Resources

► Full Reference : A. Gutierrez-Crespin, "L’audit du dispositif de compliance : un outil clé pour en vérifier la robustesse" ("Audit of Compliance system: a key tool for checking its robustness"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 133-140. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author identifies what characterizes a "Compliance audit". Different from a "Compliance program", which is an instrument of constraint, and even from an internal investigation, which aims to detect breaches, the Compliance audit aims to measure the risks of discrepancy in relation to Compliance requirements. or even identify areas for improvement. From this definition, it is explained how concretely a Compliance audit is carried out, by a risk-based approach, and who are the actors (internal and external to the company). -

► Full Reference: S. Merabet, "La morale by design" ("Morality by design"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 287-298. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): After having wondered about the relationship between Law and Morality, for which it is difficult to find points of contact, the author advances the hypothesis that the latter could find a space of concretization in the technology of artificial intelligence, even though many are worried about the deleterious effects of it. The author considering that Compliance is only a method while ethics would be the way in which morality is incorporated in a relaxed way in Law, the technology known as Artificial Intelligence could therefore express the moral rule ("compliance by design could be the appropriate tool to ensure the effectiveness of moral rules without falling into the excesses envisaged"). The author draws on examples to estimate that thus technology for on the one hand expressing the moral rule and on the other hand making it effective. The moral rule can thus be drawn up in a balanced way since it is jointly developed between the State and the economic operators, this collaboration taking the form of general principles adopted by the State using the means chosen by the company. Its content would also be characterized by the search for a "right balance", which would be found by this distribution between the primary moral principles whose expression would be the act of the State and the secondary moral principles whose expression would be delegated to companies. Taking therefore what would be the principles of Compliance, the author applies them to Artificial Intelligence, showing that these technologies include not only the principle of neutrality but also the ethical principles of non-maliciousness, even of benevolence. (first principles) that companies then decline into secondary principles. Therefore, "compliance can usefully be used to convert these fundamental moral principles into derived moral rules, a source of greater effectiveness.". Thus resulting in a "moral by design", the overall system has an additional effectiveness tool. This supposes that the fundamental and derived rules are of an acquired moral quality because for the moment the technological tool can only ensure their effectiveness and not the moral quality of the implemented rules. In determining the "moral rules of application", the company has margins of freedom, used through technological tools. -

► Full Reference: H. Causse, "La Compliance : par et au-delà de la formation juridique classique" ("Compliance: through and beyond traditional legal training"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 215-226. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author emphasizes that not only Compliance training is required by Law but also that it is necessary. To conceive and practice it, it is certainly necessary to integrate new knowledge, often outside Law, but it is also necessary to preserve the qualities of the classical teaching of classical Law. This is why training is an essential aid and asset for companies. The article shows that the international dimension specific to the subject and that the cultural confrontation it translates must be inserted into traditional legal systems, training succeeding by highlighting the practical imperatives of which Compliance relays the concern. To achieve this, the author maintains that it is above all the classical qualities of the lawyer and the teacher that are required; classical Law thus finding a revival, as teaching methods are revitalized by this new Compliance Law. Its teaching must therefore be anchored both in traditional legal principles and in techniques specific to Compliance mechanisms. -

► Full Reference : S. Koenigsberg and Fr. Barrière, "La construction de l'expertise de l'avocat en matière de Compliance" ("The development of attorney's Compliance expertise"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils  de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 141-146. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The authors observe that many law firms are now developing expertise in compliance, either in departments or in teams. They emphasize that this expertise is achieved through specialization, which makes it possible to support companies, in Ex Ante (for example in mergers) and in Ex Post (in litigation) in continuum between the two. Moreover, this expertise is built in a collaborative way between the team of lawyers and the company concerned, which reinforces this necessary continuity. -

► Full Reference : L. Rapp, "Théorie des incitations et gouvernance des activités spatiales" ("Incentive Theory and Governance of Space Activities"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 73-88. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): The article studies the conditions for an application of the theory of incentives to the problems currently posed by the governance of space activities. These activities have been enriched by the presence of numerous private operators, without the market that is being set up having yet been properly regulated. The accumulation of debris in close space highlights the difficulty of maintaining a situation where only national laws govern in the absence of a specialized international organization and in the insufficiency of the international treaties in force. This article shows the contributions of the behavioral approach in Law and economics and the interest that there would be in developing it. -

► Full Reference: H. Tardieu, "Souveraineté des données et Compliance" ("Data Sovereignty and Compliance"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 107-114. -  📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) : After having considered that Europe had in terms of power "lost the battle" of personal data, the author asks for the same error, linked to a lack of interest at the start, not be repeated concerning "company data". The European Commission having affirmed its will in 2020, it is now necessary to build a "European ecosystem" for the sharing of industrial data in confidence. For this, the author explains that it is necessary to develop "incentives for the sharing of company data", in order to increase their available volume and fuel common progress in Artificial Intelligence between European companies and to use common complementary data, which 'none could generate alone, allowing the creation of new services. These incentives can be new and adapted "regulations", but also the adoption by the industry of a "common data model". But the author stresses that it is necessary to go, by experiments allowed by the "regulatory sandboxes". This will allow the deployment of data sharing, with Compliance being able to contribute to it, a path for a sovereign Europe of shared industrial data, a monumental objective which can thus be achieved. -

► Full Reference: L. Calandri, "Incitation(s) et autorégulation(s) : quelle place pour le droit de la compliance dans le secteur audiovisuel ?" ("Incentive(s) and self-regulation(s): what place for Compliance Law in the audiovisual sector?"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 115-122. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author took the audiovisual sector, "pilot" in the matter, to measure very precisely the way in which in France case law of the Conseil d'État introduced a logic of Compliance by leaving the operators free to organize themselves while supervising them. After recalling that by the decisions of 2016 Fairvesta and Société Numéricable, the Conseil d'État allowed the judicial control of acts of soft law, in particular those issued by the Audiovisual Regulator, the author confronts this state of law with the assertion of this Regulator that he is not the "policeman" of this sector. The Conseil d'État follows it by isolating among its acts those which are only incentive and escape the control by the judge, in the same way as acts of soft law adopted by the companies of the sector, expression of a self-regulation, They also escape litigation and are therefore also "unjustifiable". The author concludes that this completely renovates the governance of the sector, the Regulator by becoming more the arbiter and the supervisor of this new soft law. -

► Full Reference: J.-Ch. Roda, "La Compliance by design en antitrust : entre innovation et illusion" ("Compliance by design in antitrust: between innovation and illusion"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 257-266. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): It is a question of studying what seems to be the requirement of the European Commission to know an "antitrust compliance by design", which seems for the moment a rather confused idea but answering the hypothesis of violation of Competition Law through so-called "smart" technologies, for example aligning prices without intervention. The Author takes up the solutions already identified, but he does not include the automatic internal reporting of a situation inciting anti-competitive behavior justifying greater vigilance on the part of the company itself because Compliance by design must, according to him, integrate the rules themselves and not just being a simple warning system. In the same way, the "transparency of algorithms" will make it possible in Ex Post to sanction those who have programmed or to consider their use as aggravating, which is not a mechanism by design in the strict sense, since this does not in itself produce respect for the rule. In Competition Law, Compliance by design is therefore "the coding of the goals of Competition Law, with relatively simple instructions: do not set prices collectively, do not exchange a particular category of information" and block access to sensitive information. It could go further, towards a kind of education, the software "learning" to refuse to perform tasks leading to offenses. Law could incite this by a responsibility, which is in germ. But the author believes that for the moment there are obstacles, not so much legal as technical. It is indeed necessary that lawyers and computer scientists understand each other …, and therefore agree to think a little differently, and both. We can do it. But the complexity of Competition Law, associated with the margins of interpretation, are such, but their binary translation is almost impossible. In economic technology, the same pitfalls will be found, for example in the calculation of market power, determining in Antitrust Compliance by design. Not to mention the ethical aspect of Competition Law, which is difficult to encode. -

► Full Reference: M. M. Salah, "Conception et application de la compliance en Afrique" ("Conception and application of Compliance in Africa"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 165-180. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author presents the way in which Compliance, which may seem "insurmountable" in Africa in particular with regard to corruption, even terrorism, a gravity offset by the prevalence of the group's solidarity on the Weberian conception of Law, nevertheless aims to to "deploy" in Africa. It describes the way in which in certain African countries the Compliance mechanisms have been established, under the influence of international institutions requiring first of all the autonomy of economic structures vis-à-vis social structures and then relaxing them so that they are more "human" and therefore more "sustainable". Under the aegis of the United Nations, anti-corruption programs have been particularly deployed. But the African Union and sub-regional organizations have also helped design and implement anti-corruption programs, for example through the adoption of uniform laws. In addition, the extraterritorial effect of foreign laws, in particular the FCPA, Bribery Act and Sapin2, increases this anchoring of Compliance. The article shows that this anchoring translates legally into a transformation of materials. In the first place, banking and financial law welcomes it more readily, since it tends to be globally standardized, African rights participating in this globalization, and imposes on financial institutions and beyond a general obligation of vigilance, in particular as regards the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, an obligation to alert and specific criminal liability of legal persons. Secondly, all African legislation is aimed at combating corruption through Compliance, which mainly aims at prevention. But the author measures their effectiveness ("that is to say their ability to produce the desired results" which is often still limited. This is mainly due to the conjunction between the size of the informal sector, notably hampering 'identification of the actors, and the weakness of state structures which, allied to the low level of banking services and the still weak culture of writing and recording, leaves the system without crucial operators who can be entrusted with the realization of Compliance Law. The author concludes that it is not the risk of national sanction that leads operators to respect the Compliance rules but the fear of losing markets by the external threat of international actors and the damage to their local reputation and to abroad. The weakness of state structures affecting the effectiveness of Compliance as it affects everything else, he underlines that they must be strengthened for this to be reinforced for the rest, in particular concerning the effectiveness of judicial control. More specifically, Compliance should be less expensive because African States often cannot bear the cost, only the subsidiaries of large foreign private groups can do so, which leads to abandoning Compliance at the will of the private sector, a phenomenon regrettable, whereas public supervisors do not have the means to exercise their control function. -

► Full Reference : N. Guillaume, "Cartographie des risques de compliance. Premiers aperçus des enjeux, des limites et des bonnes pratiques" ("Compliance risk mapping. First insights of challenges, limits and good practices"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 63-70. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author gives an overview of what is risk mapping for a company, not only an obligation in certain cases, such as corruption, but also and beyond an excellent tool to design and control its strategy. He shows that this is due to the fact that legislation now incorporates the risk-based approach, companies having to use these maps, sometimes demanding to put them at the service of an overall strategy, even if their handling may lead to initiating responsibility of the company and its managers. The author emphasizes that the maps are very diverse because their objectives are themselves different, their users also being different (which implies different insights into the same risks). The author therefore identifies principles common to all maps, which always assess risks according to their probability of occurrence and the severity of their consequences if they materialize. It is also necessary to apprehend the "gross risk", seized in the absolute, and the "net risk" which integrates the company itself in this apprehension of the probability and the gravity, then release an acceptable level of risks for the company. On these common principles are superimposed specificities relating to the various risks, the author taking more particularly the risk of corruption, since Compliance Law gives it a great place. The mapping that is specific to the specific risk then becomes finer to be relevant, while the criteria used here will be abandoned in another mapping. The way of proceeding becomes common again, involving the commitment of the company's management bodies, internal surveys and interviews, benchmarks. If the company thus deploys the art of risk mapping, then they cease to be only a requirement of Law to which the company must comply in order to be a central tool in the overall risk prevention system and strategy design, feeding codes of conduct, design of training and supervision, to finally deploy in the company a "risk culture", which is essential. -

► Full Reference: L. Benzoni and B. Deffains, "Approche économique des outils de la Compliance: finalité, mesure, effectivité de la Compliance "subie" et "choisie"" ("Economic approach of Compliance Tools: purpose, measurement, efficiency of Compliance "undergone" and "chose""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 39-50. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published.  - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Authors refer to economic analysis of Law general works to say that firms can have an interest in showing by anticipation that they comply to Law in a long term strategy of reputation and reliability, this internalization imposed by Compliance and transformed by the Corporate Social Responsibility benefiting to the firm and its choice being related thus to rationality and not to emotion.  Thus the mechanisms of Compliance stop to be "imposed", the firm just minimizing the perspective of a future sanction, to be "chosen", the firm taking freely a responsibility, for example in the environnemental or human rights protection fields, going beyond legal requirements (what "monumental goals" corresponds to, which goes beyond the interest of partners and of the legal obligation). The investment calculus is more difficult for the second one, hardly measurable, than for the first one (probability calculus). The loi PACTE leaves room to a "chosen Compliance" but we badly measure its effectivity: we wait case law in its use of obligation Law. Moreover, if the status of "entreprise à mission" is adopted, the goal becomes statutorily binding and the governance of the firm must be modified for the internal control of means implemented. But, supposing that companies only search competitive avantages, it is only about, through this general interest service, conquering new benefits, the lucrative purpose of chosen Compliance showing the liberal character of Compliance.  The authors underline that this "chosen Compliance" implies evaluation and analysis tools different from those used for "imposed Compliance". In "imposed Compliance", it is about, taking back Gary Becker's works, considering risk aversion, the firm calculating its likelihood to be punished or not with regards to the gain obtained with the infringement (dependent on those who conceive Law to design it according to the model of incentives) and to the cost generated by the intern Compliance tools. The authors underline that the uncertainty of legal solutions, and there the importance of soft law, makes these calculus harder and that rationality of agents is not total, the perspective of being punished being rejected in itself while the respect of the rule is rather natural, the firms being so "honest" (theory of cognitive bias) and not wanting to be singled out (name and shame). Behavioral economics thus privileges "imposed Compliance", beyond cost-advantage calculus.  In the case of "chosen Compliance", it is competition economics which draws solutions, because the firm imposes to itself a constraint to get a competitive advantage of it, in that these self-imposed constraints meet societal demands, external (for example, environnement) or internal (for example, cohesion into the firm). The external gains are the positive image of the firm with regards to the reputation of its competitors. These investments lose their efficacy because all the firms adopt the same, what by the way transform these practices in common legal norms. Internal gains are measured in organizational sociology by the adhesion to the firm's project, reducing the internal inefficiency in a superior to investment profit.   -

► Full Reference: M. Galland, "Le contrôle par le régulateur de l’effectivité des instruments de Compliance mis en place par l’entreprise", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 195-208. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author underlines the complexity of the measure of the effectivity of compliance tools because the measure of the risks cannot be mechanical, the exercise is a cost whose the advantage does not appear immediately, the essential is in the behaviors that the firm masters with difficulty while these are results that are evaluated, because Compliance tools must be effective and produce tangible results.  To do that, the regulator intervenes in Ex Ante in order to the applicable texts are understandable by the firm and in order to the tool is working. When a noncompliance occurs, the regulator must beyond the sanction build on this measure of ineffectiveness to lead operators to improve their systems. Thus, it is in terms of "Compliance effort" that the regulator's control works, especially through the observation of an "embodied exemplarity".  -

► Full Reference: A. Banck, "La maturité de l’utilisateur d'un outil de Compliance, premier critère du choix de l’outil adéquat" ("The maturity of the Compliance Tool’s user, first criterion of the choice of the salient tool"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 209-212. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author insists on the practical necessity for the firm to show immediately the documents attesting of the reality of Compliance mechanisms. IT tools helps companies to do that, but the crucial point is that everyone in the firm appropriates these tools.  To obtain it, it is necessary that the Compliance officer does not necessarily choose the tool which suits him or her best and pleases him or her the most but rather suits the one who will handle it, for example commercial teams on the ground, monitoring that the tool integrates the specificity of the sector and of the firm. The adjustment of the softwares must meet a maturity of its users in the firm, which must have a "culture of compliance" to take advantage of its tools. Thus more rudimental tools can be more efficient if the culture of Compliance is still weak, sophisticated tools could be unuseful if a prior minimum basis is not reach.  The author thus shows the link to be made between the maturity of the users and the technicality of the tools, the two having to progress together. -

► Full Reference: M. Audit, "The arbitrator's position on compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", to be published.  - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021.  In the book, the article will be published in its Title III, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): For the arbitrator to intervene in matters of Compliance, a "Compliance Obligation" must exist. The identification of this specific obligation is tricky because it cannot generally be identified per se, if it is grasped only through Criminal Law, which does not enter directly into the field of Arbitration, which has developed an autonomous conception of the facts, in particular facts of corruption, which are also criminally reproachable. But because the obligation of compliance is itself autonomous, since it is a question of detecting and preventing various offenses and breaches, the arbitrators rely on the detection and prevention mechanisms as such, distinct from the possible behaviors that the Law wants they don't happen. But the question of the source of this compliance obligation is central because it must arise from a standard that can lead to Arbitration. This is the case of the contract, for example an intermediary contract which not only prohibits any corrupt practice but also provides for audit or control, or even the case of national laws, in particular the UK Bribery Act or the so-called French "Sapin 2" law, or even decisions imposing compliance programs or the unconstrained adoption of these by the company. According to its source, the arbitrator will take the Compliance obligation into account. If a Compliance obligation, having a source giving its significance in an Arbitration proceeding, is considered by the arbitrator to be breached, the consequences often depend on this source. The solution is classic if it is the lex contractus, more difficult if it is a Law which has inserted this obligation in the lex societatis, the requirements of compliance being generally considered as mandatory laws. If the arbitrators cannot apply the sanctions attached by the repressive law, they can support their decision in consideration of the breach found to assess the legality of a behavior or the validity of a contract, the ICC Rules for combating corruption being able to serve them as an analysis guide. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: C. Kessedjian, "L'arbitrage au service de la lutte contre la violation des droits de la personne humaine par les entreprises" ("Arbitration in the service of the fight against the violation of human rights by companies"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 295-302.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done par the author): By choosing the expression "Human Rights violations by Businesses", the Author is taking sides among the many possible titles for her article, that could portrait the field of law we are talking about here.  Often acronyms are used: RBC (responsible business conduct), CSR (corporate social responsibility), ESG (environment, social and governance), to name only the three main ones. Her preference would be to use RBC by far, as CSR has been discredited by many NGOs and ESG has too much of a "financial" connotation. In any case, this article deals with the attitude of enterprises that, in the conduct of their activities, cause damage to stakeholders, whether "internal" (employees, customers, partners, subcontractors, etc.) or external (local civil society, communities in which the activity takes place, the environment, etc.). Legally, each of these cases may be characterized differently and generate the application of different procedural and substantive rules. When these disputes are submitted to arbitrators, many questions arise, the most delicate of which relate to the delimitation of the power of the arbitral tribunal, particularly if one starts from the idea that compliance aims at a proactive attitude on the part of enterprises with a clear preventive purpose. The objective of prevention will lead to changes in the conduct of the arbitration that, for example, cannot remain confidential, confidentiality being an obstacle to the preventive effect of the decision rendered. -

► Full Reference: E. Kleiman, "The objectives of compliance confronted with the actors of arbitration", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", to be published.  - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): International arbitration, which remains the preferred method for the resolution of disputes arising from international commercial relations, has been overtaken by compliance, the manifestations of which are everywhere: arbitral institutions, arbitrators and courts exercising curial supervision of the international regularity of awards are regularly called upon to take into account rules of compliance. Compliance has undeniably got a hold on the arbitration community.  Being operators in an unregulated activity, arbitral institutions and arbitrators must generate trust; their ability to effectively self-regulate is a prerequisite for the success of arbitration and requires transparency and exemplarity.  This self-imposed compliance is nowadays consubstantial to arbitration and is illustrated in such classic fields as prevention of conflicts of interest and control of arbitrators' availability, but also in the more recent domains of parity and diversity as well as reduction of the carbon footprint.  Moreover, compliance has caught up with the ex post control of the international regularity of arbitral awards in matters involving allegations of corruption and money laundering.  There is room for debate, particularly in France, because of the porosity of the boundaries between the methods that are specific to those mandatory rules of compliance that intend to prevent the most serious offences, and the methods that are specific to the establishment of the constituent elements of such crimes before criminal courts.  This is an important issue, especially as the increasingly imperative nature of climate change and human rights regulations will extend the scope of these overlaps between compliance methods and the control of arbitral awards. Arbitration is also taking over compliance.  Arbitrators are called upon to rule on controversies arising from economic activities that are related to compliance: contracts relating to the implementation of preventive measures in the fields of anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and human rights as well as transactions relating to the reduction of the carbon footprint and climate change, etc.  Moreover, compliance is also an arbitrable matter and arbitrators must apply or take into consideration the observance or disregard of rules of compliance when adjudicating commercial or investment disputes. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: E. Kleiman, "Les objectifs de la compliance confrontés aux acteurs de l’arbitrage" ("The goals of compliance faced with arbitration actors"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 335-353.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): L’arbitrage international, qui demeure le mode de règlement privilégié des différends nés des relations commerciales internationales, est rattrapé par la compliance dont les manifestations sont partout : centres d’arbitrage, arbitres et juridictions de contrôle de la régularité internationale des sentences sont régulièrement appelés à prendre en considération les règles de la compliance.  La compliance a indéniablement saisi les acteurs de l’arbitrage.  En tant qu’acteurs d’une activité non régulée, les institutions d’arbitrage et les arbitres doivent générer de la confiance ; leur aptitude à une autorégulation efficace conditionne le succès de l’arbitrage et passe par la transparence et l’exemplarité.  Cette compliance auto-imposée est aujourd’hui consubstantielle de l’arbitrage et s’illustre notamment dans les domaines classiques de la prévention des conflits d’intérêts et du contrôle de la disponibilité des arbitres, mais aussi dans ceux, plus nouveaux, de la parité et de la diversité ainsi que de la réduction de l’empreinte carbone.  De plus, l’activité arbitrale, et notamment le contrôle de la régularité internationale des sentences n’échappent pas à une application ex post des critères issus de la compliance, notamment en matière de lutte contre la corruption et le blanchiment : il y a là place pour le débat, notamment en France, en raison de la porosité des frontières entre les méthodes propres aux règles de compliance impératives censées prévenir les infractions les plus graves, et celles qui sont propres à la constatation des éléments constitutifs de celles-ci en matière pénale.  La question est d’importance, d’autant que l’impérativité croissante des prescriptions en matière de changement climatique et de droits humains viendra étendre le champ de ces télescopages entre méthodes de la compliance et contrôle des sentences arbitrales. Mais l’arbitrage s’empare à son tour de la compliance.  Ainsi, les arbitres sont amenés à statuer à l’occasion de controverses issues d’activités économiques qui sont nées de la compliance : contrats relatifs à la mise en place des dispositifs anticorruption et anti-blanchiment comme des obligations de vigilance, opérations relatives à la réduction de l’empreinte carbone et au changement climatique, etc.  En outre, la compliance est également une matière arbitrable, les arbitres étant conduits à appliquer ou prendre en considération les règles de compliance dans le règlement de litiges commerciaux ou d’investissement, notamment au titre des conséquences que l’on peut tirer de leur méconnaissance ou de leur observation. -

► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "Compliance et Arbitrage. Essai de problématisation" ("Compliance and Arbitration : Problematisation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 265-279.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021.  In the book, the article will be published in Title II, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage. - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Under the consideration of the "Compliance Juridictionalisation", it is necessary to study in the links between Compliance and Arbitration. The arbitrator is a judge, he is even the natural judge of international trade. Arbitration is therefore naturally intended to meet compliance which transforms the action of companies in an international context. However, the links between compliance and arbitration are not obvious. It is not a question of providing firm and definitive answers, but rather, and above all, of asking questions. We are at the start of reflection on this topic, which explains why there is, for the time being, little legal literature on the subject of the relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. It doesn't mean there aren't connections.  Quite simply, these relations may not have come to light, or they are in the making. We should research  the existing or potential bridges between two worlds that have long gravitated separately: Compliance on the one hand, Arbitration on the other. The central question is: is or can the arbitrator be a compliance judge, and, if so, how? In any event, the Arbitrator is thus in contact with matters requiring the methods, tools and logic of Compliance. In addition to the prevention and suppression of corruption, three examples can be given. Arbitration has been facing economic sanctions (notably embargoes) for several years. The link with Compliance is obvious, insofar as texts providing for economic sanctions are often accompanied by compliance mechanisms, as in the United States. The arbitrator is concerned as to the fate he reserves in the treatment of the dispute with the measures of economic sanctions. Competition Law is a branch that came into contact with Arbitration from the end of the 1980s. The arbitrability of this type of dispute is now established and arbitrators apply it regularly. At the same time, Compliance has also entered Competition Law, admittedly more strongly in the United States than in France. The existence, absence or insufficiency of a compliance program aimed at preventing violations of the competition rules are thus circumstances which may assist the arbitrator in the assessment of anti-competitive behavior. Environmental Law is also concerned. There is environmental Compliance, for example with regard to the French law of March 27, 2017 on the duty of vigilance. Companies are thus responsible for participating in the protection of the environment, by internalizing these concerns in their internal and external operations (in their sphere of influence). As soon as an arbitrator is in charge for settling a dispute relating to Environmental Law, the question of the relationship to Compliance, from this angle, naturally arises. It is therefore the multiple interactions between Compliance and Arbitration, actual or potential, which are thus open. -