎!footnote-2458  where there must be much more responsibility for the benefit of others📎!footnote-2423 and powers since this notion includes others who are the beneficiaries. Droit de l'Avenir where Emmanuel Gaillard will be present, in particular thanks to this work of doctrine offered in 1981.  So that, in practical terms, those who are entrusted with looking after others - for example, today all companies obliged by Compliance Law to look after others so that they are not destroyed by hatred in the digital space, by corruption in the economic system or by climate change in a projected future - do not find themselves challenged by the same Law for the means of exercising this power for the benefit of others, for example when this involves 'judging'. Dean Cornu himself emphasised the identity of the two offices.

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Lire les développement ci-dessous⤵

► Référence complète : N. Ida, "La charge de la preuve en matière de compliance : réflexion à partir de la décision Imerys", Rev. sociétés, 2020, pp. 464-470

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : "La commission des sanctions de l'Agence française anticorruption a rendu sa deuxième décision de sanction le 7 février 2020 dans l'affaire Imerys. À cette occasion, elle a rappelé que la vraisemblance du manquement reproché à la société mise en cause suffit à renverser la charge de la preuve sur cette dernière, qui est alors tenue de démontrer qu'elle a respecté ses obligations. Cette solution est originale en ce qu'elle déroge au principe d'attribution de la charge de la preuve à l'accusation. Elle se justifie néanmoins dans le contexte particulier du droit de la compliance, en raison de la plus grande aptitude probatoire des entreprises assujetties aux obligations de prévention de la corruption, qui sont légalement tenues de se préconstituer des preuves par le biais de documents imposés.".

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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 It is often observed, even theorized, even advised and touted, that Compliance is a mechanism by which public authorities internalize political (eg environmental) concerns in big companies, which accept them, in Ex Ante, because they are rather in agreement with these "monumental goals" (eg saving the planet) and that this shared virtue is beneficial to their reputation. It is observed that this could be the most successful way in new configurations, such as digital.

But, and the Compliance Mechanism has often been brought closer to the contractual mechanism, this is only relevant if both parties are willing to do so. This is technically true, for example for the Deferred Prosecution, which requires explicit consent. This is true in a more general sense that the company wants to choose itself how to structure its organization to achieve the goals politically pursued by the State. Conversely, the compliance mechanisms work if the State is willing to admit the economic logic of the global private players and / or, if there are possible breaches, not to pursue its investigations and close the file it has opened, at a price more or less high.

But just say No.

As in contractual matters, the first freedom is negative and depends on the ability to say No.

The State can do it. But the company can do it too.

And Daimler just said No.

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Publicly, including through an article in the Wall Street Journal of June 28, 2019.

The company sets out in a warning to the market that it is the object of a requirement on the part of the German Motor Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt)  of an allegation of fraud, by the installation of a software, aimed at misleading instruments for measuring emissions of greenhouse gases on cars using diesel.

It is therefore an environmental compliance mechanism that would have been intentionally countered.

On this allegation, the Regulator both warns the company of what it considers to be a fact, ie compliance fraud, and attaches it to an immediate measure, namely the removal of the circulation of 42,000 vehicles sold or proposed by Daimler with such a device.

And the firm answers : "No".

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Which is probably only beginning, since a No ends the dialogue of Ex Ante to project in the Ex Post sanction procedures, calls 6 observations:

• 1. No doubt Daimler, a German car manufacturing company, has it in mind in this allegation of fraud calculating pollution of its diesel cars what happened to his competitor Volkswagen: namely a multi-billion dollar fine, for lack of compliance in a similar hypothesis (so-called dieselgate). The strategic choice that is then made depends on education through the experience of the company, which benefits as such from a previous case that has had a very significant cost. Thus educated, the question is to measure the risk taken to refuse any cooperation, when the company can anticipate that it will still result in such an amount ....

• 2. In addition, we find the difficulty of the distinction of Ex Ante and Ex Post. Indeed, saying No will involve for the company a cost of confrontation with the Regulator, then the peripheral jurisdictions or review courts. But in Germany, the Government itself, concerning a bank threatened with compliance proceedings and almost summoned by the US regulator to pay "of its own free will" a transactional fine, felt that this was not normal, because it must be the judges who punish, after a contradictory procedure with due process and after established facts. 

• 3.  However, this is only an allegation, of probable assertions, of what legally allows to continue, but which does not allow to condemn. The confusion between the burden of proof, which presupposes the obligation to prove the facts before being able to sanction, and the burden of the allegation, which only supposes to articulate plausibility before being able to prosecute, is very damaging, particularly if we are committed to the principles of Repressive Law, such as the presumption of innocence and the due process. This distinction between these two probationary charges is at the heart of the probatory system in the Compliance Law. Because Compliance Law always looks for more efficiency, tends to go from the first to the second, to give the Regulator more power, since businesses are so powerful ....

• 4. But the first question then arises: what is the nature no so much of the future measure to be feared, namely a sanction that could be taken later, against Daimler, if the breach is proven, or which will not be applied to the firm if the breach is not established; but what is the nature of the measure immediately taken, namely the return of 42,000 vehicles?

• This may seem like an Ex Ante measurement. Indeed, the Compliance assumes non-polluting cars. The Regulator may have indications that these cars are polluting and that the manufacturer has not made the necessary arrangements for them to be less polluting (Compliance) or even organized so that this failure is not detected ( Compliance fraud).

• This allegation suggests that there is a risk that thiese cars will polluting. They must immediately be removed from circulation for the quality of the environment. Here and now. The question of sanctions will arise after that, having its procedural apparatus of guarantees for the company that will be pursued. But see the situation on the side of the company: having to withdraw 42,000 vehicles from the market is a great damage and what is often called in Repressive Law a "security measure" taken while the evidence is not yet met could deserve a requalification in sanction. Jurisprudence is both abundant and nuanced on this issue of qualification.

• 5. So to withdraw these cars, it is for the company to admit that it is guilty, to increase itself the punishment. And if at this game, taken from the "cost-benefit", as much for the company immediately assert to the market that this requirement of Regulation is unfounded in Law, that the alleged facts are not exacts, and that all this the judges will decide. It is sure at all whether these statements by the company are true or false, but before a Tribunal no one thinks they are true prima facie, they are only allegations.
•  And before a Court, a Regulator appears to have to bear a burden of proof in so far as he has to defend the order he has issued, to prove the breach which he asserts exists, which justifies the exercise he made of his powers. The fact that he exercises his power for the general interest and impartially does not diminish this burden of proof.

• 6. By saying "No", Daimler wants to recover this classic Law, often set aside by Compliance Law, classic Law based on burden of proof, means of proof, and prohibition of punitive measures - except imminent and future imminente and very serious damages  - before 'behavior could be sanctioned following a sanction procedure.
• Admittedly, one would be tempted to make an analogy with the current situation of Boeing whose aircraft are grounded by the Regulator in that he considers that they do not meet the conditions of safety, which the aircraft manufacturer denies , Ex Ante measurement that resembles the retraction measure of the market that constitutes the recall request of cars here operated.
• But the analogy does not work on two points. Firstly, flight activity is a regulated activity that can only be exercised with the Ex Ante authorization of several Regulators, which is not the case for offering to sell cars or to drive with. This is where Regulatory Law and Compliance Law, which often come together, here stand out.Secundly, the very possibility that planes of which it is not excluded that they are not sure is enough, as a precaution, to prohibit their shift. Here (about the cars and the measure of the pollution by them), it is not the safety of the person that is at stake, and probably not even the overall goal of the environment, but the fraud with respect to the obligation to obey Compliance. Why force the withdrawal of 42,000 vehicles? If not to punish? In an exemplary way, to remind in advance and all that it costs not to obey the Compliance? And there, the company says: "I want a judge".

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It is about a particular case that one can rephrase the general questions. If the case is hot, it is even more important to return to the general questions, which are always colder (more boring, too).

Thus, Cambridge Analytica is a case of which everyone speaks a lot ... It is at the same time particular and very burning.

So we talk about it a lot, and with vehemence, and in a way often definitive, as well in attack as in defense.

For the prosecution, there are many advocacies, gathered for example in the Guardian's files.

For the defense, we find less. But one can read for example the article that has been published in early April 2018: Why (almost) everything reported about the Cambridge Analytica Facebook 'hacking' controversy is wrong.

The number of comments, and their more or less inflamed nature, in any case always definitive, does not mean anything in itself.

The regulators took the floor a little later, both in a more concrete way, the "group of 29" (bringing together all the European Regulators personal data) establishing the 11 April 2018 a working group on this subject and publishing April 10, 2018 new guidelines on the place that must be made to "consent".

But for the moment, if we loof at the media, it looks like a trial, because everyone claims to be entirely right and pretends that the other is entirely wrong. Trial to break the truth and virtue, say the accusers. Trial in witchcraft, says Facebook. And it's always up to us.

Because all this is probably due to the fact that we are no longer spectators: we are placed in the judge's position. The financial market was the first judge. It has already condemned. Without really trying to find out. This is because the public good of the financial markets is Trust, it is enough that one can even suspect the wife of Caesar, and so it is not really matter of truth of the facts and goof application of Rule of Law.

For the public opinion that we are, this is something else, because we could wait to know more. And we should, since we seek to remain a little attached to the "truth " of the facts and respect for the Rule of Law. However, this case is complex and is above all a matter of judicial analysis which will come and which we cannot lead ourselves, both in terms of the facts-which are complex-as well as the rules of law to be applied which are equally so.

What turns us into a court, an ordinary sociological phenomenon, is a new legal mechanism: the "whistleblower". By nature, it gives the bonus to the Attack

This logic of the legal mechanism of the whistleblower, a movement of fact to throw facts as one throws a buoy outside but one could also say stones on the firm that the insider denounces, logic today encouraged and protected by the Law, allows a person who knows something, most often because he participated, to let everyone know, without a filter. To denounce it. For the public good..

The successive texts on the whistleblower are nrms of a Compliance Law!footnote-1129 which seek, in particular in French Law, to ensure a balance between this "monumental goal"!footnote-1130 which is the respect of the truth, the fight against corruption, the protection of human beings, etc., and the risks to be endured by the company thus denounced.

The case is exemplary of this, since Facebook is  "denounced" only in second place, behind Cambridge Analytica, but the notoriety and power of the first makes that it is hit first. French law in the so-called "Sapin 2 Act " of 2016 has ensured to protect the company denounced, but British and American Law are more violent, probably because they encourage more the private enforcement.

Temporality is therefore favorable to the attack. The time of the defense is always slower. It is usually the people in situations of weakness who suffer it: slowness of justice, justice outside courthouses, etc. With Compliance mechanisms, it is probably the very powerful who will live this. It is not a matter of rejoicing: the misfortune of some (here the difficulty of a company hasty  "judged") does not console in any way the misfortune of others (the difficulty of ordinary beings accused or having only the right to protect themselves to reach concretely a judge and really get a judgment executed, even as they are in their right).

But if we go to general questions, since on the facts of this case we don't have the means to appreciate them, nor on the rules which apply to them, we cannot apply them in an adequate way until a court will have exercised its office?

However, the general perspectives highlighted by this singular case are two orders: Probationary order (I) and Accountability order (II).

Read below.

L'arrêt rendu le 6 septembre 2017 par la Cour de Justice de l'Union européenne dans le cas Intell c/ Commission Européenne est exemplaire. Il constitue une leçon de droit, un trame de la façon dont une autorité de sanction doit fonctionner : leçon de procédure, au point de contact entre la forme et le fond que constitue la preuve. C'est en cela que le Droit économique, si inspiré par les théories économiques soit-il, doit satisfaire les principes directeurs du droit les plus fondamentaux comme les plus simples, par exemple : l'Autorité ne peut condamner sans preuve. En effet l'Autorité qui sanctionne se rapproche de la figure du juge, l'entreprise poursuivie se rapproche de celle d'une personne poursuivie, titulaire de droits de la défense et du droit de contredire.

D'une concision et d'une clarté de rédaction à faire rougir la doctrine française qui ne cesse de vanter ces qualités dont on cherche parfois trace dans nos décisions nationale de justice, la CJUE exprime 3 idées claires et nettes.

1. En préalable, la CJUE, réunie en Grande chambre, rappelle que l'Autorité de concurrence n'est pas une Autorité de régulation.

Elle pose que sur un marché concurrentiel, la "concurrence par les mérites" permet à une entreprise de vouloir activement atteindre une position dominante, l'éviction des compétition moins efficace étant un bienfait pour les consommateurs, leur présence sur le marché ayant pas à être protégée.

2. En deuxième lieu, la CJUE reprend la construction entre les objets de preuve, leur pertinence, les charges de preuves et le contradictoire.

• La CJUE affirme que l'Autorité de concurrence doit donc démontrer l'objet ou l'effet, effectif ou potentiel, anticoncurrentiel de la pratique.
• L'Autorité peut pour cela recourir à des "tests", comme ici le test AEC (As Efficient Competitor), mais si elle prend appui sur les résultats de celui-ci et si ces résultats sont contestés par l'entreprise, elle ne peut pas condamner celle-ci sans avoir répondu aux critiques méthodologiques ainsi formulées.

3. En troisième lieu, la CJUE continue de veiller au respect des droits de la défense, principe de procédure par lequel la personne menacée par la décision peut faire valoir ses arguments, articulation donc entre le système probatoire et le fond du dossier.

Et c'est pourquoi au terme de cette leçon, la condamnation a été magistralement annulée.

Référence : CJUE, Grande chambre, 6 septembre 2017, Intell c/ Commission Européenne, C‑413/14.

Lire l'arrêt.

Lire l'Ordonnance rendue par le Conseil d’État.

La personne avait saisi les juges administratifs car il est l'objet dans sa détention d'une télésurveillance en continue.

Sa détention provisoire est organisée dans le cadre d'une procédure sur des faits d'homicides multiples s'étant déroulés dans le lieu de spectacle "Le Bataclan".

La personne conteste le traitement dont il est l'objet, notamment parce que le caractère continu de cette télésurveillance constituerait une atteinte à sa vie privée, dont la protection est protégée par un droit de l'homme dont il est titulaire au terme de l'article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme.

Le 15 juillet 2016, le juge administratif des référés rejette sa demande.

Sur recours, le Conseil d’État par une ordonnance rendue par trois juges des référés rejette le recours.

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Le Conseil d’État rappelle la charge de preuve qui pèse sur celui qui veut obtenir la suppression du dispositif en alléguant son droit subjectif : le requérant doit démontrer que "la mesure dont il fait l’objet serait manifestement incompatible avec les stipulations de l’article 8 de la convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales", ce qui la rendrait de ce fait manifestement illégale et devrait alors être rapportée.

L'Ordonnance est longuement motivée, pour justifier ce qui est désigné par le Conseil d’État comme   "la compatibilité de l’atteinte portée au droit de M. B...au respect de sa vie privée avec l’article 8 de la convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales".

Le Conseil d'Etat rappelle que "il résulte de l’instruction que tant le caractère exceptionnel des faits pour lesquels M. B... est poursuivi, qui ont porté à l’ordre public un trouble d’une particulière gravité, que le contexte actuel de poursuite de ces actes de violence terroriste, font, à la date de la présente décision, obligation à l’administration pénitentiaire de prévenir, avec un niveau de garantie aussi élevé que possible, toute tentative d’évasion ou de suicide de l’intéressé".

Il poursuivit la première partie de son raisonnement : "eu égard à la forte présomption selon laquelle ce dernier peut bénéficier du soutien d’une organisation terroriste internationale disposant de moyens importants, et alors même qu’il n’aurait pas manifesté à ce jour de tendance suicidaire, sa surveillance très étroite, allant au-delà de son seul placement à l’isolement, revêt ainsi, à la date de la présente décision, un caractère nécessaire".

Puis le Conseil d’État passe à la seconde question et souligne que : "il résulte également de l’instruction que l’administration, qui devra statuer sur le maintien de la mesure de vidéosurveillance continue au plus tard à l’échéance de la durée de trois mois prévue par la décision du 17 juin 2016, est également en mesure de s’assurer régulièrement de son bien fondé, notamment, ainsi qu’il a été rappelé à l’audience, par l’existence d’une surveillance médicale régulière ; que compte tenu de cette circonstance, ainsi que des modalités de mise en œuvre de la vidéosurveillance, qui comportent notamment la mise en place de dispositifs permettant de respecter l’intimité de la personne, l’absence de transmission ou d’enregistrement sonore, l’usage, ainsi qu’il a été précisé à l’audience, de caméras à infrarouge pendant la nuit, l’absence de dispositif biométrique couplé, la limitation de la durée de conservation des images et l’encadrement de leurs droits d’accès, la mesure contestée ne porte pas au droit au respect de la vie privée du requérant une atteinte manifestement disproportionnée aux buts en vue desquels elle a été établie".

Référence complète : Danis-Fatôme, A., "Le dispositif propre à la charge de la preuve, frein ou outil de lutte contre les discriminations ?", Revue des droits de l’homme, 2016, n°9.  

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Référence complète : N. Hoffschir, La charge de la preuve en droit civil, Dalloz, préf. de S. Amrani-Mekki, coll. "Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses", vol. 153, 2016. 

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Première partie. La notion de charge de la preuve
Titre 1. Les contours de la notion de charge de la preuve
Chapitre 1. La conception classique de la charge de la preuve
Chapitre 2. La conception moderne de la charge de la preuve
Titre 2. Le contenu de la notion de charge de la preuve
Chapitre 1. Les devoirs du titulaire de la charge de la preuve pendant le procès civil
Chapitre 2. Les devoirs du titulaire de la charge de la preuve en amont du procès civil

Seconde partie. La gestion de la charge de la preuve
Titre 1. Les règles de répartition de la charge de la preuve
Chapitre 1. Les théories de la répartition de la charge de la preuve
Chapitre 2. Les techniques de répartition de la charge de la preuve
Titre 2. L’aménagement des règles de répartition de la charge de la preuve
Chapitre 1. La gestion contractuelle de la charge de la preuve
Chapitre 2. Les dispenses de preuve

Référence complète : FRISON-ROCHE, Marie-Anne, L'office du juge en matière de médicaments, in FRISON-ROCHE, Marie-Anne (Dir.), Concurrence, santé publique, innovation et médicament, coll. Droit et Economie, LGDJ, Paris, 2010, p.423-432.

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