► Référence complète : R. Sève, « Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship »,
in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.),
Compliance Obligation,
Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll. « Compliance & Regulation », à paraître -
consulter une présentation générale de l’ouvrage,
Compliance Obligation, dans lequel cet article est publié -
► Résumé de l’article (fait par le
Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : The contribution describes « les changements de philosophie du droit que la notion de
compliance peut impliquer par rapport à la représentation moderne de l’Etat assurant l’effectivité des lois issues de la volonté générale, dans le respect des libertés fondamentales qui constituent l’essence du sujet de droit. » («
the changes in legal philosophy that the notion of Compliance may imply in relation to the modern representation of the State ensuring the effectiveness of laws resulting from the general will, while respecting the fundamental freedoms that constitute the essence of the subject of law« ). The contributor believes that the definition of Compliance is due to authors who « jouer un rôle d’éclairage et de structuration d’un vaste ensemble d’idées et de phénomènes précédemment envisagés de manière disjointe. Pour ce qui nous occupe, c’est sûrement le cas de la théorie de la
compliance, développée en France par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche dans la lignée de grands économistes (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) et dont la première forme résidait dans les travaux bien connus de la Professeure sur le droit de la régulation. » ( «
play a role in illuminating and structuring a vast set of ideas and phenomena previously considered in a disjointed manner. For our purposes, this is certainly the case with the theory of Compliance, developed in France by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche in the tradition of great economists (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) and whose first form was in her well-known work on Regulatory Law« ). Drawing on the
Principles of the Law of the
American Law Institute, which considers compliance to be a « set of rules, principles, controls, authorities, offices and practices designed to ensure that an organisation conforms to external and internal norms », he stresses that Compliance thus appears to be a neutral mechanism aimed at efficiency through a move towards Ex Ante. But he stresses that the novelty lies in the fact that it is aimed ‘only’ at future events, by ‘refounding’ and ‘monumentalising’ the matter through the notion of ‘monumental goals’ conceived by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, giving rise to a new
jus comune. Thus, « la
compliance c’est l’idée permanente du droit appliquée à de nouveaux contextes et défis. » (« C
ompliance is the permanent idea of Law applied to new contexts and challenges« ). So it’s not a question of making budget savings, but rather of continuing to apply the philosophy of the Social Contract to complex issues, particularly environmental issues. This renews the place occupied by the Citizen, who appears not only as an individual, as in the classical Greek concept and that of Rousseau, but also through entities such as NGOs, while large companies, because they alone have the means to pursue the Compliance Monumental Goals, would be like « super-citizens », something that the digital space is beginning to experience, at the risk of the individuals themselves disappearing as a result of « surveillance capitalism ». But in the same way that thinking about the Social Contract is linked to thinking about capitalism, Compliance is part of a logical historical extension, without any fundamental break: « C’est le développement et la complexité du capitalisme qui forcent à introduire dans les entités privées des mécanismes procéduraux d’essence bureaucratique, pour discipliner les salariés, contenir les critiques internes et externes, soutenir les managers en place » («
It is the development and complexity of capitalism that forces us to introduce procedural mechanisms of a bureaucratic nature into private entities, in order to discipline employees, contain internal and external criticism, and support the managers in place« ) by forcing them to justify remuneration, benefits, and so on. Furthermore, in the words of the author, « Avec les buts monumentaux, – la prise en compte des effets lointains, diffus, agrégés par delà les frontières, de l’intérêt des générations futures, de tous les êtres vivants – , on passe, pour ainsi dire, à une dimension industrielle de l’éthique, que seuls de vastes systèmes de traitement de l’information permettent d’envisager effectivement. » («
With the Monumental Goals – taking into account the distant, diffuse effects, aggregated across borders, the interests of future generations, of all living beings – we move, so to speak, to an industrial dimension of ethics, which only vast information processing systems can effectively envisage »). This is how we can find a division between artificial intelligence and human beings in organisations, particularly companies, or in decision-making processes. In the same way, individual freedom does not disappear with Compliance, because it is precisely one of its monumental goals to enable individuals to make choices in a complex environment, particularly in the digital space where the democratic system is now at stake, while technical mechanisms such as early warning will revive the right to civil disobedience, invalidating the complaint of « surveillance capitalism ». The author concludes that the stakes are so high that Compliance, which has already overcome the distinctions between Private and Public Law and between national and international law, must also overcome the distinction between Information and secrecy, particularly in view of cyber-risks, which requires the State to develop and implement non-public Compliance strategies to safeguard the future. -
🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche -
