►  Complete reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Having a good behavior in the digital space, working paper, April 2019.

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📝  This working document serves as a basis for a contribution to the collective book dedicated to Professor Michel Vivant, article written en French.

Summary: The jurist sees the world through the way he learns to speak!footnote-1536, legal vocabulary build by Law itself, whether in common law or in civil law. Thus, we think we are dealing with the human being who does not move, taken by the legal notion expressed by the term "person", their body and their biological development in time, from the birth to the death, holding entirely in this hollow of that word "person", while the behavior of the human being with regard to the world, others and things, are grouped in other branches of Law: the Contract and Tort Law and the Property Law, which are only what people do with and about things.

The Law of the Environment has already come to blur this distinction, so finally so strange because this classical conception refers to a person taken firstly in his immobility (Law of individuals), and then in his only actions (Contrats and Tort Law, Property Law). Indeed, the very notion of "environment" implies that the person is not isolated, that he/she is "surrounded", that he/she is what he/she is and will become because of what surrounds him/her ; in return the world is permanently affected by his/her personal action. On second thought, when once "Law of Individuals" was not distinguished from Family Law, the human being was more fully restored by this division in the legal system that not only followed him/her from birth to death but also in him/her most valuable interactions: parents, siblings, couples, children. Thus Family Law was finer and more faithful to what is the life of a human being.

To have instituted Law of Individuals, it is thus to have promoted of the human being a vision certainly more concrete, because it is above all of their identity and their body about what Law speaks, astonishing that we have not noticed before that women are not men like the others. To have instituted the Law of the people, it is thus to have promoted of the human being a vision certainly more concrete, because it is above all of his identity and his body that one speaks to us, astonishing that the we have not noticed before that women are not men like the others!footnote-1537 without however remembering that abstraction is sometimes the best of protections!footnote-1538.  But it is also to have isolated human beings, split from what they do, what they touch, what they say to others. It is by taking legally a static perception of a "man without relationship". We have gone from the legal individualism of the Law of the sole man.

From this concrete vision, we have all the benefits but Law, much more than in the eighteenth century, perceives the human being as an isolated subject, whose corporeality ceases to be veiled by Law!footnote-1570, but for whom the relation to others or to things does not define him or her. Which brings the human being a lot closer to things. An human being who is a legal subject who does what they wants, as they can, limited by the force of things. But in fact things are so powerful and the human being, in fact, so weak. For example, the marks people leave are erased by time. Their grip on the world stops at the extent of their knowledge, the time and money they have, building to use better their own time and to reach projects that they designed, In this conception, Person and Liberty are one, returning the subject to their solitude.

This freedom will come into conflict with the need for order, expressed by society, social contract, state, law, which imposes limits on freedom of one to preserve freedom of the other, as recalled by the French Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme  of 1789. Thus, it is not possible de jure to transform every desire in action,, even though the means would be within reach of the person in question, because certain behaviors are prohibited in that they would cause too much disorder and if they are nevertheless committed, they are punished for order to return. Thus, what could be called "law of behavior", obligations to do and not to be put in criminal, civil and administrative Law, national and international Law, substantial Law and procedural Law :they will protect the human being in movment pushed by the principle of freedom forward others and thing, movement inherent in their status as a Person. 

The human being is therefore limited in what they want to do. In the first place by the fact: their exhausting forces, their death that will come, the time counted, the money that is lacking, the knowledge that they does not even know not holding, all that is to say by their very humanity; Secondly, by the Law which forbids so many actions ...: not to kill, not to steal, not to take the spouse of others, not to pass as true what is false, etc. For the human being on the move, full of life and projects, Law has always had a "rabat-joy" side. It is for that reason often ridiculous and criticized because of all its restraining regulations, even hated or feared in that it would prevent to live according to our desire, which is always my "good pleasure", good since it is mine. Isolated and all-powerful, the human being alone not wanting to consider other than its desire alone.

Psychoanalysis, however, has shown that Law, in that it sets limits, assigns to the human being a place and a way of being held with respect to things and other persons. If one no longer stands themselves by the prohibition of the satisfaction of all desire (the first of which is the death of the other), social life is no longer possible!footnote-1571. Thank to the Law, everyone follows the same Rule at the table, from which a discussion can take place between guests and without which it can not!footnote-1539. You stand straight in your chair, you do not eat with your fingers, you do not speak with your mouth full, you do not interrupt the speaker. Admittedly, one often learns at the beginning of the learning of the Law that one should not confuse "politeness" and Law. That these rules are politeness and that this is not Law ...

But this presentation aims to make it possible to admit that the criterion of Law would be in the effectiveness of a sanction by the public power: the fine, the prison, the confiscation of a good, which the rudeness does not trigger whereas Law would imply it: by this way we are thus persuaded of the intimacy between the public power (the State) and Law... But later, after this first lesson learned, the doubt comes from the consubstansuality between Law and State. Is it not rather appropriate to consider that Law is what must lead everyone to "behave well" with regard to things and people around them? The question of punishment is important, but it is second, it is not the very definition of Law. The French author Carbonnier pointed out that the gendarme's "kepi" is the "Law sign", that is to say what it is recognized without hesitation, but it is not its definition.

The first issue dealt with by Law is then not so much the freedom of the person as the presence of others. How to use one's freedom and the associated deployment of forces in the presence of others? How could I not using it when I would like to harm them, or if the nuisance created for them by the use of my free strength is indifferent to me!footnote-1540 How can Law lead me to use my means for their benefit while our interests do not converge? 

We do not use our force against others because we have interest or desire, we do not give him the support of our strength while he indifferent us, because Law holds us. If the superego was not enough. If Law and the "parental function of the States" did not make alliance. We do it because we hold ourselves

Or rather we were holding ourselves.

Because today a new world has appeared: the digital world that allows everyone not to "hold" himself, that is to say to constantly abuse others, never to take them into consideration, to attack massively. It's a new experience. It is not a pathological phenomenon, as is delinquency (which simply leads to punishment), nor a structural failure in a principle otherwise admitted (which leads to regulatory remedies) but rather a new use, which would be a new rule: in the digital space, one can do anything to everyone, one is not held by anything or anyone, one can "let go" (I). This lack of "good behavior" is incompatible with the idea of ​​Law, in that Law is made for human beings and protect those who can not afford to protect themselves; that is why this general situation must be remedied  (II).

Le 5 juin 2019, Youtube a informé via son "blog officiel" (Official YouTube Blog) le renforcement de sa politique pour atteindre la lutte contre les contenus de haine, en raison de leur responsabilité sociale : we need "to live up to our responsability and protect the YouTube community from harmfum content".

Le slug du billet de blog "officiel" est plus clair encore : our-ongoing-work-to-tackle-hate.html.

On ne peut qu'être favorable à cette politique dans son principe, et ce d'autant plus qu'en ce qui concerne l'Europe ce sont les Autorités publiques, la jurisprudence et bientôt la Loi en ce qui concerne la France, qui exigent des opérateurs numériques cruciaux l'adoption d'une telle politique!footnote-1615. 

Le "billet officiel" prend deux cas et deux exemples : le premier porte sur la déinformation et l'affirmation que la terre est plate, le second porte sur l'incitation à la haine et la promotion du nazisme. Sur celui-ci, le "billet officiel" le fait en ces termes :

"Today, we're taking another step in our hate speech policy by specifically prohibiting videos alleging that a group is superior in order to justify discrimination, segregation or exclusion based on qualities like age, gender, race, caste, religion, sexual orientation or veteran status. This would include, for example, videos that promote or glorify Nazi ideology, which is inherently discriminatory. Finally, we will remove content denying that well-documented violent events, like the Holocaust or the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary, took place.

We recognize some of this content has value to researchers and NGOs looking to understand hate in order to combat it, and we are exploring options to make it available to them in the future. And as always, context matters, so some videos could remain up because they discuss topics like pending legislation, aim to condemn or expose hate, or provide analysis of current events. We will begin enforcing this updated policy today; however, it will take time for our systems to fully ramp up and we’ll be gradually expanding coverage over the next several months.

Le 6 juin, un journaliste s'en inquiète en affirmant qu'avec une telle politique le film Le triomphe de la volonté, en ce qu'elle met en scène le nazisme et constitue un film de propagande de ce mouvement est donc condamné à disparaître de l'espace numérique. 

Il titre son article : "YouTube Pulls ‘Triumph of the Will’ For Violating New Hate Speech Policy".

Il proteste en disant que dans toutes les universités le film a été montré pour souligner à quel point le cinéma peut être un médium en politique : "Riefensahl's harrowing depiction of the Nuremberg Rallies remains an essential loof at the ideological power of the moving image, and how it can be co-opted on a mass scale" ; "the movie also illuminates how a nation can filter its own realities through recorded media". 

Il soutient qu'à ce compte les films d'Eistenstein, Potemkin, devrait être retiré, ce qu'il n'est pas, et soutient que cela devrait aussi le cas pour Naissance d'une Nation de Griffith, qui ne l'est pas davantage. 

Découvrant dans une chaine que Youtube diffuse au titre des "archives historiques", une prise de position est prise sur le caractère inadmissible du "Triomphe de volonté", il estime que le retrait de ce film-là est donc le reflet d'une prise de position qui n'est pas neutre.

Il conclut son article de la façon suivante : "It raises major issues surrounding the platform's capacity as a historical archive, and how much viewers can be trusted to do some of the legwork on their own. These are the challenges that no algorithmes can solve.".

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Pourtant effectivement, le film est désormais indisponible sur Youtube, l'internaute ne trouvant que le message suivant (dans la langue que son adresse IP suppose être la suivante : "Cette vidéo a été supprimée, car elle ne respectait pas le règlement de YouTube concernant les contenus incitant à la haine. Découvrez comment lutter contre l'incitation à la haine dans votre pays.". Il est possible en cliquant sur "En savoir plus".

En cliquant, l'on arrive à un document de "Règles concernant l'incitation à la haine".  Il s'adresse aux personnes qui mettent des contenus, les prévient de ce qui sera supprimé par Youtube et pourquoi, donne des exemple. Signale que cela résulte des mesures supplémentaires adoptées par YouTube le 5 juin. Renvoie par click  à ce document. L'internaute arrive au document précité en anglais du "blog officiel".

Qu'en penser en Droit ?

Lire ci-dessous.

Référence complète : Favro, K., Communications numériques. Régulation et résolution des litiges, coll. "Systèmes", LGDJ Lextenso, 2019, 155 p.

Consulter la quatrième de couverture.

Consulter la table des matières.

Même si l'expression de "régulation du numérique" est extrêmement courante, elle ne va pas du tout de soi, si l'on respecte le sens précis des mots. L'idée même de réguler cet espace contredit son origine, des principes américains - comme la liberté d'expression, ou des soucis économiques - comme l'innovation, qui renvoie plutôt vers l'Ex Post que vers l'Ex Ante auquel est toujours associé le Droit de la Régulation. En outre, le numérique peut être difficilement qualifié de "secteur", ce qui paraît mener à une impasse. 

C'est pourquoi pour l'instant en premier lieu l'on s'appuie sur l'efficacité relative mais non inexistante de l'Ex Post, du droit pénal et du droit civil mais surtout l'on fait mener en première ligne le Droit de la concurrence, à la fois dans son utilisation Ex Post de mesures comportementales (obligation d'accès notamment) et dans sa partie Ex Ante qu'est le contrôle des concentrations. En outre les Régulateurs sectoriels ne sont pas arrêtés par l'immatérialité du numérique et utilisent leur pouvoir de sanction, notamment quant à l'usage des données.

Car c'est autout de la notion de "donnée" qu'une "gouvernance" pourrait prendre forme en matière numérique. Il pourrait s'agit d'internaliser dans des opérateurs numériques, en tant qu'ils tiennent mondialement le secteur, des obligations pour autrui, en trouvant un juste milieu entre une "Régulation à la californienne" basée sur des consentements mécaniques et une "Régulation à la chinoise" dans laquelle l'Etat tient tout. 

Pour cela, de la même façon que le Droit de la Régulation reconcrétise le monde que le marché concurrentiel ayant pour seul critère ultime le prix, une gouvernance par la Compliance pourrait reconcrétiser le monde digitalisé par le numérique en distinguant dans une catégorie abusivement unifiée de "data" plusieurs sortes de data. L'Europe en a donné l'exemple à travers la Régulation internalisée par le Droit de la Compliance dans les entreprises lorsque les data "concerne" les personnes.

L'on peut analyser la décision rendue par la CNIL, Google le 21 janvier 2019. 

Consulter les slides servant de support à la leçon.

Revenir à la présentation générale du Cours.

Consulter la bibliographie générale du Droit commun de la Régulation

Consulter le Dictionnaire bilingue du Droit de la Régulation et de la Compliance

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Competition Law & Compliance Law , Working Paper, October 2018.

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► this Working Paper has served as basis for an Article published later in French in the Review Concurrences  ; read the presentation in English of this Article. 

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► Summary and introduction : Compliance Law is a new branch of Law, still under construction. One can have a "narrow definition" of seeing it as the obligation of businesses to show that they are constantly and actively complying with the law. One can have a richer definition, of a substantive nature, defining it as the obligation or the own will of certain companies to achieve "monumental goals" that go beyond economic and financial performance.The Competition Law partly integrates its two conceptions of Compliance: Precursor, the Competition Law concretizes dynamically the first conception of the Compliance Law (I) It is with more difficulties but also much more future that the Competition Law can express in dialectic the second conception of the Compliance Law as internationalization of these "monumental goals", especially in the digital space (II).

►   This working document was intended to serve as a support for a conference pronounced in French in the conference Droit et Ethique ( Law & Ethics) of May 31, 2018 in a symposium organized by the Court of Cassation and the Association Française de Philosophie du Droit.  French Association of Philosophy of Law on the general theme Law & Ethics.

See a general presentation of this conference. 

Rather, it has served as a support for the article to be published in the Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD). This article is written in French. 

►   Summary: It is through the Law that the human being has acquired a unity in the West (I). What religion could have done, the Law also did by posing on each human being the indetachable notion of him of "person" (I.A). But this is what is challenged today, not the personality and the power that the human being has to express his freedom but the unity that implies in the disposition that we have of ourselves in repelling the desire that others have always had to dispose of us. Current law tends to "pulverize" human beings into data and transform into neutral legal services what was considered before as the devouring of others. The legal concept of "consent", ceasing to be proof of a free will but becoming an autonomous concept, would suffice (I.B.).

To prevent the reigning of the "law of desires", which merely reflects the adjustment of forces, we must demand here and now the ethical sovereignty of Law, because Law can not be just just be just the interests adjustment (II). We can form this request if we do not want to live in an a-moral universe (II.A), if we see that the unity of the person is the legal invention that protects the weak human being (II.B.). If we admit this imperative, then we must finally ask who in the legal system will express and impose it, especially the legislator or the judge, because we seem to have lost the ability to recall this principle of the Person on which the West was so centered. But the principles that are no longer said disappear. There would then remain only the case-by-case adjustment of interests between human beings in the world field of particular forces. At this yardstick, Law would be more than a technique of securisation of particular adjustments. Law would be reduced at that and would have lost its link with Ethics. (II.C).

Référence complète : Moreaux, A., Comment se conformer au RGPD ?,  in Affiches Parisiennes, mai 2018, pp. 1-3.

L'échéance du fameux Règlement général sur la protection des données approche. Pour Mounir Mahjoubi, secrétaire d'État au Numérique, « 2018 est l'année du RGPD » qui va entraîner un « véritable choc de sécurité » sur la toile. La mise en conformité avec le nouveau règlement européen sur le digital qui entre en vigueur le 25 mai est une question centrale pour les entreprises.

Pour consulter l'article.

It is about a particular case that one can rephrase the general questions. If the case is hot, it is even more important to return to the general questions, which are always colder (more boring, too).

Thus, Cambridge Analytica is a case of which everyone speaks a lot ... It is at the same time particular and very burning.

So we talk about it a lot, and with vehemence, and in a way often definitive, as well in attack as in defense.

For the prosecution, there are many advocacies, gathered for example in the Guardian's files.

For the defense, we find less. But one can read for example the article that has been published in early April 2018: Why (almost) everything reported about the Cambridge Analytica Facebook 'hacking' controversy is wrong.

The number of comments, and their more or less inflamed nature, in any case always definitive, does not mean anything in itself.

The regulators took the floor a little later, both in a more concrete way, the "group of 29" (bringing together all the European Regulators personal data) establishing the 11 April 2018 a working group on this subject and publishing April 10, 2018 new guidelines on the place that must be made to "consent".

But for the moment, if we loof at the media, it looks like a trial, because everyone claims to be entirely right and pretends that the other is entirely wrong. Trial to break the truth and virtue, say the accusers. Trial in witchcraft, says Facebook. And it's always up to us.

Because all this is probably due to the fact that we are no longer spectators: we are placed in the judge's position. The financial market was the first judge. It has already condemned. Without really trying to find out. This is because the public good of the financial markets is Trust, it is enough that one can even suspect the wife of Caesar, and so it is not really matter of truth of the facts and goof application of Rule of Law.

For the public opinion that we are, this is something else, because we could wait to know more. And we should, since we seek to remain a little attached to the "truth " of the facts and respect for the Rule of Law. However, this case is complex and is above all a matter of judicial analysis which will come and which we cannot lead ourselves, both in terms of the facts-which are complex-as well as the rules of law to be applied which are equally so.

What turns us into a court, an ordinary sociological phenomenon, is a new legal mechanism: the "whistleblower". By nature, it gives the bonus to the Attack

This logic of the legal mechanism of the whistleblower, a movement of fact to throw facts as one throws a buoy outside but one could also say stones on the firm that the insider denounces, logic today encouraged and protected by the Law, allows a person who knows something, most often because he participated, to let everyone know, without a filter. To denounce it. For the public good..

The successive texts on the whistleblower are nrms of a Compliance Law!footnote-1129 which seek, in particular in French Law, to ensure a balance between this "monumental goal"!footnote-1130 which is the respect of the truth, the fight against corruption, the protection of human beings, etc., and the risks to be endured by the company thus denounced.

The case is exemplary of this, since Facebook is  "denounced" only in second place, behind Cambridge Analytica, but the notoriety and power of the first makes that it is hit first. French law in the so-called "Sapin 2 Act " of 2016 has ensured to protect the company denounced, but British and American Law are more violent, probably because they encourage more the private enforcement.

Temporality is therefore favorable to the attack. The time of the defense is always slower. It is usually the people in situations of weakness who suffer it: slowness of justice, justice outside courthouses, etc. With Compliance mechanisms, it is probably the very powerful who will live this. It is not a matter of rejoicing: the misfortune of some (here the difficulty of a company hasty  "judged") does not console in any way the misfortune of others (the difficulty of ordinary beings accused or having only the right to protect themselves to reach concretely a judge and really get a judgment executed, even as they are in their right).

But if we go to general questions, since on the facts of this case we don't have the means to appreciate them, nor on the rules which apply to them, we cannot apply them in an adequate way until a court will have exercised its office?

However, the general perspectives highlighted by this singular case are two orders: Probationary order (I) and Accountability order (II).

Read below.

Cryptocurrencies seem to be admitted, delivered from the State. And many rejoiced.

Let's take the question on the side of Law.

In France, we remember an article written in 1968 by the great lawyer Carbonnier : L'imagerie des monnaies  (Imagery of Coins), seeing in Caesar's face engraved on the coin the image of the State itself, guarantor of the entire monetary and exchange system.

In Europe, we remember the discussions on the image of the euro, how each state in the zone could express its existence while the guarantee was common and concentrated in the same central bank, preferring a public building to a character.

Today the currencies to be virtual do not have less an "image".

One could even say that they have only that, since it is no longer the State which, by the face of Caesar is inserted there.

But other faces can be imbued. Could the law find fault with it, because some figures would be "reprochable" because only Caesar would be beyond reproach? Could the Law draw any consequences from it, because some figures would be "engaging", less than that of Caesar but still a little?

Certainly, not faces that the Criminal Law rejects, not that of Jack the Ripper, not that of Hitler. But other historical figures less clearly banned, in this period where it is easily argued that everything would be "questionable" and therefore admissible and that besides everything would be "to discuss", the currency thus expressing this flow of discussion , speech that goes from hand to hand, from post to post on virtual networks?

Still, figures are block around them. This is particularly true in communities that can thus elect them to trust each other: just like their "Caesar", and knowing each other well, lend themselves more easily with confidence, to pay each other, while they would not lend to others, they would not buy from others.

Why no. Since we accept the principle of this currency, based on the only technical security (double encryption) and trust between people (intersubjectivity of a circle that has been chosen), without mentioning the issue of the debtor as a last resort, in order to challenge Caesar and public finances.

But let us take the hypothesis that the figure embedded in the virtual currency is that of Jesus. And the hypothesis is not fancy.

Indeed, the "religious currencies" are multiplying.

And the platforms that offer them insist on the fact that these tokens that are exchanged between people who believe in Jesus place great trust in the "son of God" and are therefore particularly trusting each other, for example in their respective capacity to keep their commitment. Outside the Law. On their respective ability to help each other. Outside the Law.

Is it necessary to forget the affirmation that it was necessary "to render to Caesar what was Caesar's"?

Let's ask some questions in Law.

- Reflections on what could or should be the "regulation" of non-state currencies, whether we call them virtual or not (in what does this change the nature of the currency?), That we secure them by encryption technology and / or by the decentralization of information, should they also relate to images?

- Are non-state currencies so much that the religious image, as long as it is not contrary to public order, is permissible, notably in legal systems where the constitutional principle of secularism has as its object and effect not only to neutralize the religious significance of religious objects but also to protect religious freedom?

- Can "religious currencies" be protected and have specific economic and financial significance, as the United States Supreme Court admitted in the Hobby Lobby judgment of June 30, 2014? Europe is not the United States.

- If the image of Jesus is encrusted on the currency, can we consider that the corpus is also inserted so that the platform that attracts a particularly interesting clientele (solvent, "responsible", holding its commitments, etc.) ? This insertion of the religious corpus, as the state was through the face of Caesar would operate not de jure but de facto, so that the company holding the platform should respond to third parties by the factual belief that this may have generated in third parties.

- Moreover, do not these "religious currencies" produce a specific systemic risk? Not that such and such a religion could collapse, or this or that religious effigy to undergo a haircut with a domino effect on all the saints, waves of doubt provoking a mistrust of all the faithful ones because the various religions are doing well, but precisely because the mark of these religious communities to which these platforms specifically appeal is to make "their own law" prevailing over the law of the Dtate, considered inferior since it comes only from men and not from God.

And now the churches are starting to coin money...

At the very least, it will be necessary in Ex Post that the faithful do not come to seek the state by guaranteeing if there is bankruptcy, because Caesar does not meddle in the affairs of Jesus. To each his currency and each to reread Carbonnier, one of the finest readers of the Bible

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Référence complète : Malaurie-Vignal, M., Concurrence - Efficacité économique v/ politique de concurrence ? Réflexions à partir du marché du numérique, Contrats Concurrence Consommation n° 2, février 2018, repère 2.

L'article peut être lu par les étudiants de Sciences po via le Drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation & Compliance"

Lire la description de la décision par Reuters, ou Bloomberg.

Lire un commentaire de la décision, en comparaison avec la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne à propos de Google.

Référence complète : Vogel, L., Réseaux contre plates-formes : la distribution sélective à l'épreuve de l'internet, in Études en l'honneur du Professeur Jérôme Huet. Liber amicorum, LGDJ - Lextenso, 2017, pp. 401-410.

Consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l'article via le Drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

Référence complète : Warusfel, B., La transversalité du droit du numérique, in Études en l'honneur du Professeur Jérôme Huet. Liber amicorum, LGDJ - Lextenso, 2017, pp. 411-423.

Consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l'article via le Drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

Référence complète : Derieux, E., Données à caractère personnel et communication publique . Règlement (UE) 2016/79 du 27 avril 2016 relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données in Études en l'honneur du Professeur Jérôme Huet. Liber amicorum, LGDJ - Lextenso, 2017, pp. 127-138.

Consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l'article via le Drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation & Compliance".

Référence générale : Études en l'honneur du Professeur Jérôme Huet. Liber amicorum, LGDJ - Lextenso, 2017, 423 p.

Lire la 4ième de couverture.

Lire la table des contributions.

Consulter la présentation des contributions suivantes :

• Seidowsky, O., Audits logiciels et conformité digitale

• Vogel, L., Réseaux contre plates-forme : la distribution sélective à l'épreuve de l'internet

• Warusfel, B., La transversalité du droit du numérique

• Derieux, E., Données à caractère personnel et communication publique . Règlement (UE) 2016/79 du 27 avril 2016 relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données

Référence complète : Seidowsky, O., Audits logiciels et conformité digitale, in Études en l'honneur du Professeur Jérôme Huet. Liber amicorum, LGDJ - Lextenso, 2017, pp. 329-338.

Consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l'article via le Drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Pour réguler l'espace numérique : la solution de "l'interrégulation" !, entretien, Revue Communication Commerce Électronique, nov. 2016, p.8.

Cet interview a été donné à l'occasion de l'ouvrage Internet, espace d'interrégulation

Il aborde trois questions :

• la définition de l'interrégulation,
• les justifications de l'interrégulation en matière numérique
• les conditions de l'effectivité de l'interrégulation en matière numérique

Lire l'interview.

Lire l'arrêt.

Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Les conséquences régulatoires d'un monde repensé à partir de la notion de "donnée", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Internet, espace d'interrégulation, série "Régulation", Journal of Regulation - Dalloz, 2016, p.183-207.

Lire l'article.

Il est à corréler à un article publié dans le même ouvrage : Penser le monde à partir de la notion de "donnée".

Cet article s'appuie sur un working paper : lire le working paper.

Complete references :  Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Internet, espace d'interrégulation, Serie "Régulations", coll. "Thèmes & Commentaires", Dalloz, Paris, 2016.

Read the presentation of the book (written in French).

Read the presentation of the  authors of the contributions (written in French)

"Regulate the Internet".

Some argue that any regulation is contrary to the nature of digital. Others argue that this is indispensable, for its economic deployment and for public freedoms. Internet renews conceptions and practices. Notably those of the Law of the Regulation. Indeed, the Internet makes it possible to offer and obtain services that are in often regulated sectors: financial, audiovisual, healthcare, gaming. Moreover, they converge in new objects: the connected objects.

Often described as a "legal desert", digital appears as a kind of jumble of systems of various regulations that overlap, deform and contradict each other. In reaction, an "interregulation", de facto or de jure, in law more or less flexible, is in the process of being established. Who will be the Regulator: The States? The judge? The Internet users?

The future is open.

The book first determines the "Interregulation Needs" and then describes and conceives solutions for the interregulation of the digital space.

Read the presentation of the two articles written by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche:

     Thinking the world from the notion of "data"
     To draw the regulatory consequences of a rethinked world from the notion of "data"

The working papers which are the base of these articles are written in English.

Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Penser le monde à partir de la notion de "donnée", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Internet, espace d'interrégulation, série "Régulation", 2016, p.7-16.

English summary :

Law is a reconstruction of the world through definitions and categories, expressed in words, to which are imputed rules. There is always a share of invention in Law, articulated to a share of fidelity to the concrete world that it retranscribes, a combination enabling Law to regulate the latter.

Law is put in difficulty by what the term "data", quite new, is not easy to define. The fact that it is strangely formulated in Latin to show that there is plurality, the data, before associating it with an English adjective when there are many, the "big data", does not advance us more on what a "data" is. Law is a practical art that works well only if it manipulates categories whose definition is mastered.

This is why, in a first stage, we must recognize the uncertainties of the very notions of "data" (I), in order to orientate the adequate rules in the second step towards what is a given, namely a "pure" value in our consumer information society (II).

Read the article (in French)

This article is linked to another article published in the same book : Les conséquences régulatoires d'un monde repensé à partir de la notion de "donnée" ("the regulatory consequences of a word redesigned from the notion of "data")

Law is a reconstruction of the world through definitions and categories, expressed in words, to which are imputed rules. There is always a share of invention in Law, articulated to a share of fidelity to the concrete world that it retranscribes, a combination enabling Law to regulate the latter.

Law is put in difficulty by what the term "data", quite new, is not easy to define. The fact that it is strangely formulated in Latin to show that there is plurality, the data, before associating it with an English adjective when there are many, the "big data", does not advance us more on what a "data" is. Law is a practical art that works well only if it manipulates categories whose definition is mastered.

This is why, in a first stage, we must recognize the uncertainties of the very notions of "data" (I), in order to orientate the adequate rules in the second step towards what is a given, namely a "pure" value in our consumer information society (II).

Read the article written in French on the basis à this working paper

Lire l'arrêt de la Cour d'appel de Paris.

Lorsqu'un Internaute a recours aux services de FaceBook, il accepte les "conditions générales" dans lesquelles sont insérées des stipulations diverses, par lesquelles une clause attributive de compétence territoriale aux juridictions de Santa Clara (Californie).

Certes, cette clause est nulle en droit de la consommation, mais FaceBook, assigné par un internaute devant un Tribunal de Paris, affirme que le droit de la consommation n'est pas applicable car il ne s'agit pas d'un "contrat de consommation" puisqu'il s'agit du rapport de gratuité.

La Cour d'appel de Paris ne retient pas cette argumentation tirée de la "gratuité" et constate au contraire que FaceBook en retire des bénéfices très importants et qu'il s'agit d'un contrat d'adhésion régi par le droit des clauses abusives et du Règlement communautaire de protection des consommateurs.

La Cour d'appel relève que le Règlement communautaire confère au consommateur le droit de saisir le juge de son domicile, que le Code de la consommation protège le consommateur contre la privation de fait de son droit d'action, ce à quoi équivaut l'obligation de saisir pour un internaute français une juridiction californienne, "entrave sérieuse à son droit d'action en justice" et "déséquilibre significatif entre les droits et obligations des parties".

C'est pourquoi la Cour d'appel de Paris confirme l'Ordonnance par laquelle le Président du Tribunal de Grande instance de Paris a déclaré non-écrite la clause attributive de compétence et déclaré compétent le Tribunal de grande instance de Paris sais par l'internaute contre FaceBook.