Articles in The Journal of Regulation & Compliance « JoRC »

► Full Reference: V. Magnier, "Transformation de la gouvernance et obligation de vigilance" (The transformation of governance and due diligence), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 259-269. - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : The author develops the tensions caused by Compliance Law and the Duty of Vigilance on corporate governance. The French "Sapin 2" law targets corruption, while the French "Vigilance" law has a broader scope in terms of risks and the entire value chain. It is logical that this should create tensions in terms of governance, given the monumental goals involved. Companies need to take ownership of the powers delegated to them, which means rethinking their governance and the way in which they exercise their corporate mandates, with the corporate interest, the judge's compass, having to be combined with the adoption of new standards of behaviour formalised voluntarily by ethical charters in line with international standards. On this voluntary and supervised basis, the company must adapt its structure and then contractualise these norms. This ethical approach has an impact on the role of corporate organs, not only in terms of transparency and risk prioritisation, but also proactively in terms of the adoption of commitments whose sincerity will be verified, as reflected, for example, in corporate governance codes (cf.in France the AFEP-MEDEF Code), the setting up of ad hoc committees and the presence of stakeholders, who will be consulted when the vigilance plan is drawn up. She stresses that this creates tensions, that dialogue is difficult, that business secrecy must be preserved, but that stakeholders must become Vigilance watchdogs, a role that should not be left to the public authorities alone. - 🦉this article is available in full text pour the persons following the Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche teaching -

► Full Reference : E. Netter, "Les technologies de conformité pour satisfaire les exigences du droit de la compliance. Exemple du numérique" (Conformity technologies to meet the requirements of Compliance Caw. Digital example), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 355-367. - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published. - ► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :The author distinguishes between Compliance, which refers to Monumental Goals, and conformity, which are the concrete means that the company uses to tend towards them, through processes, check-lists in the monitoring of which the operator is accountable (art. 5.2. GRPD). Technology enables the operator to meet this requirement, as the changing nature of technology fits in well with the very general nature of the goals pursued, which leave plenty of room for businesses and public authorities to produce soft law. The contribution focuses firstly on existing technologies. Through Compliance, Law can prohibit a technology or restrict its use because it runs counter to the goal pursued, for example the technology of fully automated decisions producing legal effects on individuals. Because it is a perilous exercise to dictate by law what is good and what is bad in this area, the method is rather one of explicability, i.e. control through knowledge by others. Regulators are nevertheless developing numerous requirements stemming from the Monumental Goals of Compliance. Operators must update their technology or abandon obsolete technology in the light of new risks or to enable effective competition that does not lock users into a closed system. But technological power must not become too intrusive, as the privacy and freedom of the individuals concerned must be respected, which leads to the principles of necessity and proportionality. The author stresses that operators must comply with the regulations by using certain technologies if these technologies are available, or even to counteract them if they are contrary to the goals of the regulations, but this obligation of conformity is applied only if these technologies are available. The notion of "available technology" therefore becomes the criterion of the obligation, which means that its content varies with circumstances and time, particularly in the area of cybersecurity. In the second part of this contribution, the author examines technologies that are only potential, those that Law, and in particular the courts, might require companies to invent in order to fulfill their conformity obligation. This is quite understandable when we are talking about technologies that are in the making, but which will come to fruition, for example in the area of personal data transfer to satisfy the right to portability (GRPD), or where companies must be encouraged to develop technologies that are of less immediate benefit to them, or in the area of secure payment to ensure strong authentication (SPD 2). This is more difficult for technologies whose feasibility is not even certain, such as online age verification or the interoperability of secure messaging systems, two requirements which appear to be technologically contradictory in their terms, and which therefore still come under the heading of "imaginary technology". But Compliance is putting so much pressure on companies, particularly digital technology companies, that considerable investment is required to achieve it. The author concludes that this is the very ambition of Compliance and that the future will show how successful it will be.          - 🦉This article is available in full texte for persons following Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche teaching. -

► Full Reference: J.-Ch. Roda "La preuve de la bonne exécution de la Vigilance au regard du système probatoire de Compliance (Proof that Vigilance has been properly carried out with regard to the Compliance evidence system)", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Éditions Lefebvre – Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 679-689.   - 📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published  - ► English summary of this contribution : Taking the Duty of Vigilance as an illustration, the first part of the article examines the question of who must prove about that and in what order. There are no rules in the legal dispositions specific to the Vigilance Duty duty that expressly reverse the burden of proof, to the extent of placing it on the company that should demonstrate that it has correctly fulfilled its obligation. Instead, it is needed to return to general law, which makes the burden of proof vary according to the nature of the obligations incumbent on the company as a result of its Duty of Vigilance, in particular between simplly drawing up a plan and drawing it up such that its effectiveness can be expected to give rise to an obligation on those who dispute it to demonstrate its ineffectiveness. In any event, the 2 litigant parties immediately seek to fuel the debate with elements in their favour, whatever their position in the process. This brings us to the second part of the article, devoted to the question of what constitutes proof of proper performance of the Vigilance Duty. Requiring proof of a positive fact and the constitution of a self-evidence of conformity would both be excessive and would distance the company from the Monumental Goals that are its compass. Instead, it is pertinent to distinguish between Compliance Structures, for which the proof requirements must be high, and Expected Compliance Actions, for which proof of efforts is sufficient, the obligation being only of means. In fact, companies will be wise to provide proof of their efforts as early as possible. The third part therefore deals logically with the means of proof available to the parties. Claimants act on the principle of freedom of evidence and benefit from numerous sources of information, but the most serious difficulties arise when the facts to be proven are located outside the European Union. The company can establish that the plan has been implemented using various types of evidence, but it would appear that the standard of proof is high, even if the Vigilance Plan were to be regarded as an act of management. - 🦉This article is available in full texte for people who follow  Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche teaching

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur" (Compliance Obligation: build a compliance structure producing credible effects in the perspective of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 3-44. - ► This article is the introduction to the book - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this article has been written, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 📚see the general presentation of the series "Régulations & Compliance" in which this book is published - ► English Summary of this contribution: This article explains what companies' Compliance Obligation" is. Delving into the mass of compliance obligations, it uses the method of classification of those that are subject to an obligation of result and those that are subject to an obligation of means. It justifies the choice of this essential criterion, which changes the objects and the burden of proof of companies that are subject to an obligation of result when it comes to setting up "compliance structures" and are subject to an obligation of means when it comes to the effects produced by these compliance structures. Indeed, rather than getting bogged down in definitional disputes, given that Compliance Law is itself a nascent branch of Law, the idea of this contribution is to take as a starting point the different legal regimes of so many different compliance obligations to which laws and regulations subject large companies: sometimes they have to apply them to the letter and sometimes they are only sanctioned in the event of fault or negligence. This brings us back to the distinction between obligations of result and obligations of means. Although it would be risky to transpose the expression and regime of contractual obligations to legal obligations put by legislation, starting from this observation in the evidentiary system of compliance of a plurality of obligations of means and of result, depending on whether it is a question of this or that technical compliance obligation, we must first classify them. It would then appear that this plurality will not constitute a definitive obstacle to the constitution of a single definition of the Compliance Obligation. On the contrary, it makes it possible to clarify the situation, to trace the paths through what is so often described as a legal jumble, an unmanageable "mass of regulations". Indeed, insofar as the company obliged under Compliance Law participates in the achievement of the Monumental Goals on which this is normatively based, a legal obligation which may be relayed by contract or even by ethics, it can only be an obligation of means, by virtue of this very teleological nature and the scale of the goals targeted, for example the happy outcome of the climate crisis which is beginning or the desired effective equality between human beings. This established principle leaves room for the fact that the behaviour required is marked out by processes put in place by structured tools, most often legally described, for example the establishment of a vigilance plan or regularly organised training courses (effectiveness), are obligations of result, while the positive effects produced by this plan or these training courses (effaciety) are obligations of means. This is even more the case when the Goal is to transform the system as a whole, i.e. to ensure that the system is solidly based, that there is a culture of equality, and that everyone respects everyone else, all of which come under the heading of efficiency. The Compliance Obligation thus appears unified because, gradually, and whatever the various compliance obligations in question, their intensity or their sector, its structural process prerequisites are first and foremost structures to be established which the Law, through the Judge in particular, will require to be put in place but will not require anything more, whereas striving towards the achievement of the aforementioned Monumental Goals will be an obligation of means, which may seem lighter, but corresponds to an immeasurable ambition, commensurate with these Goals. In addition, because these structures (alert mechanisms, training, audits, contracts and clauses, etc.)  have real meaning if they are to produce effects and behaviours that lead to changes converging towards the Monumental Goals, it is the obligations of means that are most important and not the obligations of result. The judge must also take this into account. Finally, the Compliance Obligation, which therefore consists of this interweaving of multiple compliance obligations of result and means of using the entreprise's position, ultimately Goals at system efficiency, in Europe at system civilisation, for which companies must show not so much that they have followed the processes correctly (result) but that this has produced effects that converge with the Goals sought by the legislator (effects produced according to a credible trajectory). This is how a crucial company, responsible Ex Ante, should organise itself and behave. - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Droit & Art

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La volonté, le cœur et le calcul, les trois traits cernant l'Obligation de Compliance" ("Will, Heart and Calculation, the three marks surrounding the Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance" 2025, pp. 49-65. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this contribution has been built, with  more developments, technical references and hyperlinks.  - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 📚see the general presentation of the series "Régulations & Compliance" in which this book is published - ► English summary of this contribution : There is often a dispute over the pertinent definition of Compliance Law, but the scale and force of the resulting obligation for the companies subject to it is clear.  It remains difficult to define. First, we must not to be overwhelmed by the many obligations through which the Compliance Obligation takes shape, such as the obligation to map, to investigate, to be vigilant, to sanction, to educate, to collaborate, and so on. Not only this obligations list is very long, it is also open-ended, with companies themselves and judges adding to it as and when companies, sectors and cases require.  Nor should we be led astray by the distance that can be drawn between the contours of this Compliance Obligation, which can be as much a matter of will, a generous feeling for a close or distant other in space or time, or the result of a calculation. This plurality does not pose a problem if we do not concentrate all our efforts on distinguishing these secondary obligations from one another but on measuring what they are the implementation of, this Compliance Obligation which ensures that entities, companies, stakeholders and public authorities, contribute to achieving the Goals targeted by Compliance Law, Monumental Goals which give unity to the Compliance Obligation.  Thus unified by the same spirit, the implementation of all these secondary obligations, which seem at once disparate, innumerable and often mechanical, find unity in their regime and the way in which Regulators and Judges must control, sanction and extend them, since the Compliance Obligation breathes a common spirit into them.  In the same way that the multiplicity of compliance techniques must not mask the uniqueness of the Compliance Obligation, the multiplicity of sources must not produce a similar screen. Indeed, the Legislator has often issued a prescription, an order with which companies must comply, Compliance then often being perceived as required obedience. But the company itself expresses a will that is autonomous from that of the Legislator, the vocabulary of self-regulation and/or ethics being used in this perspective, because it affirms that it devotes forces to taking into consideration the situation of others when it would not be compelled to do so, but that it does so nonetheless because it cares about them. However, the management of reputational risks and the value of bonds of trust, or a suspicious reading of managerial choices, lead us to say that all this is merely a calculation. Thus, the contribution sets out to identify the Compliance Obligation by recognising the role of all these different sources. It emphasises that, in monitoring the proper performance of technical compliance obligations by Managers, Regulators and Judges, insofar as they implement the Compliance Obligation, it is pointless to limit oneself to a single source or to rank them abruptly in order of importance. The Compliance Obligation is part of the very definition of Compliance Law, built on the political ambition to achieve these Monumental Goals of preserving systems – banking, financial, energy, digital, etc. – in the future, so that human beings who cannot but depend on them are not crushed by them, or even benefit from them. This is the teleological yardstick by which the Compliance Obligation is measured, and with it all the secondary obligations that give it concrete form, whatever their source and whatever the reason why the initial standard was adopted. In order to define Compliance's Obligation, the study endeavours to recognise the contribution of all these three sources: Will, Heart and Calculation.   - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Droit & Art

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Le droit processuel, prototype de l'Obligation de Compliance " ("General Procedural Law, prototype of Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance" 2025, pp. 209-233. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this contribution has been built, with  more developments, technical references and hyperlinks.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published  - ► English summary of this contribution : At first glance, General Procedural Law seems to be the area the least concerned by the Compliance Obligation, because if the person is obliged by it, mainly large companies, it is precisely, thanks to this Ex Ante, in order to never to have to deal with proceedings, these path that leads to the Judge, that Ex Post figure that in return for the weight of the compliance obligation they have been promised they will never see: any prospect of proceedings would be seeming to signify the very failure of the Compliance Obligation (I). But not only are the legal rules attached to the Procedure necessary because the Judge is involved, and increasingly so, in compliance mechanisms, but they are also rules of General Procedural Law and not a juxtaposition of civil procedure, criminal procedure, administrative procedure, etc., because the Compliance Obligation itself is not confined either to civil procedure or to criminal procedure, to administrative procedure, etc., which in practice gives primacy to what brings them all together: General Procedural Law (II). In addition to what might be called the "negative" presence of General Procedural Law, there is also a positive reason, because General Procedural Law is the prototype for "Systemic Compliance Litigation", and in particular for the most advanced aspect of this, namely the duty of vigilance (III). In particular, it governs the actions that can be brought before the Courts (IV), and the principles around which proceedings are conducted, with an increased opposition between the adversarial principle, which marries the Compliance Obligation, since both reflect the principle of Information, and the rights of the defence, which do not necessarily serve them, a clash that will pose a procedural difficulty in principle (V). Finally, and this "prototype" status is even more justified, because Compliance Law has given companies jurisdiction over the way in which they implement their legal Compliance Obligations, it is by respecting and relying on the principles of General Procedural Law that this must be done, in particular through not only sanctions but also internal investigations (VI). - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Obligation sur Obligation vaut" ("Obligation upon obligation work"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 324-354. - 📝read the article - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this article has been written, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 📚see the general presentation of the series "Régulations & Compliance" in which this book is published - ► English Summary of this contribution: The demonstration of the part played by Will in the Compliance Obligation incumbent on companies is based on the distinction and articulation between the Regulatory Legal Obligation and the spontaneous Obligation of companies, in the use that companies make of their will to implement their Regulatory Legal Obligation and the use that they make of it to produce even new ambitions. This is why the demonstration is carried out in 3 stages. The first part of the demonstration consists in finding the part played by the free will of companies in their Compliance Obligation by putting an end to two confusions: the first, which, within the Contract and Tort Law itself but also within Compliance Law, splits up and confuses "free will" and "consent", which would no longer require freely expressed acceptance; the second, which, specific to Compliance Law, confuses "Compliance" and "conformity", reducing the former to mechanical obedience, which would exclude any free will. Having clarified this, the rest of this study focuses on the 2 ways in which a company subject to a Compliance Obligation by regulations expresses a part of its free will, which the study expresses in this proposed adage: Obligation upon Obligation is valid, since the regulatory legal obligation to which the company responds by the obedience owed by all those subject to the Law may be superimposed by its free will, which will then oblige it. The first case of Obligation upon Obligation, studied in a second part, concerns the means by which the Regulatory Legal Compliance Obligation is implemented, the company subject to the Monumental Goals set by the Law remaining free to choose the means by which it will contribute to achieving them. Its free will will thus be exercised over the choice and implementation of the means. This can take two legal forms: contracts on the one hand and "commitments" on the other. Thirdly, the second case of Obligation upon Obligation, which is more radical, is that in which, in addition to Compliance's regulatory legal Obligation, the company draws on its free will to repeat the terms of its regulatory legal Obligation (because it is prohibited from contradicting it), a repetition which can be far-reaching, because the legal nature (and therefore the legal regime) is changed. The judgment handed down by the The Hague Court of Appeal on 12 November 2024, in the case law Shell, illustrates this. What is more, the free will of the company can play its part in the Compliance Obligation by increasing the Compliance Obligation. This is where the alliance is strongest. The interpretation of the specific obligations that result must remain that of the Monumental Goals in a teleological application that gives coherence to the whole. - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Droit & Art

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La Vigilance, pointe avancée et part totale de l’Obligation de Compliance" (Vigilance, the cutting edge and a full part of the Compliance Obligation), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance" 2025, pp. 511-536. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this contribution has been built, with  more developments, technical references and hyperlinks.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published  - ► English summary of this contribution : The "duty of vigilance" unleashes all the more radical and passionate positions, sometimes among Law professors, because it has not been precisely defined. One word is used for another, either inadvertently or deliberately, deliberately if it can attract this or that element from one legal corpus and import it into another.  The very exercise of definition is therefore required in practice. There are specific obligations of vigilance that come under such and such a body of regulations and are imposed on such and such a category of operators to fulfill such and such a function. These are precise circles which are not confused and must not be confused. This is superimposed on what the French 2017 law so-called "Vigilance law", which is much more encompassing since it applies to all large companies in the operation of the value chains they have set up. The European 2024 directive is in the same way. But there is no general duty or obligation of Vigilance. Such a claim would be based on confusing or shifting each of these 3 levels, which must be avoided because no positive law does support this (I). If the duty of vigilance is attracting so much attention, whether or not the European CS3D is fully effective, it is because Vigilance is the "cutting edge" of Compliance Obligation (II). Vigilance requires companies, by consideration of their power and without reproaching them for it or demanding that it be reduced, to detect risks of damage to the environment and climate, but also to human rights, because they are in a position to do so in order to prevent them from turning into disasters. In this respect, the  Vigilance duty makes clearer the exact legal nature of the Compliance Obligation. Moreover, Vigilance appears as the Total Part of the Compliance Obligation (III). Indeed, although it is restricted to one area, the value chain, and to two types of risk, deterioration of the environment and deterioration of human rights, it expresses the totality of the Compliance Obligation by means of tools that the 2017 French "Vigilance law" had itself duplicated from the 2016 so-called "Sapin 2 law": to preserve systems today, but above all tomorrow, in order they do not collapse (Negative Monumental Goals), or even consolidate them (Positive Monumental Goals), so that the human beings who are willingly or unwillingly involved in them are not crushed by them but benefit from them. This is why large companies are subject to the Obligation of Compliance and Vigilance, particularly in the humanist conception that Europe is developing. The result is a new type of Litigation, of a systemic nature, for which the Courts have spontaneously become specialised, and for which the procedures will have to be adapted and the office  of the Judge shall have to evolve. - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb

► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "L’arbitre, juge, superviseur, accompagnateur ?" (The arbitrator, judge, supervisor, coach?), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 489-502. - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published - ► English Summary of this article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : From the outset, the author sets out what is at stake in these terms:  "Quel rôle peut ou pourrait jouer l’arbitre dans les dispositifs de compliance ? Selon le rôle qu’il est amené à jouer, il peut ou pourrait venir en renfort de l’obligation de compliance. Poser cette question, c’est poser la question des pouvoirs de l’arbitre et de son office. C’est aussi, d’une certaine manière, renvoyer à la notion même d’arbitrage." (What role can or could the arbitrator play in compliance systems? Depending on the role he/she is called upon to play, he/she can or could reinforce the compliance obligation. Asking this question raises the question of the powers of the arbitrator and his/her office. In a way, it also goes back to the very notion of arbitration).  In practice, arbitrators deal with compliance issues in their office as judges. This is illustrated by disputes involving allegations of corruption, where the arbitrators' ruling obviously cannot give effect to a corrupt practice unless they violate themselves international public order. But in this, the arbitrator is only applying a legal standard, the main issue being then the question of evidence, with compliance tools often serving as indicators of the corruption itself. Leaving behind the strict legal source and coming to the standards issued by the ICC about the fight against corruption, we really enter into the "compliance obligation", in the strict sense, when a contract appears. International business practices standards are emerging, not only in the area of probity but also in the protection of human rights, for which arbitrators can now act as guarantors. Arbitrators can do this, in particular, through the emerging litigation relating to vigilance obligation, either directly when vigilance plans are at issue,, even if a legal rule gives a specific competence to a State court (as the French 2017 law does) or if we imagine that a plan itself includes a system for recourse to arbitration, which would imply a change in culture, or if we consider that soft law is in the process of emerging from the practices of international trade laying down a duty of vigilance that arbitrators could take up. In the second part of his contribution, the author takes a second, bolder approach, namely that of an arbitrator who understands Compliance Law in that he/she would be more than a Judge, i.e. he/she would do more than settle a dispute by applying the law. This would be conceivable given the tendency to consider that the arbitrator could modify contracts and if example is taken from the technique of arbitration practised for concentration disputes in merger law. To give arbitration the required regulatory dimension, this third party would have to be able to exercise a supervisory function, which the notion of "dispute" hardly lends itself to, especially as an arbitrator is only set up to be a judge, and if he/she ceases to be one it is difficult for him/her to remain an arbitrator…. However, it is conceivable that in Ex Post the arbitrator could perform the monitoring function often required in Compliance Law. The technique of disputes boards is inspiring in this respect. The two fields, Arbitration and Compliance, are thus destined to move closer together, as the two traditional limits, arbitrability and litigation, are in the process of evolving so that they no longer stand in the way of such rapprochements. The author can therefore conclude: "C’est aux différents acteurs de la compliance de penser à l’arbitrage, et à la souplesse, la plasticité et la liberté qu’il offre, pour éventuellement le configurer spécialement au service des buts de la compliance." (It is up to the various players in Compliance to think about Arbitration, and the flexibility, plasticity and freedom it offers, in order to configure it specifically to serve the goals of Compliance Law). -

► Full Reference: L. Rapp, "Compliance, Chaines de valeur et Économie servicielle",  ", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 153-172. - 📕read the general contribution of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published - ► English summary of this contribution  (done par its author) :  Based on an analysis of the value chains of companies in the space sector and their recent evolution, this contribution examine the role, place and current transformations of compliance policies and strategies in the context of an industrial transformation that has become essential: the transition from an industrial economy to a service economy. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "À quoi engagent les engagements" (In Compliance Law, the legal consequences for Entreprises of their commitments and undertakings), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 419-447. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on which this article is based, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 📚see the general presentation of the series "Régulations & Compliance" in which this book is published - ► English summary of this article: The innocents might believe, taking the Law and its words literally, that "commitments" are binding on those who make them. Shouldn't they be afraid of falling into the trap of the 'false friend', which is what the Law wants to protect them from (as stated in the prolegomena)? Indeed, the innocent persons think that those who make commitments ask what they must do and say what they will do. Yet, strangely enough, the 'commitments' that are so frequent and common in compliance behaviours are often considered by those who adopt them to have no binding value! Doubtless because they come under disciplines other than Law, such as the art of Management or Ethics. It is both very important and sometimes difficult to distinguish between these different Orders – Management, Moral Norms and Law – because they are intertwined, but because their respective standards do not have the same scope, it is important to untangle this tangle. This potentially creates a great deal of insecurity for companies (I). The legal certainty comes back when commitments take the form of contracts (II), which is becoming more common as companies contractualise their legal Compliance Obligations, thereby changing the nature of the resulting liability, with the contract retaining the imprint of the legal order or not having the same scope if this prerequisite is not present. But the contours and distinctions are not so uncontested. In fact, the qualification of unilateral undertaking of will is proposed to apprehend the various documents issued by the companies, with the consequences which are attached to that, in particular the transformation of the company into a 'debtor', which would change the position of the stakeholders with regard to it (III). It remains that the undertakings expressed by companies on so many important subjects cannot be ignored: they are facts (IV). It is as such that they must be legally considered. In this case, Civil Liability will have to deal with them if the company, in implementing what it says, what it writes and in the way it behaves, commits a fault or negligence that causes damage, not only the sole existence of an undertaking.  - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Droit & Art

► Full reference : Th. Goujon-Bethan, "Les enjeux présents à venir de l’articulation des principes de procédure civile et commerciale avec la logique de compliance (Current and future challenges for articulating civil and commercial procedural principles with Compliance Logic)", in  M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 693-719. - 📕Read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of this article (by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author shows that the French Code of Civil Procedure, because it is exceptionally well designed and managed, can respond to the scale of transformation brought about by Compliance Law. Compliance Law is normatively anchored in its Monumental Goals: these are brought as such before the judge in 'Systemic Cases'. However, the French Code of Civil Procedure distinguishes between litigation and conflict, as demonstrated by the work of the academic authors of the Code, who were very famous legal scholars. Indeed, in a "Systemic Case" such as Compliance Law, which necessarily takes precedence (climate, protection of internet users, effective equality of human beings, sustainability of banking systems, etc.), it is the parties who are in dispute, while the conflict encompasses the systems themselves and other entities. The procedure must incorporate not only the dispute but also the conflict. This means, in particular, that we must deal not only with the dispute, but also with the conflict, which does not necessarily end with the dispute and does not find the same solutions as those sought by the dispute. It is particularly in this latter perspective, essentially in a "Systemic Compliance Case" procedure, that the techniques of mediation, amicus curiae, with a judge who takes an ex ante position, etc., are required. They are available through legal dispositions of this French Code of Civil Procedure: judges who understand what "Systemic Compliance Cases" are need only apply them. - 🦉this  article is available in full text for people who follow the professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's teaching  -

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Le juge adéquat pour l'effectivité de l'Obligation de Compliance" ("The Adequate Judge for the Effectiveness of the Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance" 2025, pp. 741-775. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this contribution has been built, with  more developments, technical references and hyperlinks.  - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 📚see the general presentation of the series "Régulations & Compliance" in which this book is published - ► English summary of this contribution : The Judge is a character who seems weak in a Compliance Law that seems so powerful in a world where Technology is developing even a more impressive power. But present and future cases show, on the contrary, that he or she has a central role to play and that his/her role must be to use his/her own strength to remain what he/she is: the guardian of the Rule of Law, which is not so obvious because many Compliance tools, which are technological in nature, are in a way 'insensitive' to what we hold dear, the protection of human beings, which is based on the diligence of companies (I).  The second role that we can expect of the Judge is that not only does he/she help to ensure the permanence of this Rule of Law, which relies to a large extent on him:Her in the face of a future world that is unknown to us, mainly in its digital and climatic dimensions, perspectives that Compliance Law seeks to grasp, by renewing Regulation Law, by acting in relation to companies whose role is active, which leads the Judge to control them and to be aware of the claims that can be made against them, without taking the place of their management powers (II). This presupposes a new method (III), and all the judges, however diverse, will converge in an active dialogue between the judges, which will enable, firstly, the traditional role of the judge, linked to the Rule of Law, to endure in a rapidly changing world and, secondly, each judge to take on this new role implied by Compliance Law (IV). The perfect triangle will then be established, the strength and simplicity of which allows the use of the singular and the retention of capital letters for each of these three terms: Regulation Compliance Judge. - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb

► Full Reference: , J.-B. Barbièri, "Les juges du droit des entreprises en difficulté et les obligations de compliance (Judges of Insolvency Law and Compliance Obligations), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Éditions Lefebvre – Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 313-323. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published  - ► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): Describing at first sight the intersection of Compliance and Insolvency procedures as the "marriage of the carp and the rabbit", the Author shows that the logic is in many ways the same, particularly in terms of the role played by the Judge, since it is always a question of the State delegating Monumental Goals, with Insolvency procedures giving concrete expression to the desire to save a company, jobs, an industry, a region, etc., in what is always a "public interest".  In his/her office, the insolvency judge is confronted with compliance clauses, relating to commitments, or information, or organising monitoring. The author begins by examining the cases in which the insolvency judge is confronted with the principle of primacy of the insolvency proceedings over this compliance contractual organisation, either under current contracts, which may contain compliance obligations, in particular because audits and controls will have been strengthened or automatic termination will be provided for (which would then be deactivated?), or because the nullity of the suspect period comes into play, because the compliance clauses are often unbalanced. The second part examines the hypothesis that compliance techniques will support insolvency proceedings themselves and the purpose they serve. Indeed, because they are preventive in nature, contractual compliance mechanisms can also prevent failures, by means of audit and monitoring clauses and the introduction of reporting, if necessary under the supervision of the Judge, associated with conciliation mechanisms. What is more, they should be used to restructure companies in difficulty. The plan, which can be imposed on creditors, must open up the range of instruments, and could perhaps be articulated at this class of parties, which would only be made up of creditors benefiting from compliance clauses, if we consider that they constitute a "sufficient community of economic interest". They could then also be delegated the task of monitoring the survival of the company, which is the main goal served by the plan. In the case of a disposal plan, an offer including compliance undertakings should not be favoured, since the law expressly states that the sole purpose of such a plan is to ensure the maintenance of activities and to clear the past. But time will tell whether the judge will go beyond this. - 🦉This article is available for people who follow the Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche teaching

► Full reference : Ch. Lapp, "L’usage de l’arbitrage international pour renforcer l’obligation de Compliance : l’exemple du secteur de la construction" (The use of International Arbitration to strengthen Compliance oObligations: the example of the construction sector)", in  M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Regulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 471-487. - 📕Read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published. - ► English summary of this article (by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The author emphasises that Arbitration is a particularly significant method of dispute resolution in the construction sector, not only because operators make extensive use of it, but also because this activity gives rise to difficulties that lend themselves to arbitration and at the same time concern compliance issues. In order to provide the necessary legal security and focusing on the Vigilance Plan especially in French and European Law, the author examines how disputes may arise in relation to it and what they may concern. In light of this, the author examines, on the one hand, the cases in which arbitration may be organised alongside the jurisdiction legally assigned to the Paris Court of Appel and, on the other hand, how Arbitrators will resolve the issues submitted to them. - 🦉This article is available in full text for those following the Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses. -

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance, Vigilance et Responsabilité civile : mettre en ordre et raison garder" (Compliance, Vigilance and Civil Liability: put in Order and keep the sense of Reason), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, pp. 635-659. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on which this article is based, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published 📚see the general presentation of the series "Régulations & Compliance" in which this book is published - ► English summary of this article: The descriptions of the Liability incurred by large companies as a result of their compliance obligations are very diverse, even contradictory, going beyond the wishes that may be expressed as to what this liability should be. The first part of this study therefore sets out the various liabilities incurred by companies, which differ in the conditions under which they are implemented and in their scope, so as not to confuse them. Indeed, as the various laws establish specific legal compliance obligations, they give rise to liabilities of varying conditions and scope, and it is not possible to avail of the regime of one in a situation that falls within the scope of another. It is therefore necessary to review the various bodies of compliance legislation, the GDPR, the ALM-FT regulations, the French so-called Sapin 2 law, the French so-called Vigilance law , the European IA Act , the European European DGA Act, etc., to recall the inflexion that each of these bodies of legislation has made to the liability rules applied to the companies subject to them. Nevertheless, the unicity of the Compliance Obligation, overcoming this necessary diversity of situations, regulations and liability regimes,  can provide grouping lines to indicate beyond this diversity the extent of the liability incurred by companies. Once this classification has been made, the second part of the study develops the observation that none of this can create any principle of general liability on large companies in terms of compliance, and in particular not in terms of vigilance. It is not possible to deduce a general principle of specific obligations of liability or specific obligations to reparation, for example in the area of vigilance, as the texts creating specific vigilance obligation refer to the conditions of commun Tort Law (proof damage and causality), and International Public Law does not have the force to generate a general principle binding companies in this respect. The third part stresses that it is nevertheless always possible to invoke Tort Law, and companies cannot claim to escape this. This may involve contractual liability, a situation  becoming increasingly frequent as companies contractualise their legal compliance obligations, reproducing them but also modifying them, and as Vigilance duty is an obligation that goes beyond the specific situations covered by the regulations.  But it is essential, and this is the subject of the fourth part, not to make companies pure and simple guarantors of the state of the world, present and future. Indeed, if we were to transform sectoral compliances into illustrations of what would then be a new general principle, but one that applied only to them, they would consequently exercise the other side of this coin, namely power over others. - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Droit & Art