Publications [697]

July 22, 2019


This working document serves as a basis for a contribution to the Grands Arrêts de la Propriété intellectuelle (major cases in Intellectual Property), published under the direction of Michel Vivant, in the new section devoted to Regulatory perspective.

Conceived as a "regulatory tool", intellectual property is then used by the State as an "incentive for innovation". Public authorities adopt solutions that stem from sectoral concerns that permeate intellectual property. Because the economic sectors become prime, the systemic perspective then prevails in the solutions retained in the judgments passed by the courts. 

 One can see it through three French court decisions: 


 Civ., 1ière, 28 février 2006, named Mulholland Drive ;

 Paris, 11 décembre 2012, Sanofi-Aventis ;

 Civ., 1ière, 6 juillet 2017, SFR, Orange, Free, Bouygues télécom et autres.



Intellectual property, derived from the State and inserted in a public policy, can be conceived, not to reward a posteriori the creator but to incite others to innovate. It is then an Ex Ante tool of Regulation, alternative to subsidies. If private copying is an exception, it is not in relation to the principle of competition but in an insertion in a system of incentives, starting from the costs borne by the author of the first innovation: the owner of the rights is then protected , not only according to a balance of interests, but in order not to discourage innovative potentials and the sector itself. (1st decision).

The sectoral policy then pervades the intellectual property used to regulate a sector, for example that of the drug. While it is true that a laboratory wishing to market a generic medicine did not wait for the patent expiry of the original medicine to do so, it is not relevant to sanction this anticipation of a few days because investments made by the holder of the intellectual property right have been made profitable by it and because the public authorities favor generics for the sake of public health (2nd decision).

The systemic interest provides and that is why Internet service providers have to bear the costs of access blocking while they are irresponsible because of the texts. This obligation to pay is internalized by Compliance because they are in the digital system best able to put an end to the violation of intellectual property rights that the ecosystem requires to be effective. (3rd decision).



It is necessary to underline the paradox represented by the infatuation of the theoreticians of Regulation with intellectual property, whose legal nature it transforms by an exogenous reasoning(I). Influenced, the case law uses reasoning based on incentives, investments, returns and costs, so that the State obtains the operators expected behaviors (II). As a natural result, there is a sectoral segmentation, for example  in telecommunications or pharmacy, which ends up calling into question the uniqueness of intellectual property, according to the technologies and public policies that affect them  (III). There are still imputations of new obligations on operators just because they are in the technical position of implementing intellectual property rights: the transition from Regulation to Compliance is thus taking place (IV).

July 15, 2019


July 15, 2019


Updated: July 4, 2019 (Initial publication: April 30, 2019)


  Complete reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Having a good behavior in the digital space, working paper, April 2019.


📝  This working document serves as a basis for a contribution to the collective book dedicated to Professor Michel Vivant, article written en French.


Summary: The jurist sees the world through the way he learns to speak!footnote-1536, legal vocabulary build by Law itself, whether in common law or in civil law. Thus, we think we are dealing with the human being who does not move, taken by the legal notion expressed by the term "person", their body and their biological development in time, from the birth to the death, holding entirely in this hollow of that word "person", while the behavior of the human being with regard to the world, others and things, are grouped in other branches of Law: the Contract and Tort Law and the Property Law, which are only what people do with and about things.

The Law of the Environment has already come to blur this distinction, so finally so strange because this classical conception refers to a person taken firstly in his immobility (Law of individuals), and then in his only actions (Contrats and Tort Law, Property Law). Indeed, the very notion of "environment" implies that the person is not isolated, that he/she is "surrounded", that he/she is what he/she is and will become because of what surrounds him/her ; in return the world is permanently affected by his/her personal action. On second thought, when once "Law of Individuals" was not distinguished from Family Law, the human being was more fully restored by this division in the legal system that not only followed him/her from birth to death but also in him/her most valuable interactions: parents, siblings, couples, children. Thus Family Law was finer and more faithful to what is the life of a human being.

To have instituted Law of Individuals, it is thus to have promoted of the human being a vision certainly more concrete, because it is above all of their identity and their body about what Law speaks, astonishing that we have not noticed before that women are not men like the others. To have instituted the Law of the people, it is thus to have promoted of the human being a vision certainly more concrete, because it is above all of his identity and his body that one speaks to us, astonishing that the we have not noticed before that women are not men like the others!footnote-1537 without however remembering that abstraction is sometimes the best of protections!footnote-1538.  But it is also to have isolated human beings, split from what they do, what they touch, what they say to others. It is by taking legally a static perception of a "man without relationship". We have gone from the legal individualism of the Law of the sole man.

From this concrete vision, we have all the benefits but Law, much more than in the eighteenth century, perceives the human being as an isolated subject, whose corporeality ceases to be veiled by Law!footnote-1570, but for whom the relation to others or to things does not define him or her. Which brings the human being a lot closer to things. An human being who is a legal subject who does what they wants, as they can, limited by the force of things. But in fact things are so powerful and the human being, in fact, so weak. For example, the marks people leave are erased by time. Their grip on the world stops at the extent of their knowledge, the time and money they have, building to use better their own time and to reach projects that they designed, In this conception, Person and Liberty are one, returning the subject to their solitude.

This freedom will come into conflict with the need for order, expressed by society, social contract, state, law, which imposes limits on freedom of one to preserve freedom of the other, as recalled by the French Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme  of 1789. Thus, it is not possible de jure to transform every desire in action,, even though the means would be within reach of the person in question, because certain behaviors are prohibited in that they would cause too much disorder and if they are nevertheless committed, they are punished for order to return. Thus, what could be called "law of behavior", obligations to do and not to be put in criminal, civil and administrative Law, national and international Law, substantial Law and procedural Law :they will protect the human being in movment pushed by the principle of freedom forward others and thing, movement inherent in their status as a Person. 

The human being is therefore limited in what they want to do. In the first place by the fact: their exhausting forces, their death that will come, the time counted, the money that is lacking, the knowledge that they does not even know not holding, all that is to say by their very humanity; Secondly, by the Law which forbids so many actions ...: not to kill, not to steal, not to take the spouse of others, not to pass as true what is false, etc. For the human being on the move, full of life and projects, Law has always had a "rabat-joy" side. It is for that reason often ridiculous and criticized because of all its restraining regulations, even hated or feared in that it would prevent to live according to our desire, which is always my "good pleasure", good since it is mine. Isolated and all-powerful, the human being alone not wanting to consider other than its desire alone.

Psychoanalysis, however, has shown that Law, in that it sets limits, assigns to the human being a place and a way of being held with respect to things and other persons. If one no longer stands themselves by the prohibition of the satisfaction of all desire (the first of which is the death of the other), social life is no longer possible!footnote-1571. Thank to the Law, everyone follows the same Rule at the table, from which a discussion can take place between guests and without which it can not!footnote-1539. You stand straight in your chair, you do not eat with your fingers, you do not speak with your mouth full, you do not interrupt the speaker. Admittedly, one often learns at the beginning of the learning of the Law that one should not confuse "politeness" and Law. That these rules are politeness and that this is not Law ...

But this presentation aims to make it possible to admit that the criterion of Law would be in the effectiveness of a sanction by the public power: the fine, the prison, the confiscation of a good, which the rudeness does not trigger whereas Law would imply it: by this way we are thus persuaded of the intimacy between the public power (the State) and Law... But later, after this first lesson learned, the doubt comes from the consubstansuality between Law and State. Is it not rather appropriate to consider that Law is what must lead everyone to "behave well" with regard to things and people around them? The question of punishment is important, but it is second, it is not the very definition of Law. The French author Carbonnier pointed out that the gendarme's "kepi" is the "Law sign", that is to say what it is recognized without hesitation, but it is not its definition.

The first issue dealt with by Law is then not so much the freedom of the person as the presence of others. How to use one's freedom and the associated deployment of forces in the presence of others? How could I not using it when I would like to harm them, or if the nuisance created for them by the use of my free strength is indifferent to me!footnote-1540 How can Law lead me to use my means for their benefit while our interests do not converge? 

We do not use our force against others because we have interest or desire, we do not give him the support of our strength while he indifferent us, because Law holds us. If the superego was not enough. If Law and the "parental function of the States" did not make alliance. We do it because we hold ourselves

Or rather we were holding ourselves.

Because today a new world has appeared: the digital world that allows everyone not to "hold" himself, that is to say to constantly abuse others, never to take them into consideration, to attack massively. It's a new experience. It is not a pathological phenomenon, as is delinquency (which simply leads to punishment), nor a structural failure in a principle otherwise admitted (which leads to regulatory remedies) but rather a new use, which would be a new rule: in the digital space, one can do anything to everyone, one is not held by anything or anyone, one can "let go" (I). This lack of "good behavior" is incompatible with the idea of ​​Law, in that Law is made for human beings and protect those who can not afford to protect themselves; that is why this general situation must be remedied  (II).


Cornu, G., Linguistique juridique, 2005. 


Frison-Roche, M.-A. & Sève, R., Le Droit au féminin (ed.), 2003.


Under this "mask" of the "subject of Law", we are all equal. S. Archives de Philosophie du Droit, Le sujet de droit, 1989.


Baud, J.P., L'affaire de la main volée. Histoire juridique du corps humain, 1993. 


On neurosis as a constitutive mode of child sociability, s. Lebovici, S., "C'est pas juste", in La justice. L'obligation impossible, 1994. 


Read the article of Alain Supiot about the idée of Rule common of all, under the discussion between all, presented by this author through the artwork of Kafka : "Kafka, artiste de la loi", 2019; Kafka is very present in the work of Alain Supiot, for example in his First Lesson in the Collège de France, 2012, or in an Introduction of La Gouvernance par les nombres ; This latter book is now available in English : Governance by numbers. The making a legal model of allegiance, 2017 (translated by S. Brown). 


That's why splitting Persons Law and Family Law masks another reality: the family is not made up of third parties. The links are there. They pre-exist. Starting from the only Persons Law pushes to think one can "build" his/her  family by links drawn on white paper: the contracting of the families made up of individuals becomes thinkable, even natural.

June 28, 2019


 It is often observed, even theorized, even advised and touted, that Compliance is a mechanism by which public authorities internalize political (eg environmental) concerns in big companies, which accept them, in Ex Ante, because they are rather in agreement with these "monumental goals" (eg saving the planet) and that this shared virtue is beneficial to their reputation. It is observed that this could be the most successful way in new configurations, such as digital.

But, and the Compliance Mechanism has often been brought closer to the contractual mechanism, this is only relevant if both parties are willing to do so. This is technically true, for example for the Deferred Prosecution, which requires explicit consent. This is true in a more general sense that the company wants to choose itself how to structure its organization to achieve the goals politically pursued by the State. Conversely, the compliance mechanisms work if the State is willing to admit the economic logic of the global private players and / or, if there are possible breaches, not to pursue its investigations and close the file it has opened, at a price more or less high.

But just say No.

As in contractual matters, the first freedom is negative and depends on the ability to say No.

The State can do it. But the company can do it too.

And Daimler just said No.



Publicly, including through an article in the Wall Street Journal of June 28, 2019.

The company sets out in a warning to the market that it is the object of a requirement on the part of the German Motor Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt)  of an allegation of fraud, by the installation of a software, aimed at misleading instruments for measuring emissions of greenhouse gases on cars using diesel.

It is therefore an environmental compliance mechanism that would have been intentionally countered.

On this allegation, the Regulator both warns the company of what it considers to be a fact, ie compliance fraud, and attaches it to an immediate measure, namely the removal of the circulation of 42,000 vehicles sold or proposed by Daimler with such a device.

And the firm answers : "No".



Which is probably only beginning, since a No ends the dialogue of Ex Ante to project in the Ex Post sanction procedures, calls 6 observations:


  • 1. No doubt Daimler, a German car manufacturing company, has it in mind in this allegation of fraud calculating pollution of its diesel cars what happened to his competitor Volkswagen: namely a multi-billion dollar fine, for lack of compliance in a similar hypothesis (so-called dieselgate). The strategic choice that is then made depends on education through the experience of the company, which benefits as such from a previous case that has had a very significant cost. Thus educated, the question is to measure the risk taken to refuse any cooperation, when the company can anticipate that it will still result in such an amount ....


  • 2. In addition, we find the difficulty of the distinction of Ex Ante and Ex Post. Indeed, saying No will involve for the company a cost of confrontation with the Regulator, then the peripheral jurisdictions or review courts. But in Germany, the Government itself, concerning a bank threatened with compliance proceedings and almost summoned by the US regulator to pay "of its own free will" a transactional fine, felt that this was not normal, because it must be the judges who punish, after a contradictory procedure with due process and after established facts. 


  • 3.  However, this is only an allegation, of probable assertions, of what legally allows to continue, but which does not allow to condemn. The confusion between the burden of proof, which presupposes the obligation to prove the facts before being able to sanction, and the burden of the allegation, which only supposes to articulate plausibility before being able to prosecute, is very damaging, particularly if we are committed to the principles of Repressive Law, such as the presumption of innocence and the due process. This distinction between these two probationary charges is at the heart of the probatory system in the Compliance Law. Because Compliance Law always looks for more efficiency, tends to go from the first to the second, to give the Regulator more power, since businesses are so powerful ....


  • 4. But the first question then arises: what is the nature no so much of the future measure to be feared, namely a sanction that could be taken later, against Daimler, if the breach is proven, or which will not be applied to the firm if the breach is not established; but what is the nature of the measure immediately taken, namely the return of 42,000 vehicles?


  • This may seem like an Ex Ante measurement. Indeed, the Compliance assumes non-polluting cars. The Regulator may have indications that these cars are polluting and that the manufacturer has not made the necessary arrangements for them to be less polluting (Compliance) or even organized so that this failure is not detected ( Compliance fraud).


  • This allegation suggests that there is a risk that thiese cars will polluting. They must immediately be removed from circulation for the quality of the environment. Here and now. The question of sanctions will arise after that, having its procedural apparatus of guarantees for the company that will be pursued. But see the situation on the side of the company: having to withdraw 42,000 vehicles from the market is a great damage and what is often called in Repressive Law a "security measure" taken while the evidence is not yet met could deserve a requalification in sanction. Jurisprudence is both abundant and nuanced on this issue of qualification.


  • 5. So to withdraw these cars, it is for the company to admit that it is guilty, to increase itself the punishment. And if at this game, taken from the "cost-benefit", as much for the company immediately assert to the market that this requirement of Regulation is unfounded in Law, that the alleged facts are not exacts, and that all this the judges will decide. It is sure at all whether these statements by the company are true or false, but before a Tribunal no one thinks they are true prima facie, they are only allegations.
  •  And before a Court, a Regulator appears to have to bear a burden of proof in so far as he has to defend the order he has issued, to prove the breach which he asserts exists, which justifies the exercise he made of his powers. The fact that he exercises his power for the general interest and impartially does not diminish this burden of proof.


  • 6. By saying "No", Daimler wants to recover this classic Law, often set aside by Compliance Law, classic Law based on burden of proof, means of proof, and prohibition of punitive measures - except imminent and future imminente and very serious damages  - before 'behavior could be sanctioned following a sanction procedure.
  • Admittedly, one would be tempted to make an analogy with the current situation of Boeing whose aircraft are grounded by the Regulator in that he considers that they do not meet the conditions of safety, which the aircraft manufacturer denies , Ex Ante measurement that resembles the retraction measure of the market that constitutes the recall request of cars here operated.
  • But the analogy does not work on two points. Firstly, flight activity is a regulated activity that can only be exercised with the Ex Ante authorization of several Regulators, which is not the case for offering to sell cars or to drive with. This is where Regulatory Law and Compliance Law, which often come together, here stand out.Secundly, the very possibility that planes of which it is not excluded that they are not sure is enough, as a precaution, to prohibit their shift. Here (about the cars and the measure of the pollution by them), it is not the safety of the person that is at stake, and probably not even the overall goal of the environment, but the fraud with respect to the obligation to obey Compliance. Why force the withdrawal of 42,000 vehicles? If not to punish? In an exemplary way, to remind in advance and all that it costs not to obey the Compliance? And there, the company says: "I want a judge".




June 24, 2019


In what it presents as a set of guidelines designed by a risk-driven approach, the FATF published on 21 June 2019 recommendating to fight the use of crypto-assets and cryptocurrency platforms for launderind money and financing terrorism.

This fight against money laundering is (with the fight against corruption) often presented as the core of the Compliance Law. The FATF takes a large part of it. Even if this new branch of Law aims to crystallize other ambitions, such as the fight against tax fraud or climate change, or even the promotion of diversity or education and the preservation of democratie, the legislation of Compliance Law are mature in the matter of money laundering and the terrorism financing, as they are in the fight against corruption.

The news comes then not from the new legal mechanisms but rather from the new technological tools that could allow the realization of the behaviors against which these obligations of compliance have been inserted in the legal system. It is then to these technologies that the law must adapt. This is the case with crypto-assets and cryptocurrency platforms. Because these are rapidly evolving technologies, with the exercise of written guidelines in 2019 to inform the meaning of the provisions adopted in 2018, the FATF is taking the opportunity to change the definition it provides of crypto-assets and cryptocurrencies. So that a too narrow definition by the texts does not allow the operators to escape the supervision (phenomenon of "hole in the racket" - loophole)..  




In fact, in October 2018, the FATC (Financial Action Task Force) developed 15 principles applying to these platforms, to allow this intergovernmental organization to carry out its general mission to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. These June 2019 recommendations are to interpret them.


In this very important document, where it is expressly stated that it is a matter of fixing the obligations of those who propose crypto-assets and crypto-currencies, the notion of self-regulation is rejected. Il est writter : "Regarding VASP (virtual assets services providers) supervision, the Guidance makes clear that only competent authorities can act as VASP supervisory or monitoring bodies!footnote-1628, and not self-regulatory bodies. They should conduct risk-based supervision or monitoring, with adequate powers, including the power to conduct inspections, compel the production of information and impose sanctions. There is a specific focus on the importance of international co-operation between supervisors, given the cross-border nature of VASPs’ activities and provision of services."

On the contrary, it is a matter of elaborating the control obligations that these service providers must exercise over products and their customers (Due Diligences), which must be supervised by public authorities. 

In order to exercise this supervision and monitoring, the national authorities themselves must ensure that they work together : "As the Virtual Assets Services Providers (VASP) sector evolves, countries should consider examining the relationship between AML/CF (Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financint) measures for covered VA activities and other regulatory and supervisory measures (e.g., consumer protection, prudential safety and soundness, network IT security, tax, etc.), as the measures taken in other fields may affect the ML/TF risks. In this regard, countries should consider undertaking short- and longer-term policy work to develop comprehensive regulatory and supervisory frameworks for covered VA activities and VASPs (as well as other obliged entities operating in the VA space) as widespread adoption of VAs continues".

After particularly interesting comparative law information on Italy, the Scandinavian countries and the United States, the report concludes: "International Co-operation is Key", because of the global nature of this activity.


Since the issue is not the global Regulation of these platforms and types of products, but only the possible modes of money laundering and terrorist financing to which they may give rise, the FATF recalls that neither crypto-products nor product suppliers are not referred to as such. As the guidance's title recalls, common to the 2018 document adopting the 15 principles and this interpretive document, these are "risk-based" rules. Thus, it is according to the situations that these - products and suppliers - that they may or may not present risks of laundering and financing of terrorism: depending on the type of transaction, the type of client, the type of country, etc. For example, from the moment that the transaction is anonymous, that is impossible to know the "beneficiary", or that it is transnational and instantaneous, which makes it difficult to supervise because of the heterogeneity of national supervisions little articulated between them.

In reports that public supervisors must have with crypto-product suppliers, they must adjust according to the level of risk presented by them, higher or lower: "Adjusting the type of AML/CFT supervision or monitoring: supervisors should employ both offsite and onsite access to all relevant risk and compliance information.However, to the extent permitted by their regime, supervisors can determine the correct mix of offsite and onsite supervision or monitoring of Virtual Assets Services Providers (VASPs). Offsite supervision alone may not be appropriate in higher risk situations. However, where supervisory findings in previous examinations (either offsite or onsite) suggest a low risk for ML/TF, resources can be allocated to focus on higher risk VASPs. In that case, lower risk VASPs could be supervised offsite, for example through transaction analysis and questionnaires".

This "adjustment" required does not prevent a very broad conception of the power of supervision. So, for nothing escapes the recommendations (and in particular the obligations that ensue for the suppliers of these products), the definition of the crypo-assets and crypo-currencies is this one: “Virtual asset” as a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded or transferred and can be used for payment or investment purposes. Virtual assets do not include digital representations of fiat currencies, securities, and other financial assets that are already covered elsewhere in the FATF Recommendations."

And for the same reason of effectiveness is posited the principle of technological neutrality: "Whether a natural or legal person engaged in Virtual Assets (VA) activities is a Virtual Asset Services Provider (VASP) depends on how the person uses the VA and for whose benefit. As emphasized above, ...  then they are a VASP, regardless of what technology they use to conduct the covered VA activities. Moreover, they are a VASP, whether they use a decentralized or centralized platform, smart contract, or some other mechanism.".

The interpretative guidelines then formulate the obligations that these platforms have with regard to the supervisors they obey(question of the "jurisdiction", ratione loci ; ratione materiae): " The Guidance explains how these obligations should be fulfilled in a VA context and provides clarifications regarding the specific requirements applicable regarding the USD/EUR 1 000 threshold for virtual assets occasional transactions, above which VASPs must conduct customer due diligence (Recommendation 10); and the obligation to obtain, hold, and transmit required originator and beneficiary information, immediately and securely, when conducting VA transfers (Recommendation 16). As the guidance makes clear, relevant authorities should co-ordinate to ensure this can be done in a way that is compatible with national data protection and privacy rules. ".

These platforms are not uniformly defined due to the diversity of their activities. Because it is their activity that makes them responsible for this or that regulator. For example from the Central Bank or the Financial Regulator: "For example, a number of online platforms that provide a mechanism for trading assets, including VAs offered and sold in ICOs, may meet the definition of an exchange and/or a security-related entity dealing in VAs that are “securities” under various jurisdictions’ national legal frameworks. Other jurisdictions may have a different approach which may include payment tokens. The relevant competent authorities in jurisdictions should therefore strive to apply a functional approach that takes into account the relevant facts and circumstances of the platform, assets, and activity involved, among other factors, in determining whether the entity meets the definition of an “exchange”!footnote-1626 or other obliged entity (such as a securities-related entity) under their national legal framework and whether an entity falls within a particular definition. In reaching a determination, countries and competent authorities should consider the activities and functions that the entity in question performs, regardless of the technology associated with the activity or used by the entity".



Reading this very important document, it is possible to make 6 observations: 

1. Interpretative documents are often more important than rules interpretated themselves. En these guidances, first and foremost, these are major obligations that are stated, not only for platforms but also for national laws, and well beyond the issue of money laundering. So, it is laid: "Countries should designate one or more authorities that have responsibility for licensing and/or registering VASPs. ...  at a minimum, VASPs should be required to be licensed or registered in the jurisdiction(s) where they are created. ".This is a general prescription, involving a general regulation of these platform, which registered in a general way, will probably be supervised in a general way.

Secondly, it is a series of binding measures that is required of the National legal systems, for example the possibility of seizing crypto-values.

It shows that the soft Law illustrates the continuum of the texts, and allows their evolution. Here the evolution of the definition of the object itself: the definition of crypto-assets and crypto-currencies is widened, so that the techniques of money laundering and terrorist financing are always countered, without it being necessary to adopt new binding rules. We are beyond mere interpretation. And even more of the principle of restrictive interpretation, classically attached to the Repressive Law ...

2. Fort the effectiveness of the Compliance Law, definition become extremely broad. Thus, to follow the FATF, the definititon off a financial institution is as follows: "“Financial institution” as any natural or legal person who conducts as a business one or more of several specified activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer". This is more the definition of a company in Competition Law!footnote-1627....Why ? Because otherwise, an operator finds a status allowing him to escape the category and obligations listed. The principle of efficiency implies it. The principle of "legality", derived from criminal law, has hardly any existence. But this also corresponds to the general evolution of the financial world, in which one no longer stars from the organ (for example to be a"bank") but of activity, but from an activity or a fonction whose metamorphoses are so rapid that it is almost impossible to define them ....

3. In the same way, the definition of crypto-assets or crypto-currencies: "“Virtual asset” as a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded or transferred and can be used for payment or investment purposes. Virtual assets do not include digital representations of fiat currencies, securities, and other financial assets that are already covered elsewhere in the FATF Recommendations". This definition is purely operational because nothing can escape the FATF: all that is financial or monetary, whatever its form or support, its traditional form or a form that will be invented tomorrow, is within its competence and, through a such definition, is under national supervisors. In Compliance Law, and since everything is based on risk analysis, the idea is simple: nothing must escape obligations and supervision.

4. Platform apprehension is done by the criterion of activity, according to the "functional" method. Thus, its supervision, or even its regulation, and its obligations of compliance, will apply, depending on what it does, to the Financial Regulator (if it does ICO) or to others if it only uses tokens as an instrument of exchange. If it makes several uses, then it would fall under several Regulators (criterion ratione materiae).

5. The principle of "technological neutrality" is a classic principle in Telecommunications Law. Here we measure the interference between the principles of Telecommunications Law and Financial Law, which is logical because crypto-financial objects are born of digital technology. This neutrality allows both technological innovation to develop and supervision to be unhindered for not having foreseen an innovative technology appearing after the adoption of the legal text. Here again, the effectiveness of Compliance and risk management are served, without the innovation being thwarted, which is often opposed.

6. What is expected of national public authorities is a very wide "interregulation". This is both "positive". Indeed, this includes financial matters but also the security of networks, or the protection of consumers. It can be called equilibrium interregulation in that all goals converge. But this is also an "interregulation" that can be described as balance. Indeed, the FATF is concerned about the protection of personal data. However, it emphasizes that the effectiveness of the Compliance system must stop. But the protection of personal data is also a part of Compliance Law.... This is one of the major challenges in the future: the balance between security and the fight against global evils(here the fight against money laundering and terrorism) and the protection of the privacy of individuals, as both fall under Compliance, but both have opposite legal effects: one the transmission of information, and the other the secret of the information. 





souligné par nous


Underlined by us.


Plus loin, le texte donne une définition plus détaillée : "When determining whether a specific activity or entity falls within the scope of the definition and is therefore subject to regulation, countries should consider the wide range of various VA services or business models that exist in the VA ecosystem and, in particular, consider their functionality or the financial activities that they facilitate in the context of the covered VA activities (i.e., items (i) through (v) described in the VASP definition above). Further, countries should consider whether the activities involve a natural or legal person that conducts as a business the five functional activities described for or on behalf of another natural or legal person, both of which are essential elements to the definition and the latter of which implies a certain level of “custody” or “control” of the virtual asset, or “ability to actively facilitate the financial activity” on the part of the natural or legal person that conducts the business for a customer."

June 20, 2019


Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Analyse des blockchains au regard des usages qu'elles peuvent remplir et des fonctions que les officiers ministériels doivent assurer, in Revue Défrenois, Lextenso, n°25, 20 juin 2019, pp. 23-29.


Résumé : La blockchain est une technologie qui n'est pas, en soir, bonne ou mauvaise. Elle est plus ou moins adaptée aux fonctions qu'elle est apte à remplir. Ce qu'il faut ensuite confronter aux fonctions que l'État a dévolues aux officiers ministériels. Or, autant les fonctions de conservation et de duplication des actes gagnent à être transférées et développées dans cette technologie, autant la fonction d'élaboration des instrumentums ne peut être assumée que par des officiers ministériels auxquels l'État demande de vérifier la correspondance entre les mentions des instrumentums et la réalité des négotiums, ce que seuls des êtres humains peuvent mener et ce qu'aucune machine ne peut faire.


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Updated: May 27, 2019 (Initial publication: May 13, 2019)


First of all, this working document was used as a support for an oral intervention done in French on the general topic.  L'officier ministèriel est-il soluble dans la blockchain ? (Is the ministerial officer soluble in the blockchain?) at the "Club du Droit", which took place at the Conseil supérieur du Notariat on May 14, 2019, in Pars.

Consult the general presentation of the conference (in French).

Then it serves as a basis for an article to be published in the Revue Defrénois (in French).


Introduction & Summary.

The technical analysis of the confrontation between the tool that is the blockchain and the function that ensure these particular people who are the "ministerial officers"!footnote-1542, might make it possible to deduce the use that they must make of it. .

For this, it is necessary to keep in mind this distinction so simple: the blockchain is a tool, a thing, a machine, an algorithm, a mechanical, mathematical power, while the ministerial officer is a human being.

This refers to the distinction that the Western legal system, whether Civil Law or Common Law, poses as summa divisio: the distinction between human beings and things. This first distinction is formulated so that we do not treat human beings as things, since they are legally qualified as "person"!footnote-1584. This is not a natural idea, because if the opportunity arises we would be inclined to treat the other human being as thing. It would be nice and effective. But Law, in its first principle, opposes it, to protect the one who can not afford to be a wolf for the other. This political reason implies that this distinction remains very clear and strong. Now, many try at any moment to make us forget it.

For this essential distinction to remain effective, not only should we not imagine human beings as things (reduced to their bodies, for example, or reduced to mechanical acts of consumption!footnote-1543), like this is notably described and denounced by Alain Supiot in his successive works!footnote-1582, but it is also necessary that, especially by an imagined vocabulary, one represents things as acting like people, whereas it does not only machines and tools.

But technology represents more and more things with anthromophormi forms and reactions , through robots which "speak", "intelligent" machines, etc. The economic success of promoters of machines and other human-like robots, mechanical solutions presented as "intelligent", is based on forgetting the distinction between the person and things. It is certainly possible to erase this distinction from our system of thought. The difficulty is that it is the basis of Western Lawl!footnote-1583 and that there are strong reasons to keep it because this distinction protects the weak human being from injustice, permits him and her to participate in the general  order, to avoid an order built on a pure balance of power which can only lead to violence.

It is this background that is played in the practical questiond of insertion of blockchains and other technologies and the way in which the various professions must exercise their functions today. If these tools are consistent with these functions, or even improve them, professionals must welcome them without suspicion, or even participate directly in developing them. If these tools are not capable of fulfilling certain functions entrusted to these professionals, then these functions must not be inadvertently or maliciously inserted into a blockchain, whose capacity for preservation and reliability does not amount to anything, because a thing doesn't have any ability to think.

This is why we must start from the functions, by dinstinguising the technical function of conservation, duplication and elaboration of acts (I).

It seems that assuming the technical reliability of preservation and duplication acquired through the blockchain, as soon as there is a part of elaboration in the act, human intervention must step in because a machine is unfit to check the facts. Here we find the distinction between the retranscribed negotium, this retranscription never being mechanical, and the instrumentum itself, which, split from what gave rise to it, can be subjected to duplicative and conservation technologies. These technologies of conservation and duplication could be so efficient that the notions of original and copy could be questioned because of the reliability of the blockchain (II).

Thus the blockain is an effective technology on the instrumentum as documents divided from the negotium, but it can not guarantee the correspondence between the two ; it has only the reliability in the conservation, the availability and the duplication to infinity of the instrumentum, of what is extremely useful, and justifies that ministerial officers incorporate this technology. But the function of these are not limited to being agents of conservation and duplicators. We do not simply move from the copyist monk to the blockchain. The main and so precious function of the ministerial officers is to check the accuracy of the mentions of the instrumentum in relation to the reality of the negotium. This is so precious for a market economy to have this correspondance!footnote-1585. The ministerial officer does so as a human being, while a machine can neither check this correspondence nor advise the parties - especially not the weak part in the negotium. This is why the State - which has never ignored the effectiveness of "decentralization" techniques - has decentralized its office and its correspondance. With a sole and autonomous machine, it is not possible to know if  acts correspond to the objective reality of the transactions (their object) as well as to their subjective reality (consent). If we choose not to entrust this to human beings carrying this function, for which a machine is unfit, it would be a political choice It will have a price (III).

This would be the choice of a very liquid and unsecured market (without intermediary, with the benefit of lower cost in Ex Ante and higher risk for the long term). In policy, the balance is always between security and liquidity, especillay in financial systemic policy. This was done by American Law, wich prefered low costs and high liquidity, especially for real estate loans, which were securitized by subprime mortgages. For the moment, this choice is not made in this sense by European Law, safety concern in the elaboration of the acts being preferred and the distinction between the human aptitude and the mechanical aptitude remaining. And we know that in the first system the reajustment takes the form of a general crisis, which reinjects the reality of the negotiums, lost in the instrumentums.  What price are we ready to pay ?

Once this distinction is clearly made, because the elaboration of an acte mus be made bye the ministerial officer, human being invested by the State of the particular charge ensures the accuracy of the mentions of the act with the reality of people, wills, obligations and goods, it is all the more expedient for ministerial officiers to organize themselves to develop blockchain technology. Indeed, once this act has been developed reliably, ans as such deserves to be "authentic", because of the continuum between elaboration, preservation and duplication, because it is up to the ministerial officiers to draw up the deeds more incontestably reliable. It is up to them to equip themselves with the technological means of best conservation and duplication of acts elabored by them (IV). 


Sur la confrontation déjà faite dans l'analyse économique de la "régulation" et la fonction notariale, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., ....


Anders, G., notamment dans son ouvrage central L'obsolescence de l'homme (1956)présentant l'être humain réduit à l'état de "machine désirante" par une société de pure et simple consommation. Le souci qu'il en a comme philosophe rejoint le souci qu'en avait Jacque Ellul, comme juriste, s'inquiétant de la "société technicienne" (...). Or, les machines correspondent aujourd'hui au dessin que ces auteurs du milieu du XXième siècle en faisaient. De la même façon, Alain Supiot rapporte à Kafka le souci du "machinisme" dans le fonctionnement des institutions humaines (....) ; il ne fait notamment dans son analyse de Kafka comme "artiste de la Loi" (2019).


Par exemple Supiot, A., La gouvernance par les nombres, 2015 ; Mondialisation ou globalisation ? Les leçons de Simone Weil, 2019 ; Le droit au XXIème siècle : droit, technique et écoumène (dernière leçon au Collège de France, 22 mai 2019).

Sur cette idée folle et dévastatrice qu'il faut faire davantage confiance aux machines qu'il ne faut faire confiance aux êtres humains, ce qui justifierait donc de "mécaniser" les autres humains, idée folle reprise le plus souvent par les auteurs avec entrain, v. par ex. Caprioli, E.A., La blockchain ou la confiance dans la technologie, JCP 2016. 672, n° 3. 


Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'acte authentique, acte de marché, 2010. 

May 27, 2019


Ce document de travail sert de base à une conférence dans la Journée d'étude : "J'ai toujours été pour tout être". Guillaume Dustan ou l'infini des possibles", du 28 mai 2019.

Ecouter la conférence. 

Il est aussi référencé dans l'Emission qui lui est consacrée par France Culture le 15 février 2020



J'ai toujours été pour Tout Etre. 

"Tout Etre", c'est un très bon plan. Personne ne l'a : ce plan est trop onéreux, trop aristocratique, trop dévastateur pour celui qui  le conçoit et le déroule. 

C'est pourtant ce qui fît William. Etre un homme accompli.

Le poser, le dire, le mener, suppose des qualités consubstantielles qui se cumulent, qui sont immédiatement acquises, visibles, constantes. Elles font se diriger toutes les flèches contre l'impudent. Depuis le départ et jusqu'à la fin. L'essentiel, la beauté, la prouesse d'un tel plan tiennent en ce qu'aucune de ces qualités ne se contredisent, ne s'affaiblissent les unes les autres, alors qu'on les met usuellement soit en choix exclusif soit en balance.

Que le corbeau, cher à Guillaume d'Occam, puisse être effectivement pleinement noir et encore être aussi pleinement blanc, en même temps, et pour autant n'en jamais devenir gris. Sinon la vie ne serait plus que grisaille, gribouillage et improvision. Il fallait que jamais la pureté du blanc ne vienne assombrir la pureté du noir. Tout noir et tout blanc, pleinement. Pour William faire différemment aurait été gâcher ses talents. Qui étaient si grands. Dès le départ, quand il était tout petit. Et jusqu'à la fin. Si douloureuse.

Cela fût un plan bien conçu, bien mené. Très réussi. Nous parlions souvent ensemble du dialogue de Platon, Le Philèbe , dans lequel celui-ci récuse le "mixte" pour louer la beauté du geste pur, du plaisir pur, ceux qui sont liés à l'inattendu et à la pureté de l'âme. Tout ce que les mécanismes d'intérêt, de calcul et d'opportunisme détruisent. Parce que William "a toujours été" du côté de la pureté, c'est-à-dire de l'absence de calcul, il ne pouvait y avoir de place pour le gris, ce mixte par exemple. L'âme de William était si pure.

Ainsi, Guillaume Dustan ne gâcha pas William Baranès. L'intensité de la couleur de l'un laissa intacte la pureté de la couleur de l'autre. Car " Tout Etre" demande avant tout de ne pas transiger, ni avec autrui ni avec soi.

Etre du côté du Tout, puisque William a "toujours été pour Tout Etre", cela ne laisse pas la place à grand chose, pas même pour la respiration. L'on comprend  qu'à un moment le souffle lui ait manqué. Et là personne n'est venu puisque Tout Etre c'est prétendre se suffire. 

Car qui réussit à " Tout Etre" ? 

Cest-à-dire à Etre totalement Tout d'une façon substantiellement ontologique et contradictoire, si cela n'est le Christ ? 

Celui-ci affirma être à la fois totalement Dieu et totalement homme.  Il est vrai que ce personnage ne plût pas à tout le monde et qu'il fût crucifié à la grande joie de beaucoup et grâce à la souplesse du Tribunal dont il relevait de jure, l'eau étant disponible en abondance  pour effacer toutes traces sur les mains de ceux qui auraient eu à perdre s'ils avaient exercé leurs responsabilités, le reste s'efffaçant dans l'indifférence .

"Tout Etre" c'est affronter dès le départ la perspective possible de cela. Avec la douleur par avance du spectacle non pas de ceux qui vous crucifient, non pas de ceux qui vous jettent des pierres sur le chemin, mais de tous ceux qui n'en ont rien à faire alors que l'ascèce de cette vie Totale fût conçue et menée pour eux. La dimension christique de la vie de William Baranès est tangible par cette complétude qu'il attînt en étant tout aussi  pleinement Guillaume Dustan. Quand le calvaire commença pour cette personne entière, littérallement entière, personne ne bougea. 

Un plan de cette ambition, Tout Etre, tout de suite et pour toujours l'on le retrouve chez Napoléon, qui fût  lui aussi tout de suite Tout  et qui ne trouva quelque repos qu'à Sainte-Hélène. Car il faut des îles pour contenir des personnages si grands : en les entourant d'eau, on peut tenter de les sauver d'eux-mêmes. D'ailleurs William partit dans des îles pour y exercer son office de juge.

Il pensait peut-être que l'eau pourrait éteindre le feu. Mais dans la maison qui brûlait, quand il fallut ne sauver qu'une chose, il fît comme répondît Cocteau : il ne sauva que le feu. Cocteau ne disait cela que pour faire de l'esprit, allant quant à lui de fête en fête, alors que William se consuma pour ne garder que le plus précieux des précieux pour qui ne veut que le Tout : garder la flamme. Comme une vestale. William était un classique.


 je ne saurais dire quelle place avait l'amitié et encore moins l'exercice du Droit pour Guillaume Dustan, mais je crois pouvoir dire celle qu'ils occupaient pour William.

Là encore, cela serait méconnaître qui était William de monter l'un contre l'autre, d'opposer l'ami et le juriste, comme si l'on devait décrire un personnage privé, celui qui fut l'ami par exemple, et un personnage public de la fonction publique, juge administratif, auteur d'écrits de Droit ou de réflexion sur le Droit.

En effet, lorsque nous discutions ensemble en soliloque partagé, le Droit avait une grande place. Nous n'étions qu'étudiants lorsque nous avons commencé à parler du Droit et de l'Injustice, ce qui nous permit plus tard, devenant plus grands en âge, de rédiger des écrits, de diriger des ouvrages et d'organiser des manifestations sur la Justice et sur le Droit.

Des descriptions de lui semblent présenter son "côté juriste" comme un élément annexe,ou paradoxal, ou un paravent, ou un pis-aller (il faut bien trouver une source de revenus...., être fonctionnaire....). C'est lui faire injure. Celui qui pose "Tout Etre" ne saurait perdre du temps avec des à-côtés, s'affaiblir avec des besognes sans intérêt ou sans rapport avec son plan. Dans son plan, la Justice et le Droit ont une grande place.

Prenons un autre auteur qui, avant que Guillaume Dustan ne l'exprime à son tour et à sa manière, avait réfléchi sur la façon dont la société broye les êtres humains, ce que l'on pourrait désigner comme l'injustice du monde, Kafka. Alain Supiot, professeur de droit, a montré dans sa leçon inaugurale au Collège de France en 2012 et dans un article paru récemment dans le Nouveau Magazine Littéraire sur "Kafka, artiste de la Loi", que Kafka était juriste pour une compagnie d'assurance, vérifiant la réalité des accidents du travail et que cela marqua profondément son oeuvre, que l'on dit romanesque. Il faut avoir étudié, dossier après dossier, les bras et les jambes brisés par les machines aveugles et qui ne s'arrêtent pas tandis que le sang coule et que le corps se révulse, pour écrire ensuite Le procès ou La colonie pénitentaire....

Pour William, cela fût la même démarche. A l'envers. Ayant vu enfant la famille et la société broyer les êtres humains innocents, il choisit de devenir juriste, de connaître le Droit, de parler du Droit et de le pratiquer. Non pas parce qu'il faut bien choisir un métier et que l'ENA mènerait à tout. Non. Parce que l'injustice qui fût pour lui comme un bain d'acide dans lequel il trempa, ce qui donne de l'acuité, puis vit chacun y couler, il décida de le décrire, et sans doute Guillaume le fît aussi totalement, mais il décida également de la combattre. Dans le Tout, il y a l'action.

Nous n'avons à nous résigner de rien. Surtout pas si nous sommes des personnes entières. L'injustice, on la repère par l'expérience. Comme le dit Ricoeur, l'injustice est un fait qui rend "perspicace" et nous évite de perdre des forces et du temps à chercher le point exact de ce qui pourrait être le "juste". Puis, nous devons le dire, car "dire l'injustice", c'est déjà faire quelque chose en faveur de celui qui en est victime (Arendt: dire, c'est déjà agir pour autrui). C'est pourquoi William fît de nombreux travaux de philosophie de la justice en tant que celle-ci est nouée par un souci pour autrui, constitue donc un lien avec celui-ci, c'est-à-dire constitue l'amitié (I).

Plus concrètement encore, William choisit d'être juge, non pas par dépit et mauvais classement de sortie à l'ENA du fait de notes de stage catastrophiques - il est vrai que faire des leçons de morale à ceux qui notent se paye -, mais parce qu'être juge représentait pour lui la concrétisation de la justice au bénéfice de tout un chacun (II).

Si William était juriste, et pleinement, c'était par amitié pour le genre humain, pour aider autrui, celui qui était plus mal loti que lui (III). Voilà le bénéfice d'une vision totale du monde : l'on trouve toujours encore plus malheureux que soi. Et William mena même l'exploit de trouver plus malheureux que lui : Autrui.

May 16, 2019


Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Game of Thrones : un droit si classique. Pour l'instant, in Le Pluard, Q., et Plouhinec, P., (dir.), Du droit dans GAME OF THRONES2019, pp. 19-34.


Résumé. Dans cette série emplie de surprises grandioses, de personnages épiques, de retournements, et ce d’autant plus qu’elle se mit à courir plus vite que le livre dont elle naquit, on semble ne trouver que ce que l'on connaît déjà du Droit : il suffirait de soulever les déguisements, comme on le fait dans une fable. On y retrouve alors les règles juridiques classiques (I), la reproduction en décalque de l'organisation juridique féodale (II), parfois contestée au nom de principes exogènes (III). Mais il est remarquable que la série ne soit pas encore finie. Or, ce qui va arriver ne renvoie-t-il pas à des problématiques juridiques que nous ne maîtrisons pas nous-mêmes ? Saison inconnue au sens plein du terme, terrain juridique glacé et  sol incertain d’un Droit qui prendrait la forme des "sans-visages" et des "morts qui marchent" ? (IV).


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Consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage.



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May 15, 2019


Complete references : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Foreword, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Pour une Europe de la Complianceserie Régulations & Compliance, 2019. 

It is sometimes said the construction of Europe is blocked, or even is in decline. But this consruction can only advance because it is not only community to be rediscovered by the effect of a common culture or the result of an agreement between States or the benefit of commercial exchanges: it is also a legal Order. And Law is moving forward, sometimes like a goat through rulings of lightning justice, sometimes through legislation whose development have certainly the step of the turtle but also the strength of this military figure.

For this, any legal mechanism is good to take, so foreign, even aggressive, it may seem at first. Compliance, on which everyone questions the definition, in which we sometimes see the enemy to fight, about which we often doubt that it is really a legal mechanism, could well be useful.

So, let's seize the opportunity. It is not so common that a branch of law appears. The framework is still young, it is appropriate to take advantage of what is sometimes presented as defects, for example the uncertainty of definitions, but which are only defects of youth, or what is perceived as archaisms, in particular the violence of the compliance mechanisms, in their scale, their procedure and their territorial scope. But isn't a means of reconstituting the regalian at the moment when the states are struggling to recover from a report given to the cause to the territory ? Allowing them to pursue goals in the pretension that they must be satisfied (for example the fight against corruption or the sale of human beings)? Compliance Law allows the states to claim again and with a stronger voice their prerogatives.

Moreover, let us take advantage of this still malleable idea of ​​the Compliance Law to obtain that Europe imbues the compliance mechanism with its legal Order. Compliance Law is undoubtedly the Law of tomorrow, the law without frontiers by which the legitimate public authorities set the Law, by fixing Ex ante goals and internalizing them in the crucial operators who carry them out in ways they build, public supervisors continuously monitoring the results achieved the goals set by the authorities. The Compliance Law allows that the powerful worldwird companies are not our masters because is the master who sets the goals and not the one who reaches them.

This is where Europe brings to the Compliance Law, where Europe can be exemplary of the Law of tomorrow. Indeed, where long-established systems, as American Law did, have developed Cmpliance techniques to prevent systemic risks, Europe can put back to the center its primary concern: the Person, a notion that Europe invented in order to protect by rights and obligations human beings against the only game of powers.

A Europe strengthened by Compliance Law; a Compliance Law transfigured by the European tradition: how not to be For a Europe of Compliance?


This is what the authors of this book demonstrate to us.

May 15, 2019


General reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Pour une Europe de la Compliance , serie "Régulations & Compliance", Dalloz & Journal of Regulation & Compliance, 2019, 124 pages. 

This book is written in French. The topic is : "For the Europe of the Compliance".

See below its general presentation in English. 

The political dimension is intrinsic to the Compliance Law. Indeed, compliance mechanisms consist of internalizing in certains companies the obligation to implement goals of general interest set by Public Authorities. These public bodies control the Ex Ante reorganization that implies for these companies and punish Ex Post the possible structural inadequacy of these compagnies, becoming transparent for this purpose. 

This new mode of governance establishes a continuum between Regulation, Supervision, Compliance (book published in 2017) and renew the links between Companies, Regulators and Judges!footnote-1600

This political dimension must be increased: the Compliance Law of Compliance must today be used to build Europe.

One can observe not only the construction of the  European Compliance Law, object-by-object, sector-by-sector, purpose-by-purpose, but also the construction of the European Compliance Law that transcends and unifies them. Becoming independent of American Law and ceasing to be in reaction, even on the defensive, the Compliance Law contributes to the European project, offering it a higher ambition, that Europe can carry and, by this way, can carry the Europe itself, not only to preserve the European economy from corruption or money laundering, but by claiming the protection of nature and human beings.

This is why the book describes the "reasons and objectives" of the Europe of the Compliance, which makes it possible to describe, detect and even predict the ways and means.


Authors: Thierry BonneauMonique Canto-SperberJean-Jacques DaigreCharles DuchaineMarie-Anne Frison-RocheArnaud de La CotardièreKoen LenaertsJean-Claude MarinDidier MartinXavier MuscaPierre Sellal et Pierre Vimont.

Each mention of an author refers to a summary of his contribution. 


Read the book's foreword by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, translated in English.

Read the working paper written in English by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, base for her article published in French in the book : What the Law of Compliance can build relying of the European Humanist tradition.


See the Serie in this book is published in Éditions Dalloz.


Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance, see

May 13, 2019


 Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Un Droit substantiel de la Compliance, appuyé sur la tradition européenne humaniste, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Pour une Europe de la Compliancesérie Régulations & Compliance, Dalloz, 2019, p.13-35.



📕 Lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel est publié l'article.

📚 Consulter les autres titres de la Série dans laquelle est publié l'ouvrage.



🚧 Lire le document de travail sur la base duquel s'appuie l'article 

🚧 Read the working paper on which the article is based : What the Law of Compliance can build relying on the European humanist tradition

Updated: May 3, 2019 (Initial publication: Feb. 7, 2019)


This working paper has served as a basis for an article subsequently published in French in the Law Journal Recueil Dalloz (see Compliance et personnalité, Recueil Dalloz, 2019).

It is enriched with notes, references and links. 


Summary: Compliance Law is often presented as empty and a mechanical set of procedures, in which human beings do not matter. It is the opposite.

The concern of human beings justifies it fights against the legal technique of the personality. Indeed as Compliance Law is an legal construction around Information and even in its core function of prevention of the systemic risks and its markets protection, the Compliance Law sets the requirement to know "genuinely" the person who is "relevant" - behind the legal person - for the purpose set, for example the fight against corruption or money laundering, establishing in principe what are only exception in Corporate Law or Competition Law.

In a more European conception of Compliance Law, as Law of direct protection of human beings beyong legal personnalities, from near the company and even far, humans being the real and effective beneficiaries of the new branch of Law. 

Updated: May 3, 2019 (Initial publication: Aug. 24, 2018)


Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Game of Thrones: a so classical Law. For the moment. Working paper, 2018,

 This working paper has been written to be the base for an article published in French, "Game of Thrones : un Droit si classique. Pour le moment", for a collective book Game of Thrones et le Droit. 


Summary. In this series filled with grandiose surprises, epic characters, reversals, and all the more so as it began to run faster than the book it was born, we would find only what we know already of Law: it would be enough to raise the disguises, as one does in a fable. We then find the classic legal rules (I), the reproduction in decal of the feudal legal organization (II), sometimes contested in the name of exogenous principles (III). But it is remarkable that the series is not over yet. But what will happen does not refer to legal issues that we do not control ourselves? Unknown season in the full sense of the term, frozen legal terrain and uncertain soil of a Law that would take the form of "faceless" and "walking dead"? (IV).

Feb. 19, 2019


Feb. 13, 2019


Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Creating "Regulation Law" at Dauphine, in Huault, I. and Bouchard, B. (ed.), 50 years of Research in Dauphine. 1968-2019, 2019, pp. 110-114

Read Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's article (in French)


Read also: 

The foreword of the book written by Bruno Bouchard (in French)

The preface of the book written by Ivar Ekeland (in French)

The table of contents of the book (in French)

Feb. 9, 2019


► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Pour une conception humaniste du Droit des affaires et de son enseignement,  document de travail, février 2019


📝ce document de travail a été élaboré pour servir de base à un article publié un an et demie après sa remise, en novembre 2020  dans les  📘




Alain Couret est un grand professeur de Droit et un très bon technicien de celui-ci. On se surprend soi-même non seulement à devoir souligner cette maîtrise technique insérée dans l'activité d'enseignement mais à prévenir qu'il s'agit d'une grande qualité.  Cette maîtrise technique et l'aptitude à transmettre le savoir juridique par la compréhension de ses principes de base, n'est-ce pas le métier même de professeur ? Si chacun l'admet, alors désigner ainsi Alain relèverait du pléonasme...

Mais l'on entend souvent aujourd'hui que l'art juridique ne serait plus qu'un art de tordre les textes et les mots dans tous les sens, que ceux-ci s'y prêteraient, voire qu'ils seraient faits pour cela, qu'il faudrait apprendre avant tout à argumenter et à contredire si habilement que le tiers spectateur, qu'il soit juge, auditoire ou opinion publique, sera persuadé à la fin que, dans le cas particulier auquel la discussion est cantonné, l'intérêt défendu est bien le meilleur, que c'est bien celui-ci qu'il faut protéger et non pas celui de l'adversaire, qu'il faut rendre effectif cet intérêt singulier-là. Quitte à penser différemment dans le cas suivant. D'ailleurs, il sera possible par la suite de soutenir une autre cause, puisque les situations ne sont jamais semblables. Dans cette façon de faire, connaître techniquement le Droit et ses principes de base apparaît secondaire. La technique ? Cela serait les machines qui s'en chargeront. Les principes ? Ils seraient à éviter, parce que cela ne servira à rien : à chaque cas sa solution.

Par ses enseignements et ses écrits, Alain Couret exprime le contraire : le Droit des affaires n'est pas réductible à un amas réglementaire, repose sur des principes qui reflètent la conception que l'on se fait de la place des êtres humains dans les échanges, dans l'entreprise, dans l'organisation marchande. Enseigner le Droit des affaires, c'est transmettre ces principes. C'est aussi les discuter. Ecrire, dans une continuité avec l'enseignement, c'est au besoin inventer d'autres principes, tandis que les machines continuent de stocker par milliers les dispositions techniques posées là, chacune équivalente à une autre. Enseigner des principes, seuls les êtres humains sont aptes et soucieux de le faire, à l'exemple d'Alain Couret. Si on l'oublie, alors les professeurs étant devenus des répétiteurs, les machines répéteront bien mieux qu'eux par un débit infatigable les "paquets réglementaires". Mais inventer de nouveaux principes, seuls les êtres humains ont souci à le faire, à travers des idées. Lorsqu'un auteur prit  l'image d'algorithmes qui "rêvent", c'était pour mieux poser qu'ils ne le font pas!footnote-1485, tandis que Lévi-Strauss définissait l'enseignement comme le fait pour une personne particulière de rêver tout haut. 

Et le Droit des affaires, n'est-à-ce pas d'imagination et d'humanisme dont il a besoin, plus que jamais, puisque l'intimité des affaires et de la technologie mécanise les êtres humains ? , à travers des personnalités comme celle d'Alain Couret, alors même que nous allons toujours plus vers un pointillisme et une déshumanisation, à laquelle sa conception réglementaire participe ? 

Jan. 8, 2019


This working document is the basis for a conference held in Nice on February 4, 2020.
Refer to the presentation of the conference, in particular to the slides which are the support of its presentation.
The working document is also the underlying of the article to appear in the book: Compliance Tools..
Summary of the Working Paper. The link between Law and History is so often emphasized, also between Law and Society, but very little between Law and Geography. Braudel does not have enough emulators in the matter. However Pascal affirmed as an observation that the legal rules are not the same below and beyond the Pyrenees. Montesquieu in the new formulation which he proposes of the Theory of climates, gives to the observation of the variety of systems and their correlation with geography a more normative turn. Human beings would be different according to the regions and by the effect of time a difference of nature appears which implies that one should not conceive the same rule according to the zones of the world. Everyone often talk about Montesquieu and affirms the good idea to return to his conception on the art of designing Law. Why not use this specifif theory  in matters of Compliance Law, globally applied since the climates are so different? All the more if we take more literally the reference to "climate", to different climates and we have in mind the now very strong link between Law and environmental policies on the one hand and the tools of Compliance Law on the other hand (like the so-called "green finance").
If we have to do it with caution, we can already do it as an exercise, if only to test the way we design and apply Compliance tools without ever thinking about the differences in latitude, which are neither hot nor cold to artificial intelligences.
It is certainly with great caution that we should move forward but by expressing more consideration for the essential relationships between Law, Compliance and Geography. This consideration must be not just a simple indicator that ultimately comes in the risk mapping and in the programs compliance, If we pay attention, then firstly this avoids two pitfalls (I). The first is to avoid giving all the space to tools that do not integrate this geographic dimension, by reducing what Compliance itself is. This risk of giving too little importance to the geographic dimension in the design and use of Compliance tools (A) can take three forms. Indeed if we reduce Compliance to being only a "procedure" aiming to mechanically ensure the entreprise "conformity" to "regulation" (1), then this literally meaningless definition can apply everywhere and to everyone. But is Compliance Law just that? It is notably to ignore its normative teleological character. The second exclusion from geographic relevance, which similarly signals a poor vision of Compliance, consists in entrusting the entire mechanics of Compliance to platforms and algorithms, by which machines "talk" and would be able to "develop standards" (2) . If Compliance is only data capture, storage and correlation, this is conceivable. But the "ground" where the weak signals are perceived, memorized, where the standards are "internalized, shows that it varies according to the zones. As such, the idea of" regulation by data ", promoted by many regulations and Regulators deserves be more careful because the information does not make the decision by itself, Compliance Law remaining from Ex Ante with humans who decide for the future. Similarly, Compliance Law takes shape in companies, either all (about corruption, worker security), or those of certain sectors (banks for money laundering) or of a certain size (vigilance mechanisms). When it is assumed that the compliance standards, embodied by internal controls, are the same for all of the locations of the so-called "global" company (3), is this not a somewhat outdated vision of the company? While we question the State, because too hierarchical, this is the board of the company which sometimes imposes via its private regulatory power the same standard, fixed on the West .....
But once alerted on this first type of pitfall is to better guard against another type of pitfall. It is the reverse. Indeed, we must be careful not to give too much importance to the geographic dimension in the design and use that we have of Compliance tools (B).  It is not appropriate to draw boundaries between Compliance systems, since Compliance has given rise to a new Law branch, strongly linked to the phenomenon known as "globalization" (1). However, not only can we observe the permanence of these borders, on which international settlement systems run up, but we note that Compliance Law allows the construction of new walls, against which we could do nothing. While there is a war between exported local Compliances, of which that of the United States is the most conspicuous because its voice carries the most, but it is above all a defeat of the Law, but about which we tends to confuse the part and the whole (2).
Once we have tried to regain our senses a little, it could be possible to classify Compliance tools because the Compliance techniques, as soon as we want them substantial, that is to say built on the goals that their power can actually achieve, have an immense field of action which means that we must at the same time identify general but concrete rules. To find the right relationship between Compliance Law and Geography (II), we can propose a triptych. In the first place, there is undoubtedly what concerns technical information and conservation methods, where we can accelerate by passing stages of development and pass directly to detection techniques, without worrying about keeping in the geographic place what appears there before mais is not useful (A). Then by focusing on the normativity of Compliance, that is to say the different goals pursued, it turns out that some are certainly objectively anchored in the geography of an area, which finds particularly its relevance in terms of environment, but have effects that pass the Pyrenees dear to Pascal, which justifies global compliance requirements, as shown in the case of the Amazon, which is a "crucial object" (B). 
Even more, if we put some hope in Compliance Law and that the monumental goal pursued by it is of a political nature and not only technical, Compliance being what sustains and not what replaces Politics , it is therefore necessary to assume the Ex Ante Responsibility carried by Compliance through the concept of Vigilance. This is taking place. What is yet to be devised is to improve the very definition of what Compliance Tools are ; for the moment, maybe they are too abrupt, too violent. In this, they must be conceived not as violence - however legitimate they may be, but as a "path", which the texts of energy "transition" show us. The company then becomes the supervisor of others to bring them from one state to another, as we can see about invest banking (C). Law as a "path" and not as a prescription, it is Kanak Law which shows us the example.  Sure that Montesquieu would appreciate it. 

Jan. 2, 2019


This working paper has served as a basis for an article published in French in the collective publication Pour une Europe de la Compliance in the serie Regulation & Compliance.



Compliance is often presented as a complex, technical, almost incomprehensible set, in that it consists only of empty and moving procedures, mechanical corpus about which the goal would be a question that would not arise.

The question of the purpose of these huge compliance devices might not even have to be asked. And this for two reasons.

Firstly it would only be a matter of following "processes", that is, mechanical and endless procedures. This conception of compliance is often called "kafkaes". Closer to closer, one thinks first of all of the book written by Kafka's The trial l and Welles' adaptation to the cinema in which the charcters are surrounded by walls that are narrowing around them, but it is rather to his novel In the penal colony that must be thought, that is to say to a procedural system of isolation which we do not understand the foundation, which makes it without foundation and without end but also which takes mainly the form of a machine in which the person is placed and which mechanically writes the Law on and under the skin of his back. This internalization of the rule in the body of the condemned - that the French legal system before the French Revolution associated only with "enormous crimes" - being the ordinary way of actual and ordinary application of the rules can correspond to a certain vision of the Compliance, detached from any purpose.

The question of the purpose of Compliance may also not have to arise for a second reason, almost the opposite: they would always be devices that are specific to particular sectors. Thus, the banking sector, the insurance sector, the drug sector, the agri-food sector, the telecommunications sector, the energy sector, etc. Then the opposite happens: too many goals! Since each of these sectors has specificities such that it includes purposes that are specific to each of them. For example continuity for energy, access information for telecommunications, control of systemic risk for banking and finance, protection and secret for private information, etc. Now, either these ends so diverse are indifferent to each other, or they can contradict each other. Therefore, to ask the question of the purpose of compliance mechanisms would be to move to the stitution of not even trying to understand "processes" to be exceeded by too many substantial purposes pursued at the same time and in contradictorily senses ... .

This is why the question of the purpose of the Compliance is not asked in a main way. Even less if it is superimposed with another goal that is the European construction ....

But on the contrary, if we confront this question of the aims of the Compliance Mechanisms by crossing it with another issue, older but also under construction, namely the question of Europe, it is possible to make an alliance of these two difficulties to transform them as an asset. That one can help the other. Indeed, both Europe and Compliance in their current states are two constructs with uncertain goals or behaviors most often only "reactive" (I). If we do not want to mobilize all our strength to limit our weakness, which leads rather to feed it, we can go draw on the unity of this Europe so diverse but which finds it unity in the protection of the human being by the very idea of ​​"person". However, Compliance Law can have the same unity, despite the diversity of sectors, and thus fill the meaning of these multiple procedures, providing the balance between information and secrets, circulation of data and conservation of that they concern, common and dialectic purpose that this European Compliance Law. in the process of being constituted can give the world an example in relying on the European tradition  (II)

Nov. 28, 2018


Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., GPA : dire Oui ou dire Non, avec la collaboration de Christophe Hambura et Alexandre Köhler, préface d'Éliette Abécassis, Dalloz, novembre 2018, 161 p.




Les situations juridiques de GPA et les différents droits applicables sont souvent présentés comme « complexes ». C'est faux. Il s'agit toujours d'une femme qui « consent » à porter un enfant pour le donner à la naissance à ceux qui ont commandé sa venue au monde. Face à ce fait simple, le Droit choisit soit d'instituer un lien de filiation entre la femme et l'enfant soit de l'instituer entre l'enfant et ceux qui l'ont désiré. Dans le premier cas, c'est la maternité qui fait la filiation, dans le second cas c'est le pur désir d'enfant. Dans le premier cas, les entreprises sont exclues car on ne peut vendre le lien de maternité, dans le second cas elles sont centrales car on paye pour concrétiser son désir d'enfant. Le choix est aujourd'hui ouvert. C'est un choix de société.                                                  
Les États-Unis et l'Europe sont souvent présentés comme ayant fait les mêmes choix. C'est faux. La Californie a fait le choix du désir d'enfant, servi par le consentement, l'argent et le contrat. L'Europe s'y refuse : pour protéger les êtres humains, lois et juges ne scindent pas le corps des femmes et des enfants de la notion de « personne ».
Comment et jusqu'à quand ?


Consulter la table des matières.

Lire l'introduction.



Lire le document de travail ayant servi de base à la partie  de l'ouvrage rédigée par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, enrichie dans sa version numérique par des notes de bas de page, des références techniques et de liens hypertextes.



Nov. 27, 2018


► Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Droit de la concurrence et droit de la compliance ("Competition Law and Compliance Law), November 2018,  in Revue Concurrences n° 4-2018, Art. n° 88053, pp. 1-4. 



 Summary: Compliance Law is a new branch of Law, still under construction. One can have a “narrow definition” of seeing it as the obligation of businesses to show that they are constantly and actively complying with the law. One can have a richer definition, of a substantive nature, defining it as the obligation or the own will of certain companies to achieve “monumental goals” that go beyond economic and financial performance. Competition Law partly integrates its two conceptions of Compliance: Precursor, Competition Law concretizes dynamically the first conception of Compliance Law. It is with more difficulties but also much more future that Competition Law can express in dialectic the second conception of Compliance Law as internationalization of these “monumental goals”, especially in the digital space.


📝 read the article (in French)

📝 read the Working Paper on which this Article is based, with footnotes, technical references and hypertext links.  



Nov. 21, 2018


Référence générale : Frison-Roche M.-A., Pour protéger les êtres humains, l'impératif éthique de la notion juridique de personne, in in "Droit et Ethique" (dossier spécial des Archives de Philosophie du Droit) Archives de Philosophie du droit (APD), La justice prédictive, Dalloz, 2018, z, pp. 363-378.


Résumé : C'est par le Droit que l'être humain a acquis en Occident une unité (I). Ce que la Religion avait pu faire, le Droit l'a également fait en posant sur chaque être humain la notion indétachable de lui de « personne » (I.A). Mais c'est cela qui est remis en cause aujourd'hui, non pas la personnalité et le pouvoir que l'être humain a d'exprimer sa liberté mais l'unité que cela implique dans la disposition que l'on a de soir en repoussant le désir qu'autrui a toujours eu de disposer de nous. Le Droit actuel tend en effet à « pulvériser » les êtres humains en données et à transformer en prestations juridique de « consentement », cessant d'être une preuve d'une volonté libre mais devenue une notion autonome , y suffirait (I.B.).

Pour empêcher que ne règne plus que la « loi des désirs », laquelle ne fait que traduire l'ajustement des forces, il faut requérir ici et maintenant la souveraineté éthique du Droit, parce que le Droit ne peut pas être qu'une technique d'ajustement des intérêts (II). L'on peut former cette requête si l'on ne veut pas vivre dans un univers a-moral (II.A), si l'on constate que l'unité de la personne est l'invention juridique qui protège l'être humain faible (II.B.). Si on en admet l'impératif, il faut alors se demander enfin qui en Droit va l'exprimer et l'imposer, notamment de la Loi, ou du Juge, car nous semblons avoir perdu la capacité de rappeler ce principe de la Personne sur laquelle l'Occident fut si centré. Or, les principes qui ne sont plus dits disparaissent. Il ne resterait plus alors que l'ajustement au cas par cas des intérêts entre êtres humains dans champ mondial des forces particulières. À cette aune, le Droit ne serait plus qu'une technique de sécurisation des ajustements particuliers. (II.C). Réduit à cela, le Droit aurait perdu son lien avec l'Éthique.


Lire l'article.


Consulter une présentation de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article est publié.


Lire le document de travail ayant servi de base à l'article rédigée par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, enrichie dans sa version numérique par des notes de bas de page, des références techniques et de liens hypertextes.



Voir la présentation d'autres tomes des Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Nov. 8, 2018


Ce document de travail a été établi pour servir de base à une intervention dans le cadre d'une audition du 9 novembre 2018 devant une mission menée au Ministère de la Justice sur l'avenir des opérateurs de ventes volontaires

Nov. 7, 2018


Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le système juridique français constitue-t-il un atout ou un handicap pour nos entreprises et nos territoires ? in Pébereau, M. (dir.), Réformes et transformations, PUF, 2018.


Résumé : La formulation de la question posée est comme une fermeture de tout débat, posant implicitement que le Droit devrait servir l'Économie et le servir "bien" (atout) plutôt que "mal" (handicap), alors qu'il faudrait s'accorder sur une méthode consistant pour chaque discipline à l'œuvre à ne prendre l'ascendant sur l'autre (I). Ce jugement doit être global, porter sur le droit en tant qu'il est un système. Quand on lit les différents travaux, ils ne portent que sur tel ou tel mécanisme, au mieux sur tel ou tel branche du Droit, ce qui méconnaît le fait que le Droit français est un système (II). C'est pourtant bien qu'en tant qu'il est un système que le Droit français doit être saisi, l’appréhender non seulement par ses signaux forts, mais aussi par ses signaux faibles Ceux-ci peuvent constituer les atouts les plus précieux (III).  Plus encore, il est fructueux de donner plein effet à ce terme si particulier et peu souvent valorisé qu’est le terme de « territoire », placé dans la question, terme si ancien et aujourd'hui si intriguant puisque de "nouveaux territoires" s'offrent à nous : le digital, l’Europe. Et là, le système juridique français, que peut-il apporter, portant alors ce que l’on pourrait appeler la gloire française, car le Droit est comme le Politique une discipline qui porte des « prétentions », par exemple celle de construire l’Europe, par exemple l’Europe digitale (IV).


Lire l'article.


Lire le document de travail ayant servi de base à l'article