Resources

► Full Reference: J.-Ch. Roda, "Compliance, Internal Investigations and International Competitiveness: What are Risks for the French Companies (in the Light of Antitrust Law)?", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2023, pp. 355-368. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article: The author draws on American and European Competition Law to measure whether internal investigations, as far as they provide factual elements, can provide foreign authorities and competitors, here American, with "sensitive information" (notably via leniency programs), and as such constitute a competitive handicap. But this turns out to be quite difficult, whereas compliance audits, for example under the legal duty of vigilance, can provide American litigants with useful information, drawn from internal documents, in particular the reports of compliance officers, which can be captured by procedures of discovery. French Law remains weak in the face of these dangers, due to its refusal to recognise the legal privilege mechanism concerning these internal documents, contrary to American Law and the consequent effectiveness of discovery in international procedures, concerning internal documents, in particular resulting from internal investigations. Solutions have been proposed, the activation of a new conception of blocking statutes being complex, the prospect of adopting a legal privilege being more effective, but there would remain the hypothesis of an international conflict of privilege, American Law having a strict design of legal advice justifying it and judges checking that powerful companies do not use it artificially. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: S. Lochmann, "ESG Rating Agencies and Compliance as an Effective Way of Increasing International Competitiveness", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 389-400. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article:  -

► Full Reference: L. Benzoni, "International Trade, Competitivity and Sovereignty: Towards a Political Economy of Compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 447-458. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article:  -

► Full Reference: Agence française anticorruption – AFA (French Anti-Corruption Agency) and Parquet national financier – PNF (French National Financial Prosecutor's Office), Internal anti-corruption investigations. Practical Guide, march 2023.  - 📜read the guide -  

► Full reference: ECHR, Grand chamber, 14 February 2023, Halet c. Luxembourg, n° 21884/18. - ► Read the judgment  - ► See the judgment of the third section of the 11th May 2021 which is overruled by this decision. -

► Full reference: Conseil constitutionnel (French Constitutional Council), decision n°2022-1035, QPC, 10 February 2023, Société Sony interactive entertainment France et autre - ► Read the decision (in French) -

► Full Reference: A. Bavitot, "Le façonnage de l'entreprise par les accords de justice pénale négociée" ("Shaping the company through negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 187-198.   - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Negotiated justice is "the situation in which the criminal conflict is the object of a trade in the etymological sense of the term negotio, i.e. a debate between the parties to reach an agreement". Thus, the French legislator has succumbed to globalized mimicry by creating the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public (Public Interest Judicial Agreement), first in matters of probity and then in environmental matters. What is the nature of this deal of justice? Validated by a judge's order, it does not entail any declaration of guilt, has neither the nature nor the effects of a judgment of conviction and is not registered in the judicial record. Possible at the investigation stage as well as at the pre-trial stage, the Public Interest Judicial Agreement is original in that it makes it possible to avoid either the prosecutor's proceedings or the judge's wrath. A detailed study of the agreements signed shows that in order to negotiate in the best possible way, the company can and must shape itself. The company will shape the facts of its agreement, shape its charge and, finally, shape its sentence. The article offers a concrete analysis of these three dimensions of corporate shaping to better approach understanding the legal nature of negotiated criminal justice agreements. -

► Full Reference: A. Bruneau, "L'entreprise juge d'elle-même : la fonction compliance dans la banque" ("The company judge of itself: the compliance function inside the bank"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 115-131.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published     - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance. In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as "Sapin 2" requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk. Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution. Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law. Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the "judge-judged": following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients. -

► Full Reference: S. Scemla and D. Paillot, "La difficile appréhension des droits de la défense par les autorités de contrôle en matière de compliance" ("The supervisory authorities face difficulties to apprehend the rights of the defence in Compliance matters"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 241-249. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the authors): Since 2016, French companies subject to the provisions of the so-called “Sapin 2” Law must implement eight stringent anti-corruption measures, such as a risk mapping, a whistleblowing procedure or a third-party due diligence procedure. To ensure their compliance with these obligations, the Sapin 2 law created the Agence française anticorruption – AFA (French Anti-Corruption Agency), which had been assigned three missions: firstly, to help any person prevent and detect corruption; secondly, to control the quality and effectiveness of the anti-corruption programs deployed by the companies; and thirdly, to sanction any breaches, through its Sanctions Committee. As pointed out by the French Conseil d’État, the powers devolved to the administrations have multiplied and became stratified. While the Conseil d'État suggests to improve both the conduct and the effectiveness of administrative controls by harmonising their practices and simplifying their prerogatives, it is urgent to remedy the numerous procedural failures that undermine the rights of defence. In fact, the AFA exercises various powers when undertaking its controls. Some of these powers are not provided for by the Law, and most of them infringe fundamental rights and freedoms among which the adversarial principle and the freedom not to self-incriminate. For instance, the AFA does not necessarily draft minutes of the interviews it conducts, thus depriving the interviewee of the possibility to challenge the statements reported by the AFA to the Sanctions Committee. From a more structural point of view, the scope of the AFA's mission is extremely broad. The Law allows the AFA to request the communication of "any professional document or any useful information", without defining the notion of usefulness. Also, the AFA considers that the entity cannot benefit from the legal privilege that would cover their documents, and considers that an entity who voluntarily hands over a document, without expressing any reserves, waives its right to the benefit of its legal privilege. Apart from the severe consequences that could arise if another proceedings was to be initiated by a foreign authority, the concept of "voluntary handover" does not faithfully reflect the reality. Indeed, the controlled entities only cooperate under the threat of being prosecuted on the basis of an obstruction to the control, which compels them to communicate documents even when facing the risk of contributing to their own incrimination. These many procedural deficiencies encountered during AFA controls must therefore be reformed, as recommended by the Conseil d’État, so as to require the authorities to take into account the rights of the defence. -

► Full Reference: N. Cayrol, "Des principes processuels en droit de la compliance" ("General Procedural Law in Compliance Law"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 213-224.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): We could be satisfied with examining the reception of the principles of general Procedural Law in compliance litigation and the distortion that compliance techniques justify in procedural mechanisms. But the innovation that constitutes this emerging branch of law that is Compliance Law justifies going to more fundamental. From this perspective, the pertinent question is the very legitimacy of procedural principles in this branch of law, in that Procedural Law is built on the notion of “Litigation” while Compliance Law deals with situation so enormous, concerning for example the fate of the planet, that this notion of litigation appears inadequate, and consequently the procedural law would be too limited in compliance matters. If, however, this perspective is maintained of Compliance Law facing, in an almost warlike perspective, the greatest current challenges, general Procedural Law needs to be redesigned, in its very definition. Indeed, compliance trials call into question the future of systems and it is as such that they hold the entities, for instance the enterprises, that are at the heart of these systems. It is in this that liability trials are more “accountability” trials, allowing the judge to demand actions for the future, trials by which commitments are made and the “intentions” of the persons involved are challenged and required. -

► Full Reference: J. Morel-Maroger, "La réception des normes de la compliance par les juges de l'Union européenne" ("Application of compliance standards by EU judges"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 443-452.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Compliance rules are intended to pursue objectives of public interest – or monumental goals – and thereby in principle modify and guide the behaviour of economic operators. In order to achieve these objectives, the full spectrum of norms are used in compliance matters. What is and what should be the role of the judges of the European Union in the development of compliance rules ? As in domestic law, the legality of compliance standards developed by regulatory authorities has been challenged. It will first be necessary to analyse what control the judges of the European Union have over these rules. The question arises essentially as regards the rules of soft law, the challenge of which can be considered in two ways : by way of an action for annulment and by exception by way of a preliminary ruling. But beyond the control of the legality of compliance rules exercised by European judges, they also contribute to their application. The effectiveness of compliance rules depend above all on them being followed by those to whom they are addressed, and economic operators are undoubtedly the first actors of its success. But the judges of the European Union, competent to settle disputes concerning the application of European Union law between the Member States, the European institutions, and individual applicants, may be also be involved in ensuring the effectiveness of European compliance rules and in interpreting them. -

► Full Reference: A. Linden, "Motivation et publicité des décisions de la formation restreinte de la Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL) dans une perspective de compliance" ("Motivation and publicity of the decisions of the restricted committee of the French Personal Data Protection Commission (Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés–CNIL) in a compliance perspective"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 235-239.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): In the event of a breach of the personal data protection rules, the restricted formation of the French personal data protection Commission (CNIL) pronounces fines, injunctions of "compliance" or calls to order. It can order the publication of these measures, which can be contested before the French High Administrative supreme court (Conseil d'État). It is essential that these decisions be justified, not only in order to respect this principle of law but also concretely to obtain the public concerned, being very heterogeneous, understand them, the educational role of the CNIL also being applicable. The principle of publicity is handled with nuance, the data controllers often requesting a closed door and, in fact, very few public attending the hearing. The publicity of decisions is in itself a sanction. The publication may moreover not be total or may only have a time, anonymization often allowing the balance between necessary pedagogy and preservation of interests, the CNIL taking great attention to the very modalities of publication, even if it cannot control the circulation and the media use which is then made of it. -

► Full Reference: S. Schiller, "Un juge unique en cas de manquement international à des obligations de compliance ?" ("A single judge in the event of an international breach of compliance obligations?"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 453-464.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author, translated by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Given the very international nature of the topic apprehended, the actors involved and therefore the compliance disputes, it is essential to know if a person can be implicated before several judges, attached to different states or even if he can be condemned by several jurisdictions. The answer is given by the non bis in idem principle, which is the subject of a abondant case law on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol n°7 of the ECHR, clearly inapplicable for jurisdictions emanating from different States. To assess whether breaches of compliance obligations may be subject to multiple sanctions in different states, it will first be necessary to ascertain whether there is a textual basis to be invoked. At European level, Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights now allows the principle of ne bis in idem to be invoked. Applicable to all areas of compliance, it provides very strong protection which covers not only sanctions, but also prosecutions. Like its effects, the scope of Article 50 is very broad. The procedures concerned are those which have a repressive nature, beyond those pronounced by criminal courts in the strict sense, which makes it possible to cover the convictions pronounced by one of the many regulatory authorities competent in matters of compliance. Internationally, the situation is less clear. Article 14-7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may be invoked, if several obstacles are overcome, including the decision of 2 November 1987 of the Human Rights Committee which restricted it to the internal framework, requiring a double conviction by the same State. Even if these principles are applicable, two specificities of compliance situations risk hampering their application, the first related to the applicable procedural rules, in particular the rules of jurisdiction, the second related to the specificities of the situation. The application of the non bis in idem rule is only formally accepted with regard to universal jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, that is to say extraterritorial jurisdiction, which is only part of the jurisdiction. . The Cour de cassation (French Judiciary Supreme Court) confirmed this in the famous so-called “Oil for food” judgment of March 14, 2018. The refusal to recognize this principle as universal, regardless of the jurisdiction rule in question, deprives French companies of a defense. Moreover, the repression of breaches of compliance rules is more and more often resolved through transactional mechanisms. The latter will not always fall within the scope of European and international rules laying down the non bis in idem principle, for lack of being sometimes qualified as "final judgment" under the terms of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 14-7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Breaches in terms of compliance are often based on multiple acts. This results from prescriptions the starting point of which is delayed at the last event and a facilitated jurisdiction for French courts when only one of the constitutive facts is found in France. In terms of compliance, the non bis in idem principle therefore generally does not protect companies and does not prevent them from being sued before the courts of two different countries for the same case. It nevertheless grants them another protection by obliging them to take into account foreign decisions in determining the amount of the penalty. The sanction against Airbus SE in the Judicial Convention of Public Interest (CJIP) of January 29, 2020 is a perfect illustration of this. Breaches in terms of compliance are often based on multiple acts. This causes delays in the starting point of prescriptions, starting point delayed at the last event, and this facilitates judicial jurisdiction for French courts when only one of the constitutive facts is found in France. In terms of compliance, the non bis in idem principle therefore generally does not protect companies and does not prevent them from being sued before the courts of two different countries for the same case. It nevertheless grants them another protection by obliging them to take into account foreign decisions in determining the amount of the penalty. The sanction against Airbus SE in the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public -CJIP (French Judicial Convention of Public Interest)  of January 29, 2020 is a perfect illustration of this. -

► Full Reference: O. Douvreleur, "Compliance et juge du droit" ("Compliance and Judge ruling only on points of Law"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 465-471.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Compliance maintains with the judge complex relations, and even more with the judge ruling only on points of Law  (in France, the Court de Cassation in the judicial order, the one who, in principle, does not know the facts that he leaves to the sovereign appreciation of the judges ruling on the substance of the disputes. At first glance, compliance is a technique internalised in companies and the place occupied by negotiated justice techniques leave little room for intervention by the judge ruling only on points of Law However, his role is intended to develop, in particular with regard to the duty of vigilance or in the articulation between the different branches of Law when compliance meets Labor Law, or even in the adjustment between American Law and the other legal systems, especially French legal system. The way in which the principle of Proportionality will take place in Compliance Law is also a major issue for the judge ruling only on points of Law. -

► Full Reference: E. Wennerström, "Quelques réflexions sur la Compliance et la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme" ("Some Reflections on Compliance and the European Court of Human Rights"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 479-489. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The development of the European Court of Human Rights case law, contributing to European integration, has incorporated the substantial concept of ​​"compliance" which goes beyond the idea of ​​legality with respect to which companies remain passive, and promotes legal orders as systems in interaction with another.  The author develops the spirit and scope of Protocol 15 by which both the principle of subsidiarity and the margins of appreciation the signatory States are organized, mechanisms governed by the principle of proportionality. Subsidiarity means that the States are in the best position to design the most adequate application of the Convention, the close links between the States allowing its effective application. In addition, the new opinion procedure which allows a national court to have during a case the non-binding opinion of the ECHR ensures better compliance with the objectives of the Convention. The case-law of the Court takes up this substantial requirement through its doctrine, in particular identified in the Bosphorus case, by stressing that the accession of a State to the European Union presumes its compliance when implementing EU law with the obligations arising from the ECHR, even if this presumption can be refuted if the protection is manifestly lacking, which was admitted in several cases, in particular concerning the right to an impartial tribunal in matters of economic regulation. The different legal orders are thus articulated.  The author concludes that the European Court of Human Rights, like the Court of Justice of the Union, contributes to the construction of Compliance Law in Europe, from an Ex Ante perspective favoring opinions rather than Ex Post sanctions and creating, in particular through the Bosphorus doctrine, elements of security and confidence for European integration around common values. -

► Full Reference: B. Silliman, "Secret professionnel et coopération : les leçons de procédure tirées de l’expérience américaine pour une application universelle" ("Privilege and cooperation, procedural lessons learned from the U.S for global application"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 231-234.   - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► English summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The French legal system is evolving, organizing interaction between lawyers with regulators and prosecutors, especially in investigations about corruption or corporate misconduct, adopting U.S. negotiated resolutions such as the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public, which encourages "collaboration" between them.  The author describes the evolution of the U.S. DOJ doctrine and askes French to be inspired by the U.S. procedural experience, U.S. where this mechanism came from. Indeed, the DOJ released memoranda about what the "collaboration" means. At the end (2006 Memorandum), the DOJ has considered that the legal privilege must remain intact when the information is not only factual to maintain trust between prosecutors, regulators, and lawyers. French authorities do not follow this way. The author regrets it and thinks they should adopt the same reasoning as the American authority on the secret professionnel of the avocat, especially when he intervenes in the company internal investigation. - 🦉This article is available in full text for those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

► Full Reference: F. Raynaud, "Le juge administratif et la compliance" ("The Administrative Judge and the Compliance Law"), ​in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 473-478. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done par the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author studies the close relationship between Compliance Law and Soft Law, such as the Administrative Judge has made room for it in his case law. This was particularly the case with the judgments of the Conseil d'État (French Council of State) in 2016, relating to legal topic of Regulatory Law, which is extended by Compliance Law. This concern to internalize in companies what the public authorities want had also been taken into consideration by the Conseil d'État by small touches from 2010 and has continually expanded. This is particularly the case when the document issued is "de nature à produire des effets notables, notamment de nature économique, ou ont pour objet d'influer de manière significative sur les comportements des personnes auxquelles ils s'adressent" ("likely to produce significant effects, in particular of an economic nature, or are intended to significantly influence the behavior of the people to whom they are addressed"), which is related to compliance issues directly. This new concept adopted by the Conseil d'État has led it to review and control numerous "positions", "recommendations", "guidelines", etc., adopted by multiple authorities, to protect the persons on whom these acts have a "notable effect", the Conseil sometimes not hesitating to censor the issuing body. In Banking compliance, the Soft Law, more specifically issued by the European Banking Authority, gave the Administrative Judge the opportunity to adjust his control with that exercised by the Court of Justice seized by a preliminary question. Thus, "Par sa jurisprudence sur la justiciabilité des actes de droit de souple, le Conseil d’État s’affirme donc comme un acteur de la compliance en permettant aux entités visées par ces actes et soumises à leur égard à une obligation de compliance de saisir le juge administratif d’un recours en annulation contre ces actes, afin qu’ils puissent être soumis à un contrôle de légalité et, le cas échéant, annulés" ("Through its case law on the justiciability of Soft Law acts, the Conseil d'État therefore asserts itself as a compliance actor by allowing the entities covered by these acts and subject to a compliance obligation in their regard to seize the administrative judge of an action for annulment against these acts, so that these acts can be subjected to a control of legality and, if necessary, annulled"). But must the administrative judge be seized. It can be the case in new fields, for example in climate matters, as he we in the Grande Synthe case. By its decision, "Le Conseil d’État va ainsi au bout de la logique du dispositif mis en place par le législateur et par le pouvoir réglementaire pour mettre en œuvre les accords de Paris, lesquels reposent sur une forme de compliance à l’échelle mondiale, chaque Etat signataire s’engageant, en quelque sorte, à faire le nécessaire pour atteindre un objectif commun à une date donnée, à charge pour chacun de s’organiser pour l’atteindre. En l’absence d’un juge international capable de vérifier le respect de ces engagements, le juge national apparait le plus naturel pour accepter de vérifier, lorsqu’il est saisi d’un litige en ce sens, que ces engagements ne restent pas lettre morte. " ("The Conseil d'État thus goes to the end of the logic of the system put in place by the legislator and by the administrative power to implement the Paris Agreements, which are based on a form of compliance at the worldwide scale, each signatory State undertaking, in a way, to do what is necessary to achieve a common goal by a given date, it being up to each to organize itself to achieve it. to verify compliance with these commitments, the national judge seems the most natural to accept to verify, when seized of a dispute in this sense, that these commitments do not remain a dead letter".). Through this general movement,  "La compliance est devenue un nouveau mode de régulation d’un nombre croissant d’activités. " ("Compliance has become a new way of regulating a growing number of activities."). -