Resources

Full reference: Guenzoui, Y. (ed.), La norme culturelle dans l'ordre juridique. Réflexions sur le vivre ensemble (written in French), Coll. "Contextes. Culture du droit", LGDJ, March 2020, 368 p. Read the fourth of cover (in French) Read the table of contents (in French)

Reference: Patrick BOLTON – Morgan DESPRES – Luiz Awazu PEREIRA DA SILVA – Frédéric SAMAMA – Romain SVARTZMAN, The green swan: central banking and financial stability in the age of climate change, Banque des Règlements Internationaux, Janvier 2020 Accede to article

Full reference: Féral-Schuhl, C., Cyberdroit. Le Droit à l'épreuve de l'internet, Collection Praxis Dalloz, Dalloz, 8th edition, 2020, 1731p.   Read the forth of cover (in French) Read the table of contents (in French)

Full reference: Cour de Cassation, Chambre commerciale, Arrêt n° 319 du 1er juillet 2020 (18-21.487) Read the decision 

Full reference: Adam, P., Le Friant, M. et Tarasewicz, Y. (ed.), Intelligence artificielle, gestion algorithmique du personnel et droit du travail (written in French), serie "Les travaux de l'AFDT", Coll. "Thèmes et Commentaires", Dalloz, 2020, 241p. Read the fourth of cover

Full reference: Desmoulin-Canselier, Sonia and Le Métayer, Daniel, Décider avec les algorithmes: Quelle place pour l'Homme, quelle place pour le droit? (written in French), coll. Les sens du droit: essai, Dalloz, February 2020, 258p. Read the fourth of cover (written in French)

Full reference: Tzutzuiano, C., L'effectivité de la sanction pénale (written in French), Collection "Bibliothèque des sciences criminelles", n°67, Lextenso – LGDJ, February 2020, 429 p. Read the fourth of cover (written in French)

Look at the video defining the "subjective right"

Full reference: ARAFER, Opinion n°2019-083 relatif aux projets de décrets approuvant les statuts de la société nationale SNCF, de la société SNCF Réseau, de la filiale mentionnée au 5° de l’article L. 2111-9 du code des transports et de la société SNCF Voyageurs, et portant diverses dispositions relatives à ces mêmes entités (related to the project of decrees approving the status of the national societies SNCF, SNCF réseau, of the subsidy mentionnes at the 5° of the article L. 2111-9 du code des transports and of SNCF Voyageurs, and carrying some dispositions related to this bodies), 9th of December 2019 Read the opinion (in French) Read the décret approuvant les status de la société nationale SNCF (in French) Read the opinion of 9th of May 2019 having preceded the one of 9th of December 2019

Watch the video explaining the "right to be forgotten". The "right to be forgotten" is a recent and specifically European invention. It was designed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Google Spain judgment of May 13, 2014, so that in this world without time, in which all information is eternally stored and available that is the digital world, the individual thus exposed can be protected against this new phenomenon, since forgetting no longer exists, by Law which by its power endows it with a "right to be forgotten". In this the term Right to be forgotten is more accurate. Because Law is made to protect human beings, the technological efficiency which created the digital world is limited by the new legal prerogative of the person to make unattainable information which concerns him when it takes on a "personal character". This was taken up by the community regulation of April 27, 2016, often called GDPR, transposed in the member states of the European Union no later than May 25, 2018. More than in the laws which have taken up the idea of ​​protection of persons in the handling of "data" by others, expressing more the concern to protect the consumer in a market economy, it is a question of directly protecting persons. in a technological world allowing blind obedience, Europe rejecting this model because the technique of the files left him a terrible memory because of the Second World War. However, Law is the memory of peoples and expresses the “spirit” of these (Savigny).

Full reference: CEDH, 24th of October 2019, Carrefour France v. France, n°21488/14 Read the decision (in French) Read the press release (in French)   Summary of the decision In this decision, the ECHR convicts Carrefour France to a civil fine for practices restricting competition committed by the company Carrefour hypermarkets France, dissolved and absorbed by its sole shareholder Carrefour France after the facts.  

Subsidiarity in the current sense is the idea that those closest to the action to be carried out must do so rather than the one who is far from it, because the latter is on the one hand less legitimate to do so and on the other hand less effective to do so. Subsidiarity is therefore a mechanism of both efficiency and legitimacy. In this respect, it constitutes both a political and a management principle: it is a principle of governance. It is also found in the form of a legal principle in European Union law, with a strong impact in Regulatory Law. Indeed, the principle of subsidiarity is a pillar of the European Union. Article 5 of the Treaty states that the power which enables public authorities to act legally by setting standards and by coercion is and remains with the Member States. But – and this is the very meaning of the Treaty which founded the Community, then the European Union – powers and objectives have been conferred on the European Union. In a first formulation, it was stated that within the "limits" of these "competences" and these "objectives", the European Union (as a legal person endowed with powers) and its institutions – in particular the Commission – can to act. The first meaning of the principle of subsidiarity is therefore that which one could say of a "sovereignty retained" by the Member States: everything that is not vested in the European Union is retained by the Member States. But we can see that as much as it is easy enough to define the "limits of competences", the line is less certain concerning the "objectives". Indeed, the "objectives" conferred on the Union are so broad that, depending on the interpretation given by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), there may not be much left of the principle of subsidiarity. This is why the text was completed, a principle indicating more of a method. Indeed, the Treaty firstly states that in certain matters the European Union has "exclusive competence". It is also exceptional, since it is vested in the Member States. This mainly concerns customs jurisdiction outside the Union, monetary jurisdiction outside the euro zone, competition law and common commercial policy. In this case, the European institutions exercise their full normative powers. When this transfer has not taken place, the European Union is no longer prima facie legitimate, that is to say its institutions cannot act since the Member States remain the legitimate authors of the standards. But if it turns out that the European Union is best placed to effectively achieve the desired objectives, even if there is no transfer of exclusive competence to the Union, then if the European institution can provide this proof that it is "better placed" to act effectively, it will be able to act. Completed, Article 5 of the Treaty now provides: By virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union intervenes only if, and to the extent that, the objectives of the action envisaged cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, both at central, regional and local level, but may be better achieved, due to the dimensions or effects of the envisaged action, at the level of the Union. The end of Article 5 is above all methodological: the method of comparing the effectiveness of the action of a Member State – for example a law – and the action of a Union institution – for example a draft Regulation drawn up by the European Commission. When the two claim to be the most effective in achieving the Community objective – for example – energy security, then the question of the burden of proof arises. This is where the principle of subsidiarity takes all its power, which is above all proof: it is indeed for the European Union, in the above example the European Commission – to demonstrate that it is proved its project for an instrument (here an energy security regulation) which will be more effective in serving the objective, which the Member State could not achieve alone. A very heavy burden of proof for the Union and numerous objects of proof: the inability of the Member State to achieve this objective and the capacity of the Union to achieve it. If the Union provides this proof, then, even if there has not been a transfer of exclusive competence to its benefit, it will be able to act and lay down the principle that in Europe the normative power remains in the Member States. The legal principle of subsidiarity is essential in Regulatory Law. Indeed, because of its link with Politics, sectoral regulations are generally not transferred exclusively to the level of the European Union. This is why, strictly speaking, there are no "European regulators", but rather agencies which centralize information and its access. However and to take the most topical example, the need generated by the financial and banking situation in Europe justified the regulatory, supervisory and institutional mechanisms being brought to community level by the Banking Union, from 2010. But we do not find the same transfers, for example in energy, rail or telecommunications, which would undoubtedly contradict the legal principle of subsidiarity.

The sector is the first historical reference for Regulation since, independently of the notion of market, it is a set of economic activities which have a technical object in common, for example the telephone, rail or banking. It is precisely because these objects have a particular technicality, for example conveying innovation or presenting a risk, or developing only in the long term, that definitive regulations are put in place, because there is a failure of market. The breakdown by sector seems to be obvious, for example the post office on the one hand, the telephone on the other hand, and the media on the third. But the evolution of technology means that if one takes into consideration the transmission of information first, these sectors become interchangeable. This is why the primary criterion of technicality that justifies recourse to the sector to define the contours of regulation, the construction of a regulator and its powers, necessarily evolves over time with the technical modifications of the objects in question. This is why, for example, we have chosen to segment the telecommunications sector into around twenty markets, while the minds of the possible merger of regulators of the container and content in telecommunications and the media or that we hesitate between 'interregulation and the merger between banking, finance and insurance, while the entry into the digital "era" would give the idea of ​​a new regulator, while it is difficult to say that the digital is a sector. The question then arises as to whether the "sector" is an outdated benchmark. Internet and digital can make it think so. The sector, if it is not an outdated concept, is at least for regulation a changing concept, for example in that it must give way to the concept of sector.