About

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., coordination and moderation of the conference L'office du juge et les causes systémiques (""The Office of the Judge and systemic causes"), in Cycle of Conferences, Penser l'office du juge ("Thinking the Office of the Judge"), Grand Chamber of the Cour de cassation, Paris, May 9, 2021, 17h-19h. The conference is held in French. - ► General presentation of the conference: the conference is based on the intervention of three judges, Christophe Soulard, Fabien Raynaud, and François Ancel, who think and debate among themselves on a hypothesis: the existence of "systemic causes". The hypothesis is that beyond and through the diversity of disputes and cases that are submitted to the most diverse judges, there is a category of cases that are systemic, which means containing in what is submitted to the judge for resolution a system.  If such a category exists, which also raises the question of the diversity of systems and the difficulty arising from their submission to rules that are not legal (for example economic, biological, financial "laws", etc.) , then the judge should take this into account, both in the procedure and in the judgment they make on the case and in the way they formulate et restitute this judgment. - 📝read the presentation of this conference by the Cour de cassation (in French) 📝read the program of the cycle of conferences 2022 (in French) -  🎥see the conference video (in French)  🎥 see the synthesis video of the conference, made in situ by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche (in French)   - ​✏️read the notes taken during the conference to make the synthesis (in French) 📝read the article of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche restituting this conference, published in the Recueil Dalloz (in French) - ►read the works, basis of the two interventions of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche 🚧 L'hypothèse de la "cause systémique (made before the conference to prepare it), available en English 📝Synthese of the conference (made during the conference) -

  🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law  - ► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Compliance Law and Climate. To prevent Climate Risk and build Climate Balance, January 2022. - 🎤 In its French version, this Working Paper had been written for a speech  for  the colloquium held under the scientific direction of Marta Torre-Schaub, Béatrice Lormeteau, & Anne Stevignon, Les risques climatiques à l’épreuve du droit Comment le droit fait-il face aux nouveaux risques engendrés par la crise climatique ? , at the University Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris I), Amphithéâtre Liard, on March 17, 2022. - 📝it is also the basis of an article : "Droit de la compliance et climat. Pour prévenir le risque et construire l'équilibre climatiques" ("Compliance Law and climate. Prevent the climate risk and build the climate balance") - ► Summary of this Working Paper: Compliance Law is beginning to emerge in climate topic, through the expression  "Climate Compliance Law", but the climate issue itself is the most perfect example of why General Compliance Law is made for.  It is indeed a new branch of Law, a global Law claiming to provide Ex Ante solutions here and now for global issues, so that in the future systemic catastrophies will not occur, will not happen: it is these "Monumental Goals" that give meaning, coherence, and simplicity to Compliance Law. Compliance Law, linked to the Rule of Law principle, makes it possible to go beyond the choice often presented between the effectiveness of the protection of the planet and the renunciation of freedoms, in particular the freedom to do business and the freedom of individuals, especially the protection of their data. Climate is thus exemplary of the object of Monumental Goals of Compliance Law (I). The systemic risk that it now constitutes is analogous to Banking or Digital Systemic Risks and therefore calls for the application of identical legal Compliance Tools, formerly put in place for Banking Regulatory and Compliance Law, recently invented for Digital. Compliance Law, extending Regulation Law, itself from the precondition of the Sector and the Territory, is therefore the branch which makes it possible to put in place new legal solutions, either by force (judicial agreements, compliance programs, etc.), or by will (commitments, global charters, etc.). Therefore, an alliance can exist between political and public authorities, and crucial economic operators (II), that the rise in power of the "raison d'être" is the sight and whose technical challenge is the collection of information that must be put in correlation. Scientists pooling Information, this public good, provided by public and private entities. The courts are at the center of this articulation between Compliance Law and Climate, which object is the Future. -   🔓read the developments below⤵️ -

► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Conceiving Power, Working Paper, December 2021 - 📝 This Working Paper serves as the basis for an article to be published in the collective book drawn up in tribute to Professor Emmanuel Gaillard.    - ► Working Paper summary: In 1985, Emmanuel Gaillard's central work came out under the title Le pouvoir en droit privé  (The Power in Private Law)📎¹Gaillard, E., Le pouvoir en droit privé, préf. Cornu. G., coll. ..., Economica, 1985., but when it was defended in 1981, his thesis directed by Dean Cornu was entitled La notion de pouvoir en droit privé (The notion of Power in Private Law) 📎²Gaillard, E., La notion de pouvoir en droit privé, thèse .... ; . Let's give full force to the original title of the thesis.   The deletion of the term notion perhaps implies that by defining something the essential is done, that there would be something of a pleonasm in aiming at The notion of Power and The Power, as Law likes to economise on words.   But it was indeed a renewed, simpler and more powerful conception of the notion of Power, containing the entire regime necessarily imputed, that this work imposed, henceforth illuminating positive Law. Emmanuel Gaillard's definition, on the other hand, goes beyond Private Law. We would gladly have argued in favour of retaining the heading for the term Notion, proposing instead to dispense with the reference to Private Law alone …. Perhaps it was because the concept is so vast that in this seminal thesis its scope was restricted to Private Law, since the author already had to account for the sheer multiplicity of manifestations in this part of the legal system; Or perhaps it was because the concept of 'Power' is so familiar in Public Law that it would have needed less definition in Public Law (which, moreover, is so diversely proposed in this more political area, which is already careful on principle to distinguish between powers, which must always be plural in order to be separated), and that it was therefore reasonable to want to arrive at a single concept of Power in Private Law, where the notion of subjective rights is more familiar.  However, Emmanuel Gaillard's definition of Power as a prerogative placed, by legal rule or contract, in the hands of the person invested with them for the benefit, at least in part, of others, covers both Public and Private Law. This even contributes to the solidity of this thesis and explains why it flourishes today in legal systems where the distinction between Private Law and Public Law is weakening. The power of this definition lies in its simplicity. Simple and brave minds are often the most fruitful. As Dean Gérard Cornu points out in his preface, the author, in particular because he bases himself more on positive law, for example that relating to the powers of corporate officers, does not get bogged down in discussions between authors only to end up preferring one over the other. He arrives at a definition that is close to our everyday experience: the one we experience when we collect an envelope on behalf of someone else and the agent asks us in what capacity we claim to be doing this on his behalf. We then show him our 'power', the legal power to do so for the benefit of the person to whom the letter is addressed, and can thus exercise the power to withdraw the letter, even though it is personal. When legal and common sense come together, it is a good omen, not only in terms of form, because everyone can understand it and the Law must remain comprehensible, but also in terms of substance, because everyone must be able to control the exercise of a power that is exercised for and over others. For this letter addressed to someone else, the person who has been able to take it by virtue of the power conferred on him/her, could just as easily open it and read it, then destroy it or give it to the worst enemy of the person to whom it was addressed. In Power, there is always might to do, and the danger to others that Power contains therefore.  This highly legal definition of Power not only distances the holder from his/her own interests, but also channels the Power thus granted to the person who benefits from it. In this respect, Emmanuel Gaillard not only distinguished between Power and subjective right, but also identified the right amount of power required for this power to effectively fulfill this 'Mission', through the notion of abuse of power, when the holder uses for other beneficiaries this power that was conferred on him/her for this sole purpose. What is more, this concept makes it possible to distinguish Power from discretionary force, because the holder of Power thereby exercises factual , by acting for others, deciding for others, deciding on others. Because Power is inseparable from might, but might must remain the means of power and no more, the Law shall produce the antibodies that are not only the theory of abuse of power but also an Ex Ante responsibility that accounts must always be rendered, either to the other for whom everything is done or to a third party. For this third party is often there from the outset, the guardianship judge for example: because the Power was put in place because of the beneficiary's weakness, both in himself/herself and because of the situation, an impartial and disinterested third party is needed to ensure proper execution from the outset, without there even being a dispute. In this respect, how useful this thesis is for thinking about what Supervision is today!   This thesis, so clear, so simple and so strong, goes beyond Private or Civil Law. It is both much more restrictive than the more factual and political definition of Oower, which would be the ability to do something, and much broader than the usual definitions, since it embraces and legitimises de jure all situations where a person acts legally for the benefit of another.  Dean Cornu shows, moreover, in two sentences that such a notion of power also captures the office of the judge, who has power over others only to serve them 📎³"En droit processuel, l'office du juge aurait donné à l'auteur un renfort. Pour le juge, il n'est point de pouvoir sans devoir. Au-delà de la distinction de ce qu'il a obligation de faire ou faculté d'apprécier, il y a toujours, au creux de ce qu'il peut, le sceau de ce qu'il doit, un devoir gardien - comme un âme - de l'exercice du pouvoir." (p.5).. The definition corresponds to the mission of one who has power only to fulfill his office. It suits so well the conception we have today of Administration, especially if it takes the form of independent authorities. Moreover, Power thus contains its own limit in its very definition, since others are present in it: the holder has power only to serve others. From then on, it is only a power because it is a kind of Charge. Emmanuel Gaillard immediately uses the term: "Un individu se voit confier une charge qu'il exerce dans un intérêt au moins partiellement distinct du sien propre"  ("An individual is entrusted with an office which he exercises in an interest at least partially distinct from his own") 📎⁴n°3, p.9. . Dean Carbonnier, who reformed the legislation in this area 📎⁵🕴️J. Carbonnier, 📗Essai sur les lois, 1992 (on the guardianship).,, emphasised that the guardian has a public duty because the State entrusts him/her with a child. In the same way parental authority is a charge on the parents for the benefit of the children. More generally, Power is a burden that the Law places on a person to satisfy the interests of another. This definition offered by Emmanuel Gaillard in 1981, anchored in Private Law only insofar as it is the entire legal system, is premonitory of the Regulatory and Compliance Law as it unfolds today. It would be enough to continue the Gaillard's sentences, as if they had been half-written, to finish them 40 years later and find in them the mechanisms of Supervision of companies by public authorities which are now in place not to reduce their power but to ensure that they exercise it for the benefit of others 📎⁶S. in a general way, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017.. The whole evolution of Company Law and Financial Law is here. Between the lines of this thesis, which develops the notion of duty 📎⁷Cornu, préface précitée : "Tous les pouvoirs sont, à double face, des pouvoirs-devoirs" (p.5)., we can also see what positive Law is developing today, in particular through the 'duty of Vigilance', this personal responsibility for the benefit of others (I). The definition of Power thus conceived contains within itself its regime and enables us to anticipate it better today: because the holder exercises Power only for others, at least partially, he is consubstantially accountable for it, responsibility being only one form of this accountability; because this service must be effective and others must benefit fully from it, because unlike the subjective right which allows the holder freely not to use his might, Power has never been the 'most absolute' availability to use his/her might: it is even the opposite. It is the expression of a Power assigned to a purpose, compelling the holder to use his/her Power to that end.  But it is equally necessary for the holder to have all the might to do so, otherwise the very notion of 'Power' is meaningless. This is the definition that should be given to the principle of Proportionality: the person on whom the Power rests must have not more power than is necessary, but all the power necessary to achieve the Monumental Goals for which the Power has been entrusted to him/her, so that others may derive full benefit from it (II).  In today's positive Law, the definition of Power as a Duty is found not only in Private Law but also in Public Law, not least because pure might, i.e. those that do not account for the use of their might, are in decline while concern for others is on the increase. The days of discretionary powers are over, and the increased independence of those who exercise Power over others requires them to be accountable. Beyond this Accountability, the personal Responsibility of those who have the Power to serve others is being established. But, no doubt because the Law is slow to evolve, the correlative idea that the holder of Power must have all the powers required to carry out his/her mission is less entrenched:  As Emmanuel Gaillard has shown, the Law has only gone part of the way in sanctioning excesses of power, when the holder uses his/her power for other goals, but it has not yet clearly established that the holder – sometimes forced – of a Power is legitimate in using all the means required to achieve the result for which this Power, i.e. a charge and a duty, has been conferred on him/her.   No doubt we need to read Emmanuel Gaillard's thesis again in all its potential, to imagine the reading we could do today of what he could have written as if on blank pages that would write themselves, a magical thesis where everything is already there, a thesis so short (250 pages) and so beautiful, so dense that it already contains the Law of the Future. The Law of the Future 📎⁸On Compliance Law as a Law of the Future, s. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023. On the consequences for Liability Law, which is now looking to the Future, s. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Ex Ante Responsibility, 2021.  where there must be much more responsibility for the benefit of others📎⁹Sur la notion de "Responsabilité Ex Ante", v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., La responsabilité Ex Ante", in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La responsabilité, 2022. and powers since this notion includes others who are the beneficiaries. Droit de l'Avenir where Emmanuel Gaillard will be present, in particular thanks to this work of doctrine offered in 1981.  So that, in practical terms, those who are entrusted with looking after others – for example, today all companies obliged by Compliance Law to look after others so that they are not destroyed by hatred in the digital space, by corruption in the economic system or by climate change in a projected future – do not find themselves challenged by the same Law for the means of exercising this power for the benefit of others, for example when this involves 'judging'. Dean Cornu himself emphasised the identity of the two offices. -                         Lire les développement ci-dessous⤵ - 🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Chair for "The temporal dimension: Imminence and Intertemporally", in Climate Change Cases before National and International Courts Cross-fertilization and Convergence", November 27, 2021, Paris.  -   read the program   Summary of the panel presentation: The specific topic of our panel is the “temporal dimension” of the judicial cases of Climate change. We shall listen to two great experts on this topic, which is Time. Listening the other previous speakers, I understand how this topic is important, because Climate Change requires an immediate action and it create a political issue, because everyone comes before courts. A basis and fundamental problem, because the times are not adjusted.  let's come back to basic notions, to have three times : “past, present, future”.   The issue of Climate Change is in the Future, the necessity of Action is in the Present and the basis temporal question is to know if Courts are the bodies adequate to responde ; maybe it is inevitable that Judge must be recreate their office because the time of the classical judicial office is the Past. Immediately, this simple et huge problem appears : in a classical repartition, the judge is the legal character to intervenir for the Past, the present (maybe is for you and me), and the future is the time for the State, and more precisely for the Parliament. But the climate change is a huge topic, not in the past, not in the present, but in the future. Therefore a gap exists between the time of the topic and the time of the court before the case is explained for obtaining a solution : how to give a good answer ? Judge maybe must travel in time, from past to future …. Maybe, he must, but might he? Classically, the judge can anticipate a very next future, but not the more distant and systemic future. Climate change belongs to the second one. This is why the title of this panel is non only about the necessity to take in consideration the “imminence” but also the “intertemporally” : maybe court are the sole able to create this intertemporality between Past and Future, and by this way to obtain from States and companies to do something immediately !   By two legal ways.    Courts can stay in Past, supervising States, if they dispose of effective legal decisions taken by States in the past about Climate Change (essentially Paris Agreement, for instance transposed in the French legal system by a formal law). This is why an efficient judicial solution would be the possibility for the courts to oblige State to implement their more or less committment they had taken in the past for the future (as the Conseil d’État did in the Commune de Grande-Synthe Cas Law). Even for that, the courts must adopt a creative notion of what is a commitment from a State through a Law… ; as they must do about private companies comitment (in their codes of conduct or soft law of corporate social responsability).    But what to do if States didn’t take such commitment ? Some can allege Courts are not Parliaments and are not legitimate to rule for the future … It is a political issue, a very classical one but very accurate for Climate change (where States and companies are face to courts…) and maybe  And as our colleague said, judicial system is quite technically weak to concretize human rights.   Therefore, the second way, more innovative, est the new use of Tort Law : no more a liability Ex Post, but a responsibility Ex Ante. In every legal system, even in Civil Law systems, Tort Law is conceived by courts (for instance in French Law).  If the new reasoning is conveived in Ex Ante, Tort Law must be a set of legal tools to reach the monumental tools to reach the "Monumental Goal" (being by nature future) which is the Climate Change stopping.  In this teleological reasoning, the admissibility and the choice remedies, must be adapted to obtain what is central : the effectivity and the efficiencicy.  In this sens, the judgement between two parties (which was an Ex Post act) may be conceived as an systemic efficient action (which was an Ex Ante act), because it must be.  -