The recent news

July 23, 2021


Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Programme de mise en conformité (Compliance), Dictionnaire de droit de la concurrence, Concurrences, Art. N° 12345, 2021

Read the definition (in French)

July 22, 2021


Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A.Definition of Principe of Proportionality  and  definition of Compliance Law,  Working Paper, July  2021.



🎤 this Working Paper is the basis for a conference in the colloquium Compliance and Proportionality. From the control of Proportionality to the proportionality of the control, to be helded in Toulouse, France, on the 14th October 2021.


📝It constitutes the basis for an article: 

📕 this article will be published in its French version in the book  Les buts monumentaux de la Compliancein the Series 📚   Régulations & Compliance

 📘  in its English version in the book Compliance Monumental Goalsin the Series 📚   Compliance & Regulation


► Working Paper Summary: Measuring the relationship between the Principle of Proportionality and Compliance Law depends entirely on the Definition chosen for Compliance Law. Let us first take the definition of Compliance Law as a simple "mode of effectiveness" of the rules to which we hold (I). The more we stick to this procedural definition of Compliance Law as a mode of effectiveness of the rules, the less it is easy to detect specificities in the application of the Principle of proportionality in compliance mechanisms. There are certainly many examples of the application of the principle of proportionality, but the addition and variety of examples are not enough to sculpt an original relationship between Proportionality and Compliance.


However, this exercise is not wasted. In fact, in the confusion which still marks the emergence of Compliance Law, the legal nature of the compliance mechanisms remains contested. However, the imposition of Proportionality, not only as it is an obligation but as a limitation of powers in this first definition focusing on Efficiency, recalls that Compliance, conceived as " process ", would then in any case be admissible at the very least as a" Procedure ", anchored in the Rule of Law Principle, therefore self-limititation expression.   But Proportionality is then like a cold shower in compliance, since it is defined by self-limitation in a Law which would be defined by effectiveness as its only definition...  Ineffectiveness In Efficiency...: it is no longer a relation, it is then an opposition which is established between the two terms ...

In this definition of Compliance Law, there is no other choice than to put process in this sort of  squaring circle because in this procedural Compliance Definition, as a method of effectiveness, of effectiveness and efficiency of the rules estimated more important more than others, it must however be admitted that Compliance Law, as any branch of the Law, without denying its very legal nature, must be anchored in the Rule of Law Principle.

By the principle of proportionality, this new branch of Law is forced to anchor classic solutions from Constitutional, Public or Criminal Law,  the Principle of Proportionality prohibiting the Compliance of be just a process. The Repression  Law  has a large part in this conception and the Proportionality Principle reminds it of the part that Criminal Law still takes (with difficulty and for the moment ...) in the admission of ineffectiveness that the Law demands, particularly in the face of Compliance technologies.

In this first definition, the Proportionality Principle thus reminds Compliance, entirely held in the idea of ​​Efficiency that it is a "Law" of Compliance" and anchored in the Rule of Law Principle, it must limit its Effectiveness . It is therefore a kind of "price" that these techniques pay, with regret ..., to the Rule of Law and in particular to the freedoms of human beings. There is a strong temptation not to want to pay this price. For example by affirming that there is a new technological world, which the new system, entirely in algorithms, will promote in a move away from the Law, rejected towards the Old World. Frequently proposed, or set up for instance in China. Others say that we must "do the balance". But when you balance Efficiency performance and Efficiency self-limitation, you know very well who will win ...


But why not look rather on the side of a Definition of Compliance Law where, on the contrary, the two concepts, instead of opposing each other, support each other!


Indeed, Compliance Law is then defined as an extension of Regulatory Law as a set of rules, institutions, principles, methods and decisions taking their meaning and normativity for specific Goals. . In this definition, which is both specific and substantial, these "Monumental Goals" are systemic and require that all means be mobilized for them to be achieved. Future and negative in nature (events that must not happen) but also future and positive in nature (events that must occur), Compliance Law does not apply to all the rules whose  effectiveness required, but this specific type of "Monumental Goals", in an alliance between the political authorities in charge of the future of human groups and the entities in a position to mobilize its means. The method is then different. It is no longer a question of entrenching and the prospect of repression fades into the background.

A reversal occurs. Proportionality ceases to be what limits Efficiency to become what increases Efficiency. As soon as Goals have be precised, Proportionality is not the consequence of the limitation (as in the principle of "necessity" of Criminal Law, insofar as the latter is an exception), it is the consequence of the fact that any legal mechanism is a "Compliance Tool", which only has meaning in relation to a "Monumental Goal". It is therefore essential to set the "Goal Monumental Goals". As this is where the legal normativity of Compliance is housed, the control must first and foremost relate to that. Then all the Compliance Tools must adjust in a "proportionate way", that is to say effective to its goals: as much as it is necessary, not more than it is necessary. According to the principle of economy (which is also called the "principle of elegance" in mathematics).

In consequence, the rule contrary to the Principle of Proportionality is: the rule useless to achieve the goal. The unnecessary rule is the disproportionate rule: this is how the judicial review of excessive sanctions should be understood, not by the notion of "the limit" but not by the notion of "the unnecessary".

Everything then depends on the legal quality of the goal. De jure - and this would deserve to be a requirement at constitutional level, the goal must always be clear, understandable, non-contradictory, attainable.

This increases the office of the Judge. This renews the power of the Legislator in a conception which ceases to be discretionary.

But the Legislator retains the prerogative of determining the Monumental Goals, while the Judge controls the quality of the formulation that he makes of them, in order to be able to measure the proportionality of the means which are put in front by the State and the Companies, while Companies can rally to the Monumental Goals of the Politics by making an alliance with them, but certainly not instituting others in an autonomous way because they are not normative political entities, whereas they are free to determine the means necessary to achieve these goals, the Judge controlling the proportionality mechanism that makes this new system work.

The case law of the German Constitutional Court expresses this conception. It is fully consistent with what Compliance Law is in what is the one Monumental Goal containing all the systemic Monumental Goals: the protection of the human being.



July 3, 2021


► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance Law Big Bang, talk show with Jean-Philippe Denis, July 3,  2021. 



🎥 watch the emission totally in French 

🎥 watch the emission with English subtitles

June 26, 2021


► Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Notes taken for the summary report of the colloquium of Droit et Commerce, La concurrence dans tous ses états ("Competition in all its states"), June 26, 2021.

This text is the translation of the notes taken in French (this colloquium was in French.


Notes' Summary: The opinions around the "Competition in all its states" highlighted the choices available for what could be this branch of Law tomorrow: choice of a political nature between various possible definitions of Competition Law. 

In method, the main thing is that this definition be clear. For this, this definition must be based on a principle and that the goal pursued by competition law is simple, so that in a second step, competition law can be easily articulated on the one hand with other branches of law. (by the care of the judge, in particular), on the other hand with "policies", such as "competition policy", then other policies (by the care of political authorities, especially European).

In essence, two conceptions of principle are opposed: either Competition Law will want to appropriate the goals of other branches, such as those of Regulatory and Compliance Law, or Competition Law will have the modesty to remain anchored in its definition as Market Law. This is the crossroads where we are.



► Method: Because of the richness and diversity of the comments made, in order to keep to the time limit, some passages have not been repeated orally.

Because it is a synthesis, the document is only based on what was said and does not include technical references, nor does it refer to personal work.


► Articulation  of the notes taken while listening to the different interventions of the successive speakers:

During two days, listening to all the interventions on "Competition Law in all its states" has brought out the choices that are offered for what could be tomorrow this branch of law: they are choices of a political nature between various possible definitions of what should be Competition Law.

The most important thing is undoubtedly that this definition be clear; in order to be clear, it must be based on principle and the goal pursued by Competition Law must be simple, in order to be articulated with other branches of law (by the judge, in particular), and with "policies", such as "competition policy", and then other policies (by political authorities, in particular European ones).

The speakers proposed various, even opposing conceptions of what Competition Law should be, but all agreed on the fact that it has suffered many shocks and that, without a doubt, its recovery requires a common "culture" of Competition.

The evolution has attacked the very pillars of Competition Law in order to better reconstruct it by moving it from a mainly Ex Post perspective to a mainly Ex Ante perspective, by giving relevance to the objects themselves, notably to data, by taking into consideration human beings.

The evolution can take place by internalizing the perspectives of Regulation and Compliance in a Competition Law that becomes hypertrophied and political, which raises the question of the legitimacy of this "holistic" conception; it can also take place by a Competition Law that remains "self-centered" on its technical notions of market, price, etc., but articulates with the other branches of Law, economic or not. This is a political choice

It is in the hands not only of the States and the Parliaments, particularly with regard to the digital space, but also, and above all, in the hands of the supreme courts, a category to which the Court of Justice of the European Union belongs and to which everyone has constantly referred.

  • Read the notes below in full

June 26, 2021


 ►Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Conclusion ("Rapport de synthèse"), in Droit et Commerce, La concurrence dans tous ses états, Deauville, 25th and 26th of June 2021.



📅 This event was initially scheduled for June 22 and 23, 2020, then due to the health crisis, it was postponed to March 27 and 28, 2020; it finally takes place a year later.


📝  Read the general presentation of the colloquium and the program.  (in French)




June 23, 2021

Organization of scientific events

This scientific manifestation is placed under the scientific responsibility of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda. It is organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de Droit de l'Entreprise of Lyon 3 University.  

It is the fourth colloquium of the cycle of colloquia organized in 2021 around the general topic of Juridictionnalization of Compliance.




The different interventions will be then transformed into contributions in the books La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance and Compliance Juridictionnalization  which will be published in the Regulation & Compliance serie, jointly published by the JoRC and Dalloz for the book in French and by JoRC and Bruylant for the book in English. 

This colloquium will take place in Lyon 3 on 23rd of June 2021 with a limited audience. It will also be broadcasted in live on Zoom

To register: 


Presentation of the topic: Initially, it was through Criminal Law, inseparable from the trial, which forced companies to take charge of monitoring within themselves behavior likely to be deviant, the requirement of Ex Ante to be designed by the 'Ex Post of the jurisdictional. From this reversal of things, there has always remained this presence of the judge and the prosecution bodies in a Compliance Law which is nevertheless defined by its concern for the future and the Ex Ante tools within the company.

In doing so, the company becoming on the one hand a judge of itself, on the other hand a prosecutor of itself, it splits up, taking in reverse the most established procedural principles. Moreover, because of the monumental goals which constitute Compliance Law, companies become attorneys and judges of the others, or for the others, the cutting machines and the "supreme courts" being by name instituted to regulate in Ex Ante all different before that it does not become litigation. The Ex Ante of Compliance would then make the Ex Post disappear.


The colloquium which had to take place initially on 8th of April has been postponed to 23rd of June to enable speakers to meet and talk in face to face, with a limited audience. 

These exchanges will be captured so that third parties can benefit from them, even before the publication of the works, La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance and Compliance Juridictionalization, within which this work constitutes the basis for the development of a specific chapter.

Five practical cases will first be examined in five specific sectors, where this institution of the firm as prosecutor and judge of itself is particularly observable before both specific and more cross-sectoral themes are examined and discussed.


Will speak :

🎤Luc-Marie Augagneur, attorney before Lyon Court of Appeal, CVS Law Firm

🎤Alexis Bavitot, senior lecturer at Lyon 3 University 

🎤Alain Bruneauchief compliance officer at Natixis

🎤Jean-Marc Coulon, Head of Legal Infrastructure at Bouygues Construction

🎤Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, director of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC)

🎤Cécile Granier, senior lecturer at Lyon 3 University 

🎤Xavier Hubert, director of Compliance at Engie

🎤Jérémie Jourdan-Marques,  professor at Lyon 2 University

🎤Jérémy Heymann, professor at Lyon 3 University

🎤Daphnée Latour, attorney before Paris Court of Appeal 

🎤Christophe Lapp, founding partner of Altana law firm

🎤Samir Merabet, senior lecturer at Lyon 3 University 

🎤Béatrice Oeuvrard, Public Policy Manager at Facebook France

🎤Jean du Parc, Bâtonnier 

🎤Jean-Christophe Roda, professor at Lyon 3 University and director of the Centre de droit de l'entreprise (Center of Company Law)

🎤Jean-Baptiste Siproudhis, director Ethics, Integrity and CSR at Thalès

June 23, 2021


Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., The judge-judged: Articulate words and things face to the difficult conflicts of interest, in L'entreprise instituée Procureur et Juge d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance, colloquium co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lyon 3 Law School, 23rd of June 2021.



This conference was in French ; the Working Paper on which this conference was based is in French and in English: The judge-judged: Articulate words and things face to the stressful conflicts of interest 

📅  June 23, 2021, 9h30 - 18h30 

🧭 Lyon,  Lyon 3 Law School, "Salle de la Rotonde" and online



📊 Read the slides on which this conference is based (in French)

🎥 See the video of this conference. 


📝 Read the general program of this colloquium (in French)

📝 Read the working paper on which this conference is based  (in English)


📅 This colloquium is part of the cycle of colloquia in 2021 organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners about Compliance Juridictionnalization

📕 📘 The conference is the first basis for the writing of an article, forthcoming in a book whose the French version is La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC and Dalloz, and whose the English version Compliance Juridictionnalisation, is co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant. 

📚   The book in French will be published in the collection "Régulation & Compliance " while the book in English will be published in the same collection "Compliance & Regulation". 


🔻 Summary of the conference: read below.

June 22, 2021


Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., The Judge-Judge ; articulating words and things in the face of the impossible conflict of interest, in "Compliance Juridictionnalisation", working paper, June 22, 2022.



🎤 This Working Paper had been made to prepare a conference (done in French).

This conference took place in the Academic Colloquium, L'entreprise instituée Procureur et Juge d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance, in Lyon, the 23rd  June 2021.


📝this Working Paper is the basis of an article to be published 

📕 in its French version in the book La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in the Series 📚 Régulations & Compliance

📘 in its English version in the book  Compliance Juridictionnalisation, in the Series 📚 Compliance & Regulation



► Working Paper Summary: Puisque le thème de cette réflexion générale sur L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance porte sur un ensemble d'autres réflexions soucieuses de l’ajustement des mots et des choses, la façon dont le rapport entre les uns et les autres évoluent, ce travail va porter sur la question de savoir si cette évolution est radicale ou pas, lorsqu'on parle de "juge".

Car, "juger" c'est un mot que le Droit a disputé à d'autres discipline!footnote-2090s, mais qu'il s'est approprié pour non pas tant avoir davantage de pouvoirs, par exemple celui de surveiller et de punir, mais au contraire s'imposer des limites, puisqu'à celui qui juge il a mis aux pieds les chaines de la procédure, ce qui rend supportable pour l'autre un tel pouvoir exercé!footnote-2091. C'est pourquoi ceux qui veulent le pouvoir de juger voudraient souvent n'en avoir pas le titre, car avoir de jure  le titre de juge c'est être soumis au régime corrélé, c'est se soumettre à l'exactitude procédurale.

Le Droit repère qui juge et oblige ce si-puissant à la procédure. Mais il a aussi le pouvoir d'instituer juge et tous les personnages du procès. Il le fait d'ordinaire avec clarté en distinguant les uns des choses. C'est si important que ce conseil a valeur constitutionnelle. Ainsi, non seulement celui qui juge doit être nommé ainsi mais l'appareillage procédurale qui va avec le personnage et qui constitue à la façon une façon de faire et des droits fondamentaux, ne sont pas "concédés" par bonté ou dans un second temps : c'est un bloc. Si l'on ne voulait pas avoir à supporter les droits processuels, il ne fallait vouloir être juge. Certes on pu en conclure que la procédure serait donc devenue "substantielle" ; par cette élévation, il s'agit plutôt de dire que la procédure ne serait plus une "matière servante": c'est une sorte de déclaration d'amour pour la procédure, tant qu'on affirme qu'à l'acte de juger, d'enquêter ou de poursuivre, sont "naturellement" attachées les droits pour celui qui risque d'en être l'objet.

Le Droit de la Compliance, à la recherche d'alliés pour atteindre les Buts Monumentaux pour l'atteinte desquels il a été institué, va requérir, voire exiger d'entreprises privées qu'elle aillent elles-mêmes rechercher, c'est-à-dire enquêter, des faits susceptibles de lui être reprochés. Le Droit de la Compliance va aussi exiger qu'elles poursuivent les personnes ayant commis ces faits. Il va encore exiger qu'elles sanctionnent les faits que des personnes ont commis en son nom.

On le comprend bien du point de vue de l'efficacité Ex Ante. La confusion est souvent très efficace. Par exemple il est plus efficace que celui qui poursuit soit aussi celui qui instruise et qui juge, puisqu'il connait bien le dossier. D'ailleurs il est plus efficace qu'il prenne aussi les règles, ainsi il connait mieux que quiconque "l'esprit" des textes. Cela fut souvent souligné en Droit de la Régulation.  Mais tout cela ne va pas de soi.

Pour deux raisons, l'une extérieur et l'autre intérieure. 

La première raison, extérieure, tient que l'on ne pourrait pas "nommer" juge qui ne l'est pas. Cela serait trop facile, car il suffirait alors de désigner quiconque, voire de le faire soi-même pour s'approprier le régime qui va avec, pouvoir notamment d'obtenir qu'autrui obéisse alors même qu'il n'est pas subordonné ou qu'il transmette des informations, alors même qu'il serait concurrent : il faudrait alors rappeler seul le juge pourrait se nommer juge ! et dans ce temps nouveau, voilà que des entreprises seraient juges, procureurs, enquêteurs ! Les temps seraient donc si graves et en si grand désordre qu'il faudrait en revenir à cette tautologie là... !footnote-2092 Mais sommes-nous dans une telle radicalité ? D'ailleurs, les juges ont-ils "l'apanage" du jugement et le Droit n'admet-il pas cela depuis longtemps ? Dès l'instant que la procédure est là en Ex Ante et le contrôle du juge en Ex Post ?  

La seconde raison, interne à l'entreprise, tient à ce que l'entreprise enquête sur elle-même, se juge elle-même, se sanctionne elle-même. Or, la personne morale n'exprimant sa volonté qu'à travers soit ses organes, l'on souligne en pratique les difficultés pour un même être humain de formuler des griefs, en tant qu'il est le mandataire de la personne morale, à la personne physique qu'il est lui-même. Les deux intérêts des deux ne sont pas les mêmes, sont souvent opposés, et comment les secrets de l'un peuvent être tenus à l'égard de l'autre. C'est tout le mystère, voire l'artifice de la personnalité morale qui apparaît et l'on comprend mieux que le Droit de la Compliance ne veut plus utiliser cette notion étrange. Car toues les règles de procédure ne peuvent masquer que se poursuivre soi-même n'a pas plus de sens que de contracter avec soi-même. Ce conflit d'intérêts est impossible à résoudre car nommer un même individu x puis le nommer y, en déclarant ouverte la dispute entre eux n'a pas de sens. 

Ce dualisme impossible à admettre dès l'instant qu'il s'agit de faire jouer ces fonctions à l'égard des mandataires sociaux peut retrouver vie en instituant des tiers de confiance qui vont porter les secrets et les oppositions.  Par exemple par la désignation de deux avocats distincts par l'être humain mandataire et l'être humain dirigeant, chaque avocat pouvant avoir des secrets l'un pour l'autre et s'opposer l'un à l'autre. Ces espaces de reconstitution des oppositions si "naturelles" en procédure entre celui qui juge et celui qui est jugé peuvent aussi avoir prendre la forme technologique des plateformes : là où il n'y a plus personne, là où le process a remplacé la procédure, il n'y a plus non plus de jugement humain. L'on mesure ainsi que la crainte des conflits d'intérêts est si forte que l'on se résigne à dire que seule la machine serait "impartiale", dérisoire conception de l'impartialité contre laquelle il convient de lutter.

Cela permet alors d'aboutir à une dernière question : l'entreprise peut-elle prétendre exercer le pouvoir juridictionnel de poursuivre et de juger et d'enquêter sans même se prétendre ni procureur, ni juge d'instruction, ni tribunal ? L'avantage serait de pouvoir se soustraire au régime juridique que le Droit classique attache à ses mots-là, principalement les droits de la défense, les droits d'action et le principe de publicité de la justice.  Quand Facebook dit "réagir" à la décision du 5 mai 2021 adoptée par ce qui ne serait qu'un Oversight Board pour décider pourtant "en conséquence" une suspension de 2 ans du compte de Donald Trump, l'art des qualifications semble être utilisé afin d'éviter toute contrainte de régime.  Mais cet art de l'euphémisme est bien ancien. Ainsi les Etats, lorsqu'ils voulurent accroître la répression, présentèrent la transformation du système comme un adoucissement de celui-ci à travers la "dépénalisation" du Droit économique, transféré des tribunaux correctionnels aux AAI. L'efficacité en fût grandement accrue, puisque les garanties de la procédure pénales ont cessé de s'appliquer. Mais 20 ans plus tard, les mots retrouvèrent leur chemin vers les choses : sous le Droit pénal, dormait la "matière pénale", qui requière la même "impartialité". Un juge un jour l'affirma et tout fut changé. Attendons donc ce qu'en diront les Cours, puisqu'elles sont les maîtres des qualifications, comme le dit l'article 12 du Code de procédure civil, qu'écrivit Motulsky.