Articles in The Journal of Regulation & Compliance « JoRC »

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "General Procedural Law, prototype of the Compliance Obligation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, forthcoming. - 📝read the article - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this article has been written, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of this article: At first glance, General Procedural Law seems to be the area the least concerned by the Compliance Obligation, because if the person is obliged by it, mainly large companies, it is precisely, thanks to this Ex Ante, in order to never to have to deal with proceedings, these path that leads to the Judge, that Ex Post figure that in return for the weight of the compliance obligation they have been promised they will never see: any prospect of proceedings would be seeming to signify the very failure of the Compliance Obligation (I). But not only are the legal rules attached to the Procedure necessary because the Judge is involved, and increasingly so, in compliance mechanisms, but they are also rules of General Procedural Law and not a juxtaposition of civil procedure, criminal procedure, administrative procedure, etc., because the Compliance Obligation itself is not confined either to civil procedure or to criminal procedure, to administrative procedure, etc., which in practice gives primacy to what brings them all together: General Procedural Law (II). In addition to what might be called the "negative" presence of General Procedural Law, there is also a positive reason, because General Procedural Law is the prototype for "Systemic Compliance Litigation", and in particular for the most advanced aspect of this, namely the duty of vigilance (III). In particular, it governs the actions that can be brought before the Courts (IV), and the principles around which proceedings are conducted, with an increased opposition between the adversarial principle, which marries the Compliance Obligation, since both reflect the principle of Information, and the rights of the defence, which do not necessarily serve them, a clash that will pose a procedural difficulty in principle (V). Finally, and this "prototype" status is even more justified, because Compliance Law has given companies jurisdiction over the way in which they implement their legal Compliance Obligations, it is by respecting and relying on the principles of General Procedural Law that this must be done, in particular through not only sanctions but also internal investigations (VI). - 🌐Follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐Subscribe to the video newsletter MAFR Overhang 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Law & Art

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "In Compliance Law, the legal consequences for Entreprises of their commitments and undertakingsn", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, forthcoming. - 📝read the article - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this article has been written, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of this article: The innocents might believe, taking the Law and its words literally, that "commitments" are binding on those who make them. Shouldn't they be afraid of falling into the trap of the 'false friend', which is what the Law wants to protect them from (as stated in the prolegomena)? Indeed, the innocent persons think that those who make commitments ask what they must do and say what they will do. Yet, strangely enough, the 'commitments' that are so frequent and common in compliance behaviours are often considered by those who adopt them to have no binding value! Doubtless because they come under disciplines other than Law, such as the art of Management or Ethics. It is both very important and sometimes difficult to distinguish between these different Orders – Management, Moral Norms and Law – because they are intertwined, but because their respective standards do not have the same scope, it is important to untangle this tangle. This potentially creates a great deal of insecurity for companies (I). The legal certainty comes back when commitments take the form of contracts (II), which is becoming more common as companies contractualise their legal Compliance Obligations, thereby changing the nature of the resulting liability, with the contract retaining the imprint of the legal order or not having the same scope if this prerequisite is not present. But the contours and distinctions are not so uncontested. In fact, the qualification of unilateral undertaking of will is proposed to apprehend the various documents issued by the companies, with the consequences which are attached to that, in particular the transformation of the company into a 'debtor', which would change the position of the stakeholders with regard to it (III). It remains that the undertakings expressed by companies on so many important subjects cannot be ignored: they are facts (IV). It is as such that they must be legally considered. In this case, Civil Liability will have to deal with them if the company, in implementing what it says, what it writes and in the way it behaves, commits a fault or negligence that causes damage, not only the sole existence of an undertaking.  -   - 🌐Follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐Subscribe to the video newsletter MAFR Overhang 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Law & Art

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Arbitration consideration of Compliance Obligation for a sustainable Arbitration Place", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, forthcoming. - 📝read the article - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of this article: The first part of this study assesses the evolving relationship between Arbitration Law and Compliance Law, which depends on the very definition of the Compliance Obligation (I). Indeed, these relations have been negative for as long as Compliance has been seen solely in terms of "conformity", i.e. obeying the rules or being punished. These relationships are undergoing a metamorphosis, because the Compliance Obligation refers to a positive and dynamic definition, anchored in the Monumental Goals that companies anchor in the contracts that structure their value chains. Based on this development, the second part of the study aims to establish the techniques of Arbitration and the office of the arbitrator to increase the systemic efficiency of the Compliance Obligation, thereby strengthening the attractiveness of the Place (II). First and foremost, it is a question of culture: the culture of Compliance must permeate the world of Arbitration, and vice versa. To achieve this, it is advisable to take advantage of the fact that in Compliance Law the distinction between Public and Private Law is less significant, while the concern for the long term of contractually forged structural relationships is essential. To encourage such a movement to deploy the Compliance Obligation, promoting the strengthening of a Sustainable Arbitration Place (III), the first tool is the contract. Since contracts structure value chains and enable companies to fulfill their legal Compliance Obligation but also to add their own will to it, stipulations or offers relating to Arbitration should be included in them. In addition, the adoption of non-binding texts can set out a guiding principle to ensure that concern for the Monumental Goals is appropriate in order the Compliance Obligation to be taken into account by Arbitrators. - 🌐Follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐Subscribe to the video newsletter MAFR Overhang 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Law & Art

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Vigilance Obligation, Spearheard and Total Share of the Compliance Obligation", in  M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, " Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, forthcoming. - 📝read the article - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published 📚see the series in which this book is published:  "Compliance & Regulation"  - 🚧Read the bilingual Working Paper on which this article is based, with further developments, technical references and hypertext links - ► Summary of this article: The "obligation of vigilance" unleashes all the more radical and passionate positions, sometimes among Law professors, because it has not been precisely defined. One word is used for another, either inadvertently or deliberately, deliberately if it can attract this or that element from one legal corpus and import it into another.  The very exercise of definition is therefore required in practice. There are specific obligations of vigilance that come under such and such a body of regulations and are imposed on such and such a category of operators to fulfill such and such a function. These are precise circles which are not confused and must not be confused. This is superimposed on what the French 2017 law so-called "Vigilance law", which is much more encompassing since it applies to all large companies in the operation of the value chains they have set up. The European 2024 directive is in the same way. But there is no general duty or obligation of Vigilance. Such a claim would be based on confusing or shifting each of these 3 levels, which must be avoided because no positive law does support this (I). If the duty of vigilance is attracting so much attention, whether or not the European CS3D is fully effective, it is because Vigilance is the "cutting edge" of Compliance Obligation (II). Vigilance requires companies, by consideration of their power and without reproaching them for it or demanding that it be reduced, to detect risks of damage to the environment and climate, but also to human rights, because they are in a position to do so in order to prevent them from turning into disasters. In this respect, the  Vigilance duty makes clearer the exact legal nature of the Compliance Obligation. Moreover, Vigilance appears as the Total Part of the Compliance Obligation (III). Indeed, although it is restricted to one area, the value chain, and to two types of risk, deterioration of the environment and deterioration of human rights, it expresses the totality of the Compliance Obligation by means of tools that the 2017 French "Vigilance law" had itself duplicated from the 2016 so-called "Sapin 2  law": to preserve systems today, but above all tomorrow, in order they do not collapse (Negative Monumental Goals), or even consolidate them (Positive Monumental Goals), so that the human beings who are willingly or unwillingly involved in them are not crushed by them but benefit from them. This is why large companies are subject to the Obligation of Compliance and Vigilance, particularly in the humanist conception that Europe is developing. The result is a new type of Litigation, of a systemic nature, for which the Courts have spontaneously become specialised, and for which the procedures will have to be adapted and the office  of the Judge shall have to evolve.   - 🌐Follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐Subscribe to the video newsletter MAFR Overhang 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Law & Art

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Conceiving the Compliance Obligation: Using its Position to take part in achieving the Compliance Monumental Goals", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, forthcoming. - 📝read the article - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this article has been written, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of this article: This article explains what companies' Compliance Obligation" is. Delving into the mass of compliance obligations, it uses the method of classification of those that are subject to an obligation of result and those that are subject to an obligation of means. It justifies the choice of this essential criterion, which changes the objects and the burden of proof of companies that are subject to an obligation of result when it comes to setting up "compliance structures" and are subject to an obligation of means when it comes to the effects produced by these compliance structures. Indeed, rather than getting bogged down in definitional disputes, given that Compliance Law is itself a nascent branch of Law, the idea of this contribution is to take as a starting point the different legal regimes of so many different compliance obligations to which laws and regulations subject large companies: sometimes they have to apply them to the letter and sometimes they are only sanctioned in the event of fault or negligence. This brings us back to the distinction between obligations of result and obligations of means. Although it would be risky to transpose the expression and regime of contractual obligations to legal obligations put by legislation, starting from this observation in the evidentiary system of compliance of a plurality of obligations of means and of result, depending on whether it is a question of this or that technical compliance obligation, we must first classify them. It would then appear that this plurality will not constitute a definitive obstacle to the constitution of a single definition of the Compliance Obligation. On the contrary, it makes it possible to clarify the situation, to trace the paths through what is so often described as a legal jumble, an unmanageable "mass of regulations". Indeed, insofar as the company obliged under Compliance Law participates in the achievement of the Monumental Goals on which this is normatively based, a legal obligation which may be relayed by contract or even by Ethics, it can only be an obligation of means, by virtue of this very teleological nature and the scale of the goals targeted, for example the happy outcome of the climate crisis which is beginning or the desired effective equality between human beings. This established principle leaves room for the fact that the behaviour required is marked out by processes put in place by structured tools, most often legally described, for example the establishment of a vigilance plan or regularly organised training courses (effectiveness), are obligations of result, while the positive effects produced by this plan or these training courses (effaciety) are obligations of means. This is even more the case when the Goal is to transform the system as a whole, i.e. to ensure that the system is solidly based, that there is a culture of equality, and that everyone respects everyone else, all of which come under the heading of efficiency. The Compliance Obligation thus appears unified because, gradually, and whatever the various compliance obligations in question, their intensity or their sector, its structural process prerequisites are first and foremost structures to be established which the Law, through the Judge in particular, will require to be put in place but will not require anything more, whereas striving towards the achievement of the aforementioned Monumental Goals will be an obligation of means, which may seem lighter, but corresponds to an immeasurable ambition, commensurate with these Goals. In addition, because these structures (alert mechanisms, training, audits, contracts and clauses, etc.)  have real meaning if they are to produce effects and behaviours that lead to changes converging towards the Monumental Goals, it is the obligations of means that are most important and not the obligations of result. The judge must also take this into account. Finally, the Compliance Obligation, which therefore consists of this interweaving of multiple compliance obligations of result and means of using the entreprise's position, ultimately Goals at system efficiency, in Europe at system civilisation, for which companies must show not so much that they have followed the processes correctly (result) but that this has produced effects that converge with the Goals sought by the legislator (effects produced according to a credible trajectory). This is how a crucial company, responsible Ex Ante, should organise itself and behave. - 🌐Follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐Subscribe to the video newsletter MAFR Overhang 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Law & Art

► Full Reference: E. Maclouf, "Entités industrielles et Obligation de compliance" ("Industrial Entities and Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, "Régulations & Compliance" Serie, 2025, to be published - 📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of this article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : This article looks at the topic Industrial Entities and Compliance Obligation from the perspective of Management Science and sets out to resolve the paradox of industrial organisations expressing the ambition of progress for the benefit of people, a humanist ambition that is contradicted by the effects produced by this industrialisation itself, which are harmful to that same humanity. The Compliance Obligation, insofar as it is based on the Monumental Goals and is anchored in Industrial Organisations, aims to resolve this paradox. The science of human organisations aims to allocate nature's scarce resources as efficiently as possible by getting individuals to cooperate, this engineering producing natural, industrial and social disasters, which are themselves more or less anticipated. The Compliance Obligation holds out the hope of better preventing them (Negative Monumental Goal) and managing them, or even improving people's lives (Positive Monumental Goal) by going beyond traditional disciplines and developing Ex Ante. However, Industrial Organisations may also reject the weight of the constraints that this creates for them, calling for deregulation instead. The debate is currently open. Furthermore, by moving from the mechanical logic of conformity to the dynamic logic of the Compliance Obligation, companies find themselves in a situation of systemic uncertainty and must decide on the strategy to be implemented, resulting in a managerialisation of the Law  and implying many new decisions to be taken. The notion of "project" is therefore back at the heart of Industrial Organisations, and more specifically that of "Humanist Project", as embodied by the Compliance Obligation, in a new Organisation where everyone plays their part in the Value Chain. The author draws on the work of Raymond Aron and the Rueff-Armand report to show that the dynamism and strength of Industrial Organisation can support a Humanist Project that is politically developed and fits in with the Economic Rationality of Industrial Organisations. This is all the more necessary as this Regulatory Framework cannot come from the sum of individual actions alone (employees, consumers, investors), as the interests of the company, of the sector, of society, of nature cannot be served by this addition alone, and the claim that the whole is self-regulated by the expression of a single one of these players (who are themselves both inside and outside the industrial organisation) is unsustainable. The Author shows that new entities are therefore being created to regulate Industrial Entities in the public interest through the Compliance Obligation, which inserts an Obligation into the Industrial Organisation modifying its project: the French so-called "Sapin 2" law is a perfect example of this, encouraging appropriate strategic responses from Industrial Organisations, which have modified their managerial procedures to integrate new strategic projects and involve stakeholders. Finally, because the Compliance Obligation is anchored in Monumental Goals, it can be the basis of the Company's Project and the Players' Project of the players, which leads us to return to the basis of the Organisations Theory, which entrusts to the corporate bodies the power and the mission of defining such a project through corporate deliberations which will then be, in the aforementioned approach of Industrial Rationality, broken down into Objectives and Plans. This is a reminder that Profit is not a Company's Goal: it is the sine qua non of its survival, which is different. A Rational Organisation determines its Project and for ensuring it,  to achieve it, it must not run the risk of going bankrupt. The Compliance Obligation is developing  between this difference and the link between the Project and this necessity to have some profit which is just a Condition. Furthermore, in order to establish this project, the organisation must resolve oppositions (conflictuality) through the complex interplay of players (Jean-Pierre Dupuy). Industrial organisations must respond to the Compliance Obligation. In particular, they do this by developing norms, or by contributing to the development of public norms, and by themselves expressly aiming Goals such as the fight against suffering in the workplace or equality between men and women as falling within the scope of the Compliance Obligation. This framing work is an essential part of the organisation's strategy, and environmental concerns can thus be integrated to a greater or lesser extent into this or that perspective. All this goes beyond the mere logic of conformity. The Compliance Obligation thus enables the production of what the Author calls "adaptive responses by individuals in the face of Systemic Crises and their causes", countering the Anomie which is also a monumental problem in today's society, which has lost its bearings and is suffering from Uncertainty. This Compliance Obligation enables Industrial Entities to integrate into Society, if necessary by coercion, by becoming the vectors of human rights and social and environmental expectations. But the success of this Compliance Obligation presupposes a certain appropriation of the Goals by the scales companies, which taints the Compliance Obligation itself with Uncertainty. -   🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: G. Loiseau, "L’intensité de l’obligation de vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs numériques" (The intensity of the Duty of Vigilance in different sectors: the case of digital operators), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, forthcoming - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which the contribution is published - ► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : L'auteur développe le cas des opérateurs numériques. Il souligne le paradoxe d'un Droit qui est parti d'un texte qui a posé le principe de l'irresponsabilité des hébergeurs, en raison de leur neutralité technique, pour aboutir au DSA et leur imposer des diligences, mais il rappelle que cette obligation n'apparaît qu'à partir d'un signalement qui est porté auprès de l'opérateur numérique et une interdiction expresse d'une obligation générale de surveiller les informations. Moreover, there is no general duty of vigilance incumbent on digital operators, even if recent case law seems to be tightening the role imposed on hosting providers. The Monumental Goal here is to fight against illegal content, but freedom of expression must also be preserved and regulations vary according to the type of content, whereas the DSA has a more general conception, aims at a logic of accountability and prevention of systemic risks. But wanting to make platforms 'accountable' ex ante, without touching the liability regime ex post, may pose a problem. The duty of vigilance will vary depending on whether the digital operator plays a passive or active role. This may lead platforms to adopt prior measures that may constitute structural obligations, with the trusted third party taking the form of a trusted signaller. The platform is thus made responsible for its own vigilance, but despite the possibility of enhanced vigilance, this does not have to extend to investigative measures. There are, however, specific enhanced vigilance obligations for very large platforms, justified by the risks involved and the types of content (terrorism, pornography). - 🦉This contribution est available in full text for persons following Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche teaching -

► Full Reference: M. Lamoureux, "L’obligation de vigilance des opérateurs énergétiques", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, to be published - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► English summary of this article de l'article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): Firstly, the author shows, despite the diversity of energy activities (electricity by its very nature involves fewer international value chains, oil by its very nature involves more), the operators in this sector are sufficiently unique to justify their being considered globally in terms of vigilance obligation. Currently in French case law, they are directly concerned, not only because they have been summoned before the French courts in duty of vigilance cases, but also, and above all, because they are a sign of the intensity of the vigilance expected of them. The first part of the article develops the characteristics of energy operators, which influence the intensity of the obligation of vigilance. Their uniqueness stems precisely from the enterprises themselves, which are 'giants', subject to the obligation to draw up vigilance plans, firms often vertically integrated, in a sector concentrated on multinationals with very substantial resources and present throughout the value chain, whose activity involves infrastructures. The second part of the article justifies this intensity of the obligation of vigilance by the risks specifically linked to the activities of these energy operators. Indeed, even if it is true that their activity is very heterogeneous, the risks are very significant, in that on the one hand they build diverse and gigantic infrastructures, are involved in extractive activity, and on the other hand have a long-term impact on the environment. Firms are being asked to be vigilant themselves about these infrastructures and impacts. The administrative police have been doing this for a long time in this sector. But the third part of the article shows precisely that this is nothing new: the culture of risk prevention is already very present in these enterprises, not least because of the very strong presence of the State and regulations. There is a culture of 'regulatory conformity'.  In fact, climate vigilance  relies mainly on these operators. Energy operators are therefore at the centre, not only because they generate risks, but also because they hold many of the solutions for achieving the Monumental Goals targeted by the vigilance system: they are making a decisive contribution to the fight against climate change because they have the means to do so. This is one of the reasons why the major operators have all adopted a raison d'être.         -

► Full Reference: B. Deffains, "La dette comme fondement de l'obligation de compliance" ("From the Debt to the Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, "Régulations & Compliance" Serie, 2025, pp. 67-82. - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► Summary of this contribution  (done by the Journal  of Regulation  & Compliance):  The contribution builds on the definition of Compliance in that it requires large companies to contribute to the achievement of Monumental Goals, including the preservation of human rights and systems, e.g. climate system.   This requirement is confronted with the notion of Debt as it results today from classic and new works available in economic science. In fact, in the primitive economy, debt refers not only to exchanges, but also to an ethical and social obligation leading back to the collective. The Economic Analysis of Law has highlighted this situation, where some of the entities involved in a situation benefit from positive externalities, or endure negative externalities on their own, thus creating a situation of debt: this generates an obligation to correct market failure through an obligation to manage risks, as expressed by Compliance Obligation. This implies that economic calculation can be used to quantify this debt, leading to new proposals for biodiversity accounting. The author then highlights the recognition of Debt as the source of an Compliance Obligation. This can be expressed through the classical notion of natural obligation, which can be traced back to the French Civil Code, or through more solidarist or political conceptions of Law, linked to moral responsibility, with the overall moral equilibrium referring to civic duty, superimposed on the accounting equilibrium. The political dimension is very much present, as shown by Grotius and Kant, then Bourgeois (solidarism), Rawls and Sen (social justice), who link the deep commitment of each individual with the group. This sheds light on the essential role played by the State and public institutions in formalising and enforcing the Compliance Obligation, not only to ensure its effectiveness, but also to make everyone aware of its fairness dimension. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: R. Sève, "L'Obligation de Compliance et les mutations de la souveraineté et de la citoyenneté" ("Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 97-107.   - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published. - ► English Summary of this article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : The contribution describes "les changements de philosophie du droit que la notion de compliance peut impliquer par rapport à la représentation moderne de l’Etat assurant l’effectivité des lois issues de la volonté générale, dans le respect des libertés fondamentales qui constituent l’essence du sujet de droit." ("the changes in legal philosophy that the notion of Compliance may imply in relation to the modern representation of the State ensuring the effectiveness of laws resulting from the general will, while respecting the fundamental freedoms that constitute the essence of the subject of law"). The contributor believes that the definition of Compliance is due to authors who « jouer un rôle d’éclairage et de structuration d’un vaste ensemble d’idées et de phénomènes précédemment envisagés de manière disjointe.  Pour ce qui nous occupe, c’est sûrement le cas de la théorie de la compliance, développée en France par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche dans la lignée de grands économistes (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) et dont la première forme résidait dans les travaux bien connus de la Professeure sur le droit de la régulation. » ( "play a role in illuminating and structuring a vast set of ideas and phenomena previously considered in a disjointed manner.  For our purposes, this is certainly the case with the theory of Compliance, developed in France by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche in the tradition of great economists (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) and whose first form was in her well-known work on Regulatory Law"). Drawing on the Principles of the Law of the American Law Institute, which considers compliance to be a "set of rules, principles, controls, authorities, offices and practices designed to ensure that an organisation conforms to external and internal norms", he stresses that Compliance thus appears to be a neutral mechanism aimed at efficiency through a move towards Ex Ante. But he stresses that the novelty lies in the fact that it is aimed 'only' at future events, by 'refounding' and 'monumentalising' the matter through the notion of 'monumental goals' conceived by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, giving rise to a new jus comune. Thus, "la compliance c’est l’idée permanente du droit appliquée à de nouveaux contextes et défis." ("Compliance is the permanent idea of Law applied to new contexts and challenges").  So it's not a question of making budget savings, but rather of continuing to apply the philosophy of the Social Contract to complex issues, particularly environmental issues.  This renews the place occupied by the Citizen, who appears not only as an individual, as in the classical Greek concept and that of Rousseau, but also through entities such as NGOs, while large companies, because they alone have the means to pursue the Compliance Monumental Goals, would be like "super-citizens", something that the digital space is beginning to experience, at the risk of the individuals themselves disappearing as a result of "surveillance capitalism". But in the same way that thinking about the Social Contract is linked to thinking about capitalism, Compliance is part of a logical historical extension, without any fundamental break: "C’est le développement et la complexité du capitalisme qui forcent à introduire dans les entités privées des mécanismes procéduraux d’essence bureaucratique, pour discipliner les salariés, contenir les critiques internes et externes, soutenir les managers en place" ("It is the development and complexity of capitalism that forces us to introduce procedural mechanisms of a bureaucratic nature into private entities, in order to discipline employees, contain internal and external criticism, and support the managers in place") by forcing them to justify remuneration, benefits, and so on. Furthermore, in the words of the author, "Avec les buts monumentaux, – la prise en compte des effets lointains, diffus, agrégés par delà les frontières, de l’intérêt des générations futures, de tous les êtres vivants – ,  on passe, pour ainsi dire, à une dimension industrielle de l’éthique, que seuls de vastes systèmes de traitement de l’information permettent d’envisager effectivement." ("With the Monumental Goals – taking into account the distant, diffuse effects, aggregated across borders, the interests of future generations, of all living beings – we move, so to speak, to an industrial dimension of ethics, which only vast information processing systems can effectively envisage"). This is how we can find a division between artificial intelligence and human beings in organisations, particularly companies, or in decision-making processes. In the same way, individual freedom does not disappear with Compliance, because it is precisely one of its monumental goals to enable individuals to make choices in a complex environment, particularly in the digital space where the democratic system is now at stake, while technical mechanisms such as early warning will revive the right to civil disobedience, invalidating the complaint of "surveillance capitalism". The author concludes that the stakes are so high that Compliance, which has already overcome the distinctions between Private and Public Law and between national and international law, must also overcome the distinction between Information and secrecy, particularly in view of cyber-risks, which requires the State to develop and implement non-public Compliance strategies to safeguard the future. - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

► Full Reference: D. Gutmann, "Droit fiscal et obligation de compliance" (Tax Law and Compliance Obligation), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 199-207. - ► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author takes up the hypothesis of a Compliance Law defined by its Monumental Goals, the realisation of which is entrusted to "crucial operators" and confronts it with Tax Law. The link is particularly effective since these operators possess what governments need in this area: relevant Information. Going further, Compliance Law can give rise to two types of obligations on the part of these operators, either towards others operators who need to be monitored, corrected or denounced, or towards themselves, when they need to make amends. In the first part of this contribution, the author shows that Compliance Obligation reproduces the mechanism of a Tax Law which, for large companies, is embroiled in a process of increasing Globalisation. It enables Governments to aspire to the "Monumental Goals" of combating tax optimisation and impoverishing governments, victims of the erosion of the tax base, in the face of the strategies of companies that are more powerful than they are themselves, by using this very power of firms to turn it against them. Companies become the willing or de facto allies of governments, particularly when it comes to recovering tax debts, or assist them in their stated ambition to achieve social justice.  In this way, the State "manages" Tax Law by cooperating with companies. In the second part, the author outlines the contours of this business Compliance Obligation, which is no longer simply a matter of paying tax. Beyond this financial obligation, it is more a question of mastering Information, particularly when multinational companies are subject to specific tax reporting obligations and are required to reveal their tax strategy, presumed to be transparent and coherent within the group : this legal presumption gives rise to obligations to seek information and ensure coherence, since a single tax strategy is not self-evident in a group. The author emphasises that companies have accepted the principles governing these new compliance obligations and are tending to transform these obligations, particularly Transparency, into a communication strategy, in line with the ESG criteria that have been developed and a desire for fruitful relations with stakeholders. Therefore the tax relations developed by major companies are being extended not only to the tax authorities, but also to NGOs, by incorporating a strong ethical dimension. This is leading to new strategies, particularly in the area of Vigilance. The author concludes: "A n’en pas douter, l’obligation de compliance existe bel et bien en matière fiscale." ("There is no doubt that the Compliance Obligation does exist in tax matters"). - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published -

► Full Reference: L. d'Avout, "Compliance et conflits de lois. Le droit international de la vigilance-conformité à partir de quelques applications récentes sur le continent européen" ("Compliance and conflict of laws. International Law of Vigilance-Conformity, based on recent applications in Europe"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 173-196. - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published - ► English Summary of this Article (done par the Author) : In the absence of constraints derived from the real international law, vigilance-compliance laws themselves determine their scope of application in space. They do so generously, to the extent that they often converge on the same operators and 'overlap' on the world stage. The result is a hybridisation of the law applicable to the definition of Compliance Obligations; a law possibly written "with four hands" or more, which is not always harmonious and which exposes unilateral legislators to occasional retouching their work and their applied regulations. -

► Full Reference: J.-S. Borghetti, "Le rapport entre le Droit de la responsabilité civile et l'Obligation de Compliance" (The Relation between Tort Law and Compliance Obligation), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 589-598. - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published - ► English Summary of this Article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : The Author points out that in order to establish civil liability, it is first necessary to find fault, i.e. a deviation from an obligation, which will trigger a secondary obligation, that of reparation. But it can also be argued that it is from liability that this primary obligation arises, civil liability then revealing an obligation which existed only implicitly. That establishes a two-way relationship between liability and obligation. The Compliance Obligation illustrates this, in particular through the Obligation of Vigilance conceived by the French law of 2017. The author therefore devotes the first part of his contribution to civil liability as a result of an Compliance Obligation, especially the Obligation of Vigilance. issued of the French law of 2017. After discussing whether the constraints generated by compliance should be classified as 'obligations', since there is no creditor, which therefore opens the way to liability in tort, he examines the conditions for incurring such liability, which are difficult, particularly with regard to the burden of proof and the demonstration of the causal link. The requirement concerning the latter may evolve in French law towards the admission of proportional causality, as is now accepted in certain cases in German case law. In the second part of his contribution, the author deals with the hypothesis of civil liability as an indicator of a Compliance Obligation. He points out that the claims made, particularly in the cases of TotalOuganda  (France) and Milieudefensie v. Shell (Netherlands) seek to obtain from the judge a such "revelation". The author considers that it is not possible to draw from the  French 2017 law which refers to article 1240 of the French Civil Code on the liability because this article is referred to only in order to organise the consequences of a breach of article L.225-102-4 of the French Commercial Code organising the Obligation of Vigilance (article 1240 being therefore under the secondary obligation described above) and not to feed what this article L.225-102-4 requires under the primary obligation (defined above).  -

► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "Obligation de Compliance et droits humains" ("Compliance Obligation and Human Rights"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, "Régulations & Compliance" Serie, 2025, pp. 83-95. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published - ► English Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : The author asks whether human rights can, over and above the many compliance obligations, form the basis of the Compliance Obligation. The consideration of human rights corresponds to the fundamentalisation of Law, crossing both Private and Public Law, and are considered by some as the matrix of many legal mechanisms, including international ones. They prescribe values that can thus be disseminated. Human rights come into direct contact with Compliance Law as soon as Compliance Law is defined as "the internalisation in certain operators of the obligation to structure themselves in order to achieve goals which are not natural to them, goals which are set by public authorities responsible for the future of social groups, goals which these companies must willingly or by force aim to achieve, simply because they are in a position to achieve them". These "Monumental Goals" converge on human beings, and therefore the protection of their rights by companies.  In a globalised context, the State can either act through mandatory regulations, or do nothing, or force companies to act through Compliance Law. For this to be effective, tools are needed to enable 'crucial' operators to take responsibility ex ante, as illustrated in particular by the French law on the Vigilance Obligation of 2017. This obligation takes the form of both a "legal obligation", expression which is quite  imprecise, found for example in the duty of vigilance of the French 2017 law, and in a more technical sense through an obligation that the company establishes, in particular through contracts. Legal obligations are justified by the fact that the protection of human rights is primarily the responsibility of States, particularly in the international arena. Even if it is only a question of Soft Law, non-binding Law, this tendency can be found in the Ruggie principles, which go beyond the obligation of States not to violate human rights, to a positive obligation to protect them effectively. The question of whether this could apply not only to States but also to companies is hotly debated. If we look at the ICSID Urbaser v. Argentina award of 2016, the arbitrators accepted that a company had an obligation not to violate human rights, but rejected an obligation to protect them effectively. In European Law, the GDPR, DSA and AIA, and in France the so-called Vigilance law, use Compliance Lools, often Compliance by Design, to protect human rights ex ante. Contracts, particularly through the inclusion of multiple clauses in often international contracts, express the "privatisation" of human rights. Care should be taken to ensure that appropriate sanctions are associated with them and that they do not give rise to situations of contractual imbalance. The relationship of obligation in tort makes it necessary to articulate the Ex Ante logic and the Ex Post logic and to conceive what the judge can order. The author concludes that "la compliance oblige à remodeler les catégories classiques du droit dans l’optique de les adosser à l’objectif même de la compliance : non pas uniquement un droit tourné vers le passé, mais un droit ancré dans les enjeux du futur ; non pas un droit émanant exclusivement de la contrainte publique, mais un droit s’appuyant sur de la normativité privée ; non pas un droit strictement territorialisé, mais un droit appréhendant l’espace transnational" ("Compliance requires us to reshape the classic categories of Law with a view to bringing them into line with the very objective of Compliance: not just a Law turned towards the past, but a Law anchored in the challenges of the future; not a Law emanating exclusively from public constraint, but a Law based on private normativity; not a strictly territorialised Law, but a law apprehending the transnational space". - 🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

► Full Reference: M. Torre-Schaub, "La compliance environnementale et climatique" ("Environmental and Climate Compliance"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 271-286. - 📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'Obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► Summary of this contribution  (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) : The author starts from the fact that Compliance Law, in that it is not limited to conformity process, and Environmental Law are complementary, both based above all on the prevention of risks and harmful behaviour, environmental crises and the right to a healthy environment involving the strengthening of Environmental Vigilance. It is all the more important to do this because definitions remain imprecise, not least those of Environment and Climate, which are diffuse concepts. Firstly, the contribution sets out the purpose of Environmental Compliance, which is to ensure that companies are vigilant with regard to all kinds of risks: they put in place and follow a series of processes to obtain "progress" in accordance with a standard of "reasonable vigilance". This requires them to go beyond mere conformity and encourages them to develop their own soft law tools within a framework of information and transparency, so that the climate system itself benefits in accordance with its own objectives. Then the author stresses the preventive nature of Environmental Vigilance mechanisms, which go beyond providing Information to managing risks upstream, in particular through the vigilance plan, which may be unified or drawn up risk by risk, and which must be adapted to the company, particularly in the risk mapping drawn up, with assessment being carried out on a case-by-case basis. Lastly, in the light of recent French case law, the author describes the implementation of the system, which may bring the parties before the Tribunal judiciaire de Paris (Paris Court of First Instance) and then the specialised chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal. The author believes that judges must clarify the obligation of Environmental Vigilance so that companies can adjust to it, and these 2 courts are in the process of doing so. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: J.-Ch. Roda "Obligations de compliance et concurrence : les liaisons dangereuses ? (Compliance obligations and Competition: dangerous liaisons?)", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Éditions Lefebvre – Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 287-297. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published  - ► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author stresses that if Compliance Law and Competition Law may seem far apart today, it is because many people today have a restricted and inaccurate view of Competition Law. Indeed, if Competition Law is reduced to being no more than that which enables offer and demand rule to function fully, then 'compliance obligations' need to be injected into this sort of 'natural law' of the market backed up by the legal system, compliance obligations giving humanity to the whole. But if Competition Law is given back its rightful dimension, which it has in its more classical conception, the links between the obligations arising from the 2 branches of Law find harmonious relationships. They are all the more necessary because, particularly through the Duty of Vigilance, Civil Competition Law is going to interfere because of the contractualisation of this legal obligation and the possible significant imbalance that could be identified, the article stressing that the application of Compliance stipulations on a partner could end up being analysed as a power, justifying merger control or at the very least a dominant position legal qualification, the abuse of which will be sanctioned. It is for this reason that the 2024 CS3D reminds us that it must be implemented in respect with competition legal rules. However, the author emphasises that it is towards a kind of 'Ethical Competition' that compliance obligations are leading, leading to new practices. The results, described in the second part of the article, are increasing the influence of the Compliance Obligation, which embodies the ambition of a "just transition" and a "social Europe". These ambitions are rejected by the advocates of the so-called "neo-liberal" conception of what Competition Law should be, but the conception of "Competition-Means" was indeed that of the American designers of the corpus of appropriate rules in the nineteenth century, when it was necessary in particular to fight against the large infrastructure monopolies, and it was also that of the jurists who founded the European Union. Only the minimal view of what falls within the scope of competition leads to opposition to the Compliance Obligation. The author therefore stresses that "il semble aujourd’hui évident que la compliance doit être la boussole du droit de la concurrence (it seems obvious today that Compliance must be the compass of Competition Law)". It is in this spirit that companies must draft the compliance clauses that will multiply to structure the value chains they have set up, providing in particular for the resolution of tensions, or even conflicts, with partners. The author concludes that it is in this way that crucial companies will demonstrate their "particular responsibility" both and in the same way with regard to Competition Law and Compliance Law. - 🦉This article is available for people who follow Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche teaching 

► Full Reference: B. Frydman & A. Briegleb, "L'obligation de compliance en Droit global ("Compliance Obligation in Global Law)", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Éditions Lefebvre – Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 299-311. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published  - ► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The authors stress that the Contracts Law and Tort Law are essential in Compliance Law, particularly in its global legal perspective, since it goes beyond the legal systems of States and develops new normativities, at the level of each company, but also allows a new expression of public power through the Monumental Goals that Compliance Law claims to achieve globally. The weaker the States, the greater the delegation to the first level is operating. In concrete terms, the authors examine a series of situations in which various organisations use compliance techniques to appropriate global power over things or people, which has the effect, and sometimes the purpose, of reducing the freedoms of people controlled in this way. Thus CSR, which was initially non-binding, is now the source of binding obligations, and the moral obligation expressed in codes of conduct can become a civil obligation, as the Supreme Court of California decided in 2002 in the Nike case.  In addition, "Comply or Explain" clauses are now commonplace, allowing the person subject to the legislation not to comply if they can justify it, which is the basis of the many information reports that companies are now required to publish. Then, returning to the issue of liability, particularly in the digital environment, the article stresses the importance of 'conditional immunity from liability', taking the view from the European DSA that certain operators, such as hosting providers, are not liable unless they take on obligations, such as monitoring functions on contents published. Finally, with regard to the duty of vigilance, it tends for the first time to align the scope of "responsibility" with the scope of "power", moral responsibility thus becoming legal responsibility, which would be like a new responsibility for others. The result of all this is an "obligation to regulate others". - 🦉This article is available for people who follow the Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche teaching

► Full Reference: A.-C. Rouaud, "L’intensité de l’obligation de vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs financiers" (The intensity of the obligation of vigilance depending on the sector: the case of financial operators), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) an Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 539-550. - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : The author develops the case of financial operators and shows that if they are subject to very heavy obligations of vigilance, it is above all because of the systemic risks of the markets, obligations which are consubstantial with their activities, because these operators are often in charge of market infrastructures or operating services, which make them all belong to the category of regulated professions. Despite this uniqueness, the obligation of vigilance has many facets, ranging from policing and customer surveillance to warning and protection, which can be very limited, as the fight against money laundering aims to protect the system (kyc). In addition, this obligation to exercise vigilance serves different goals, which explains the diversity of sanctions, because the intensity of the obligation also varies. The fight against systemic risk is certainly a common goal, but there are also concerns about protecting specific categories, such as investors (from a more European perspective). However, the general interest is now being renewed, as market protection is coupled with a concern for Sustainability. This is reflected in the variability of sanctions, ranging from disciplinary sanctions, handled by the financial markets regulatory bodies, to the obligation to put in place compliance programmes against which breaches are sanctioned per se. Private enforcement is developing in tandem with public enforcement, with a transformation of the litigation risk for companies, which is highly sensitive to extraterritoriality and the scope of soft law.     -