Articles in a JoRC book

Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

TORRE-SCHAUB, Marta🕴️

📝La compliance environnementale et climatique (Environmental and Climate Compliance), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: M. Torre-Schaub, “La compliance environnementale et climatique” (“Environmental and Climate Compliance”), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 271-286. - lire une présentation générale de l’ouvrage, L’Obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author starts from the fact that Compliance Law, in that it is not limited to conformity process, and Environmental Law are complementary, both based above all on the prevention of risks and harmful behaviour, environmental crises and the right to a healthy environment involving the strengthening of Environmental Vigilance. It is all the more important to do this because definitions remain imprecise, not least those of Environment and Climate, which are diffuse concepts. Firstly, the contribution sets out the purpose of Environmental Compliance, which is to ensure that companies are vigilant with regard to all kinds of risks: they put in place and follow a series of processes to obtain “progress” in accordance with a standard of “reasonable vigilance”. This requires them to go beyond mere conformity and encourages them to develop their own soft law tools within a framework of information and transparency, so that the climate system itself benefits in accordance with its own objectives. Then the author stresses the preventive nature of Environmental Vigilance mechanisms, which go beyond providing Information to managing risks upstream, in particular through the vigilance plan, which may be unified or drawn up risk by risk, and which must be adapted to the company, particularly in the risk mapping drawn up, with assessment being carried out on a case-by-case basis. Lastly, in the light of recent French case law, the author describes the implementation of the system, which may bring the parties before the Tribunal judiciaire de Paris (Paris Court of First Instance) and then the specialised chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal. The author believes that judges must clarify the obligation of Environmental Vigilance so that companies can adjust to it, and these 2 courts are in the process of doing so. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

RODA, Jean-Christophe🕴️

📝Obligations de compliance et concurrence : les liaisons dangereuses ? (Compliance obligations and Competition: dangerous liaisons?), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: J.-Ch. Roda “Obligations de compliance et concurrence : les liaisons dangereuses ? (Compliance obligations and Competition: dangerous liaisons?)”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 287-297. - read a general presentation of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author stresses that if Compliance Law and Competition Law may seem far apart today, it is because many people today have a restricted and inaccurate view of Competition Law. Indeed, if Competition Law is reduced to being no more than that which enables offer and demand rule to function fully, then ‘compliance obligations’ need to be injected into this sort of ‘natural law’ of the market backed up by the legal system, compliance obligations giving humanity to the whole. But if Competition Law is given back its rightful dimension, which it has in its more classical conception, the links between the obligations arising from the 2 branches of Law find harmonious relationships. They are all the more necessary because, particularly through the Duty of Vigilance, Civil Competition Law is going to interfere because of the contractualisation of this legal obligation and the possible significant imbalance that could be identified, the article stressing that the application of Compliance stipulations on a partner could end up being analysed as a power, justifying merger control or at the very least a dominant position legal qualification, the abuse of which will be sanctioned. It is for this reason that the 2024 CS3D reminds us that it must be implemented in respect with competition legal rules. However, the author emphasises that it is towards a kind of ‘Ethical Competition’ that compliance obligations are leading, leading to new practices. The results, described in the second part of the article, are increasing the influence of the Compliance Obligation, which embodies the ambition of a “just transition” and a “social Europe”. These ambitions are rejected by the advocates of the so-called “neo-liberal” conception of what Competition Law should be, but the conception of “Competition-Means” was indeed that of the American designers of the corpus of appropriate rules in the nineteenth century, when it was necessary in particular to fight against the large infrastructure monopolies, and it was also that of the jurists who founded the European Union. Only the minimal view of what falls within the scope of competition leads to opposition to the Compliance Obligation. The author therefore stresses that “il semble aujourd’hui évident que la compliance doit être la boussole du droit de la concurrence (it seems obvious today that Compliance must be the compass of Competition Law)”. It is in this spirit that companies must draft the compliance clauses that will multiply to structure the value chains they have set up, providing in particular for the resolution of tensions, or even conflicts, with partners. The author concludes that it is in this way that crucial companies will demonstrate their “particular responsibility” both and in the same way with regard to Competition Law and Compliance Law. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

FRYDMAN, Benoît🕴️ & BRIEGLEB, Alice🕴️

📝L’obligation de compliance en Droit global (Compliance Obligation in Global Law), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: B. Frydman & A. Briegleb, “L’obligation de compliance en Droit global” (Compliance Obligation in Global Law), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 299-311. - read a general presentation of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The authors stress that the Contracts Law and Tort Law are essential in Compliance Law, particularly in its global legal perspective, since it goes beyond the legal systems of States and develops new normativities, at the level of each company, but also allows a new expression of public power through the Monumental Goals that Compliance Law claims to achieve globally. The weaker the States, the greater the delegation to the first level is operating. In concrete terms, the authors examine a series of situations in which various organisations use compliance techniques to appropriate global power over things or people, which has the effect, and sometimes the purpose, of reducing the freedoms of people controlled in this way. Thus CSR, which was initially non-binding, is now the source of binding obligations, and the moral obligation expressed in codes of conduct can become a civil obligation, as the Supreme Court of California decided in 2002 in the Nike case. In addition, “Comply or Explain” clauses are now commonplace, allowing the person subject to the legislation not to comply if they can justify it, which is the basis of the many information reports that companies are now required to publish. Then, returning to the issue of liability, particularly in the digital environment, the article stresses the importance of ‘conditional immunity from liability’, taking the view from the European DSA that certain operators, such as hosting providers, are not liable unless they take on obligations, such as monitoring functions on contents published. Finally, with regard to the duty of vigilance, it tends for the first time to align the scope of “responsibility” with the scope of “power”, moral responsibility thus becoming legal responsibility, which would be like a new responsibility for others. The result of all this is an “obligation to regulate others”. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

FRANÇON, Mathieu🕴️

📝L’intensité du devoir de vigilance dans le secteur bancaire (The Intensity of the Duty of Vigilance in the Banking Sector), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: M. Françon, “L’intensité du devoir de vigilance dans le secteur bancaire” (The Intensity of the Duty of Vigilance in the Banking Sector), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance”, 2025, pp. 551-557. - read the general presentation of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which the contribution is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author develops the case of banking and insurance operators. He emphasises that, in banking and insurance matters, Vigilance consists of an obligation to process information, collected beforehand where necessary, in order to prevent a systemic risk from materialising. Identifying and preventing risk is an enhanced obligation of means which, in this context, varies in intensity. The obligation is long-standing, whereas the Duty of Vigilance is recent. This time lag is explained by the fact that the required Vigilance is consubstantial with the very activity of the banker and the insurer, and by the systemic nature that the sector has always had, which produces an interweaving of hard and soft law. The variations in the intensity of the obligation of Vigilance stem from the fact that there are two types of obligations: those imposed in the interest of the activity and of the client, and those imposed in the interest of the stability of the system. The latter are much stronger than the former. They weigh on the banker as well as on the client. Thus, anti-money laundering obligations have the general interest as their sole purpose, the client being unable to rely on the bank’s failures (Cour de cassation (French Court of cassation), Chambre commerciale (Commercial Chamber), 28 April 2004). Moreover, in matters of asset freezing, the obligation of Vigilance becomes an obligation of result. Within the general interest itself, intensity varies according to the goals pursued, giving rise to “standard, simplified, enhanced” Vigilance, depending on the underlying risk. In addition, interfering rights cause the obligation to vary, notably the right to the protection of personal data, or the right to non-interference by the banker. Finally, the obligations of Vigilance weighing on third parties, including those located outside Europe, also interfere. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

ROUAUD, Anne-Claire🕴️

📝L’intensité de l’obligation de vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs financiers (“The intensity of the obligation of vigilance depending on the sector: the case of financial operators”), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: A.-C. Rouaud, “L’intensité de l’obligation de vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs financiers” (The intensity of the obligation of vigilance depending on the sector: the case of financial operators), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 539-550. - read the general presentation of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author develops the case of financial operators and shows that if they are subject to very heavy obligations of vigilance, it is above all because of the systemic risks of the markets, obligations which are consubstantial with their activities, because these operators are often in charge of market infrastructures or operating services, which make them all belong to the category of regulated professions. Despite this uniqueness, the obligation of vigilance has many facets, ranging from policing and customer surveillance to warning and protection, which can be very limited, as the fight against money laundering aims to protect the system (kyc). In addition, this obligation to exercise vigilance serves different goals, which explains the diversity of sanctions, because the intensity of the obligation also varies. The fight against systemic risk is certainly a common goal, but there are also concerns about protecting specific categories, such as investors (from a more European perspective). However, the general interest is now being renewed, as market protection is coupled with a concern for Sustainability. This is reflected in the variability of sanctions, ranging from disciplinary sanctions, handled by the financial markets regulatory bodies, to the obligation to put in place compliance programmes against which breaches are sanctioned per se. Private enforcement is developing in tandem with public enforcement, with a transformation of the litigation risk for companies, which is highly sensitive to extraterritoriality and the scope of soft law. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

LOISEAU, Grégoire🕴️

📝L’intensité de l’obligation de vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs numériques (“The intensity of the Duty of Vigilance in different sectors: the case of digital operators”), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: G. Loiseau, “L’intensité de l’obligation de vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs numériques” (The intensity of the Duty of Vigilance in different sectors: the case of digital operators), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 559-569. - read the general presentation of the book, L’obligation de Compliance, in which the contribution is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author develops the case of digital operators. He highlights the paradox of a Law that started from a text laying down the principle that hosting providers are not liable, because of their technical neutrality, and ended up with the DSA imposing due diligence on them, but he points out that this obligation only arises once a notification has been made to the digital operator, and that there is an express prohibition of any general obligation to monitor information. Moreover, there is no general duty of vigilance incumbent on digital operators, even if recent case law seems to be tightening the role imposed on hosting providers. The Monumental Goal here is to fight against illegal content, but freedom of expression must also be preserved and regulations vary according to the type of content, whereas the DSA has a more general conception, aims at a logic of accountability and prevention of systemic risks. But wanting to make platforms “accountable” Ex Ante, without touching the liability regime Ex Post, may pose a problem. The duty of vigilance will vary depending on whether the digital operator plays a passive or active role. This may lead platforms to adopt prior measures that may constitute structural obligations, with the trusted third party taking the form of a trusted signaller. The platform is thus made responsible for its own vigilance, but despite the possibility of enhanced vigilance, this does not have to extend to investigative measures. There are, however, specific enhanced vigilance obligations for very large platforms, justified by the risks involved and the types of content (terrorism, pornography). - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

LAMOUREUX, Marie🕴️

📝L’obligation de vigilance des opérateurs énergétiques (“The Vigilance Obligation of the Energy Operators”), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕L’obligation de Compliance (“Compliance Obligation”)

► Full Reference: M. Lamoureux, “L’obligation de vigilance des opérateurs énergétiques” (The Vigilance Obligation of Energy Operators), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 571-585 - read the general presentation of the book, L’obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): Firstly, the author shows, despite the diversity of energy activities (electricity by its very nature involves fewer international value chains, oil by its very nature involves more), the operators in this sector are sufficiently unique to justify their being considered globally in terms of vigilance obligation. Currently in French case law, they are directly concerned, not only because they have been summoned before the French courts in duty of vigilance cases, but also, and above all, because they are a sign of the intensity of the vigilance expected of them. The first part of the article develops the characteristics of energy operators, which influence the intensity of the obligation of vigilance. Their uniqueness stems precisely from the enterprises themselves, which are ‘giants’, subject to the obligation to draw up vigilance plans, firms often vertically integrated, in a sector concentrated on multinationals with very substantial resources and present throughout the value chain, whose activity involves infrastructures. The second part of the article justifies this intensity of the obligation of vigilance by the risks specifically linked to the activities of these energy operators. Indeed, even if it is true that their activity is very heterogeneous, the risks are very significant, in that on the one hand they build diverse and gigantic infrastructures, are involved in extractive activity, and on the other hand have a long-term impact on the environment. Firms are being asked to be vigilant themselves about these infrastructures and impacts. The administrative police have been doing this for a long time in this sector. But the third part of the article shows precisely that this is nothing new: the culture of risk prevention is already very present in these enterprises, not least because of the very strong presence of the State and regulations. There is a culture of ‘regulatory conformity’. In fact, climate vigilance relies mainly on these operators. Energy operators are therefore at the centre, not only because they generate risks, but also because they hold many of the solutions for achieving the Monumental Goals targeted by the vigilance system: they are making a decisive contribution to the fight against climate change because they have the means to do so. This is one of the reasons why the major operators have all adopted a raison d’être. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

MEKKI, Mustapha🕴️

📝Peut-on repenser la responsabilité à l’aune du devoir de Vigilance, pointe avancée de la Compliance ? (Can Liability be Rethought in the Light of the Duty of Vigilance, the Cutting Edge of Compliance?), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: M. Mekki, “Peut-on repenser la responsabilité à l’aune du devoir de Vigilance, pointe avancée de la Compliance ?” (Can Liability be Rethought in the Light of the Duty of Vigilance, the Cutting Edge of Compliance?), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance”, 2025, pp. 599-615. - read the general presentation of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which the contribution is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author develops the tensions that the Vigilance Obligation generates on the very concept of liability. Listing all the very diverse manifestations of Vigilance, according to the fields, he observes that a teleological logic of prevention and management of systemic risks is taking shape, which is what Compliance is, no doubt a remedy for a powerless State, relying on a great plurality of norms. The question is whether it is possible to move from these special bodies of law, which nevertheless share a common spirit, to a transformed ordinary Law. The first decisions handed down on the 2017 law answer in the negative, but the question remains open. It is then necessary to return to the very concept of liability, which could accommodate a general mechanism of Vigilance. This concept is very flexible and has the adaptability required to accommodate the logic of Compliance. Indeed, liability, classically Ex Post, can become Ex Ante, through the notion of debt, no longer legal but ethical, because companies must be “trustworthy”. Preventive liability then aims to restore the balance of systems in the pursuit of the Monumental Goals, for the efficacy and efficiency of systems. Liability becomes a mix of subjectivity and objectivity, risk becoming central (in relation to fault), the dispute going beyond the interest of the parties, and remediation becoming the central issue in a liability trial that needs to be rethought: dialogue must be at its centre, between courts, between companies and stakeholders, within an adapted office of the judge. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

MAGNIER, Véronique🕴️

📝Transformation de la gouvernance et obligation de vigilance (The transformation of governance and due diligence), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: V. Magnier, “Transformation de la gouvernance et obligation de vigilance” (The transformation of governance and due diligence), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 259-269. - read the general presentation of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author develops the tensions caused by Compliance Law and the Duty of Vigilance on corporate governance. The French “Sapin 2” law targets corruption, while the French “Vigilance” law has a broader scope in terms of risks and the entire value chain. It is logical that this should create tensions in terms of governance, given the monumental goals involved. Companies need to take ownership of the powers delegated to them, which means rethinking their governance and the way in which they exercise their corporate mandates, with the corporate interest, the judge’s compass, having to be combined with the adoption of new standards of behaviour formalised voluntarily by ethical charters in line with international standards. On this voluntary and supervised basis, the company must adapt its structure and then contractualise these norms. This ethical approach has an impact on the role of corporate organs, not only in terms of transparency and risk prioritisation, but also proactively in terms of the adoption of commitments whose sincerity will be verified, as reflected, for example, in corporate governance codes (cf.in France the AFEP-MEDEF Code), the setting up of ad hoc committees and the presence of stakeholders, who will be consulted when the vigilance plan is drawn up. She stresses that this creates tensions, that dialogue is difficult, that business secrecy must be preserved, but that stakeholders must become Vigilance watchdogs, a role that should not be left to the public authorities alone. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

NETTER, Emmanuel🕴️

📝Les technologies de conformité pour satisfaire les exigences du droit de la compliance. Exemple du numérique (Conformity technologies to meet Compliance Law requirements. The digital example), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: E. Netter, “Les technologies de conformité pour satisfaire les exigences du droit de la compliance. Exemple du numérique” (Conformity technologies to meet the requirements of Compliance Law. Digital example), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 355-367. - read the general presentation of the book, L’obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published. - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author distinguishes between Compliance, which refers to Monumental Goals, and conformity, which are the concrete means that the company uses to tend towards them, through processes, check-lists in the monitoring of which the operator is accountable (art. 5.2. GRPD). Technology enables the operator to meet this requirement, as the changing nature of technology fits in well with the very general nature of the goals pursued, which leave plenty of room for businesses and public authorities to produce soft law. The contribution focuses firstly on existing technologies. Through Compliance, Law can prohibit a technology or restrict its use because it runs counter to the goal pursued, for example the technology of fully automated decisions producing legal effects on individuals. Because it is a perilous exercise to dictate by law what is good and what is bad in this area, the method is rather one of explicability, i.e. control through knowledge by others. Regulators are nevertheless developing numerous requirements stemming from the Monumental Goals of Compliance. Operators must update their technology or abandon obsolete technology in the light of new risks or to enable effective competition that does not lock users into a closed system. But technological power must not become too intrusive, as the privacy and freedom of the individuals concerned must be respected, which leads to the principles of necessity and proportionality. The author stresses that operators must comply with the regulations by using certain technologies if these technologies are available, or even to counteract them if they are contrary to the goals of the regulations, but this obligation of conformity is applied only if these technologies are available. The notion of “available technology” therefore becomes the criterion of the obligation, which means that its content varies with circumstances and time, particularly in the area of cybersecurity. In the second part of this contribution, the author examines technologies that are only potential, those that Law, and in particular the courts, might require companies to invent in order to fulfill their conformity obligation. This is quite understandable when we are talking about technologies that are in the making, but which will come to fruition, for example in the area of personal data transfer to satisfy the right to portability (GRPD), or where companies must be encouraged to develop technologies that are of less immediate benefit to them, or in the area of secure payment to ensure strong authentication (SPD 2). This is more difficult for technologies whose feasibility is not even certain, such as online age verification or the interoperability of secure messaging systems, two requirements which appear to be technologically contradictory in their terms, and which therefore still come under the heading of “imaginary technology”. But Compliance is putting so much pressure on companies, particularly digital technology companies, that considerable investment is required to achieve it. The author concludes that this is the very ambition of Compliance and that the future will show how successful it will be. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

MARTIN, Gilles J.🕴️

📝Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance (Clauses and Contracts, Modalities of the Vigilance Obligation), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: G. J. Martin, “Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance” (Clauses and Contracts, Modalities of the Vigilance Obligation), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance”, 2025, pp. 663-678. - read the general presentation of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which the contribution is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author focuses on what are often referred to as “CSR clauses”, insofar as they constitute a way for companies to implement their Compliance Obligation. In a practice that is still “in its infancy”, companies thus contractualise their ethical aspiration and their legal obligation, defining more precisely along the way what the Compliance and/or Vigilance obligation is for them, notably through internal and/or external standards, associating with them mechanisms of evaluation, audit and specific sanctions, such as termination. In addition, the contract organises the articulation with commercial clauses having another purpose. This is all the more necessary as the purpose of these clauses is also to make the legal obligation “trickle down” beyond the first contractual circle. The risk of imbalance must be avoided. The clauses must be precise and limited, notably in space and time. Secondly, the author examines the articulation between ordinary Contract Law and the special Law of Vigilance. Having laid down that the contract is the means, and even the only means, of transforming Soft Law into Hard Law in the relations between the contracting parties, the author considers that if such a clause appears in a commercial contract falling within a situation covered by the 2017 law (value chain, parent company–subsidiary relationship), there is a cumulation of capacities. Conflicts of jurisdiction with the Tribunal judiciaire de Paris (Paris First Instance Civil Court) therefore arise, and one may regret the abandonment of the solution adopted by the Cour de cassation (French Court of cassation) opening an option of jurisdiction. Another difficult articulation will have to be made in the event of nullity of the CSR clause, an annulment that the ordinary judge may pronounce, depending on whether or not the judge considers it decisive for other clauses, or even for the contract. In the event of non-performance of the clause, the termination of commercial relations may be pronounced, but it may be thought that a notice period must be respected. Finally, if the very purpose of the contract is the performance of the Vigilance obligation, this must not amount to a delegation that would nullify the legal principle of personal liability. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

RODA, Jean-Christophe🕴️

📝La preuve de la bonne exécution de la Vigilance au regard du système probatoire de Compliance (Proof that Vigilance has been properly carried out with regard to the Compliance evidence system), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’obligation de Compliance (“Compliance Obligation”)

► Full Reference: J.-Ch. Roda, “La preuve de la bonne exécution de la Vigilance au regard du système probatoire de Compliance” (Proof that Vigilance has been properly carried out with regard to the Compliance evidence system), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 679-689. - read a general presentation of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): Taking the Duty of Vigilance as an illustration, the first part of the article examines the question of who must prove about that and in what order. There are no rules in the legal dispositions specific to the Vigilance Duty duty that expressly reverse the burden of proof, to the extent of placing it on the company that should demonstrate that it has correctly fulfilled its obligation. Instead, it is needed to return to general law, which makes the burden of proof vary according to the nature of the obligations incumbent on the company as a result of its Duty of Vigilance, in particular between simplly drawing up a plan and drawing it up such that its effectiveness can be expected to give rise to an obligation on those who dispute it to demonstrate its ineffectiveness. In any event, the 2 litigant parties immediately seek to fuel the debate with elements in their favour, whatever their position in the process. This brings us to the second part of the article, devoted to the question of what constitutes proof of proper performance of the Vigilance Duty. Requiring proof of a positive fact and the constitution of a self-evidence of conformity would both be excessive and would distance the company from the Monumental Goals that are its compass. Instead, it is pertinent to distinguish between Compliance Structures, for which the proof requirements must be high, and Expected Compliance Actions, for which proof of efforts is sufficient, the obligation being only of means. In fact, companies will be wise to provide proof of their efforts as early as possible. The third part therefore deals logically with the means of proof available to the parties. Claimants act on the principle of freedom of evidence and benefit from numerous sources of information, but the most serious difficulties arise when the facts to be proven are located outside the European Union. The company can establish that the plan has been implemented using various types of evidence, but it would appear that the standard of proof is high, even if the Vigilance Plan were to be regarded as an act of management. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

Contribution to a collective legal work

📝Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur (Compliance Obligation: build a compliance structure producing credible effects in the perspective of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, “Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur” (Compliance Obligation: build a compliance structure producing credible effects in the perspective of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 3-44. - ► This article is the introduction to the book - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this article has been written, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 📚see the general presentation of the series “Régulations & Compliance” in which this book is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): This article explains what companies’ Compliance Obligation” is. Delving into the mass of compliance obligations, it uses the method of classification of those that are subject to an obligation of result and those that are subject to an obligation of means. It justifies the choice of this essential criterion, which changes the objects and the burden of proof of companies that are subject to an obligation of result when it comes to setting up “compliance structures” and are subject to an obligation of means when it comes to the effects produced by these compliance structures. Indeed, rather than getting bogged down in definitional disputes, given that Compliance Law is itself a nascent branch of Law, the idea of this contribution is to take as a starting point the different legal regimes of so many different compliance obligations to which laws and regulations subject large companies: sometimes they have to apply them to the letter and sometimes they are only sanctioned in the event of fault or negligence. This brings us back to the distinction between obligations of result and obligations of means. Although it would be risky to transpose the expression and regime of contractual obligations to legal obligations put by legislation, starting from this observation in the evidentiary system of compliance of a plurality of obligations of means and of result, depending on whether it is a question of this or that technical compliance obligation, we must first classify them. It would then appear that this plurality will not constitute a definitive obstacle to the constitution of a single definition of the Compliance Obligation. On the contrary, it makes it possible to clarify the situation, to trace the paths through what is so often described as a legal jumble, an unmanageable “mass of regulations”. Indeed, insofar as the company obliged under Compliance Law participates in the achievement of the Monumental Goals on which this is normatively based, a legal obligation which may be relayed by contract or even by ethics, it can only be an obligation of means, by virtue of this very teleological nature and the scale of the goals targeted, for example the happy outcome of the climate crisis which is beginning or the desired effective equality between human beings. This established principle leaves room for the fact that the behaviour required is marked out by processes put in place by structured tools, most often legally described, for example the establishment of a vigilance plan or regularly organised training courses (effectiveness), are obligations of result, while the positive effects produced by this plan or these training courses (effaciety) are obligations of means. This is even more the case when the Goal is to transform the system as a whole, i.e. to ensure that the system is solidly based, that there is a culture of equality, and that everyone respects everyone else, all of which come under the heading of efficiency. The Compliance Obligation thus appears unified because, gradually, and whatever the various compliance obligations in question, their intensity or their sector, its structural process prerequisites are first and foremost structures to be established which the Law, through the Judge in particular, will require to be put in place but will not require anything more, whereas striving towards the achievement of the aforementioned Monumental Goals will be an obligation of means, which may seem lighter, but corresponds to an immeasurable ambition, commensurate with these Goals. In addition, because these structures (alert mechanisms, training, audits, contracts and clauses, etc.) have real meaning if they are to produce effects and behaviours that lead to changes converging towards the Monumental Goals, it is the obligations of means that are most important and not the obligations of result. The judge must also take this into account. Finally, the Compliance Obligation, which therefore consists of this interweaving of multiple compliance obligations of result and means of using the entreprise’s position, ultimately Goals at system efficiency, in Europe at system civilisation, for which companies must show not so much that they have followed the processes correctly (result) but that this has produced effects that converge with the Goals sought by the legislator (effects produced according to a credible trajectory). This is how a crucial company, responsible Ex Ante, should organise itself and behave.
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

article in a legal collective book

📝La volonté, le cœur et le calcul, les trois traits cernant l’Obligation de Compliance (Will, Heart and Calculation, the three marks surrounding the Compliance Obligation), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La volonté, le cœur et le calcul, les trois traits cernant l'Obligation de Compliance" ("Will, Heart and Calculation, the three marks surrounding the Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance" 2025, pp. 49-65. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this contribution has been built, with  more developments, technical references and hyperlinks.  - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 📚see the general presentation of the series "Régulations & Compliance" in which this book is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): There is often a dispute over the pertinent definition of Compliance Law, but the scale and force of the resulting obligation for the companies subject to it is clear.  It remains difficult to define. First, we must not to be overwhelmed by the many obligations through which the Compliance Obligation takes shape, such as the obligation to map, to investigate, to be vigilant, to sanction, to educate, to collaborate, and so on. Not only this obligations list is very long, it is also open-ended, with companies themselves and judges adding to it as and when companies, sectors and cases require.  Nor should we be led astray by the distance that can be drawn between the contours of this Compliance Obligation, which can be as much a matter of will, a generous feeling for a close or distant other in space or time, or the result of a calculation. This plurality does not pose a problem if we do not concentrate all our efforts on distinguishing these secondary obligations from one another but on measuring what they are the implementation of, this Compliance Obligation which ensures that entities, companies, stakeholders and public authorities, contribute to achieving the Goals targeted by Compliance Law, Monumental Goals which give unity to the Compliance Obligation.  Thus unified by the same spirit, the implementation of all these secondary obligations, which seem at once disparate, innumerable and often mechanical, find unity in their regime and the way in which Regulators and Judges must control, sanction and extend them, since the Compliance Obligation breathes a common spirit into them.  In the same way that the multiplicity of compliance techniques must not mask the uniqueness of the Compliance Obligation, the multiplicity of sources must not produce a similar screen. Indeed, the Legislator has often issued a prescription, an order with which companies must comply, Compliance then often being perceived as required obedience. But the company itself expresses a will that is autonomous from that of the Legislator, the vocabulary of self-regulation and/or ethics being used in this perspective, because it affirms that it devotes forces to taking into consideration the situation of others when it would not be compelled to do so, but that it does so nonetheless because it cares about them. However, the management of reputational risks and the value of bonds of trust, or a suspicious reading of managerial choices, lead us to say that all this is merely a calculation. Thus, the contribution sets out to identify the Compliance Obligation by recognising the role of all these different sources. It emphasises that, in monitoring the proper performance of technical compliance obligations by Managers, Regulators and Judges, insofar as they implement the Compliance Obligation, it is pointless to limit oneself to a single source or to rank them abruptly in order of importance. The Compliance Obligation is part of the very definition of Compliance Law, built on the political ambition to achieve these Monumental Goals of preserving systems – banking, financial, energy, digital, etc. – in the future, so that human beings who cannot but depend on them are not crushed by them, or even benefit from them. This is the teleological yardstick by which the Compliance Obligation is measured, and with it all the secondary obligations that give it concrete form, whatever their source and whatever the reason why the initial standard was adopted. In order to define Compliance's Obligation, the study endeavours to recognise the contribution of all these three sources: Will, Heart and Calculation.
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

Article in a book copublished by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance

📝Le droit processuel, prototype de l’Obligation de Compliance (General Procedural Law, prototype of Compliance Obligation), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Le droit processuel, prototype de l'Obligation de Compliance " ("General Procedural Law, prototype of Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance" 2025, pp. 209-233. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this contribution has been built, with  more developments, technical references and hyperlinks.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published  - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): At first glance, General Procedural Law seems to be the area the least concerned by the Compliance Obligation, because if the person is obliged by it, mainly large companies, it is precisely, thanks to this Ex Ante, in order to never to have to deal with proceedings, these path that leads to the Judge, that Ex Post figure that in return for the weight of the compliance obligation they have been promised they will never see: any prospect of proceedings would be seeming to signify the very failure of the Compliance Obligation (I). But not only are the legal rules attached to the Procedure necessary because the Judge is involved, and increasingly so, in compliance mechanisms, but they are also rules of General Procedural Law and not a juxtaposition of civil procedure, criminal procedure, administrative procedure, etc., because the Compliance Obligation itself is not confined either to civil procedure or to criminal procedure, to administrative procedure, etc., which in practice gives primacy to what brings them all together: General Procedural Law (II). In addition to what might be called the "negative" presence of General Procedural Law, there is also a positive reason, because General Procedural Law is the prototype for "Systemic Compliance Litigation", and in particular for the most advanced aspect of this, namely the duty of vigilance (III). In particular, it governs the actions that can be brought before the Courts (IV), and the principles around which proceedings are conducted, with an increased opposition between the adversarial principle, which marries the Compliance Obligation, since both reflect the principle of Information, and the rights of the defence, which do not necessarily serve them, a clash that will pose a procedural difficulty in principle (V). Finally, and this "prototype" status is even more justified, because Compliance Law has given companies jurisdiction over the way in which they implement their legal Compliance Obligations, it is by respecting and relying on the principles of General Procedural Law that this must be done, in particular through not only sanctions but also internal investigations (VI).
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

Contribution in a collective legal book

“Obligation sur Obligation vaut” (Obligation upon obligation work), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Obligation sur Obligation vaut" ("Obligation upon obligation work"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 324-354. - 📝read the article - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this article has been written, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 📚see the general presentation of the series "Régulations & Compliance" in which this book is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The demonstration of the part played by Will in the Compliance Obligation incumbent on companies is based on the distinction and articulation between the Regulatory Legal Obligation and the spontaneous Obligation of companies, in the use that companies make of their will to implement their Regulatory Legal Obligation and the use that they make of it to produce even new ambitions. This is why the demonstration is carried out in 3 stages. The first part of the demonstration consists in finding the part played by the free will of companies in their Compliance Obligation by putting an end to two confusions: the first, which, within the Contract and Tort Law itself but also within Compliance Law, splits up and confuses "free will" and "consent", which would no longer require freely expressed acceptance; the second, which, specific to Compliance Law, confuses "Compliance" and "conformity", reducing the former to mechanical obedience, which would exclude any free will. Having clarified this, the rest of this study focuses on the 2 ways in which a company subject to a Compliance Obligation by regulations expresses a part of its free will, which the study expresses in this proposed adage: Obligation upon Obligation is valid, since the regulatory legal obligation to which the company responds by the obedience owed by all those subject to the Law may be superimposed by its free will, which will then oblige it. The first case of Obligation upon Obligation, studied in a second part, concerns the means by which the Regulatory Legal Compliance Obligation is implemented, the company subject to the Monumental Goals set by the Law remaining free to choose the means by which it will contribute to achieving them. Its free will will thus be exercised over the choice and implementation of the means. This can take two legal forms: contracts on the one hand and "commitments" on the other. Thirdly, the second case of Obligation upon Obligation, which is more radical, is that in which, in addition to Compliance's regulatory legal Obligation, the company draws on its free will to repeat the terms of its regulatory legal Obligation (because it is prohibited from contradicting it), a repetition which can be far-reaching, because the legal nature (and therefore the legal regime) is changed. The judgment handed down by the The Hague Court of Appeal on 12 November 2024, in the case law Shell, illustrates this. What is more, the free will of the company can play its part in the Compliance Obligation by increasing the Compliance Obligation. This is where the alliance is strongest. The interpretation of the specific obligations that result must remain that of the Monumental Goals in a teleological application that gives coherence to the whole.
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

📝La Vigilance, pointe avancée et part totale de l’Obligation de Compliance (Vigilance, the cutting edge and a full part of the Compliance Obligation), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La Vigilance, pointe avancée et part totale de l’Obligation de Compliance" (Vigilance, the cutting edge and a full part of the Compliance Obligation), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance" 2025, pp. 511-536. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this contribution has been built, with  more developments, technical references and hyperlinks.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published  - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The "duty of vigilance" unleashes all the more radical and passionate positions, sometimes among Law professors, because it has not been precisely defined. One word is used for another, either inadvertently or deliberately, deliberately if it can attract this or that element from one legal corpus and import it into another.  The very exercise of definition is therefore required in practice. There are specific obligations of vigilance that come under such and such a body of regulations and are imposed on such and such a category of operators to fulfill such and such a function. These are precise circles which are not confused and must not be confused. This is superimposed on what the French 2017 law so-called "Vigilance law", which is much more encompassing since it applies to all large companies in the operation of the value chains they have set up. The European 2024 directive is in the same way. But there is no general duty or obligation of Vigilance. Such a claim would be based on confusing or shifting each of these 3 levels, which must be avoided because no positive law does support this (I). If the duty of vigilance is attracting so much attention, whether or not the European CS3D is fully effective, it is because Vigilance is the "cutting edge" of Compliance Obligation (II). Vigilance requires companies, by consideration of their power and without reproaching them for it or demanding that it be reduced, to detect risks of damage to the environment and climate, but also to human rights, because they are in a position to do so in order to prevent them from turning into disasters. In this respect, the  Vigilance duty makes clearer the exact legal nature of the Compliance Obligation. Moreover, Vigilance appears as the Total Part of the Compliance Obligation (III). Indeed, although it is restricted to one area, the value chain, and to two types of risk, deterioration of the environment and deterioration of human rights, it expresses the totality of the Compliance Obligation by means of tools that the 2017 French "Vigilance law" had itself duplicated from the 2016 so-called "Sapin 2 law": to preserve systems today, but above all tomorrow, in order they do not collapse (Negative Monumental Goals), or even consolidate them (Positive Monumental Goals), so that the human beings who are willingly or unwillingly involved in them are not crushed by them but benefit from them. This is why large companies are subject to the Obligation of Compliance and Vigilance, particularly in the humanist conception that Europe is developing. The result is a new type of Litigation, of a systemic nature, for which the Courts have spontaneously become specialised, and for which the procedures will have to be adapted and the office  of the Judge shall have to evolve.
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

RACINE, Jean-Baptiste🕴️

📝L’arbitre, juge, superviseur, accompagnateur ? (The arbitrator, judge, supervisor, coach?), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, “L’arbitre, juge, superviseur, accompagnateur ?” (The arbitrator, judge, supervisor, coach?), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 489-502. - read the general presentation of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): From the outset, the author sets out what is at stake in these terms: “Quel rôle peut ou pourrait jouer l’arbitre dans les dispositifs de compliance ? Selon le rôle qu’il est amené à jouer, il peut ou pourrait venir en renfort de l’obligation de compliance. Poser cette question, c’est poser la question des pouvoirs de l’arbitre et de son office. C’est aussi, d’une certaine manière, renvoyer à la notion même d’arbitrage.” (What role can or could the arbitrator play in compliance systems? Depending on the role he/she is called upon to play, he/she can or could reinforce the compliance obligation. Asking this question raises the question of the powers of the arbitrator and his/her office. In a way, it also goes back to the very notion of arbitration). In practice, arbitrators deal with compliance issues in their office as judges. This is illustrated by disputes involving allegations of corruption, where the arbitrators’ ruling obviously cannot give effect to a corrupt practice unless they violate themselves international public order. But in this, the arbitrator is only applying a legal standard, the main issue being then the question of evidence, with compliance tools often serving as indicators of the corruption itself. Leaving behind the strict legal source and coming to the standards issued by the ICC about the fight against corruption, we really enter into the “compliance obligation”, in the strict sense, when a contract appears. International business practices standards are emerging, not only in the area of probity but also in the protection of human rights, for which arbitrators can now act as guarantors. Arbitrators can do this, in particular, through the emerging litigation relating to vigilance obligation, either directly when vigilance plans are at issue,, even if a legal rule gives a specific competence to a State court (as the French 2017 law does) or if we imagine that a plan itself includes a system for recourse to arbitration, which would imply a change in culture, or if we consider that soft law is in the process of emerging from the practices of international trade laying down a duty of vigilance that arbitrators could take up. In the second part of his contribution, the author takes a second, bolder approach, namely that of an arbitrator who understands Compliance Law in that he/she would be more than a Judge, i.e. he/she would do more than settle a dispute by applying the law. This would be conceivable given the tendency to consider that the arbitrator could modify contracts and if example is taken from the technique of arbitration practised for concentration disputes in merger law. To give arbitration the required regulatory dimension, this third party would have to be able to exercise a supervisory function, which the notion of “dispute” hardly lends itself to, especially as an arbitrator is only set up to be a judge, and if he/she ceases to be one it is difficult for him/her to remain an arbitrator…. However, it is conceivable that in Ex Post the arbitrator could perform the monitoring function often required in Compliance Law. The technique of disputes boards is inspiring in this respect. The two fields, Arbitration and Compliance, are thus destined to move closer together, as the two traditional limits, arbitrability and litigation, are in the process of evolving so that they no longer stand in the way of such rapprochements. The author can therefore conclude: “C’est aux différents acteurs de la compliance de penser à l’arbitrage, et à la souplesse, la plasticité et la liberté qu’il offre, pour éventuellement le configurer spécialement au service des buts de la compliance.” (It is up to the various players in Compliance to think about Arbitration, and the flexibility, plasticity and freedom it offers, in order to configure it specifically to serve the goals of Compliance Law). - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – L’Obligation de Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

RAPP, Lucien🕴️

📝Compliance, Chaines de valeur et Économie servicielle (Compliance, Value Chains and Service Economy), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: L. Rapp, “Compliance, Chaines de valeur et Économie servicielle” (Compliance, Value Chains and Service Economy), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L’obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 153-172. - read the general contribution of the book, L’Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Author): Based on an analysis of the value chains of companies in the space sector and their recent evolution, this contribution examine the role, place and current transformations of compliance policies and strategies in the context of an industrial transformation that has become essential: the transition from an industrial economy to a service economy. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -

Articles in a JoRC book

📝À quoi engagent les engagements (In Compliance Law, the legal consequences for Entreprises of their commitments and undertakings), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "À quoi engagent les engagements" (In Compliance Law, the legal consequences for Entreprises of their commitments and undertakings), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 419-447. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on which this article is based, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 📚see the general presentation of the series "Régulations & Compliance" in which this book is published - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The innocents might believe, taking the Law and its words literally, that "commitments" are binding on those who make them. Shouldn't they be afraid of falling into the trap of the 'false friend', which is what the Law wants to protect them from (as stated in the prolegomena)? Indeed, the innocent persons think that those who make commitments ask what they must do and say what they will do. Yet, strangely enough, the 'commitments' that are so frequent and common in compliance behaviours are often considered by those who adopt them to have no binding value! Doubtless because they come under disciplines other than Law, such as the art of Management or Ethics. It is both very important and sometimes difficult to distinguish between these different Orders – Management, Moral Norms and Law – because they are intertwined, but because their respective standards do not have the same scope, it is important to untangle this tangle. This potentially creates a great deal of insecurity for companies (I). The legal certainty comes back when commitments take the form of contracts (II), which is becoming more common as companies contractualise their legal Compliance Obligations, thereby changing the nature of the resulting liability, with the contract retaining the imprint of the legal order or not having the same scope if this prerequisite is not present. But the contours and distinctions are not so uncontested. In fact, the qualification of unilateral undertaking of will is proposed to apprehend the various documents issued by the companies, with the consequences which are attached to that, in particular the transformation of the company into a 'debtor', which would change the position of the stakeholders with regard to it (III). It remains that the undertakings expressed by companies on so many important subjects cannot be ignored: they are facts (IV). It is as such that they must be legally considered. In this case, Civil Liability will have to deal with them if the company, in implementing what it says, what it writes and in the way it behaves, commits a fault or negligence that causes damage, not only the sole existence of an undertaking.