Articles in a JoRC book

Couverture – Compliance et droits de la défense

Articles in a JoRC book

Article in the Journal of Regulation & Compliance

📝Connaitre les pratiques pour redessiner les frontières et accroître les points de contact entre Compliance et droits de la défense dans l’enquête interne, la CJIP et la CRPC (lignes de force de l’ouvrage), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche et 🕴️M. Boissavy (dir.), 📕Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRPC

► Full reference : M.-A. Frison-Roche, “Connaitre les pratiques pour redessiner les frontières et accroître les points de contact entre Compliance et droits de la défense dans l’enquête interne, la CJIP et la CRPC. Lignes de force de l’ouvrage Compliance et droits de la défense“, in M.-A. Frison-Roche and M. Boissavy (eds.), Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRPC, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2024, pp. 3-25. - ► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Connaitre les pratiques pour redessiner les frontières et accroître les points de contact entre Compliance et droits de la défense dans l’enquête interne, la CJIP et la CRPC (lignes de force de l'ouvrage)" ("Understanding practices to redraw the boundaries and increase the points of contact between Compliance and the rights of the defense in internal investigation, Judicial Public Interest Agreement and French guilty plea procedure (Main Aspects of the Book)."), in M.-A. Frison-Roche et M. Boissavy (ed.), Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRPC, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", to be published. - 📝read the article (in French) - 📝 read also the presentation of the other contribution of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche in this book: "Circuler dans le temps pour mettre en phase Compliance et droits de la défense" - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRPC, in which this article is published
Couverture – Compliance et droits de la défense

Articles in a JoRC book

📝L’évolution des rapports entre avocats et autorités de poursuites avec la CJIP, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche et 🕴️M. Boissavy (dir.), Collection Régulations & Compliance Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRP

► Full reference : Th. Baudesson, « L’évolution des rapports entre avocats et autorités de poursuites depuis l’introduction de la CJIP » (The Evolution of Relations between Lawyers and Prosecuting Authorities since the Introduction of the CJIP), in M.-A. Frison-Roche and M. Boissavy (eds.), Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRPC, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2024, pp. 299-305. - ► English Summary of this article (made by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : The author considers that the CJIP, the most striking development in criminal procedure, brings the Bar and the prosecuting authorities into dialogue, moving from a logic of confrontation to one of cooperation. This is a new type of relationship. The prosecutor concerned is above all the PNF, which has expertise in this area, disseminates it through its soft law and provides more legal certainty to companies. He illustrates his remarks in particular with the so-called Airbus CJIP, in which there was a confrontation with English and American practices in “cooperation investigations” which require mutual trust. But he acknowledges the progress that remains to be made, both on the side of lawyers, who in France seem to remain as a matter of principle in opposition to magistrates and little attentive to what could be their role in the search for truth, and on the side of magistrates, who seem to perceive lawyers as a kind of “mercenaries” to be distrusted as a matter of principle. This is why, in their guide on internal investigations, the AFA and the PNF require that the lawyer who conducts the investigation and the one who ensures the criminal defence of the company cannot be the same, which the author explains by this distrust, presuming investigations of convenience, a suspicion of principle that the author regrets. Likewise, the refusal of magistrates to recognise the professional secrecy covering the investigation report seems to the author archaic in comparison with Anglo-Saxon conceptions, since the DoJ and the SFO readily accept the legal privilege attached to this report. As a result, France would not be at the same level of Rule of Law as the United States and the United Kingdom. The author concludes that progress remains to be made for France to complete its evolution and become fully attractive, so that companies confronted with reprehensible practices are effectively led to undertake a self-reporting approach.
Couverture – Compliance et droits de la défense

Articles in a JoRC book

GRAULLE, Bénédicte and RAHIM, Yanis🕴️

📝Préserver le secret professionnel de l’avocat dans l’enquête interne et son résultat, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche et 🕴️M. Boissavy (dir.), 📕Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRPC

► Full reference : B. Graulle and Y. Rahim, « Préserver le secret professionnel de l’avocat dans l’enquête interne et son résultat » (Preserving the Lawyer’s Professional Secrecy in the Internal Investigation and Its Outcome), in M.-A. Frison-Roche and M. Boissavy (eds.), Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRPC, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2024, pp. 199-211.
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

📝The “Judge-Judged”. Articulating Words and Things in the face of Conflicts of Interest, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "The "Judge-Judged". Articulating Words and Things in the face of Conflicts of Interest", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2024, pp. 69-93 - 📝read the article - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): Since the topic of this article is part of a chapter devoted to the Company established as Prosecutor and Judge of itself by Compliance Law, chapter aiming to use the relevant qualifications, it is appropriate therefore to worry about the adjustment of words and things, of the way in which the relationship between ones and the others evolve, and of the more particular question of knowing if this evolution is radical or not when one speaks of "judge ". because "judging" is a word that the Law has disputed with other disciplines, but that it has appropriated not so much to confer more powers on those who act in its name, for example that who supervise and punish, but on the contrary to impose limits, since to the one who judges it has put the chains of the procedure under foot, thus making bearable for the other the exercise of such a power. This is why those who want the power to judge would often want to not have the title, because having de jure the title of judge is being subject to the correlated regime, it is to be submitted to procedural correctness. It is therefore to better limit that the Law sees who judges, for obliging this so-powerful character to the procedure. But the Law also has the power to appoint a judge and to fix the contours of all the characters in the trial. He usually does it with clarity, distinguishing the ones of the others, not confusing them. This art of distinction has constitutional value. Thus, not only the one who judges must be named "judge" but the procedural apparatus which goes with this character and which constitutes a way of doing things and fundamental rights, are not "granted" by kindness or in a second step: it is a block. If you didn't want to have to endure procedural rights, you didn't have to want to be a judge. Admittedly, one could conclude that the procedure would therefore have become "substantial"; by this elevation, it is rather a fashion of saying that the procedure would no longer be a "servant": it is a kind of declaration of love for the procedure, as long as one affirms that at the acts of judging , or investigating, or prosecuting, are "naturally" attached the procedural rights for the one who is likely to be the object of these powers. Compliance Law, in search of allies to achieve the Monumental Goals for the aims of which it was instituted, will require, or even demand, private companies to go and seek themselves, in particular through investigations. internal or active vigilance on others, for finding facts likely to be reproached to them. Compliance Law will also require that they prosecute those who have committed these acts. Compliance La will again demand that they sanction the acts that people have committed in their name. This is clearly understood from the point of view of Ex Ante efficiency. The confusion of roles is often very efficient since it is synonymous with the accumulation of powers. For example, it is more efficient that the one who pursues is also the one who instructs and judges, since he knows the case so well… Besides, it is more efficient that he also elaborates the rules, so he knows better than anyone the "spirit" of the texts. This was often emphasized in Regulatory Law. When everything is Information and risk management, that would be necessary … But all this is not obvious. For two reasons, one external and the other internal. Externally, the first reason is that it is not appropriate to "name" a judge who is not. This would be too easy, because it would then be enough to designate anyone, or even to do it oneself to appropriate the regime that goes with it, in particular for obtain a so-called legitimate power for obtaining that others obey even though they are not subordinate or from them they transmit information, even though they would be  competitors: it would then be necessary to remember that only the Law is able to appoint judge ; in this new Compliance era, companies would be judges, prosecutors, investigators!  Maybe, if the Law says it, but if it didn't, it would be necessary to come back to this tautology … But are we in such a radicalism? Moreover, do judges have "the prerogative" of judgment and the Law has not admitted this power for companies to judge for a long time? As soon as the procedure is there in Ex Ante and the control of the judge in Ex Post? The second reason, internal to the company, situation on which the article focuses, is that the company investigates itself, judges itself, sanctions itself. However, the legal person expressing its will only through its organs, we underline in practice the difficulties for the same human being to formulate grievances, as he/she is the agent of the legal person, adressed to the natural person that he/she himself/herself is. The two interests of the two are not the same, are often opposed; how the secrets of one can be kept with respect to the other, represented by the same individual? … It is all the mystery, even the artifice of legal personality that appears and we understand better that Compliance Law no longer wants to use this strange classical notion. Because all the rules of procedure cannot mask that to prosecute oneself does not make more sense than to contract with oneself. This conflict of interest is impossible to resolve because naming the same individual X then naming him/her Y, by declaring open the dispute between them does not make sense. This dualism, which is impossible to admit when it comes to playing these functions with regard to corporate officers, can come back to life by setting up third parties who will carry secrets and oppositions. For example by the designation of two separate lawyers for the human being agent and the human being representative of the legal person, each lawyer being able to have secrets for each other and to oppose each other. These spaces of reconstitution of the so "natural" oppositions in procedure between the one who judges and the one who is judged can also take the technological form of platforms: where there is no longer anyone, where the process has replaced the procedure, there is no longer any human judgment. We can thus see that the fear of conflicts of interest is so strong that we resign ourselves to saying that only the machine would be "impartial", a derisory conception of impartiality, against which it is advisable to fight. This then leads to a final question: can the company claim to exercise the jurisdictional power to prosecute and judge and investigate without even claiming to be a prosecutor, an investigating judge, or a court? The company's advantage would be to be able to escape the legal regime that classical Law attaches to its words, mainly the rights of the defense and the rights of action for others, the principle of publicity of justice for everyone, which expresses the link between procedure and democracy . When Facebook said on June 12, 2021 "react" to the decision of May 5, 2021 adopted by what would only be an Oversight Board to decide "as a consequence" of a 2-year suspension of Donald Trump's account, the art of qualifications seem to be used in order to avoid any regime constraint. But this art of euphemism is very old. Thus the States, when they wanted to increase repression, presented the transformation of the system as a softening of it through the "decriminalization" of Economic Law, transferred from the criminal courts to the independent administrative agencies. The efficiency was greatly increased, since the guarantees of the Criminal Procedure ceased to apply. But 20 years later, Words found their way back to Things: under Criminal Law, slept the "criminal matter", which requires the same "Impartiality". In 1996, a judge once affirmed it and everything was changed. Let us therefore wait for what the Courts will say, since they are the masters of qualifications, as Article 12 of the French Code of Civil Procedure says, as Motulsky wrote it in 1972. Law has time.
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

GRANIER, Cécile🕴️

📝Reflections on the existence of companies’ jurisprudence through Compliance matters, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: C. Granier, “Reflections on the existence of companies’ jurisprudence through Compliance matters”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, “Compliance & Regulation” Serie, 2024, pp. 95-107 - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done par the author): Because Compliance shakes up established frameworks, Compliance forces to look at certain concepts in a new light, which until then seemed to be well tamed. This is particularly the case with the notion of “Jurisprudence”. Recent developments in Compliance indeed raise questions about the possible existence of “jurisprudence” (case law) that would be produced by companies during the implementation of compliance procedures. At first glance, the concept of “business jurisprudence” may appear unnatural because case law is traditionally understood as the fruit of the office of the Judge and, more particularly, of the State Judge. However, the observation that the company can position itself as a Judge with regard to itself and others in the context of the implementation of Compliance legitimately raises the question of the possibility for the latter. to produce case law. The example of Facebook’s supervisory board and the first decisions rendered by this body increases the legitimacy of this crucial question. Thinking about the concept of “Jurisprudence of companies” implies to compare the process of emergence of the case law standard emanating from the Judge with the process of emergence of a “Jurisprudence” that would be produced by companies during their “jurisdictional functions”. On the material level, an analogy between State case law and company case law seems conceivable. It then remains to overcome an obstacle of an organic nature: can an institution other than the judge be understood as producing case law? In view of contemporary developments in Law and the practical interest that exists in designing business case law, it seems appropriate to adopt a broader view of case law, which is detached from the traditional organic criterion. It therefore seems that it is possible but above all that it is necessary to think about the concept of “business case law” in order to highlight a new facet of the normative power of companies in the context of compliance, in particular with a view to its supervision. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

AUGAGNEUR, Luc-Marie🕴️

📝The jurisdictionalisation of reputation by platforms, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: L.-M. Augagneur, “The jurisdictionalisation of reputation by platforms”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 109-125 - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): The large platforms are in the position of arbiter of the reputation economy (referencing, notoriety) in which they themselves act. Although the stakes are usually low on a unit basis, the jurisdiction of reputation represents significant aggregate stakes. Platforms are thus led to detect and assess reputation manipulations (by users: SEO, fake reviews, fake followers; or by the platforms themselves as highlighted by the Google Shopping decision issued by the European Commission in 2017) that are implemented on a large scale with algorithmic tools. The identification and treatment of manipulations is itself only possible by means of artificial intelligence tools. Google thus proceeds with an automated downgrading mechanism for sites that do not follow its guidelines, with the possibility of requesting a review through a very summary procedure entirely conducted by an algorithm. Tripadvisor, on the other hand, uses an algorithm to detect false reviews based on “fraud modeling to identify electronic patterns that cannot be detected by the human eye”. It only conducts a human investigation in limited cases. This jurisdictionality of reputation has little in common with that defined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (legal origin, contradictory procedure, independence, application of the Rules of Law). It is characterized, on the one hand, by the absence of transparency of the rules and even of the existence of rules stated in predicative form and applied by deductive reasoning. It is replaced by an inductive probabilistic model by the identification of abnormal behaviors in relation to centroids. This approach of course raises the issue of statistical bias. More fundamentally, it reflects a transition from Rule of Law, not so much to “Code is Law” (Laurence Lessig), but to “Data is Law”, that is, to a governance of numbers (rather than “by” numbers). It also comes back to a form of collective jurisdictionality, since the sanction comes from a computational apprehension of the phenomena of the multitude and not from an individual appreciation. Finally, it appears particularly consubstantial with compliance, since it is based on a teleological approach (the search for a finality rather than the application of principles). On the other hand, this jurisdictionality is characterized by man-machine cooperation, whether in the decision-making process (which poses the problem of automaticity bias) or in the contradictory procedure (which poses, in particular, the problems of discussion with the machine and the explicability of the machine response). Until now, the supervision of these processes has been based essentially on the mechanisms of transparency, a limited adversarial requirement and the accessibility of appeal channels. The French Law Loi pour une République Numérique (“Law for a Digital Republic”), the European Legislation Platform-to-Business Regulation and the Omnibus Directive, have thus set requirements on the ranking criteria on platforms. The Omnibus Directive also requires that professionals guarantee that reviews come from consumers through reasonable and proportionate measures. As for the European Digital Services Act, it provides for transparency on content moderation rules, procedures and algorithms. But this transparency is often a sham. In the same way and for the moment the requirements of sufficient human intervention and adversarial processes appear very limited in the draft text. The most efficient forms of this jurisdictionality ultimately emerge from the role played by third parties in a form of participatory dispute resolution. Thus, for example, FakeSpot detects false Tripadvisor reviews, Sistrix establishes a ranking index that helped establish the manipulation of Google’s algorithm in the Google Shopping case by detecting artifacts based on algorithm changes. Moreover, the draft Digital Services Act envisages recognizing a specific status for trusted flaggers who identify illegal content on platforms. This singular jurisdictional configuration (judge and party platform, massive situations, algorithmic systems for handling manipulations) thus leads us to reconsider the grammar of the jurisdictional process and its characteristics. If Law is a language (Alain Sériaux), it offers a new grammatical form that would be that of the middle way (mesotès) described by Benevéniste. Between the active and the passive way, there is a way in which the subject carries out an action in which he includes himself. Now, it is the very nature of this jurisdictionality of compliance to make laws by including oneself in them (nomos tithestai). In this respect, the irruption of artificial intelligence in this jurisdictional treatment undoubtedly bears witness to the renewal of the language of Law. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

KLEIMAN, Elie🕴️

📝The objectives of compliance confronted with the actors of arbitration, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: E. Kleiman, “The objectives of compliance confronted with the actors of arbitration”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 335-355. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): International arbitration, which remains the preferred method for the resolution of disputes arising from international commercial relations, has been overtaken by compliance, the manifestations of which are everywhere: arbitral institutions, arbitrators and courts exercising curial supervision of the international regularity of awards are regularly called upon to take into account rules of compliance. Compliance has undeniably got a hold on the arbitration community. Being operators in an unregulated activity, arbitral institutions and arbitrators must generate trust; their ability to effectively self-regulate is a prerequisite for the success of arbitration and requires transparency and exemplarity. This self-imposed compliance is nowadays consubstantial to arbitration and is illustrated in such classic fields as prevention of conflicts of interest and control of arbitrators’ availability, but also in the more recent domains of parity and diversity as well as reduction of the carbon footprint. Moreover, compliance has caught up with the ex post control of the international regularity of arbitral awards in matters involving allegations of corruption and money laundering. There is room for debate, particularly in France, because of the porosity of the boundaries between the methods that are specific to those mandatory rules of compliance that intend to prevent the most serious offences, and the methods that are specific to the establishment of the constituent elements of such crimes before criminal courts. This is an important issue, especially as the increasingly imperative nature of climate change and human rights regulations will extend the scope of these overlaps between compliance methods and the control of arbitral awards. Arbitration is also taking over compliance. Arbitrators are called upon to rule on controversies arising from economic activities that are related to compliance: contracts relating to the implementation of preventive measures in the fields of anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and human rights as well as transactions relating to the reduction of the carbon footprint and climate change, etc. Moreover, compliance is also an arbitrable matter and arbitrators must apply or take into consideration the observance or disregard of rules of compliance when adjudicating commercial or investment disputes. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

BAVITOT, Alexis🕴️

📝Shaping the Company through Negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements. French Perspective, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: A. Bavitot, “Shaping the Company through Negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements. French Perspective”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, “Compliance & Regulation” Serie, 2024, pp. 203-215 - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Negotiated justice is “the situation in which the criminal conflict is the object of a trade in the etymological sense of the term negotio, i.e. a debate between the parties to reach an agreement”. Thus, the French legislator has succumbed to globalized mimicry by creating the Convention judiciaire d’intérêt public (Public Interest Judicial Agreement), first in matters of probity and then in environmental matters. What is the nature of this deal of justice? Validated by a judge’s order, it does not entail any declaration of guilt, has neither the nature nor the effects of a judgment of conviction and is not registered in the judicial record. Possible at the investigation stage as well as at the pre-trial stage, the Public Interest Judicial Agreement is original in that it makes it possible to avoid either the prosecutor’s proceedings or the judge’s wrath. A detailed study of the agreements signed shows that in order to negotiate in the best possible way, the company can and must shape itself. The company will shape the facts of its agreement, shape its charge and, finally, shape its sentence. The article offers a concrete analysis of these three dimensions of corporate shaping to better approach understanding the legal nature of negotiated criminal justice agreements. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

HEYMANN, Jérémy🕴️

📝The Legal Nature of the Facebook “Supreme Court”, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: J. Heymann, “The Legal Nature of the Facebook “Supreme Court””, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, “Compliance & Regulation” Serie, 2024, pp. 167-182 - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done par the Author): Taking place in the general theme aiming at making “words and things coincide”, the article offers some thoughts on the “conditions of the discourse” – in the sense in which Foucault understood it in his Archéologie des sciences humaines – relating to the phenomenon of “jurisdictionalization” of Compliance. The thoughts are more specifically focusing on the nature of the so-called “Supreme Court” that Facebook instituted to hear appeals of decisions relating to content on the digital social networks that are Facebook and Instagram. Is this really a “Supreme Court”, designed in order to “judge” the Facebook Group? A careful examination of the Oversight Board – i.e. the so-called “Supreme Court” created by Facebook – reveals that the latter, in addition to its advisory mission (which consists of issuing policy advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies), exercises some form of adjudicative function. This is essentially conceived in terms of compliance assessment, of the content published on the social networks Facebook or Instagram with the standards issued by these corporations on the one hand, of content enforcement decisions taken by Facebook with the Law on the other hand. The legal framework of reference is yet rather vague, although its substantial content seems to be per se evolutive, based on the geographical realm where the case to be reviewed is located. An adjudicative function can therefore be characterized, even if the Oversight Board can only claim for a limited one. The author can ultimately identify the Oversight Board as a preventive dispute settlement body, in the sense that it seems to aim at avoiding any referral to state courts and ruling before any court’s judgement can be delivered. Some questions are thus to be raised, relating with both legitimacy and authority of such a Board. But whatever the answers will be, the fact remains that the creation of the Oversight Board by a private law company already reveals all the liveliness of contemporary legal pluralism. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

📝Reinforce the Judge and the Lawyer to impose Compliance Law as a characteristic of the Rule of Law, in🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.) 📘Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Reinforce the Judge and the Lawyer to impose Compliance Law as a characteristic of the Rule of Law", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2024, pp. 39-65 - 📝read the article - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► This article is the introduction of the book.   ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): One can understand that the compliance mechanisms are presented with hostility because they seem designed to keep the judge away, whereas there is no Rule of Law without a judge. Solid arguments present compliance techniques as converging towards the uselessness of the judge (I). Certainly, we come across magistrates, and of all kinds, and powerful ones, but that would be a sign of imperfection: its ex-ante logic has been deployed in all its effectiveness, the judge would no longer be required… And the lawyer would disappear so with him… This perspective of a world without a judge, without a lawyer and ultimately without Law, where algorithms could organize through multiple processes in Ex Ante the obedience of everyone, the "conformity" of all our behaviors with all the regulatory mass that is applicable to us, supposes that this new branch of Law would be defined as the concentration of processes which gives full effectiveness to all the rules, regardless of their content. But supposing that this engineer's dream is even achievable, it is not possible in a democratic and free world to do without judges and lawyers. Therefore, it is imperative to recognize their contributions to Compliance Law, related and invaluable contributions (II). First of all, because a pure Ex Ante never existed and even in the time of the Chinese legists1 L’empire chinois n’a semble-t-il jamais apprécié les juges, ne leur faisant place que sous la forme de serviteurs purs de l’Etat, qu’ils soient des enquêteurs, des punisseurs et de gardiens de l’ordre public. Sur cet aspect du Droit chinois, v. … ; sur cette période particulièrement sanglante des légistes, où le principe de « certitude » de la législation a été portée à ses nues, v. …, people were still needed to interpret the regulations because a legal order must always be interpreted Ex Post by who must in any case answer the questions posed by the subjects of law, as soon as the political system admits to attributing to them the right to make claims before the Judge. Secondly the Attorney, whose office, although articulated with the Judge's office, is distinct from the latter, both more restricted and broader since he must appear in all cases where the judicial figure puts himself in square, outside the courts. However, Compliance Law has multiplied this since not only, extending Regulatory Law, it entrusts numerous powers to the administrative authorities, but it also transforms companies into judges, in respect of which the attorneys must deal with. Even more so, Compliance Law only takes its sense from its Monumental Goals2🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), 📘​Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022.. It is in this that this branch of the Law preserves the freedom of human beings, in the digital space where the techniques of compliance protect them from the power of companies by the way that the Compliance Law forces these companies to use their power to protect people. However, firstly, it is the Judges who, in their diversity3The topic of this study is general. For a more analytical perspective, s.. 🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A., « The function of the Judge in Compliance Law », in 🕴️Frison-Roche, M.A. (ed.), 📘Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, 2023. , impose as a reference the protection of human beings, either as a limit to the power of compliance tools4🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021.  or as their very purpose. Secondly, the Attorney, again distinguishing himself from the Judge, if necessary, reminds us that all the parties whose interests are involved must be taken into consideration. In an ever more flexible, soft and dialogical Law, everyone presenting himself as the "advocate" of such and such a monumental goal: the Attorney is legitimate to be the first to occupy this place.
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

SCEMLA, Sophie🕴️ et PAILLOT, Diane🕴️

📝The difficulty for Compliance Enforcement Authorities to comprehend the Rights of the Defence in compliance matters, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: S. Scemla & D. Paillot, “The difficulty for Compliance Enforcement Authorities to comprehend the Rights of the Defence in compliance matters”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 263-272. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Authors): Since 2016, French companies subject to the provisions of the so-called “Sapin 2” Law must implement eight stringent anti-corruption measures, such as a risk mapping, a whistleblowing procedure or a third-party due diligence procedure. To ensure their compliance with these obligations, the Sapin 2 law created the Agence française anticorruption – AFA (French Anti-Corruption Agency), which had been assigned three missions: firstly, to help any person prevent and detect corruption; secondly, to control the quality and effectiveness of the anti-corruption programs deployed by the companies; and thirdly, to sanction any breaches, through its Sanctions Committee. As pointed out by the French Conseil d’État, the powers devolved to the administrations have multiplied and became stratified. While the Conseil d’État suggests to improve both the conduct and the effectiveness of administrative controls by harmonising their practices and simplifying their prerogatives, it is urgent to remedy the numerous procedural failures that undermine the rights of defence. In fact, the AFA exercises various powers when undertaking its controls. Some of these powers are not provided for by the Law, and most of them infringe fundamental rights and freedoms among which the adversarial principle and the freedom not to self-incriminate. For instance, the AFA does not necessarily draft minutes of the interviews it conducts, thus depriving the interviewee of the possibility to challenge the statements reported by the AFA to the Sanctions Committee. From a more structural point of view, the scope of the AFA’s mission is extremely broad. The Law allows the AFA to request the communication of “any professional document or any useful information“, without defining the notion of usefulness. Also, the AFA considers that the entity cannot benefit from the legal privilege that would cover their documents, and considers that an entity who voluntarily hands over a document, without expressing any reserves, waives its right to the benefit of its legal privilege. Apart from the severe consequences that could arise if another proceedings was to be initiated by a foreign authority, the concept of “voluntary handover” does not faithfully reflect the reality. Indeed, the controlled entities only cooperate under the threat of being prosecuted on the basis of an obstruction to the control, which compels them to communicate documents even when facing the risk of contributing to their own incrimination. These many procedural deficiencies encountered during AFA controls must therefore be reformed, as recommended by the Conseil d’État, so as to require the authorities to take into account the rights of the defence. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

MOREL-MAROGER, Juliette🕴️

📝The application of compliance standards by European Union judges, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: J. Morel-Maroger, “The application of compliance standards by European Union judges”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant,coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 397-407. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): Compliance rules are intended to pursue objectives of public interest – or monumental goals – and thereby in principle modify and guide the behaviour of economic operators. In order to achieve these objectives, the full spectrum of norms are used in compliance matters. What is and what should be the role of the judges of the European Union in the development of compliance rules ? As in domestic law, the legality of compliance standards developed by regulatory authorities has been challenged. It will first be necessary to analyse what control the judges of the European Union have over these rules. The question arises essentially as regards the rules of soft law, the challenge of which can be considered in two ways : by way of an action for annulment and by exception by way of a preliminary ruling. But beyond the control of the legality of compliance rules exercised by European judges, they also contribute to their application. The effectiveness of compliance rules depend above all on them being followed by those to whom they are addressed, and economic operators are undoubtedly the first actors of its success. But the judges of the European Union, competent to settle disputes concerning the application of European Union law between the Member States, the European institutions, and individual applicants, may be also be involved in ensuring the effectiveness of European compliance rules and in interpreting them. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

CAYROL, Nicolas🕴️

📝Procedural Principles in Compliance Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: N. Cayrol, “Procedural Principles in Compliance Law”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 231-243. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): We could be satisfied with examining the reception of the principles of general Procedural Law in compliance litigation and the distortion that compliance techniques justify in procedural mechanisms. But the innovation that constitutes this emerging branch of law that is Compliance Law justifies going to more fundamental. From this perspective, the pertinent question is the very legitimacy of procedural principles in this branch of law, in that Procedural Law is built on the notion of “Litigation” while Compliance Law deals with situation so enormous, concerning for example the fate of the planet, that this notion of litigation appears inadequate, and consequently the procedural law would be too limited in compliance matters. If, however, this perspective is maintained of Compliance Law facing, in an almost warlike perspective, the greatest current challenges, general Procedural Law needs to be redesigned, in its very definition. Indeed, compliance trials call into question the future of systems and it is as such that they hold the entities, for instance the enterprises, that are at the heart of these systems. It is in this that liability trials are more “accountability” trials, allowing the judge to demand actions for the future, trials by which commitments are made and the “intentions” of the persons involved are challenged and required. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

BRUNEAU, Alain🕴️

📝The company judges itself: the Compliance function in the bank, in 🕴️M-A Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: A. Bruneau, “The company judges itself: the Compliance function in the bank”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche, (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 127-145 - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article: First, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples. Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance. In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as “Sapin 2” requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk. Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution. Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law. Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the “judge-judged”: following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

RACINE, Jean-Baptiste🕴🏿

📝Compliance and arbitration. An attempt at problematisation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, “Compliance and arbitration. An attempt at problematisation”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 289-304. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021. In the book, the article will be published in Title II, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage. - ► Summary of the article: Under the consideration of the “Compliance Jurisdictionalisation”, it is necessary to study in the links between Compliance and Arbitration. The arbitrator is a judge, he is even the natural judge of international trade. Arbitration is therefore naturally intended to meet compliance which transforms the action of companies in an international context. However, the links between compliance and arbitration are not obvious. It is not a question of providing firm and definitive answers, but rather, and above all, of asking questions. We are at the start of reflection on this topic, which explains why there is, for the time being, little legal literature on the subject of the relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. It doesn’t mean there aren’t connections. Quite simply, these relations may not have come to light, or they are in the making. We should research the existing or potential bridges between two worlds that have long gravitated separately: Compliance on the one hand, Arbitration on the other. The central question is: is or can the arbitrator be a compliance judge, and, if so, how? In any event, the Arbitrator is thus in contact with matters requiring the methods, tools and logic of Compliance. In addition to the prevention and suppression of corruption, three examples can be given. Arbitration has been facing economic sanctions (notably embargoes) for several years. The link with Compliance is obvious, insofar as texts providing for economic sanctions are often accompanied by compliance mechanisms, as in the United States. The arbitrator is concerned as to the fate he reserves in the treatment of the dispute with the measures of economic sanctions. Competition Law is a branch that came into contact with Arbitration from the end of the 1980s. The arbitrability of this type of dispute is now established and arbitrators apply it regularly. At the same time, Compliance has also entered Competition Law, admittedly more strongly in the United States than in France. The existence, absence or insufficiency of a compliance program aimed at preventing violations of the competition rules are thus circumstances which may assist the arbitrator in the assessment of anti-competitive behavior. Environmental Law is also concerned. There is environmental Compliance, for example with regard to the French law of March 27, 2017 on the duty of vigilance. Companies are thus responsible for participating in the protection of the environment, by internalizing these concerns in their internal and external operations (in their sphere of influence). As soon as an arbitrator is in charge for settling a dispute relating to Environmental Law, the question of the relationship to Compliance, from this angle, naturally arises. It is therefore the multiple interactions between Compliance and Arbitration, actual or potential, which are thus open. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

SCHILLER, Sophie🕴️

📝A single judge in the event of an international breach of compliance obligations?, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: S. Schiller, “A single judge in the event of an international breach of compliance obligations?”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 409-422. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author, translated by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Given the very international nature of the topic apprehended, the actors involved and therefore the compliance disputes, it is essential to know if a person can be implicated before several judges, attached to different states or even if he can be condemned by several jurisdictions. The answer is given by the non bis in idem principle, which is the subject of a abondant case law on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol n°7 of the ECHR, clearly inapplicable for jurisdictions emanating from different States. To assess whether breaches of compliance obligations may be subject to multiple sanctions in different states, it will first be necessary to ascertain whether there is a textual basis to be invoked. At European level, Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights now allows the principle of ne bis in idem to be invoked. Applicable to all areas of compliance, it provides very strong protection which covers not only sanctions, but also prosecutions. Like its effects, the scope of Article 50 is very broad. The procedures concerned are those which have a repressive nature, beyond those pronounced by criminal courts in the strict sense, which makes it possible to cover the convictions pronounced by one of the many regulatory authorities competent in matters of compliance. Internationally, the situation is less clear. Article 14-7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may be invoked, if several obstacles are overcome, including the decision of 2 November 1987 of the Human Rights Committee which restricted it to the internal framework, requiring a double conviction by the same State. Even if these principles are applicable, two specificities of compliance situations risk hampering their application, the first related to the applicable procedural rules, in particular the rules of jurisdiction, the second related to the specificities of the situation. The application of the non bis in idem rule is only formally accepted with regard to universal jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, that is to say extraterritorial jurisdiction, which is only part of the jurisdiction. . The Cour de cassation (French Judiciary Supreme Court) confirmed this in the famous so-called “Oil for food” judgment of March 14, 2018. The refusal to recognize this principle as universal, regardless of the jurisdiction rule in question, deprives French companies of a defense. Moreover, the repression of breaches of compliance rules is more and more often resolved through transactional mechanisms. The latter will not always fall within the scope of European and international rules laying down the non bis in idem principle, for lack of being sometimes qualified as “final judgment” under the terms of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 14-7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Breaches in terms of compliance are often based on multiple acts. This results from prescriptions the starting point of which is delayed at the last event and a facilitated jurisdiction for French courts when only one of the constitutive facts is found in France. In terms of compliance, the non bis in idem principle therefore generally does not protect companies and does not prevent them from being sued before the courts of two different countries for the same case. It nevertheless grants them another protection by obliging them to take into account foreign decisions in determining the amount of the penalty. The sanction against Airbus SE in the Judicial Convention of Public Interest (CJIP) of January 29, 2020 is a perfect illustration of this. Breaches in terms of compliance are often based on multiple acts. This causes delays in the starting point of prescriptions, starting point delayed at the last event, and this facilitates judicial jurisdiction for French courts when only one of the constitutive facts is found in France. In terms of compliance, the non bis in idem principle therefore generally does not protect companies and does not prevent them from being sued before the courts of two different countries for the same case. It nevertheless grants them another protection by obliging them to take into account foreign decisions in determining the amount of the penalty. The sanction against Airbus SE in the Convention judiciaire d’intérêt public -CJIP (French Judicial Convention of Public Interest) of January 29, 2020 is a perfect illustration of this. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

DOUVRELEUR, Olivier🕴️

📝 Compliance and Judge ruling only on points of Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: O. Douvreleur, “Compliance and Judge ruling only on points of Law”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, series “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2024, pp. 423-431. - ► Article Summary (done by the Journal of Regulation): Compliance maintains with the judge complex relations, and even more with the judge ruling only on points of Law (in France, the Court de Cassation in the judicial order, the one who, in principle, does not know the facts that he leaves to the sovereign appreciation of the judges ruling on the substance of the disputes. At first glance, compliance is a technique internalised in companies and the place occupied by negotiated justice techniques leave little room for intervention by the judge ruling only on points of Law However, his role is intended to develop, in particular with regard to the duty of vigilance or in the articulation between the different branches of Law when compliance meets Labor Law, or even in the adjustment between American Law and the other legal systems, especially French legal system. The way in which the principle of Proportionality will take place in Compliance Law is also a major issue for the judge ruling only on points of Law. -   read the general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published   -      
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

WENNERSTRÖM, Erik🕴️

📝Some Reflections on Compliance and the European Court of Human Rights, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: E. Wennerström, “Some Reflections on Compliance and the European Court of Human Rights”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 441-451. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The development of the European Court of Human Rights case law, contributing to European integration, has incorporated the substantial concept of ​​”compliance” which goes beyond the idea of ​​legality with respect to which companies remain passive, and promotes legal orders as systems in interaction with one another. The author develops the spirit and scope of Protocol 15 by which both the principle of subsidiarity and the margins of appreciation the signatory States are organized, mechanisms governed by the principle of proportionality. Subsidiarity means that the States are in the best position to design the most adequate application of the Convention, the close links between the States allowing its effective application. In addition, the new opinion procedure which allows a national court to have during a case the non-binding opinion of the ECHR ensures better compliance with the objectives of the Convention. The case-law of the Court takes up this substantial requirement through its doctrine, in particular identified in the Bosphorus case, by stressing that the accession of a State to the European Union presumes its compliance when implementing EU law with the obligations arising from the ECHR, even if this presumption can be refuted if the protection is manifestly lacking, which was admitted in several cases, in particular concerning the right to an impartial tribunal in matters of economic regulation. The different legal orders are thus articulated. The author concludes that the European Court of Human Rights, like the Court of Justice of the Union, contributes to the construction of Compliance Law in Europe, from an Ex Ante perspective favoring opinions rather than Ex Post sanctions and creating, in particular through the Bosphorus doctrine, elements of security and confidence for European integration around common values. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

Articles in a JoRC book

SILLAMAN, Bryan🕴️

📝Privilege Lessons from the U.S., in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Jurisdictionalisation

► Full Reference: B. Sillaman, “Privilege Lessons from the U.S.”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 251-255. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The French legal system is evolving, organizing interaction between lawyers with regulators and prosecutors, specially in investigations about corruption or corporate misconduct, adopting U.S. negotiated resolutions such as the Convention judiciaire d’intérêt public, which encourages “collaboration” between them. The author describes the evolution of the U.S. DOJ doctrine and askes French to be inspired by the U.S. procedural experience, U.S. where this mechanism came from. Indeed, the DOJ released memoranda about what the “collaboration” means. At the end (2006 Memorandum), the DOJ has considered that the legal privilege must remain intact when the information is not only factual in order to maintain trust between prosecutors, regulators and lawyers. French authorities do not follow this way. The author regrets it and thinks they should adopt the same reasoning as the American authority on the secret professionnel of the avocat, especially when he intervenes in the company internal investigation. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -