Contract

Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le contrat est-il l'instrument optimal de la RSE ? ("Is the Contract the optimal instrument of CSR?")  in Trébulle, F.-G. (modérateur), Les instruments de la RSE : le contrat (The instruments of CSR"), cycle of conferences organized by the Cour de cassation (French Civil Supreme Court and the Universities of Paris-Dauphine, Paris VIII and Paris I),Cour de cassation, Paris, 11 mai 2017. Read the slides (in French) as served as the basis of the conference les slides Read the program on the Cour de cassation  wesite (in French). Read the program of the whole cycle of conferences in which this conference enters (in French)   Corporate Social Responsibility belongs to Economic Law. It thus enters into its logic of efficiency, leading to apprehend any legal mechanism as an instrument, the contract as the others. This does not mean that everything is only an instrument, on the contrary. Economic Law, when it takes the form of Regulation Law, places the principles in the aims pursued. It is in these principles that it can meet CSR if the goals are the same. In view of these aims, everything is an instrument. On the scale of goals which are "monumental"¹On this notion of "Monumental Goal", see Frison-Roche, M-A., Compliance Law, 2016 ; From Regulation Law to Compliance Law, 2017., in that they are global, in that they seem unattainable, such as the fight against child labor, such as the end of corruption or the sale of human beings, all legal instruments become interchangeable, from the Constitution to the contract, from the hard law to the soft law. The only criterion becomes efficiency to achieve the goal. We then reach the efficiency, criterion of the Regulation Law. New laws, such as in France in 2016 the Sapin 2 law or in 2017 the law establishing a "duty of vigilance" with uncertain contours, may use the contract only as a vehicle for legal obligations to be performed by the company²For a whole demonstration, see Frison-Roche, M.-A.,From Regulation Law to Compliance Law, 2017.. The contract becomes an instrument of the Compliance Law, chosen as the optimal instrument of the Internalized Regulation Law in the company. But the contract can also be chosen as an instrument by the company in that it pursues the same goals of general interest, becoming global³On this notion of "global general interest", and maybe of "global public service", see Frison-Roche, M.A., From Regulation Law to Compliance Law, 2017 .. The contract is then chosen as an Ex Ante tool, which will be refined to the specificity of the company, exceeded the generality of the law and which will be able to resolve the diversity of national laws by more comprehensive contractual relations. Moreover, the contract can integrate active Ex Post mechanisms, such as the warning launcher or the controller, audits, or even form an ecosystem by training clauses to disseminate a CSR culture. By these contractual provisions, the contract operates the mixing of times, the Ex-Ante and the Ex Post, which the legislation can not do, refines it to what the particular enterprise is . In this, the contract converges towards what is being constructed: a Compliance Law.

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Globalization from the point of view of Law, working paper, May 2017. - 🎤 This working paper initially served as a basis for a synthesis report made in French in the colloquium organized by the Association Henri Capitant in the International German Days on the subject of "Le Droit et la Mondialisation" (Law and Globalization). 📝 Il sert dans un second temps de base à l'article paru dans l'ouvrage La Mondialisation. 📝 it serves as a second basis for the article (written in English, with a Spanish Summary) to be published in the Brezilian journal Rarb – Revista de Arbitragem e Mediação  (Revue d`Arbitrage et Médiation). It uses the Bilingual Dictionary of the Law of Regulation and Compliance. - ► Summary of the Working: Globalization is a confusing phenomenon for the jurist. The first thing to do is to take its measure. Once it has been taken, it is essential that we allow ourselves to think of something about it, even if we have to think about it. For example, on whether the phenomenon is new or not, which allows a second assessment of what is taking place. If, in so far as the law can and must "pretend" to defend every being, a universal claim destined to face the global field of forces, the following question – but secondary – is formulated: quid facere? Nothing ? Next to nothing ? Or regulate? Or can we still claim that the Law fulfills its primary duty, which is to protect the weak, including the forces of globalization? - read the Working Paper below⤵️

February 17, 2015, as the previous "Contrat de Régulation Économique" (Economie Regulatory Contract), the firm Aéroport de Paris (ADP)  has made available on its site to all "for consultation" the draft  "Contrat de Régulation Economique ("Economic Regulatory Contract)  for the period 2016 -2020. Published in the wake of the meeting of the Board of ADP, the text is presented as a tool "for the Paris place", especially for air transport. This shows that the document is primarily intended for investors and financial markets, the document being placed on the company website in the section for the "investors". This illustrates the evolution from the traditional "contrats de plan" (plan contracts). But then, who are the parties to these types of contract? Indeed, the very term "Regulatory contract"  is new in public Law. It appears as a sort of  modernization of "plan contract." The Conseil d'État (French State Council) finally admitted the contractual nature of these planning contracts. In these contracts, are parties were the State and the company in charge of a public service. Because here the contract is an instrument of "economic regulation" the open public consultation draft rather expresses a global conception of  ADP, the company which manages the Paris airports,  for the future of the development of critical infrastructure that is the airport as the heart of global development of air transport. The enterprise manager of the airport in the heart of the contract (rather than the State) in setting objectives for the coming four years is the letter and spirit of the French law of 20 April 2005 about Airports, which put the apparatus of this "Contrat de Régulation Economique" in place. In this, the infrastructure manager is set by law as a "regulator of second degree", as can be a financial market enterprise. The company that manages and develops the Paris airports undoubtedly belongs to the category of " critical firms", as well it manages the future of the sector and helps to keep France a place in the world. More, A.D.P. behaves like a Regulator, since it is carrying out the "public consultation", the consultation paper prepared by it,  being placed on its site and developing its ambitions for the sector and for France. But A.D.P. also expressed as a financial and economic actor, emphasizing the competitive environment,  demanding in passing more stability and clarity in the regulation in which it moves … That is why the consultation mechanism provided by the law must be more complex. Indeed, ADP can not be judge and jury. Therefore if the project raises observations, they must be formuled not to ADP but to the Ministries of Aviation and Economy, within a month. They shall communicate theiir content to ADP . Then the Commission consultative aéroportaire (French Airport Consultative Committee) will be consulted. At the end of this process, the "Contrat de Régulation Economique" will be signed. Seing the end of the process, it remains in line with the plan contracts, since it remains the Economic Regulatory Contract is signed between the State and the essential infrastructure manager. But the consultation process shows firstly investors are the first recipients of the statements made by a privatized company presenting its draft primarily in terms of competitive context and international development and secondly the airlines that use daily services of the airports are also directly involved by theses questions of tarification. Airlines protest against the increase in the money that will be asked. This will be imposed, since it is tarification and princing public policy. We are in unilateral rules. But it is indeed a "price" they feel to pay, they also heard a speech referring to competition in what the mechanism is presented as a "contract". But then, does it take to admit that these "contracts for economic regulation" are not between two parties that are the state and the regulator of second degree that is the infrastructure manager but must be three, the State, the infrastructure manager and "stakeholders" that are mainly airlines? This practical difficulty is much to the fact that the qualification of "contract" is difficult to justify in proceeding in which prevail unilateral mechanisms.

TRANSLATED SUMMARIES ENGLISH “Acting in a neutral way” is an oxymoron. “Companies often require however that States use their powers in a neutral way (eg tax neutrality). In regulated sectors, some are right or even duty , of not being neutral. Firstly, it is the State, which requires the market for other purposes, other temporalities and other values​​. Secondly, they are also the “crucial operators”, which are sort of regulators of second degree, such as transmission system operators or companies capital markets firms. The difficulty increases when the systeme requires neutrality of regulators and judges, when first build economic policy and the second create jurisprudence. Their consistency, impartiality and rationality can create an objectifiable neutralitys FRENCH «Agir de façon neutre» est un oxymoron. «Les entreprises ont souvent besoin, cependant, que les États utilisent leurs pouvoirs de manière neutre (neutralité fiscale par exemple). Dans les secteurs réglementés, certains ont le droit ou même le devoir de ne pas être neutre. Tout d’abord, c’est l’État, qui insère le marché à d’autres fins, d’autres temporalités et d’autres valeurs. En second lieu, ils sont aussi les «opérateurs crucial», qui sont des sortes de régulateurs du second degré : par exemple les opérateurs de réseaux de transport ou de entreprises de marchés financiers. La difficulté augmente lorsque le systeme économique et politique exige la neutralité des autorités de régulation et des juges, alors que les premiers construisent la politique économique et les seconds construisent la jurisprudence. Le respect qu’ils doivent avoir de l’impartialité et d’une rationalité suffisamment objectivables pourra permettre cette objectivité requise.

Translated Summaries ENGLISH : This article provides an economic perspective on the role played by competition policy in the development of competition in various transport sectors. After a brief reminder of some economic features that are shared by different transport modes, it mainly examines the principles and practical underpinnings of merger control as it is implemented in the present context of rapid consolidation in some transport sectors. Thereby, it stresses some potential shortcomings of the traditional merger regula tion approach in the particular context of transportation services, pointing to an excessive attention paid to potential competition issues on overly narrow relevant markets while largely ignoring global efficiency-enhancing effects of mergers and alliances. ITALIAN Articolo: Trasporti, concorrenza e politica in material di concorrenza. Questo articolo delinea una prospettiva economica del ruolo della politica in materia di concorrenza nello sviluppo della libera concorrenza in vari settori dei trasporti. Dopo un breve richiamo ad alcuni aspetti economici, comuni a diversi tipi di trasporto, l’articolo passa in esame i principi e le pratiche fondamentali del controllo delle concentrazione cosi come applicato nell’attuale contesto di consolidamento di alcuni settori dell’industria dei trasporti. Tuttavia, l’articolo mette in rilievo ugualmente alcune carenze potenziali di un approccio classico della regolazione delle concentrazioni nello specifico settore dei trasporti, tra cui l’eccessiva attenzione data alle questioni di concorrenza potenziale su mercati di dimensioni ridotte e la noncuranza generalizzata degli effetti di alleanze e fusioni in materia di efficacia e di progresso. SPANISH Artículo: Transporte, competencia y política competitiva Este artículo da una perspectiva económica sobre el rol jugador por la política de la competencia y el desarrollo de la competencia en varios sectores de transporte. Después de un breve recordatorio sobre las características económicas compartidas por diferentes modales de transporte, examina principalmente los principios y detalles prácticos de la implementación de control de uniones en el contexto presente de consolidación rápida en algunos sectores de transporte. El artículo pone énfasis algunos de los defectos potenciales del la regulación tradicional de uniones, particularmente en el contexto de los servicios de transporte, indicando un enfoque excesivo a cuestiones de competencia potencial en mercados demasiado estrechos y a la vez ignorando los efectos del mejoramiento de eficacia global de las uniones y las alianzas.    PORTUGUESE Artigo: Transporte, concorrência e política concorrencial Este artigo fornece uma perspectiva econômica sobre o papel exercido pela política concorrencial no desenvolvimento da concorrência em diversos setores de transporte. Após uma breve retomada de conceitos econômicos compartilhados por modos de transporte diferentes, ele examina principalmente os princípios e os problemas práticos do controle como implementado no contexto presente de rápida consolidação em alguns setores de transporte. Assim, ele sublinha alguns potenciais conflitos no enfoque da regulação tradicional no contexto particular de serviços de transporte, apontando para uma atenção excessiva concedida para problemas de concorrência potencial em muito relevantes mercados enquanto são amplamente ignorados os efeitos na eficiência global. Transporte aéreo – Avião – Aeroporto – Aliança – Comportamento anti-concorrencial – Falência – Concorrência – Autoridade de concorrência – Política de concorrência – Concentração – Contrato – Subsídios cruzados – Economia de escala – Eficiência – Ganho de eficiência – Barreiras de entrada – Equilíbrio – Comissão Europeia – Custo fixo – França – Londres – Incentivo – Operador incumbente – Infraestrutura – Interconexão – Investimento – Monopólio legal – Liberalização – Rede de longa distância – Estrutura de mercado – Controle – Firma de multiprodução – Rede – Mercado oligopolístico – Concorrência potencial – Preço – Elasticidade de preço – Trilho – Transporte por trilhos – Mercado relevante – Transporte rodoviário – Segmento – Serviço – Tempo – Transporte – Reino Unido – Comunidade urbana – Veículo.* * Em The Journal of Regulation, estas palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Editor e não pelo Autor. ………………… Other translations forthcoming.

ENGLISH Competition is the principle element of markets, in the princely sense of the term.The relationships that regulation maintains with competition are ambiguous. It is important to eliminate this ambiguity in order to reveal the ab initio opposition between regulation and competition, to shed light upon the dialectics between both of them. Indeed, regulation may aim at building competition, and is thereby presented as a tool that will cease being used when the competitive market functions effectively. Administration – Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et des Postes – Competition – Competition Authority – Conflict of intersts – Consumer – Contract – Equilibrium – European Commission – Ex ante / Ex post – Government – Hayek – Horyzontal regulation – Information asymmetry – Liberalisation – Market failure – Natural economic monopoly – Online gambling – Political mandate – Postal services – Power – Principle – Real economy – “Réglementation” – Regulator – Regulatory Authority – Self regulation – symmetrical regulation – Telecommunication – Tool – Watchdog * * In The Journal of Regulation, these keywords are done by the Editor and not by the Author.   PORTUGUESE Artigo: Regulação versus Concorrência Concorrência é o principal elemento dos mercados, no mais genuíno sentido da palavra. As relações que regulação mantém com a concorrência são ambíguas. É importante eliminar essa ambiguidade de modo a relativizar a oposição ab initio entre regulação e concorrência, para trazer luz para a dialética entre elas. Com efeito, regulação pode tender a construir a concorrência, e é então apresentada como uma ferramenta que deixará de ser usada quando o mercado competitivo passar a funcionar realmente. Administração – Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et des Postes – Concorrência – Autoridade de concorrência – Conflito de interesse – Consumidor – Contrato – Equilíbrio – Comissão Europeia – Ex ante / Ex post – Governo – Hayek – Regulação horizontal – Informação assimétrica – Liberalização – Falha de mercado – Monopólio econômico natural – Jogo em linha – Mandato político – Serviços postais – Poder – Princípio – Economia real – Regulamentação – Regulador – Autoridade de regulação – Auto-regulação – Regulação simétrica – Telecomunicações – Ferramenta – Observador* * No Journal of Regulation, as palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Diretor, e não pelo Autor. ITALIAN Articolo: Regolazione vs. Concorrenza La concorrenza è il principio fondamentale dei mercati, nel senso stretto del termine. Le relazioni tra regolazione e concorrenza sono ambigue. Per rivelare il contrasto tra regolazione e concorrenza è importante cancellare questa ambiguità e chiarire la dinamica di questi due concetti. In effetti, la regolazione punta a sviluppare la concorrenza ed è spesso considerata uno strumento che non avrà più ragion d’essere una volta che il mercato funzionerà in libera concorrenza. Amministrazione – Asimmetria dell’informazione – Autoregolazione – Autorità di regolazione – Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et des Postes – Autorità garante della concorrenza – Commissione Europea – Concorrenza – Conflitto di interessi – Contratto – Consumatore – Economia reale – Equilibrio – Ex ante / Ex post – Governo – Hayek – Liberalizzazione – Mancato Funzionamento del mercato – Monopolio economico naturale – Mandato politico – Potere – Principio – “Regolamentazione” – Regolatore – Regolazione orizzontale – Regolazione simmetrica – Servizi postali – Scommesse online – Strumento – Telecomunicazioni – Vigilanza * * In The Journal of Regulation, le parole chiave sono responsabilità dell’Editore e non dall’Autore.   SPANISH Artículo: Regulación versus la competencia La competencia es el elemento principal de los mercados, en precisamente el sentido de este término. Es importante eliminar esta ambigüedad para poder revelar la posición ab initio entre la regulación y la competencia, para poder traer a luz las dialécticas entre las dos. Así tanto, la regulación puede intentar construir la competencia, y es, por consiguiente, un instrumento que cesará de ser utilizado cuando el mercado competitivo funcione de manera eficaz.     Other translations forthcoming.