Articles dans un ouvrage du JoRC

► Réference complète : L.-M. Augagneur, « The jurisdictionalisation of reputation by platforms », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 109-125  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : The large platforms are in the position of arbiter of the reputation economy (referencing, notoriety) in which they themselves act. Although the stakes are usually low on a unit basis, the jurisdiction of reputation represents significant aggregate stakes. Platforms are thus led to detect and assess reputation manipulations (by users: SEO, fake reviews, fake followers; or by the platforms themselves as highlighted by the Google Shopping decision issued by the European Commission in 2017) that are implemented on a large scale with algorithmic tools. The identification and treatment of manipulations is itself only possible by means of artificial intelligence tools. Google thus proceeds with an automated downgrading mechanism for sites that do not follow its guidelines, with the possibility of requesting a review through a very summary procedure entirely conducted by an algorithm. Tripadvisor, on the other hand, uses an algorithm to detect false reviews based on « fraud modeling to identify electronic patterns that cannot be detected by the human eye ». It only conducts a human investigation in limited cases. This jurisdictionality of reputation has little in common with that defined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (legal origin, contradictory procedure, independence, application of the Rules of Law). It is characterized, on the one hand, by the absence of transparency of the rules and even of the existence of rules stated in predicative form and applied by deductive reasoning. It is replaced by an inductive probabilistic model by the identification of abnormal behaviors in relation to centroids. This approach of course raises the issue of statistical bias. More fundamentally, it reflects a transition from Rule of Law, not so much to « Code is Law » (Laurence Lessig), but to « Data is Law », that is, to a governance of numbers (rather than « by » numbers). It also comes back to a form of collective jurisdictionality, since the sanction comes from a computational apprehension of the phenomena of the multitude and not from an individual appreciation. Finally, it appears particularly consubstantial with compliance, since it is based on a teleological approach (the search for a finality rather than the application of principles). On the other hand, this jurisdictionality is characterized by man-machine cooperation, whether in the decision-making process (which poses the problem of automaticity bias) or in the contradictory procedure (which poses, in particular, the problems of discussion with the machine and the explicability of the machine response). Until now, the supervision of these processes has been based essentially on the mechanisms of transparency, a limited adversarial requirement and the accessibility of appeal channels. The French Law Loi pour une République Numérique (« Law  for a Digital Republic »), the European Legislation Platform-to-Business Regulation and the Omnibus Directive, have thus set requirements on the ranking criteria on platforms. The Omnibus Directive also requires that professionals guarantee that reviews come from consumers through reasonable and proportionate measures. As for the European Digital Services Act, it provides for transparency on content moderation rules, procedures and algorithms. But this transparency is often a sham. In the same way and for the moment the requirements of sufficient human intervention and adversarial processes appear very limited in the draft text. The most efficient forms of this jurisdictionality ultimately emerge from the role played by third parties in a form of participatory dispute resolution. Thus, for example, FakeSpot detects false Tripadvisor reviews, Sistrix establishes a ranking index that helped establish the manipulation of Google's algorithm in the Google Shopping case by detecting artifacts based on algorithm changes. Moreover, the draft Digital Services Act envisages recognizing a specific status for trusted flaggers who identify illegal content on platforms. This singular jurisdictional configuration (judge and party platform, massive situations, algorithmic systems for handling manipulations) thus leads us to reconsider the grammar of the jurisdictional process and its characteristics. If Law is a language (Alain Sériaux), it offers a new grammatical form that would be that of the middle way (mesotès) described by Benevéniste. Between the active and the passive way, there is a way in which the subject carries out an action in which he includes himself. Now, it is the very nature of this jurisdictionality of compliance to make laws by including oneself in them (nomos tithestai). In this respect, the irruption of artificial intelligence in this jurisdictional treatment undoubtedly bears witness to the renewal of the language of Law. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : E. Kleiman, « The objectives of compliance confronted with the actors of arbitration », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 335-355.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : International arbitration, which remains the preferred method for the resolution of disputes arising from international commercial relations, has been overtaken by compliance, the manifestations of which are everywhere: arbitral institutions, arbitrators and courts exercising curial supervision of the international regularity of awards are regularly called upon to take into account rules of compliance. Compliance has undeniably got a hold on the arbitration community.  Being operators in an unregulated activity, arbitral institutions and arbitrators must generate trust; their ability to effectively self-regulate is a prerequisite for the success of arbitration and requires transparency and exemplarity.  This self-imposed compliance is nowadays consubstantial to arbitration and is illustrated in such classic fields as prevention of conflicts of interest and control of arbitrators' availability, but also in the more recent domains of parity and diversity as well as reduction of the carbon footprint.  Moreover, compliance has caught up with the ex post control of the international regularity of arbitral awards in matters involving allegations of corruption and money laundering.  There is room for debate, particularly in France, because of the porosity of the boundaries between the methods that are specific to those mandatory rules of compliance that intend to prevent the most serious offences, and the methods that are specific to the establishment of the constituent elements of such crimes before criminal courts.  This is an important issue, especially as the increasingly imperative nature of climate change and human rights regulations will extend the scope of these overlaps between compliance methods and the control of arbitral awards. Arbitration is also taking over compliance.  Arbitrators are called upon to rule on controversies arising from economic activities that are related to compliance: contracts relating to the implementation of preventive measures in the fields of anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and human rights as well as transactions relating to the reduction of the carbon footprint and climate change, etc.  Moreover, compliance is also an arbitrable matter and arbitrators must apply or take into consideration the observance or disregard of rules of compliance when adjudicating commercial or investment disputes. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : A. Bavitot, « Shaping the Company through Negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements. French Perspective », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 203-215 - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : Negotiated justice is "the situation in which the criminal conflict is the object of a trade in the etymological sense of the term negotio, i.e. a debate between the parties to reach an agreement". Thus, the French legislator has succumbed to globalized mimicry by creating the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public (Public Interest Judicial Agreement), first in matters of probity and then in environmental matters. What is the nature of this deal of justice? Validated by a judge's order, it does not entail any declaration of guilt, has neither the nature nor the effects of a judgment of conviction and is not registered in the judicial record. Possible at the investigation stage as well as at the pre-trial stage, the Public Interest Judicial Agreement is original in that it makes it possible to avoid either the prosecutor's proceedings or the judge's wrath. A detailed study of the agreements signed shows that in order to negotiate in the best possible way, the company can and must shape itself. The company will shape the facts of its agreement, shape its charge and, finally, shape its sentence. The article offers a concrete analysis of these three dimensions of corporate shaping to better approach understanding the legal nature of negotiated criminal justice agreements. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète: J. Heymann, « The Legal Nature of the Facebook “Supreme Court” », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 167-182 - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Le résumé ci-dessous décrit un article qui fait suite au colloque L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance, coorganisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et la Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. Ce colloque a été conçu sous la direction scientifique de Marie-Anne Frison-Roche et Jean-Christophe Roda et s'est déroulé à Lyon le 23 juin 2021. Dans l'ouvrage, l'article sera publié dans le Titre I, consacré à  L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance. - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : Taking place in the general theme aiming at making “words and things coincide”, the article offers some thoughts on the “conditions of the discourse” – in the sense in which Foucault understood it in his Archéologie des sciences humaines – relating to the phenomenon of “jurisdictionalization” of Compliance. The thoughts are more specifically focusing on the nature of the so-called “Supreme Court” that Facebook instituted to hear appeals of decisions relating to content on the digital social networks that are Facebook and Instagram. Is this really a “Supreme Court”, designed in order to “judge” the Facebook Group? A careful examination of the Oversight Board – i.e. the so-called “Supreme Court” created by Facebook – reveals that the latter, in addition to its advisory mission (which consists of issuing policy advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies), exercises some form of adjudicative function. This is essentially conceived in terms of compliance assessment, of the content published on the social networks Facebook or Instagram with the standards issued by these corporations on the one hand, of content enforcement decisions taken by Facebook with the Law on the other hand. The legal framework of reference is yet rather vague, although its substantial content seems to be per se evolutive, based on the geographical realm where the case to be reviewed is located. An adjudicative function can therefore be characterized, even if the Oversight Board can only claim for a limited one. The author can ultimately identify the Oversight Board as a preventive dispute settlement body, in the sense that it seems to aim at avoiding any referral to state courts and ruling before any court’s judgement can be delivered. Some questions are thus to be raised, relating with both legitimacy and authority of such a Board. But whatever the answers will be, the fact remains that the creation of the Oversight Board by a private law company already reveals all the liveliness of contemporary legal pluralism. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Reinforce the Judge and the Lawyer to impose Compliance Law as a characteristic of the Rule of Law », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 39-65 - 📝lire l'article (en anglais) - 🚧lire le document de travail bilingue sur la base duquel cet article a été élaboré, doté de développements supplémentaires, de références techniques et de liens hypertextes -   📘lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Cet article constitue l'introduction du livre.   ► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance) : One can understand that the compliance mechanisms are presented with hostility because they seem designed to keep the judge away, whereas there is no Rule of Law without a judge. Solid arguments present compliance techniques as converging towards the uselessness of the judge (I). Certainly, we come across magistrates, and of all kinds, and powerful ones, but that would be a sign of imperfection: its ex-ante logic has been deployed in all its effectiveness, the judge would no longer be required… And the lawyer would disappear so with him… This perspective of a world without a judge, without a lawyer and ultimately without Law, where algorithms could organize through multiple processes in Ex Ante the obedience of everyone, the « conformity » of all our behaviors with all the regulatory mass that is applicable to us, supposes that this new branch of Law would be defined as the concentration of processes which gives full effectiveness to all the rules, regardless of their content. But supposing that this engineer's dream is even achievable, it is not possible in a democratic and free world to do without judges and lawyers. Therefore, it is imperative to recognize their contributions to Compliance Law, related and invaluable contributions (II). First of all, because a pure Ex Ante never existed and even in the time of the Chinese legists¹ L’empire chinois n’a semble-t-il jamais apprécié les juges, ne leur faisant place que sous la forme de serviteurs purs de l’Etat, qu’ils soient des enquêteurs, des punisseurs et de gardiens de l’ordre public. Sur cet aspect du Droit chinois, v. … ; sur cette période particulièrement sanglante des légistes, où le principe de « certitude » de la législation a été portée à ses nues, v. …, people were still needed to interpret the regulations because a legal order must always be interpreted Ex Post by who must in any case answer the questions posed by the subjects of law, as soon as the political system admits to attributing to them the right to make claims before the Judge. Secondly the Attorney, whose office, although articulated with the Judge's office, is distinct from the latter, both more restricted and broader since he must appear in all cases where the judicial figure puts himself in square, outside the courts. However, Compliance Law has multiplied this since not only, extending Regulatory Law, it entrusts numerous powers to the administrative authorities, but it also transforms companies into judges, in respect of which the attorneys must deal with. Even more so, Compliance Law only takes its sense from its Monumental Goals²🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Les buts monumentaux de la compliance, 2022.. It is in this that this branch of the Law preserves the freedom of human beings, in the digital space where the techniques of compliance protect them from the power of companies by the way that the Compliance Law forces these companies to use their power to protect people. However, firstly, it is the Judges who, in their diversity³Cette présente étude est générale. Pour une étude plus analytique, v. 🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A., « Le rôle du juge dans le Droit de la Compliance », in 🕴️Frison-Roche, M.A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la compliance, 2023. , impose as a reference the protection of human beings, either as a limit to the power of compliance tools⁴🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), 📕Les outils de la compliance, 2021.  or as their very purpose. Secondly, the Attorney, again distinguishing himself from the Judge, if necessary, reminds us that all the parties whose interests are involved must be taken into consideration. In an ever more flexible, soft and dialogical Law, everyone presenting himself as the « advocate » of such and such a monumental goal: the Attorney is legitimate to be the first to occupy this place. - suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur Instagram s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

► Référence complète : S. Scemla & D. Paillot, « The difficulty for Compliance Enforcement Authorities to comprehend the Rights of the Defence in compliance matters », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 263-272. - 📘lire la présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par les auteures) : Since 2016, French companies subject to the provisions of the so-called “Sapin 2” Law must implement eight stringent anti-corruption measures, such as a risk mapping, a whistleblowing procedure or a third-party due diligence procedure. To ensure their compliance with these obligations, the Sapin 2 law created the Agence française anticorruption – AFA (French Anti-Corruption Agency), which had been assigned three missions: firstly, to help any person prevent and detect corruption; secondly, to control the quality and effectiveness of the anti-corruption programs deployed by the companies; and thirdly, to sanction any breaches, through its Sanctions Committee. As pointed out by the French Conseil d’État, the powers devolved to the administrations have multiplied and became stratified. While the Conseil d'État suggests to improve both the conduct and the effectiveness of administrative controls by harmonising their practices and simplifying their prerogatives, it is urgent to remedy the numerous procedural failures that undermine the rights of defence. In fact, the AFA exercises various powers when undertaking its controls. Some of these powers are not provided for by the Law, and most of them infringe fundamental rights and freedoms among which the adversarial principle and the freedom not to self-incriminate. For instance, the AFA does not necessarily draft minutes of the interviews it conducts, thus depriving the interviewee of the possibility to challenge the statements reported by the AFA to the Sanctions Committee. From a more structural point of view, the scope of the AFA's mission is extremely broad. The Law allows the AFA to request the communication of "any professional document or any useful information", without defining the notion of usefulness. Also, the AFA considers that the entity cannot benefit from the legal privilege that would cover their documents, and considers that an entity who voluntarily hands over a document, without expressing any reserves, waives its right to the benefit of its legal privilege. Apart from the severe consequences that could arise if another proceedings was to be initiated by a foreign authority, the concept of « voluntary handover » does not faithfully reflect the reality. Indeed, the controlled entities only cooperate under the threat of being prosecuted on the basis of an obstruction to the control, which compels them to communicate documents even when facing the risk of contributing to their own incrimination. These many procedural deficiencies encountered during AFA controls must therefore be reformed, as recommended by the Conseil d’État, so as to require the authorities to take into account the rights of the defence. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : J. Morel-Maroger, « The application of compliance standards by European Union judges », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 397-407.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : Compliance rules are intended to pursue objectives of public interest – or monumental goals – and thereby in principle modify and guide the behaviour of economic operators. In order to achieve these objectives, the full spectrum of norms are used in compliance matters. What is and what should be the role of the judges of the European Union in the development of compliance rules ? As in domestic law, the legality of compliance standards developed by regulatory authorities has been challenged. It will first be necessary to analyse what control the judges of the European Union have over these rules. The question arises essentially as regards the rules of soft law, the challenge of which can be considered in two ways : by way of an action for annulment and by exception by way of a preliminary ruling. But beyond the control of the legality of compliance rules exercised by European judges, they also contribute to their application. The effectiveness of compliance rules depend above all on them being followed by those to whom they are addressed, and economic operators are undoubtedly the first actors of its success. But the judges of the European Union, competent to settle disputes concerning the application of European Union law between the Member States, the European institutions, and individual applicants, may be also be involved in ensuring the effectiveness of European compliance rules and in interpreting them. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : N. Cayrol, « Procedural Principles in Compliance Law », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 231-243.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance) : We could be satisfied with examining the reception of the principles of general Procedural Law in compliance litigation and the distortion that compliance techniques justify in procedural mechanisms. But the innovation that constitutes this emerging branch of law that is Compliance Law justifies going to more fundamental. From this perspective, the pertinent question is the very legitimacy of procedural principles in this branch of law, in that Procedural Law is built on the notion of “Litigation” while Compliance Law deals with situation so enormous, concerning for example the fate of the planet, that this notion of litigation appears inadequate, and consequently the procedural law would be too limited in compliance matters. If, however, this perspective is maintained of Compliance Law facing, in an almost warlike perspective, the greatest current challenges, general Procedural Law needs to be redesigned, in its very definition. Indeed, compliance trials call into question the future of systems and it is as such that they hold the entities, for instance the enterprises, that are at the heart of these systems. It is in this that liability trials are more “accountability” trials, allowing the judge to demand actions for the future, trials by which commitments are made and the “intentions” of the persons involved are challenged and required. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Reference complète : A. Bruneau, « The company judges itself: the Compliance function in the bank », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 127-145 - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Summary of the article :  First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance. In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as « Sapin 2 » requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk. Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution. Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law. Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the « judge-judged »: following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients. -   🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : J.-B. Racine, « Compliance and arbitration. An attempt at problematisation », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 289-304.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié   - ► Le résumé ci-dessous décrit un article qui suit une intervention dans le colloque Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). Ce colloque a été conçu par  Marie-Anne Frison-Roche et Jean-Baptiste Racine, co-directeurs scientifiques, et s'est tenu à Paris II le 31 mars 2021.  Dans le livre, l'article sera publié dans le Titre III, consacré à : Compliance andArbitration. - ► Résumé de l'article : Under the consideration of the « Compliance Jurisdictionalisation », it is necessary to study in the links between Compliance and Arbitration. The arbitrator is a judge, he is even the natural judge of international trade. Arbitration is therefore naturally intended to meet compliance which transforms the action of companies in an international context. However, the links between compliance and arbitration are not obvious. It is not a question of providing firm and definitive answers, but rather, and above all, of asking questions. We are at the start of reflection on this topic, which explains why there is, for the time being, little legal literature on the subject of the relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. It doesn't mean there aren't connections.  Quite simply, these relations may not have come to light, or they are in the making. We should research  the existing or potential bridges between two worlds that have long gravitated separately: Compliance on the one hand, Arbitration on the other. The central question is: is or can the arbitrator be a compliance judge, and, if so, how? In any event, the Arbitrator is thus in contact with matters requiring the methods, tools and logic of Compliance. In addition to the prevention and suppression of corruption, three examples can be given. Arbitration has been facing economic sanctions (notably embargoes) for several years. The link with Compliance is obvious, insofar as texts providing for economic sanctions are often accompanied by compliance mechanisms, as in the United States. The arbitrator is concerned as to the fate he reserves in the treatment of the dispute with the measures of economic sanctions. Competition Law is a branch that came into contact with Arbitration from the end of the 1980s. The arbitrability of this type of dispute is now established and arbitrators apply it regularly. At the same time, Compliance has also entered Competition Law, admittedly more strongly in the United States than in France. The existence, absence or insufficiency of a compliance program aimed at preventing violations of the competition rules are thus circumstances which may assist the arbitrator in the assessment of anti-competitive behavior. Environmental Law is also concerned. There is environmental Compliance, for example with regard to the French law of March 27, 2017 on the duty of vigilance. Companies are thus responsible for participating in the protection of the environment, by internalizing these concerns in their internal and external operations (in their sphere of influence). As soon as an arbitrator is in charge for settling a dispute relating to Environmental Law, the question of the relationship to Compliance, from this angle, naturally arises. It is therefore the multiple interactions between Compliance and Arbitration, actual or potential, which are thus open. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : S. Schiller, « A single judge in the event of an international breach of compliance obligations? », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 409-422.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteure, traduit par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Given the very international nature of the topic apprehended, the actors involved and therefore the compliance disputes, it is essential to know if a person can be implicated before several judges, attached to different states or even if he can be condemned by several jurisdictions. The answer is given by the non bis in idem principle, which is the subject of a abondant case law on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol n°7 of the ECHR, clearly inapplicable for jurisdictions emanating from different States. To assess whether breaches of compliance obligations may be subject to multiple sanctions in different states, it will first be necessary to ascertain whether there is a textual basis to be invoked. At European level, Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights now allows the principle of ne bis in idem to be invoked. Applicable to all areas of compliance, it provides very strong protection which covers not only sanctions, but also prosecutions. Like its effects, the scope of Article 50 is very broad. The procedures concerned are those which have a repressive nature, beyond those pronounced by criminal courts in the strict sense, which makes it possible to cover the convictions pronounced by one of the many regulatory authorities competent in matters of compliance. Internationally, the situation is less clear. Article 14-7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may be invoked, if several obstacles are overcome, including the decision of 2 November 1987 of the Human Rights Committee which restricted it to the internal framework, requiring a double conviction by the same State. Even if these principles are applicable, two specificities of compliance situations risk hampering their application, the first related to the applicable procedural rules, in particular the rules of jurisdiction, the second related to the specificities of the situation. The application of the non bis in idem rule is only formally accepted with regard to universal jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, that is to say extraterritorial jurisdiction, which is only part of the jurisdiction. . The Cour de cassation (French Judiciary Supreme Court) confirmed this in the famous so-called “Oil for food” judgment of March 14, 2018. The refusal to recognize this principle as universal, regardless of the jurisdiction rule in question, deprives French companies of a defense. Moreover, the repression of breaches of compliance rules is more and more often resolved through transactional mechanisms. The latter will not always fall within the scope of European and international rules laying down the non bis in idem principle, for lack of being sometimes qualified as « final judgment » under the terms of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 14-7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Breaches in terms of compliance are often based on multiple acts. This results from prescriptions the starting point of which is delayed at the last event and a facilitated jurisdiction for French courts when only one of the constitutive facts is found in France. In terms of compliance, the non bis in idem principle therefore generally does not protect companies and does not prevent them from being sued before the courts of two different countries for the same case. It nevertheless grants them another protection by obliging them to take into account foreign decisions in determining the amount of the penalty. The sanction against Airbus SE in the Judicial Convention of Public Interest (CJIP) of January 29, 2020 is a perfect illustration of this. Breaches in terms of compliance are often based on multiple acts. This causes delays in the starting point of prescriptions, starting point delayed at the last event, and this facilitates judicial jurisdiction for French courts when only one of the constitutive facts is found in France. In terms of compliance, the non bis in idem principle therefore generally does not protect companies and does not prevent them from being sued before the courts of two different countries for the same case. It nevertheless grants them another protection by obliging them to take into account foreign decisions in determining the amount of the penalty. The sanction against Airbus SE in the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public -CJIP (French Judicial Convention of Public Interest)  of January 29, 2020 is a perfect illustration of this. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète: O. Douvreleur, « Compliance and Judge of the Law », in  M.-A.​ Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 423-431.  - 📘lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : Compliance maintains with the judge complex relations, and even more with the judge ruling only on points of Law  (in France, the Court de Cassation in the judicial order, the one who, in principle, does not know the facts that he leaves to the sovereign appreciation of the judges ruling on the substance of the disputes. At first glance, compliance is a technique internalised in companies and the place occupied by negotiated justice techniques leave little room for intervention by the judge ruling only on points of Law However, his role is intended to develop, in particular with regard to the duty of vigilance or in the articulation between the different branches of Law when compliance meets Labor Law, or even in the adjustment between American Law and the other legal systems, especially French legal system. The way in which the principle of Proportionality will take place in Compliance Law is also a major issue for the judge ruling only on points of Law. -

► Reference complète : E. Wennerström, « Some Reflections on Compliance and the European Court of Human Rights », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 441-451.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article   - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance) : The development of the European Court of Human Rights case law, contributing to European integration, has incorporated the substantial concept of ​​"compliance" which goes beyond the idea of ​​legality with respect to which companies remain passive, and promotes legal orders as systems in interaction with one another. The author develops the spirit and scope of Protocol 15 by which both the principle of subsidiarity and the margins of appreciation the signatory States are organized, mechanisms governed by the principle of proportionality. Subsidiarity means that the States are in the best position to design the most adequate application of the Convention, the close links between the States allowing its effective application. In addition, the new opinion procedure which allows a national court to have during a case the non-binding opinion of the ECHR ensures better compliance with the objectives of the Convention. The case-law of the Court takes up this substantial requirement through its doctrine, in particular identified in the Bosphorus case, by stressing that the accession of a State to the European Union presumes its compliance when implementing EU law with the obligations arising from the ECHR, even if this presumption can be refuted if the protection is manifestly lacking, which was admitted in several cases, in particular concerning the right to an impartial tribunal in matters of economic regulation. The different legal orders are thus articulated.  The author concludes that the European Court of Human Rights, like the Court of Justice of the Union, contributes to the construction of Compliance Law in Europe, from an Ex Ante perspective favoring opinions rather than Ex Post sanctions and creating, in particular through the Bosphorus doctrine, elements of security and confidence for European integration around common values. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : B. Sillaman, « Privilege Lessons from the U.S. », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 251-255.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance) : The French legal system is evolving, organizing interaction between lawyers with regulators and prosecutors, specially in investigations about corruption or corporate misconduct, adopting U.S. negotiated resolutions such as the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public, which encourages « collaboration » between them.  The author describes the evolution of the U.S. DOJ doctrine and askes French to be inspired by the U.S. procedural experience, U.S. where this mechanism came from. Indeed, the DOJ released memoranda about what the « collaboration » means. At the end (2006 Memorandum), the DOJ has considered that the legal privilege must remain intact when the information is not only factual in order to maintain trust between prosecutors, regulators and lawyers. French authorities do not follow this way. The author regrets it and thinks they should adopt the same reasoning as the American authority on the secret professionnel of the avocat, especially when he intervenes in the company internal investigation. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : E. Silva-Romero & R. Legru, « What place is there for compliance in investment arbitration? », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 305-317.  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Le résumé ci-dessous décrit un article qui suit une intervention dans le colloque Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). Ce colloque a été conçu par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche et Jean-Baptiste Racine, co-directeurs scientifiques, et s'est tenu à Paris II le 31 mars 2021.  Dans le livre, l'article est publié dans le Titre III, consacré à : Compliance and Arbitration. - ► Résumé de l'article : The authors emphasize the new and growing place of Compliance in International Arbitration, particularly in the requirement of respect for ethical values, since arbitrators can implement Ethics, sometimes lacking in international trade, or even must put their power only at the service of investors who respect the Rule of Law. Thus, Compliance is deployed through the classic control by the arbitrators of the legality of the investment, which applies both to the establishment of the treaty itself and to the investor. In a more recent way, the arbitrator can control about an investment project a sort of « social license to operate » of the investor, concept related to the social responsibility of the companies, appeared for the protection of the peoples indigenous. Moreover, Compliance can justify a substantial assessment by the arbitrator of the effective respect of the human rights and the environment protection via an investment treaty, the State party remaining able to act for the effectiveness of these concerns. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Adjusting General Procedural Law to Compliance Law by the Nature of things », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 273-286. - 📝lire l'article (en anglais) - 🚧lire le document de travail bilingue sur la base duquel cet article a été élaboré, doté de développements supplémentaires, de références techniques et de liens hypertextes -   📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - Les principaux éléments de cet article ont été présentés en introduction de la manifestation scientifique qui s'est tenue à l'Université Paris-Dauphine le 23 septembre 2021, coorganisée par le  Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et l'Institut Droit Dauphine.  Dans l'ouvrage, cet article est situé dans le Chapitre II, relatif à la dimension processuelle du Droit de la Compliance: General Procedural Law in Compliance Law  - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : General Procedural Law is an invention, essentially due to Professor Motulsky, going well beyond the gain that one always has in comparing types of procedures with each other. As he asserted, there is Natural Law in General Procedural Law, in that as soon as there is the Rule of Law Principle there cannot be, whatever the « procedure », even the « process », such and such way of doing things: for example, to decide, to seize the one who decides, to listen before deciding, to contest the one who has decided. General Procedural Law therefore depends on the nature of things. However, Compliance Law organizes things in a new way. Therefore, both the simple and iron principles of General Procedural Law creep in where we do not expect them at first sight, because there is no judge, this character around whom ordinary procedures fit together. The principles of General Procedural Law are essential in companies. Even if the regulations do not breathe a word about it, it is up to the Judges, in particular the Supreme Courts, to recognize this nature of things because on this effect of nature that  General Procedural Law is built: when compliance mechanisms oblige companies to strike, General Procedural law must oblige, even in the silence of the texts, to arm those who can be hit, even stand up against devices that would set aside too much these defenses that are easily considered contrary to efficiency (I). But because it is a question of making room for this nature of the things of which the Rule of Law Principle entrusts the custody to the Judge and the Lawyer, the General Procedural Law must also adjust itself to what the extraordinary new branch of Law Compliance Law is. Indeed, Compliance Law is extraordinary in that it expresses the political pretention to act now so that the future will not be catastrophic, by detecting and preventing the realization of systemic risks, or even that it is better, by building effective equality or real concern for others. Because it is the Monumental Goals that defines this new branch of Law, a disputed systemic issue, possibly disputed by several parties before a judge, the procedural principles used by the court must be broadened considerably: they must then include civil society and the future (II). General Procedural Law thus naturally acquires an even more place than in classic branches of Law since on the one hand it imposes itself outside of trials, particularly in companies, and on the other before the courts it involves people who had hardly any place to speak and thinks themselves, especially the systems entering the « causes » of Compliance now debated before the Judge. - suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur Instagram s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

► Référence complète : F.-X. Train, « Arbitration and parallel proceedings exercised in Compliance Procedure », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, à paraître.  - ► the summary below describes the article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021.  In the book, the article will be published in the Chapter III, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage international. - ► Résumé de l'article :  Firstly, the article insists on the principle of the autonomy of the international arbitration procedure, in relation to which parallel procedures remain watertight, whether they are criminal or done under Compliance Law. In the arbitral proceedings taking place independently, the arbitrators before whom the facts also referred to in these parallel proceedings, in particular the facts of corruption, are alleged before them as facts through their unlawful nature: it is at this title that they can and must apprehend them, using the standard of proof which is the bundle of clues. Secondly, the article highlights the limits of the autonomy of international arbitration. These may be de facto limits because in the search for evidence by arbitrators, red flags are often insufficiently consistent evidence to establish a sentence, especially since this sentence may be subject to control by the judge of its conformity to international public order, the annulment by the judge being able to be based on external elements, even after the arbitration procedure. It may then be wise for the arbitrators, who are not forced to do so, to suspend their proceedings to wait the results of the parallel proceedings initiated under Compliance Law, so that the procedures and their results could be harmonious. - 📘 lire la présentation de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié -  

► Référence complète : F. Ancel, « Compliance Law, a new guiding principle for the Trial? », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 245-250.   - 📘lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié   - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance) : Through this article, the author formulates a proposal: elevating the principle of compliance to the rank of leading principle of the trial. To support this, the author firstly emphasizes the convergence of the aims of compliance and the purpose of the trial. Indeed, emphasizing that Compliance Law does not oust either the State or the judge, as soon as compliance means that the person must keep their commitments and that the trial is also based on this principle that the parties must conform to the principles and to their own « speech », compliance thus becomes a trial leading principle. In a second part of the article, the author illustrates his point in a very concrete way. First, the protocols of procedure which are drawn up by the courts and the bars are commitments which should justify a form of constraint which, if it should not have the same form and nature as that of the law, must all the same even have consequences when a party fails to do so. Secondly, relying on French case law which sanctions a party which had accepted the principle of an arbitration and then systematically hinders its implementation, the author suggests that under the principle of compliance can be grouped the notions for the instant scattered of loyalty, consistency (estoppel) and efficiency. Thus, this « open practice » echoing the « open way » of a procedural principle of compliance brings out this one. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, « The Judge, the Compliance Obligation and the Company. The Compliance Evidence System », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", 2024, pp. 359-395. - 📝lire l'article (en anglais) - 🚧lire le document de travail bilingue sur la base duquel cet article a été élaboré, doté de développements supplémentaires, de références techniques et de liens hypertextes. - 📘lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : The article aims to identify the link that must be established between the company in its relationship with the compliance obligations it assumes and the judges to whom it is accountable in this respect: this link is established by evidence. The evidentiary system of proof has yet to be constructed, and it is the purpose of this long study to lay the groundwork.  To this end, the article begins with a description of what is designated here as the « probatory square » in a « probatory system » that is superimposed on the system of rules of substantive legal system. This is all the more important because Compliance seems to be in frontal collision in its very principles with the general principles of the evidentiary system, in particular because it seems that the company would have to prove the existence of the Law or that it would have to bear in a definitive way the burden of proving the absence of violation, which seems to be contrary not only to the presumption of innocence but also to the principle of the freedom of action and of undertaking. In order to re-articulate Compliance Law, the obligations of compliance which legitimately weigh on the company, it is necessary to return to the probatory system specific to Compliance, so that it remains within the Rule of Law. This presupposes the adoption of a substantial definition of Compliance, which is not only compliance with the rules, which is only a minimal dimension, but implies that Compliance Law should be defined by the Monumental Goals on which the public authorities and the companies are in substantial alliance. The evidentiary system of principle makes play between its four summits that are the burden of proof, the objects of proof this evidentiary square of principle, between the burden of proof, the means of proof and their admissibility. Compliance Law does not fall outside this evidential square, thus marking its full membership of the Rule of Law In order to lay the foundations of the evidential system specific to Compliance Law, the first part of the article identifies the objects of proof which are specific to it, by distinguishing between the structural devices, on the one hand, and the expected behaviours, on the other. The first involves proving that the structures required to achieve the Monumental Goals of Compliance have actually been put in place. The object of proof is then the effectiveness of this implementation, which presents the effectiveness of the system. As far as behavioral obligations are concerned, the object of proof is the efforts made by the company to obtain them, the principle of proportionality governing the establishment of this proof, while the systemic efficiency of the whole reinforces the evidential system. However, the wisdom of evidence lies in the fact that, even though the principle remains that of freedom of evidence, the company must establish the effectiveness, efficiency, and effectiveness of the whole, independently of the burden of proof. The second part of the article concerns those who bear the burden of proof in Compliance Law. The latter places the burden of proof on the company in principle, in view of its legal obligations. This burden comes from the legal origin of the obligations, which blocks the « round of the burden of proof ». But in the interference of the different vertices of the evidentiary square, the question becomes more delicate when it comes to determining the contours of the compliance obligations that the company must perform. Moreover, the burden of proof may itself be the subject of proof, just as the company's performance of its legal obligations may also be the subject of contracts, which brings us back to the evidentiary system ordinarily applicable to contractual obligations. The situation is different when it comes to a « compliance contract » or when it comes to one or more compliance stipulations, concepts that are still not very well developed in Contract Law.  Furthermore, as all branches of Law belong to a legal system governed by the Rule of Law, other branches of law interfere and modify the methods and solutions of proof. This is the case when the fact, which is the object of proof, can give rise to a sanction, the Law of repression imposing its own solutions in the matter of the burden of proof.  In the third part of the article, the relevant means of proof in Compliance Law are examined, used in that Compliance Law is above all a branch of Law whose object is on the one hand information and on the other hand the Future. Open questions remain, such as whether companies could be forced by the Judge to build technologies to invent new means of proof. To show that they are indeed achieving the Monumental Goals they are charged with.  In the fourth part, the vital character of the pre-constitution of evidence is shown, which is the reflection of the Ex-Ante nature of Compliance Law: evidence must be pre-constituted to avoid the very prospect of having to use it, by finding all the means to establish the effectiveness, efficiency and even the effectiveness of the various Compliance Tools.  If companies do all this methodically, the Compliance evidence system will be established, in harmony with the general evidence system, Compliance Law and the Rule of Law. - - suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur Instagram 🌐s’abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐s’abonner à la Newsletter en vidéo MAFR Surplomb 🌐s’abonner à la Newsletter MaFR Droit & Art

► Référence complète : F. Raynaud, "The administrative judge and compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, 2024, pp. 433-439  - 📘consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Résumé de l'article : -