► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Unicity and Diversity of Compliance Clauses: towards a Contractual Compliance System, Working Paper, 10 August 2026, updated on 20 September 2026.
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📝 This Working Paper served as the basis for the conference « Unicité et Diversité des clauses de Compliance » (Unicity and Diversity of Compliance Clauses) (in French), given on 25 September 2026 in Lyon at the colloquium 🧮La contractualisation de la Compliance : clause après clause, organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, as part of the 🏗️2026 cycle of colloquia Compliance and Contract.
📘 It is the basis of the article to be published in the book 📘Compliance and Contract, in the 📚Compliance & Regulation series, co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant.
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► Summary of the Working Paper: Practitioners insert into a wide variety of contracts clauses that are expressly designated as “Compliance clauses”. We lack a definition, so their legal regime is uncertain. To consolidate this practice and ensure that its development produces satisfactory effects, these clauses must be classified, named and distinguished from one another.
In a first stage, a strong unicity of Compliance clauses appears. But this unicity is somewhat misleading. It proceeds from a confusion between contract and statute: whether the clause, as a block, obliges the other contracting party to comply with all the regulations, or borrows its unity from the particular corpus of which it claims to be the tool of application, the clause copies the legislation. This is the unified but rather archaic conception to which the Regulator has itself lent credence, by designating the Compliance clause only as a delegation within a normative power that would remain first and foremost its own.
So as not to stop there, in a second stage, the study shows the great diversity of Compliance clauses, a de jure diversity born of the principle of contractual freedom and a de facto diversity resulting from the porosity of the clause to the activities concerned, the country and the persons. To be mastered, this diversity must be channelled by a nomenclature. It must also be preserved in a lasting way, because it stems from the general policy of the company and the project it wishes to develop, for example in the value chains it has chosen to build through regulatory contracts.
Nevertheless, and this is the subject of the third stage, there is a deep and programmatic unicity of Compliance clauses, which lies in the systemic goals they serve. In practice, this unicity is built through an interlinked system of clauses, precisely described and specific to each undertaking. At the level of a large company, this can give rise to a Contractual Compliance System, which is articulated and allied with the regulatory system.
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🔓read the developments below⤵️
1. “Compliance clause”: the novelty of the name. The expression is recent and already everywhere, even fashionable. Practitioners often handle it as a familiar object, yet it appears in no code and receives a definition from no statute. In “business contracts”1On this notion, see Fr. Buy, J. Heinich, M. Lamoureux, J. Mestre and J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), Les principales clauses des contrats d’affaires, 3rd ed., Lextenso - LGDJ, coll. « Droit et pratique professionnelle », 2025; see also F.-X. Testu, Contrats d’affaires, Dalloz Action, 2010, as well as J.-M. Mousseron, P. Mousseron, J. Raynard and J.-B. Seube, Technique contractuelle, Éd. Francis Lefebvre. The business contract may be defined as a contract concluded between professionals for the purposes of their economic activity, whose object is less a one-off exchange than the lasting organisation of a transaction, and which is recognised less by a statutory classification than by its milieu – business practice – and by the freedom of stipulation of which it is the field. This legal category is more doctrinal and practitioner-based than statutory, even though statutes refer to it when they handle notions such as the contract concluded between professionals, the standard-form contract within the meaning of Article 1110 of the French Civil Code, the established commercial relationship of Article L. 442-1 of the French Commercial Code, or the international commercial contract (Unidroit Principles, model contracts of the International Chamber of Commerce). The notion of business contract is particularly relevant, since the insertion of a Compliance clause seems conceivable only in this type of contract. For a more nuanced view, see infra § 48, clauses expressly designated as “conformity clause” and sometimes as “compliance clause” are now present. It was judicious for a collection of clauses to make room for it2J.-Ch. Roda, « Clause de compliance », No. 17, in Fr. Buy, J. Heinich, M. Lamoureux, J. Mestre and J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), Les principales clauses des contrats d’affaires, op. cit., pp. 131-139. The entry appears to have no equivalent. No other French-language collection of clauses devotes an entry to the Compliance clause, the publisher of this one itself classing it among the stipulations “born of the most recent practice”. English-language contract-drafting works know of it no more: databases of model clauses retain under compliance clause only the commonplace formula whereby each party undertakes to comply with applicable laws. The equivalent is to be found elsewhere and in another form: the Model Contract Clauses 2.0 drawn up by the working group of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association (D. V. Snyder, S. A. Maslow and S. Dadush, « Balancing Buyer and Supplier Responsibilities : Model Contract Clauses to Protect Workers in International Supply Chains, Version 2.0 », The Business Lawyer, vol. 77, No. 1, 2021, pp. 115-182), thirty-three stipulations which translate into contractual obligations the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance; European Model Clauses are being prepared on this model. The difference in method is significant: the collection of clauses ranks the Compliance clause among the others, in alphabetical order, whereas the American work starts from the goals and builds the stipulations that serve them.. But a single term is used to name stipulations that are highly varied.
2. A barely Spanish inn. Reading the Compliance clauses inserted by practitioners into contracts, one finds so much diversity – in the persons concerned and the organisations involved, in the situations targeted, in the mechanisms provided for, in the requirements formulated – that this “Compliance clause” looks like an “auberge espagnole”, a “Spanish inn”. It is in truth barely Spanish3Yet Spain is, on the contrary, one of the few countries to have written Compliance into its Criminal Code itself. Ley Orgánica 5/2010 introduced into it the criminal liability of legal persons (art. 31 bis of the Código Penal, applicable to acts committed after 24 December 2010), and Ley Orgánica 1/2015, which entered into force on 1 July 2015, turned it into a Compliance system: the legal person is exempted from liability if, before the offence was committed, it adopted and effectively implemented an “organisation and management model” capable of preventing offences of that kind or of significantly reducing the risk of them, whose requirements are listed in Article 31 bis 5 and whose supervision is entrusted to a body vested with autonomous powers. Circular 1/2016 of the Fiscalía General del Estado governs its assessment by the public prosecutor, who must verify that the programme reflects a genuine commitment on the part of the company and not a mere façade; the Tribunal Supremo has confirmed its exonerating effect (see esp. STS 316/2018 of 26 June 2018). Ley 2/2023, transposing Directive (EU) 2019/1937, added the regime of whistleblowing channels, including anonymous ones (art. 7.3), and the rights of the person implicated in the internal investigation (art. 9.2). Legal scholarship is abundant but almost entirely in Spanish (see esp. J.-L. Gómez Colomer (ed.), Tratado sobre compliance penal. Responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas y modelos de organización y gestión, Tirant lo Blanch); for an account accessible in English, see the contribution devoted to Spain in The Practitioner’s Guide to Global Investigations, Global Investigations Review, 2025 ed., so great does American influence remain4American influence is pervasive in Compliance Law, to the point that American law is often presented as its cradle (contra, M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Compliance : avant, maintenant, après », in N. Borga, J.-Cl. Marin and J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), Compliance : l’entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, JoRC and Dalloz, coll. « Régulations & Compliance », 2018, pp. 23-36). It is Compliance that the Department of Justice formalised in its Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, and that deferred prosecution agreements turned into contractual undertakings. The contract followed, and kept its form: the American-style Compliance clause is written in representations and warranties, coupled with covenants, audit rights, rights of immediate termination, indemnification and flow-down to subcontractors, the whole preceded by due diligence on the counterparty. This architecture, born of the practice of the large law firms, has spread unchanged into contracts that no American law governs, carried by the extraterritorial reach of the FCPA and of economic sanctions. The effect is twofold. It has given the French drafter a toolkit that he lacked; it has also imposed on him a logic of warranty and risk transfer, where Compliance Law calls for a logic of structure and effects. The critical movement, moreover, comes from the United States itself: the Model Contract Clauses 2.0, op. cit., deliberately abandon the regime of representations and warranties and strict contractual liability in favour of a regime of diligence shared between buyer and supplier. This shows that the American model is not a monolith, and that it is debated in the very language in which it was written.. The regulatory obsession has contributed to these clauses being little observed, since some go as far as asserting that the law of conformity leads to an “administered economy”, thus leaving no further room for contract5On this question, see infra §§ 20 and 26. , whereas the study of the clauses that practice invents in this field weakens such a description. Yet it is important to describe and study them, if only to accompany and assist this practice.
3. As for the Compliance Obligation, drawing up a nomenclature to better delineate the category and accompany practice. Observing practice is the starting point. Indeed, practice is often observed only through litigation, which is both reductive and distorting6Which takes nothing away from the interest of observing this litigation. See also, on the same movement whereby legal scholarship observes practice, Th. Goujon-Béthan, « Les enjeux présents à venir de l’articulation des principes de procédure civile et commerciale avec la logique de compliance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, JoRC and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. « Régulations & Compliance », 2025, pp. 693-719, as well as his two contributions in this book, one arising from the conference « Le contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance : aspects procéduraux et juridictionnels » (Université Jean Moulin – Lyon 3, 29 May 2026), « La contractualisation de la mise en état, outil naturel du contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance », the other arising from the conference « La contractualisation de la Compliance : clause après clause » (Université Jean Moulin – Lyon 3, 25 September 2026), « Les clauses de Compliance relatives à la procédure, à l’expertise et à la mise en état ».. It is all the more important to do so here since one may think that this conformity or Compliance clause will give rise to litigation: it must therefore be described in its ordinary functioning, including when its purpose is to prevent or manage disputes7On conformity clauses “in high winds”, see infra §§ 42 ff.. For example, one of the contracting parties may allege its non-performance in order to obtain the termination of the whole contract8Thus the Cour de cassation, in the judgment of its Commercial Chamber of 20 November 2019, held that, in view of the rules laid down by the Compliance programme and of the agreement concluded, the counterparty’s breach of its contractual obligations, in so far as it was liable to engage the company’s own liability as a subject of the law, was sufficiently serious to justify terminating the commercial relationship without notice (Cass. com., 20 nov. 2019, n° 18-12.817, Sté Equilibre implant chirurgical c/ Sté Zimmer Biomet France, unpublished, D. 2020, p. 913, note J.-Ch. Roda, dismissing the appeal against CA Paris, 30 nov. 2017). To the same effect, the Cour d’appel de Paris, 4 December 2024, n° 22/12973, concerning a supplier which had failed to comply with the anti-corruption programme of its principal. On this point, see J.-Ch. Roda, « Clause de compliance », op. cit., Nos. 279 and 280, and G. J. Martin, « Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit. For this, the Compliance clause must be decisive (on this point, see infra § 31). The obligee contracting party, or others, may also bring an action for liability and/or for specific performance against these actors of the Compliance clause, see infra §§ 46 ff.. But how is this practice to be described? When the aim was to delineate the Compliance Obligation, the one to which crucial operators are subject9Practice gains from being described: it is by naming it, classifying it and confronting it with the categories that legal scholarship enables it to develop rather than merely repeat itself. See J. Paillusseau, « Le big bang du droit des affaires à la fin du XXe siècle (ou les nouveaux fondements et notions du droit des affaires) », JCP 1988, éd. G, I, 3330, also published in the Revue de jurisprudence commerciale, Dec. 1987, p. 377 ff.; by the same author, his contribution to the Journées René Savatier, in Le droit contemporain des contrats, Economica, 1987, p. 169 ff. (JCP 1987, éd. G, I, 3275). See also P. Didier, « Brèves notes sur le contrat-organisation », in L’avenir du droit. Mélanges en hommage à François Terré, PUF, Dalloz and Éditions du Juris-Classeur, 1999, pp. 635-642, who shows what theory gains by starting from the arrangements that practice invents; and, for the approach of contractual engineering itself, J.-M. Mousseron, P. Mousseron, J. Raynard and J.-B. Seube, Technique contractuelle, op. cit., the method adopted was to distinguish, then classify, then name, so that this obligation would become in practice more comprehensible, more manageable and more fruitful in the long term. Nomenclature is not an academic exercise: it is the condition for the drafter of a contract to know what he is stipulating, and for the judge seised to know what he is interpreting.
4. Diversity to generate ideas, Unicity to master the whole and to conceive a Contractual Compliance System through which the use of contractual freedom serves the Monumental Goals of Compliance Law. Outline. Two movements, not two theses. Seen as a block, the Compliance clause appears to be one: but this unicity is merely apparent, for it proceeds from a confusion between contract and statute, since everything leads back to one regulation or another, which, so to speak, exhausts all the richness and contractual freedom (I). Seen up close, it bursts into a welcome diversity. For the sake of mastery, it must certainly be channelled by a nomenclature, but above all it must be preserved, for it is the reservoir of invention of the contractual art of Compliance (II). True unicity therefore lies not in the massification of technique, but in the goals: it is through them that these dissimilar stipulations form a system (III).
I. AN APPARENT UNICITY OF COMPLIANCE CLAUSES THROUGH THE BLOCK TREATMENT OF THE STIPULATION WITH REGARD TO LEGISLATION
5. The shadow cast by statute over contract. What is presented as the primary unity of the Compliance clause is most often nothing but the unity of the regulation it copies. The drafter, faced with a corpus he did not make, erects it into a stipulation, as if the clause became the projection of an entire statute. For example, faced with the so-called “Vigilance” law10L. n° 2017-399, 27 mars 2017, relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre., a “Vigilance clause” will be inserted into the contract, reproducing all the requirements of that law. This method, which is never more than a restatement of submission to the law, may cover the entire branch of Law: this is the “compliance clause”. This block treatment is thus encountered in two forms: the clause that holds all of conformity in a single stipulation (A), and the one that borrows its unity from the particular corpus of which it purports to be the instrument of application (B).
A. UNICITY IN A BLOCK: CONFORMITY HELD ENTIRELY IN A SINGLE CLAUSE: OBLIGING THE OTHER PARTY TO RESPECT THE REGULATION
6. A single clause for the whole of regulation. This is the most widespread and least elaborated form. This stipulation, therefore often long, requires the co-contracting party to respect the “applicable regulation”, sometimes listed, sometimes referred to an internal policy of the contracting party, sometimes accessible on a website. This stipulation may say nothing more than: the law must be respected. Two features characterise it: it targets a behaviour of obedience and projects itself beyond the parties (1); it designates without organising (2).
1. The general Compliance clause, targeting everything and everyone
7. Obliging the other party to respect the regulation. The object of the clause is then the obedience of another. The subject contracting party does not ask its co-contracting party to do something specific: it asks it to be in conformity with the regulation and to remain so. The stipulation has no content of its own, since its substance lies elsewhere, in the text to which it refers. By requiring of its co-contracting party, for example, the absence of corrupt behaviour or hateful behaviour, it copies the law. The stipulation restates legal subjection.
8. The pedagogical virtue of obliging the other party to respect the regulation. This clause, which one might consider poor, is nevertheless not futile. By restating the law to the co-contracting party, it makes known to it its importance, both in itself and for the one who is subject to it and who adheres to its purposes: many partners, especially the smallest or the most distant, discover through the contract the requirements weighing on their principal and, through it, on themselves11M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La formation : contenu et contenant de la Compliance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, JoRC and Dalloz, coll. « Régulations & Compliance », 2021, pp. 227-244.. Soft Law has understood this, recommending that the code of conduct be communicated to third parties, that they be made aware of it and that its respect be imposed on them by a contractual clause12See esp., from the AFA: AFA, Recommandations destinées à aider les personnes morales de droit public et de droit privé à prévenir et à détecter les faits de corruption, de trafic d’influence, de concussion, de prise illégale d’intérêts, de détournement de fonds publics et de favoritisme, JORF 12 janv. 2021 (https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000042932087); see also AFA, Les recommandations de l’AFA aux entreprises assujetties à l’article 17 de la loi Sapin 2, 20 juill. 2021, pilier 3, « Évaluation de l’intégrité des tiers »: “raise the third party’s awareness of the risk of corruption”, “require from the third party a written undertaking or a contractual anti-corruption clause” (« sensibiliser le tiers au risque de corruption », « exiger du tiers un engagement écrit ou une clause contractuelle de lutte anticorruption ») (https://www.agence-francaise-anticorruption.gouv.fr/files/files/Assujetties%20article%2017.pdf).. The clause is then a first training tool, a pedagogical dimension found in almost all Compliance tools13M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La formation : contenu et contenant de la Compliance », op. cit.; see also, on the extension of this pedagogy beyond the company, M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Pour un consommateur “vigilant” : l’éduquer. Analyse juridique », in Newsletter MaFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 18 April 2023 (https://mafr.fr/fr/article/pour-un-consommateur-vigilant-leduquer-analyse-jur/)..
9. Recalling the subjection of both contracting parties to the law so as not to have to verify it. It is rare in practice for a clause merely to express, for the subject party, the fact that it is subject to the law and, for its co-contracting party, either that it is too, or that, although it is not because not targeted by the regulation, it will act as if it were. When it does so, however, it has a utility of its own: by each declaring its subjection, or its voluntary alignment with it, the contracting parties mutually dispense each other from verifying it. The declaration stands in for checking that all the contracting parties are indeed legally subject to the same regulations. Now, given the highly complicated and shifting character of these regulations, it is difficult for the subject party to verify before signature that its partner is subject to the same regulatory constraints as itself: by presuming it while doubling them with a contractual subjection, it achieves a considerable saving. This saving, evidential in nature, enables it to require its debtor to show it the effectiveness of this subjection, which is henceforth established, since the contractual source has been added to the legal source.
10. The potentially extraterritorial nature of the clause that refers to everything and everyone. Owing to its generality, this stipulation may become more effective than a finely chiselled clause, as soon as the corpus referred to is not that of the place of performance, a frequent situation. The contracting party then imposes on its co-contracting party, by the sole force of the contract, requirements that no local law sets against it.
This is often a source of difficulty Ex Ante because this kind of reminder of the law collides with local law, and the drafting must take this into account14See L. d’Avout, La cohérence mondiale du droit. Cours général de droit international privé, Leyde, Brill Nijhoff, coll. « Les livres de poche de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye », 2025, 1032 p., in particular so as not to be neutralised in Ex Post litigation. Thus, the reasoning in the so-called “Yves Rocher” judgment15TJ Paris, 34e ch., 12 mars 2026, RG n° 22/04017, Sherpa, ActionAid France – Peuples Solidaires et a. c/ groupe Yves Rocher. on the grounds for making the provisions of French law prevail over those of local Turkish law can be transposed to contractual matters.
The fact remains that it is no longer a matter of obedience to a law that is always common to both contracting parties and to the third parties concerned, but of the diffusion of a law through a chain of private commitments. There is rightly concern for the diffusion of the French legal model16See Association Henri Capitant, La circulation du modèle juridique français, t. XLIV/1993, Journées franco-italiennes, Litec, coll. « Travaux de l’Association Henri Capitant », 1994, 661 p.; see also M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La mondialisation du point de vue du Droit », in Association Henri Capitant, La mondialisation, t. LXVI/2016, Berlin, Bruylant, coll. « Travaux de l’Association Henri Capitant », 2017, pp. 11-30.; here is a path that is particularly valuable if one accepts that Compliance Law is a branch of political Law17For the demonstration of this, see M.-A. Frison-Roche, Déployer le Droit de la Compliance pour renforcer la souveraineté et accroître l’attractivité de la France avec l’Europe, report to the Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice, Sept. 2026.. Flow-down clauses18L. Tenreira, « La rédaction des clauses d’application du devoir de vigilance par les Global Lawyers : l’exemple des clauses de flow-down », RDAI/IBLJ, 2022, No. 5, pp. 453-466., which pass the requirement down step by step to the last link, are the perfect illustration.
11. The general Compliance clause as a consolidation of the legal obligation, never as a discharge. This diffusion has a limit in principle: the Compliance Obligation cannot be transferred19M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance », D. 2022, chron., pp. 2115-2117; see also M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 3-44.. The contract is the means by which the one who was subject vis-à-vis the law certainly becomes a creditor vis-à-vis another, but it cannot cease to be legally subject; it is not20This is why it is technically inaccurate to say that being targeted by a body of Compliance rules, for instance the Sapin 2 Act or the Vigilance Act, establishes the person as a “debtor”: it establishes that person as a subject of the law. This matters, precisely because, not being a “debtor”, there is no “creditor” (neither the Legislator nor the State is a creditor), and the persons concerned are no more creditors than they are. For more technical developments, see M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Compliance, Vigilance et Responsabilité civile : mettre en ordre et raison garder », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 635-659. the means of ceasing to be subject. The liability resulting from this legal subjection, which the Conseil constitutionnel rightly characterised as personal in relation to the duty of vigilance21Cons. const., 23 mars 2017, n° 2017-750 DC, Loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre. The decision states in its § 27: “The contested provisions therefore do not establish a regime of vicarious liability, as is moreover apparent from the parliamentary debates. Consequently, and in any event, these provisions do not disregard the principle of liability” (« Les dispositions contestées n’instaurent donc pas un régime de responsabilité du fait d’autrui, ainsi que cela ressort, au demeurant, des travaux parlementaires. Par suite, et en tout état de cause, ces dispositions ne méconnaissent pas le principe de responsabilité »). On this question of personal liability and liability for others, see A. Danis-Fatôme and G. Viney, « La responsabilité civile dans la loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre », D. 2017, No. 28, pp. 1610-1618; T. Sachs and J. Tricot, « La loi sur le devoir de vigilance : un modèle pour (re)penser la responsabilité des entreprises », Droit & Société 2020, No. 106, pp. 683-698; M. Mekki, « Peut-on repenser la responsabilité à l’aune du devoir de Vigilance, pointe avancée de la Compliance ? », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 599-615; see also M. Fabre-Magnan, « Critique de la convergence des responsabilités contractuelle et délictuelle. L’exemple du devoir de vigilance », in Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Loïc Cadiet, LexisNexis, 2023, pp. 547-561., remains on the head of the contracting party since it has another source, of which it cannot dispose. But the stipulation that refers en bloc to its own legal subjection will have the effect of creating a debtor, for its co-contracting party does not become legally subject (how could a contract have such an effect?) but will in turn be obliged. Even if this is in analogous terms, this difference of source remains essential, for a difference of source always has an influence on legal regimes.
2. The general Compliance clause, as a starting point
12. A designation of the Law allowing the free contractual organisation of the means to apply it. The clause that merely refers to a corpus says neither who will do what, nor when, nor how it will be known. It therefore leaves to litigation the task of settling what the drafting did not wish to regulate. This is the whole difference between a clause that merely names “the compliance obligation” and a clause that stipulates “how to give concrete form to one’s obligation”.
13. Choosing to refer to the other clauses of the contract. The clause that designates the Law en bloc does not necessarily remain alone. The drafter may articulate it with the other stipulations of the contract, of which it then becomes the point of support: the information clause, the audit clause, the termination clause or the sanction clause come to give it the means it lacks. The general designation sets the goal; the other clauses organise the path. Still, the reference must be express and the coherence between these stipulations must be thought through from the drafting stage, failing which the judge will have to reconstruct it.
14. Choosing to refer to the Ex Post of the performance of the particular contract. The drafter may also make the opposite choice: organise nothing Ex Ante and let the performance of the particular contract reveal what the general clause required. It is then the incident – the breach, the alert, the inspection by an authority – that gives the stipulation its content. This choice has the merit of flexibility and economy of drafting; it has the defect of shifting onto litigation, and therefore onto the judge, the burden of determining what the parties did not specify. It suits relationships in which the risk is low, not those in which the Compliance Obligation is heavy.
15. Choosing to build, through other precise Compliance clauses, a “contractual system of Compliance”. There remains the most demanding path, which is also the most fruitful: making the general clause the starting point of a set of precise Compliance clauses, which respond to one another and are ordered around the goals targeted by the Law. These clauses are not simply added together; they form a system, in which each derives its meaning from its place and from the common purpose. It is this “Contractual Compliance System” that gives the diversity of clauses its true unicity22Developing this proposal is the purpose of the third part of this study, infra §§ 56 ff..
B. UNICITY BORROWED FROM EACH REGULATORY CORPUS OF WHICH THE CLAUSE IS THE INSTRUMENT OF APPLICATION
16. Unity borrowed from the corpus of which the clause is the instrument. The second form of apparent unicity is subtler, because it seems more learned. The clause no longer targets regulation in general but a specific corpus: GDPR clause, Sapin 2 clause, Vigilance clause, CSRD clause. It espouses its structure and takes up its vocabulary; it presents itself as its instrument of application. This unity is that of the text and not that of the stipulation: it can be observed (1), and it can be explained (2).
1. The frequency of the clause committing to conformity with a particular Compliance corpus
17. The frequency of the clause that has taken the name of the law whose effective respect is at stake. This is the clause most frequently encountered, and the law is cited in it by name. The so-called “Sapin 2” law appears directly in the stipulation, as the so-called “Vigilance” law will23L. n° 2016-1691, 9 déc. 2016, relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique.. The process has a virtue: it makes the clause legible to the regulator as much as to the co-contracting party. It has a cost: it makes the contract the tracing of a text, and forbids it from going beyond it.
18. A tracing that leaves too little room for contractual freedom. The drafter who copies no longer chooses. He adjusts the clause neither to the rest of the contract, nor to the activity, nor to the balance of power between the parties. Yet Compliance Law is most often a matter of public policy: the parties may undertake to do more than what the laws require of them, but no clause allows them to evade it. Whoever is constrained to less may constrain himself to more, and not the reverse. The tracing loses this margin, which is precisely where contractual art begins.
2. The fault of the Regulation-maker
19. Presentation by the regulation-maker of the contract as a kind of delegation, or concession. Drafters will not be blamed for following the path traced for them. The texts themselves – the CSRD first and foremost – describe the contract as the place where the company passes on to its partners the requirements it has received. The contract appears there sometimes as a concession, the regulatory power consenting to the company using its contractual freedom within the limits it has drawn, sometimes as a delegation, the company being entrusted with carrying the regulation itself to its partners. In both cases, the contract is not conceived as an instrument in its own right, but as the extension of regulation. The clause follows, and is impoverished.
20. Accreditation by this presentation of a perception of Compliance Law as pointing to an administered economy. The premise is false. Compliance Law is, like the Regulatory Law it extends, the mark of a liberal economy and not of a directed economy24M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Le Droit de la Compliance au-delà du Droit de la Régulation », D. 2018, chron., pp. 1561-1563.. While the Political has the prerogative of setting the Monumental Goals, the company remains free to choose the means by which it will achieve them, as the Agence française anticorruption recalled as early as 201925AFA, Commission des sanctions, déc. n° 19-01, 4 juill. 2019, Société S. SAS et Mme C., § 18: the Recommendations “constitute no more than a reference framework whose use is in no way mandatory” (« ne constituent qu’un référentiel dont l’usage n’est en rien obligatoire ») (https://www.agence-francaise-anticorruption.gouv.fr/files/files/DECISION%2019-01%20COMMISSION%20DES%20SANCTIONS%20ANONYMISEE.pdf).. That is where the Political lies: in the goals, not in the means. And that is where the contract regains its place, which is a full one.
21. Keeping contractual freedom as the principle, even when it is a matter of finding the ways and means of implementing a public-policy regulation whose application is internalised in the subject entity. The legal normativity that anchors the Compliance obligation of the subject organisation concerns the goals26See M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, JoRC and Dalloz, coll. « Régulations & Compliance », 2022, 520 p.. That the regulation is internalised in the subject entity therefore does not make the contract through which the latter applies it a directed contract: the freedom to contract, to choose one’s co-contracting party and to determine the content of the contract remains, within the limits of public policy, the principle laid down by Article 1102 of the Code civil. It falls to the drafter to invent the stipulations best suited to achieving its goals, taking into account the activity, the sector and the person of the co-contracting party. It is in this way that he best respects the will of the Legislator. It is this freedom which, far from weakening the Compliance Obligation, gives it its effectiveness, and it is from this freedom that the diversity of clauses proceeds. For the Compliance Obligation, a legal obligation possibly relayed by the contract, is an obligation of result as regards the establishment of Compliance structures and an obligation of means as regards obtaining the behaviours desired by the Legislator27See the catalogue of obligations of result and obligations of means drawn up in « Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur », op. cit.. The structures it requires – whistleblowing mechanisms, training, audits, contracts and clauses – have meaning only through the effects they produce and through the behaviours they elicit in convergence with these goals. The contract is therefore not the execution of an instruction, but one of these tools, and the one that gives legal form to the commitments by which the company binds itself for the future28Ibid..
II. THE GREAT DIVERSITY OF COMPLIANCE CLAUSES, TO BE HANDLED AND PRESERVED
22. What appears as soon as one looks at the clauses one by one: a great diversity: to be recognised; to be channelled; to be preserved. One need only leave the block view for diversity to appear. An information-transmission clause and a sanction clause do not have the same object and therefore not the same regime; an audit clause and a remediation clause do not operate at the same moment; a robustness clause and a confidentiality clause do not have the same regime. It is not always the same courts that will be seised. This diversity must first be channelled by a nomenclature, failing which it remains disorder (B); but this diversity must then be preserved, in particular so that Compliance clauses reflect the very activity of the contracting parties (C).
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE DIVERSITY OF COMPLIANCE CLAUSES
23. A diversity that proceeds from the Law itself. The observable diversity does not result from regulation, as if it were badly made or unfinished and the clauses came to complete it like so many patches: it proceeds from Compliance Law itself. Because the latter sets only the purposes pursued, however ambitious they may be, the clauses that give concrete form to the ends by all means respond first of all to the principle of contractual freedom (1). To this diversity, which may be described as de jure, is added the effect of the diversity of the situations concerned, which generates de facto a great diversity of Compliance clauses (2).
24. The success of Compliance Law does not lie in “regulatory clauses”. So-called “regulatory” clauses, which merely reproduce the legal obligation and place upon the co-contractor the burden of complying with the law, do not make Compliance Law succeed. They repeat what the law already says; they transfer the burden without building the means. Compliance Law is indeed conceived independently of sectors, and independently of the regulations specific to them. The two may of course overlap: certain sectors are regulated, which gives rise to so-called “regulatory” clauses, for instance in insurance and banking. But Compliance is not to be confused with these sectoral regulations: it is superimposed upon them. Compliance Law, which sets Monumental Goals and leaves companies the choice of means, achieves its effectiveness also through stipulations which concretely organise those means independently of regulations.
25. Articulation, in the contract of companies whose activity is regulated, of regulatory clauses and Compliance clauses. It is therefore through clauses conceived on the basis of the very activity of the contracting parties, and not through clauses modelled on regulation, that Compliance Law can succeed. The regulatory clause may thus be a starting point; it is not the end point of the contractualisation of the Compliance system, which is far more flexible, broader, and superimposed upon regulatory clauses.
There is accordingly, in the drafting of the contract, the same relationship between the regulatory clause and the Compliance clause as between submission to regulation and the freely drafted clause29M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La volonté, le cœur et le calcul, les trois traits cernant l’Obligation de Compliance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 49-65.: the Compliance clause must obviously not run counter to the regulatory clause, but it is not limited by it.
1. De jure diversity arising from the principle of contractual freedom, inseparable from any stipulation
26. In Compliance systems, the Legislator organises Compliance structures and sets the goals, not precisely the means. It is sometimes argued that Compliance Law would lead to an administered economy and that nothing would then be left to stipulate. The premise is false. Political authority has the prerogative of setting the Monumental Goals; it does not say by what means the company will achieve them, and the Agence française anticorruption has itself recalled this. From this reservation of means arises a de jure diversity: Compliance clauses differ because contractual freedom is the normal mode of giving concrete form to a legal obligation whose technical content is not fixed. It is therefore not a tolerated diversity; it is a diversity called for by the very structure of the system.
27. Illustration through the audit clause, a means of implementing the Compliance obligation. No text requires a Compliance audit to be stipulated, in the sense that none governs its material and temporal scope, nor its triggering event – periodic audits, or audits prompted by an event, notably a red flag –, nor the choice of auditor – that of the obliged entity or a third party designated by both contracting parties –, nor the arrangements for its conduct. All of this is built by the contract, under the sole criterion of the proportionality of the extent of the information captured to the purpose which justifies it. An administered economy would have no need of a clause: it would have a form. The audit clause, very frequent, is the very sign that the system remains liberal, the obliged entities choosing it as the arrangement that suits them, configuring it as suits them30For further developments, see M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La clause d’audit corrélée à l’Obligation de Compliance », in this volume.. This freedom has as its corollary a powerful and adapted office of the judge31See Th. Goujon-Béthan, « Les enjeux présents à venir de l’articulation des principes de procédure civile et commerciale avec la logique de compliance », op. cit.; see also his two contributions in this volume, op. cit..
2. De facto diversity resulting from the porosity of the Compliance clause
28. The porosity of the conformity clause to the regulation it refers to: the fact of regulatory fragmentation leads to the diversity of clauses. The conformity clause has no content of its own: it takes that of the body of rules to which it refers32See supra §§ 16 to 21.. It follows that it is filled differently according to the text referred to, and that it changes without the parties having consented to it, as that text is reformed. Two stipulations drafted in the same terms therefore do not have the same content if the bodies of rules they refer to differ, and the same stipulation does not have the same content from one year to the next. This diversity owes nothing to the drafters’ imagination: it is imposed upon them by the very porosity of what they write.
29. Porosity to a foreign legal system. The clause is porous to legal systems other than the one governing the contract. Through it, a foreign body of rules enters a relationship that no local law subjected to it: the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, economic sanctions regimes, the requirements of an American principal passed down step by step through flow-down clauses. Two contracts governed by the same French law then bear stipulations that bear no comparison, depending on whether or not one of the contracting parties is exposed to that particular law. The Biomet case gives the measure of this: it is because the American group was subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and had concluded with the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission a deferred prosecution agreement obliging it to obtain substantial cooperation from its distributors and agents that the clause imposed on its French agent took on the scope that it had. Diversity here stems from the geography of subjection, not from the will of the parties.
30. The porosity of the Compliance clause to the subject matter of the contract. The Compliance clause does not merely absorb a body of rules: it becomes imbued with the economic transaction into which it is inserted. In a supply contract, it bears on the supply chain and on the working conditions found within it; in a distribution contract, on the network and on what resellers do with the brand; in a contract for digital services, on data and on content. It is therefore not a block grafted onto any contract whatsoever: it takes on the colour of that particular contract.
This is the deepest reason for diversity, and the one which makes recourse to the standard clause a method that has its limits, whereas the constitution of a “compendium of Compliance clauses” at the level of a group and/or a sector appears welcome.
31. By the effect of its porosity, is the Compliance clause a determinative clause or an ancillary clause? From this imbuing arises a question which legal scholarship debates33 and which practice has not yet had occasion to settle. It is true that this depends greatly on the diversity of circumstances, since subjective and objective elements must be taken into account: has the Compliance clause entered the contractual field as a determinative element of consent, or does it remain ancillary to the transaction? On the answer depend the seriousness of the non-performance opening the way to termination, the operation of the termination clause, the fate of a stipulation that would deprive the essential obligation of its substance, and even mistake as to a quality that the parties held to be essential.
For example, the Anti-corruption Clause of the International Chamber of Commerce does not make every breach a ground for termination: it requires a material or repeated breach, affords the debtor the opportunity to remedy it and the right to raise in defence the existence of adequate preventive measures, and permits suspension or termination only failing that, the arbitral tribunal remaining the judge of the contractual consequences34International Chamber of Commerce, Clause anticorruption CCI, 2012 ed., since aligned with the ICC Rules on Combating Corruption of 2023: the breach must be substantial or repeated; the obligor may remedy it and may raise in defence the implementation of adequate preventive measures; only failing that may the other party suspend or terminate, the dispute resolution body provided for in the contract, in particular the arbitral tribunal, remaining competent to determine the contractual consequences of the alleged breach. The French Judge, for its part, has already ruled on the facts: Cass. com., 20 nov. 2019, n° 18-12.817, D. 2020, p. 913, note J.-Ch. Roda, holding that, in view of the rules laid down by the Compliance programme and of the agreement concluded, the contracting partner’s breach of its contractual obligations, insofar as it was liable to engage the subject company’s own liability, was sufficiently serious to justify terminating the commercial relationship without notice; to the same effect, CA Paris, 4 déc. 2024, n° 22/12973, concerning a supplier that had failed to comply with its principal’s anti-corruption programme. On the grounds of domestic law brought into the discussion, see the seriousness of the non-performance, the termination clause, the stipulation depriving the essential obligation of its substance, and mistake as to an essential quality.. This is justified since the determinative character of a clause of this type cannot be presumed. Where courts have accepted the termination of commercial relations, even without notice, it was on the basis of a contractual Compliance commitment which had been seriously breached, a seriousness from which the determinative character justifying termination had been inferred. It follows from this state of positive Law that this determinative character is accepted when the seriousness of the violation demonstrates it, proof provided Ex Post by the creditor of the contractual Compliance obligation who wishes to terminate the contract.
32. Making a Compliance clause contractually determinative by reason of the subject matter of the contract in the light of what Compliance Law is, combined with the consent of the parties. It may be appropriate expressly to provide for presumptions of this determinative character. Such a qualification, which gives very great power to the creditor, must35This refers to the evidentiary issues that lie at the centre of the contractual Compliance system. See infra §§ 65 ff. not express a significant imbalance36Significant imbalance may be addressed through article L. 442-1, I, 2°, of the French Commercial Code between commercial partners, and through article 1171 of the French Civil Code in standard-form contracts. On its application to Compliance clauses, see J.-Ch. Roda, « Clause de compliance », op. cit., n° 279 and 283: often imposed by a company in a position of strength and intrusive by nature, these clauses may take on “the trappings of power clauses” and be exposed to being deemed unwritten; yet the difficulty lies not so much in the unilateral character of the measure as in its discretionary and opaque dimension (Cass. com., 28 févr. 2024, n° 22-10.314, publié au Bulletin); and a stipulation that merely restates the clear and precise requirements of a text can hardly amount to a significant imbalance (Cass. com., 4 sept. 2024, n° 22-12.321, publié au Bulletin, concerning a clause reproducing in extenso article 6 of loi n° 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique). The author draws from this the advice to provide for mechanisms of dialogue between the contracting parties rather than peremptory stipulations, his model moreover characterising Compliance undertakings as “obligations essential to the conclusion and proper performance” of the contract (n° 284). To the same effect, G. J. Martin, « Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 663-678, who calls for clauses that are precise and limited in space and time so as to avoid imbalance.. Subject to this reservation, and justifying it in particular by reference, on the one hand, to the Goals pursued by the Legislation itself37That is to say, in general terms, the protection of systems and the protection of the human beings involved in them, willingly or not, and more specifically the protection of a given system, of a given category of persons, etc. For example, for the protection of the banking and financial system threatened by money laundering, M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Obligation de compliance et gouvernance bancaire », introductory lecture at the conference « Compliance et vigilance bancaire : la participation des acteurs du secteur bancaire et financier à la LCB/FT », Université catholique de Lille, 12 March 2026, forthcoming; for the protection of the digital system threatened by cyberattacks, M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Le Droit de la compliance, voie royale pour réguler l’espace numérique », in P. Bonis and L. Castex (eds.), Compliance et nouvelles régulations, Annales des Mines, coll. « Enjeux numériques », juin 2025, pp. 69-77. This gives rise to obligations borne by everyone, including the protected persons: L. Pailler, « Les clauses de robustesse », in this volume., it is judicious to qualify the Compliance clause as a “determinative clause” either of consent itself, or of the continuation of the negotium in whole or in part (with regard to one territory and not another, for example). Such drafting, resting on consent, may come to support a clause dealing with the organisation of a non-performance or the consequences of liability.
B. A DIVERSITY OF COMPLIANCE CLAUSES TO BE CHANNELLED BY A NOMENCLATURE
33. A nomenclature to frame the variety of elements found from contract to contract. To classify is not to freeze. The criteria that follow are not mutually exclusive: one and the same stipulation falls under several of them, and it is this intersection that gives it its physiognomy38Legal scholarship has described these clauses more than it has classified them, and the approaches differ. The clause compendium places the Compliance clause among the others, under a single entry and in alphabetical order, without distinguishing its kinds (J.-Ch. Roda, « Clause de compliance », op. cit.). G. J. Martin addresses them under the common label of “CSR clauses”, in a practice he regards as still in its infancy, and makes them the means of implementing the Duty of Vigilance: he organises them around the standards to which they refer and the assessment, audit and sanction mechanisms that accompany them, stressing their articulation with the commercial stipulations and the need for clauses that are precise and limited in space and time so as to avoid imbalance (G. J. Martin, « Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance », op. cit.). The Model Contract Clauses 2.0 proceed differently, starting from the goals in order to construct the stipulations that serve them (op. cit.). Practice has put forward its own grid, which assesses each clause according to four components – detail, control, constraint, coverage – and finds that three quarters of them merely refer to general principles (Affectio Mutandi and EcoVadis, Le contrat et les clauses RSE, leviers incontournables de vigilance, étude croisée acheteurs-fournisseurs, 2018). See also, on the distinction between Compliance contract and Compliance clauses and on what the diversity of the latter teaches, M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance », op. cit.. Five dividing lines may serve as support for the drafter in formulating elements found from contract to contract: the purpose of the clause (1), the nature, of result or of means, of the Compliance obligation it stipulates (2), the processing of information it organises (3), the “contractual climate” it presupposes (4), and the circle of persons it reaches (5).
1. Conformity clauses and Compliance clauses
34. The first division, which governs all the others. A conformity clause aims at obedience: it asks the other party to conform to a text, and the sanction is the measure of its effectiveness. A Compliance clause aims at a goal that goes beyond the two contracting parties: the preservation of a system, the protection of distant or future human beings39M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Approche juridique des outils de la Compliance. Construire juridiquement l’unité des outils de la Compliance à partir de la définition du Droit de la Compliance par ses buts monumentaux », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, op. cit., pp. 27-38.. The first bears the mark of submission; the second may bear the opposite mark, that of collaboration.
35. As for the branch of Law, a difference of nature, not of degree, between conformity clauses and Compliance clauses. It is not the same stipulation with greater or lesser intensity. The change of purpose changes the nature of what is stipulated, and therefore its interpretation. In a teleological law, the clause is assessed according to its object, that is to say according to the Compliance Law to which it gives concrete form40M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance », op. cit., and not according to the common intention of the parties alone.41J.-Ch. Roda, « Utilité comparée des clauses de conformité et des clauses de Compliance », in this volume.
36. Variation in the regulatory weight between conformity obligations and Compliance obligations. The conformity clause demands a great deal of the contractual debtor: it most often obliges it to comply with everything, and to show that it complies with everything, regulation by regulation. The Compliance clause asks something else of it: to “contribute”, most often together with its contractual creditor itself, to the achievement of the Goal pursued, conformity being merely a tool in its service42M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Compliance et conformité : les distinguer pour les articuler », D. 2024, chron., pp. 497-499..
2. Clauses stipulating a Compliance obligation of result and clauses stipulating a Compliance obligation of means
37. The true field of the distinction between “obligation of means / obligation of result”: the contract. The distinction between obligation of means and obligation of result is not, strictly speaking, a category of regulations: these prescribe, prohibit, impose structures, set goals; they do not, properly speaking, give rise to obligations of means or of result. It is Contract Law that forged this distinction and that remains its natural field. Yet authors refer to it very frequently in order to measure the scope of the legal Compliance obligation43See esp. M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur », op. cit., and the texts themselves are beginning to borrow it in their recitals44Thus, Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence, recital 19 (“the main obligations in this Directive should be obligations of means”) and recital 73, concerning the climate transition plan (“an obligation of means and not […] an obligation of results”).. This constitutes a kind of “displacement”: a distinction born of the contract is carried over into the law to measure what the latter requires. One must here return to the natural domain of the distinction: the contract and its clauses, for it is there that the parties choose the intensity of what they promise each other.
38. Taking up through Compliance clauses the distinction attributed to regulation: obligations of result for clauses whose object is the setting up and functioning of Compliance structures, and obligations of means for clauses whose object is the expected conduct. The contract restores the distinction to its accuracy. Setting up a Compliance structure – risk mapping, whistleblowing system, third-party assessment procedure, vigilance plan – is an obligation of result: the structure exists or does not exist, and the contractual creditor can observe this. Obtaining conduct that is relevant in the light of the Monumental Goals, on the part of the co-contractor as well as of those with whom it deals, can on the other hand only be an obligation of means: no one can guarantee that no harm will occur. The parties may of course increase the commitment and stipulate a result where the law expects only credible efforts; the clause is then valid if it is not abusive, the possible inequality between the contracting parties having to be taken into consideration. It is thus through the drafting of each clause that the intensity of the Compliance Obligation is fixed between the parties.
39. Through the use of contractual freedom, transforming a legal obligation of means into a contractual obligation of result. Nothing prevents the parties from going beyond what the law requires. Where the Legislator expects of the obliged company only credible efforts towards the Goal, the contract may stipulate a result: that a given supplier employs no children, that a given audit be carried out within a given time limit, that a given indicator be reached. This is an ordinary use of contractual freedom, which strengthens the effectiveness of the Compliance Obligation rather than distorting it. But such aggravation has its limits. Imposed by the company in a position of strength on a partner which does not control the causes of the promised result, it may create a significant imbalance, or even make the clause a disguised discharge. The stipulation is then assessed in the light of its purpose, which is to serve the Goal, not to transfer the risk onto the weaker party.
3. Clauses of information gathering, of information construction, of use of information
40. Three moments of one and the same matter. Information is what circulates in the Compliance contract, and clauses are distributed according to the moment at which they seize it. Some gather it – transmission, audit, alert45M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La clause d’audit corrélée à l’Obligation de Compliance », in this volume.. Others construct it – assessment, mapping, rating. Others still use it – remediation, sanction, termination. A clause that gathers without anything using what it gathers serves no purpose; a clause that strikes without anything having been gathered strikes blindly.
41. The secrecy clause, which goes in the opposite direction. Not all clauses relating to information make it circulate: some stop it. Confidentiality, non-transmission, protection of trade secrets – and sometimes a European legislation which requires precisely non-transmission where a foreign authority demands it46J.-Ch. Roda, « Les clauses relatives à la confidentialité et à la non-transmission de l’information », in this volume.. The stipulation must then settle a conflict that the law does not settle. This is the case in which contractual art is most necessary, and least practised.
4. Calm-wind clauses and high-wind clauses
42. The Compliance clauses that presuppose concord in order to function. Many Compliance stipulations operate only if the parties get along. The audit conducted with good grace, the information transmitted without having to be requested, the remediation plan accepted: all this presupposes a co-contractor who is willing. These clauses are effective in calm weather and inert as soon as the wind rises.
43. The Compliance clauses whose object is to guarantee a gentle wind. Between the former and the latter, certain stipulations have as their object the maintenance of concord itself: joint monitoring committee, periodic meetings, dialogue prior to any unilateral measure, mediation before any termination. They do not presuppose calm weather; they produce it. They are perhaps the most precious, for they preserve cooperation over time, which best serves Compliance.
44. The Compliance clauses that presuppose discord and guard against it. The others are made for the moment when agreement ceases: penalty clause, immediate termination of commercial relations on grounds of corruption, expert assessment, contractual pre-trial preparation, arbitration. They serve only once, but they must have been written long before – this is the particular difficulty of drafting them: they are written in concord, for a time of discord that one does not imagine.
45. Not providing for the one without the other: tying the clauses together. This is the practical rule that emerges from this division. A contract that contains only calm-wind clauses leaves its drafter without recourse on the day it would be needed; a contract that contains only high-wind clauses makes Compliance a permanent threat and discourages the collaboration that best serves it. The clause must be durable: it must hold in both times.
5. Compliance clauses that operate between the parties and clauses that go beyond the parties
46. A natural difficulty in integrating the situation of third parties into the contractual organisation. The contract targets the parties, conformity targets an external law, Compliance targets the future world. The three circles do not coincide, and the clause must hold them together. This is why certain Compliance stipulations do not effect an exchange but build a structure: the distinction between the exchange-contract and the organisation-contract47M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance », op. cit. finds its natural ground here, notably in value chains.
47. Using the Compliance clause as an exchange clause or as an organisation clause. Through a kind of ripple effect, the clause reaches persons who have not signed: the supplier’s supplier, the partner’s employee, the population living near the site. The Judge knows this, having accepted that a stipulation may give rise to a duty of supervision where the law did not impose one48Cass. com., 15 janv. 2025, n° 23-14.625, publié au Bulletin, Dstorage c/ Société générale; M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Le Contrat, instrument de Compliance : la clause efficacement stipulée engendrant une obligation pour une plateforme de contrôler les contenus », working paper, 29 March 2025 (https://mafr.fr/publications/documents-de-travail/le-contrat-instrument-de-compliance-lobligation-fa/).. The clause then becomes an instrument of Regulation, and no longer merely an instrument of exchange.
48. A clause beyond the business relationship? The movement may go further still, as far as persons whom no economic relationship links to the contracting parties. The indigenous people whose lands border the project is neither supplier nor customer: it is nevertheless the one whom the stipulation must protect, and the contract goes so far as to organise its consultation, or even to make performance conditional on obtaining its free, prior and informed consent. Nor is the internet user a party to the contract binding the platform to its service providers: the clause organising moderation, the traceability of reports or the preservation of evidence is nevertheless written for that user. In both cases, the stipulation does not regulate an exchange; it protects a third party who will never know that it exists. It remains to be seen whether the contract can still be called a contract, or whether it becomes the vehicle of private Regulation: the clause has settled in fact what the Law has not settled in law.
C. A DIVERSITY OF COMPLIANCE CLAUSES TO BE PRESERVED, ARISING FROM THE ACTIVITY OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
49. A diversity that is not a passing defect. One might think that the diversity of clauses stems from the inexperience of their drafters and that it will fade away. The reverse is true: it stems from the very object. Monumental Goals are not concretised in the same way in a bank and on a farm, in a company that has made sustainability its project and in one that merely endures regulation, between interchangeable contracting parties and between chosen ones. There are three sources of variation, which must not be reduced but respected: the sector (1), the general policy of the contracting party (2), and intuitu personae (3).
1. The definitive variation of Compliance clauses according to the technicalities of the economic activities concerned
50. The Monumental Goal, the persons at work and the means to be employed vary with the system to be preserved. The tautological Monumental Goal of the banking sector is the sustainability of the banking sector; that of the digital sector, the preservation of the digital space; that of the extractive industries, the protection of the human beings along the chain. The clause follows suit: what must be detected, what must be prevented, what must be proven are not the same. A cross-sector standard clause would not be an adequate clause, for it would lack substance.
51. The technicality of the sector, present in the Compliance clause, must be integrated into the office of the Regulator and of the Judge, who must be able to grasp this technicality. What the clause stipulates in a given sector – customer identification and verification of the origin of funds in banking, content moderation and traceability of reports in the digital sphere, security of supply in energy – cannot be understood without an elementary knowledge of that sector. The sectoral Regulator possesses it; the contract judge, whether civil or commercial, does not necessarily have it49This is one of the issues at stake in “Emerging Systemic Litigation”. See M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Contentieux Systémique Émergent, Lextenso - LGDJ, coll. « Droit et Économie », 2027; see also M.-A. Frison-Roche, Déployer le Droit de la Compliance pour renforcer la souveraineté et accroître l’attractivité de la France avec l’Europe, op. cit.. If the judge does not gain access to it, even though the case may be brought on the basis of the general law of contract50On the avenues that provide the Judge with this knowledge, see Th. Goujon-Béthan, « La contractualisation de la mise en état, outil naturel du contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance », in this volume., the judge might hand down an inadequate judgment. Hence the importance of the channels that bring it to the judge: expert evidence, recourse to amici curiae, dialogue with the Regulator. The arbitration clause may overcome this difficulty51L. Aynès, « Comment l’arbitrage international peut être un renfort de l’Obligation de Compliance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 503-506..
2. The definitive variation of Compliance clauses according to the general policy of the contracting party or parties
52. Bringing the notion of corporate project to interact with Compliance Law through contractual art. A company acts in legal commerce through its legal personality and generally takes corporate form. It pursues ends which constitute its project. Not going bankrupt by making, if not profits, at least no lasting losses is not its natural end; it is its condition of existence. Some companies choose to make this their project as well. The rewriting of article 1835 of the Code civil on the raison d’être has translated this into Law.
The ends pursued by the company, that is to say its project, may meet the ends pursued by the Legislator. Not always, but it can happen. Étienne Maclouf has shown that in this hypothesis of converging projects52On the convergence between corporate Purpose (“Raison d’être”), mission-driven companies and Compliance Law, see e.g., from an applied standpoint, S. Pottier, « Pour une Compliance européenne, vecteur d’affirmation économique et politique », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, op. cit., pp. 475-482., for example in environmental matters or in matters of respect for human beings, the company’s project, as formulated by its strategy and translated by Company Law, Labour Law53As expressed by the notion of “governance”, which now permeates Company Law and Financial Law, in particular in their relationship with Compliance Law. On this point, see A.-V. Le Fur, « Intérêt et raison d’être de l’entreprise : quelle articulation avec les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance ? », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, op. cit., pp. 55-67; see also M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit.: A.-V. Le Fur, « Le droit des sociétés et des marchés financiers face à l’Obligation de Compliance », pp. 235-258; V. Magnier, « Transformation de la gouvernance et obligation de vigilance », pp. 259-269., etc., will converge with Compliance Law. This holds true not only for its sectoral strategy but, because the company is autonomous, for its strategy within value chains, which are paved with organisation-contracts.
53. Contractual art will adjust Compliance clauses so that they fit the strategic project of the company while concretising the purposes of the regulations to which it is subject. This can be seen in the way each company writes its clauses. One that has made the preservation of a system its project stipulates clauses of support: it provides for assistance to its partner, organises the partner’s capacity-building, accepts the time needed and shares the cost of the upgrade. One that merely seeks to avoid sanctions stipulates clauses of shifting: it transfers the burden onto its co-contractor and reserves for itself the right to terminate. Both are lawful, but they do not produce the same effects, and it is on effects that Compliance Law, a teleological law, assesses the company. The drafter must therefore start from the project: the same legal obligation does not call for the same clause for two contracting parties whose general policies differ.
3. The definitive variation of Compliance clauses according to intuitu personae
54. Since in Europe the Monumental Goal, subsuming the others, is the protection of the person. Compliance is often presented in abstract terms, because it is observed through regulations, which are by nature general and abstract. This may be all the more justified if one is in a Compliance system that aims solely at the promotion and protection of systems, through collective action54As in Chinese Compliance Law; see M.-A. Frison-Roche, interview with O. Dufour, « La nouvelle loi de protection des données en Chine est un “anti-RGPD” », Actu-Juridique, 2 septembre 2021.. But the purpose of European Compliance Law is the protection of the persons involved in systems55European data law, which emerged early, was merely one example of this. See M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Pour une Europe de la Compliance, JoRC and Dalloz, coll. « Régulations & Compliance », 2019: esp. K. Lenaerts, « Le juge de l’Union européenne dans une Europe de la Compliance », pp. 1-12.. Consequently, not only is the contract the most natural instrument for protecting and expressing the freedom of the person, but it is also necessary to encourage intuitu personae.
55. Favouring intuitu personae Compliance clauses whenever possible. This is not always the case: where the company subject to the obligation imposes its conditions on thousands of suppliers, the standard clause remains the rule. But two situations call for a clause designed for the very person of the co-contractor. The first is where the operators are of equal strength: neither can impose on the other a stipulation it has not negotiated, and the clause can then state what each is able to do, according to its own measure, to contribute to the Goal. The second is where the clause expresses the alliance between the State and the company: when the latter contracts with a public authority, or in performance of a commitment made before it, consideration of the person lies at the heart of the agreement, because it is that particular company, and no other, which was chosen for its position and its capacities. In both cases, intuitu personae is not an obstacle to the effectiveness of Compliance: it is its condition.
III. THE DEEP AND PROGRAMMATIC UNICITY OF COMPLIANCE CLAUSES
56. Unicity lies not in the technicality of the clauses but in the systemic goals they serve. Through their strength, these goals make possible the construction of a contractual Compliance system. However diverse they may be, Compliance clauses are united by what they serve: systemic goals which will remain stable and common when techniques change (A). This unicity is not merely to be observed; it is to be built in practice, through an interwoven system of clauses specific to each company (B).
A. THE UNICITY OF COMPLIANCE CLAUSES IN THE SYSTEMIC GOALS SERVED, WHICH WILL REMAIN STABLE AND COMMON
57. Goals that do not change, stabilising the varied Compliance clauses. Contractual techniques vary from one contract to another, from one sector to another, from one era to another; the goals they serve do not vary. Preventing corruption, protecting personal data, preserving the climate, ensuring the soundness of the banking system: these Monumental Goals have been set by the Legislator for the long term, and it is to them that each clause is attached. It is through them that diversity is brought back to unity: by recalling these goals in each clause (1) and by organising through the contract the convergence of their concretisation (2).
1. In scattered Compliance clauses, restating both the legal goals and the company’s own goals
58. Writing the goal into the clause. A Compliance clause should never be silent about what it serves. It benefits from stating the legal goal it concretises – the fight against corruption, the protection of persons, the preservation of the environment – but also the company’s own goal, when its raison d’être or its project meets the former. Drafted in this way, even the most technical clause, scattered in a contract whose object is altogether different, connects with all the others. The judge who has to interpret it will find there the teleological thread that must guide the judicial office, and the co-contractor will know why it is committing itself, which is the first condition of its adherence.
59. Declining the same goals from clause to clause. It is not enough for the goal to be written once, in a general clause placed at the head of the contract. It must be restated in each of the stipulations that serve it, the audit clause as well as the information clause, the remediation clause as well as the sanction clause, in terms specific to the object of each. It is this restatement, declined from clause to clause, that brings out unicity beneath diversity.
2. To ensure convergence between the concretisation of the Legislator’s ambitions and the concretisation of the company’s overall policy, contractually organising the production of credible trajectories
60. Four timeframes that must be held together. The Legislator, the Judge, the industrial project and the Contract do not move at the same pace. The first sets goals for a distant future; the second decides after the fact; the third is measured in financial years; the fourth in stipulated duration. The Compliance clause is the place where these four timeframes must converge (1), and the place where this convergence must be proven (2).
61. Giving them Unicity, restating in Compliance clauses the time of the Legislator: a goal for the future. Compliance Law was built so that, in the future, certain events do not happen – and so that others do come about. Choosing what the future must be is the expression of a will that is political by nature56M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Les Buts Monumentaux, cœur battant du Droit de la Compliance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, op. cit., pp. 21-44.. The text therefore does not say what must be done tomorrow morning; it says where one must head. The clause inherits this indeterminacy and must convert it into dated obligations.
62. Giving them Unicity, restating in Compliance clauses the time of the Judge: after the fact, but not too late. The judge intervenes Ex Post and rules on what has been done. But in Compliance Law the judge assesses a mechanism whose object was to prevent: the judge appraises prevention in the light of a harm which, if it has occurred, proves only that the mechanism was not sufficient. This is why the clause must leave room enabling the creditor to obtain, Ex Post, a remedy, and not merely compensation.
63. Giving them Unicity, restating in Compliance clauses the time of the industrial project: increasing capacities, including those of the debtor. A value chain is not brought into conformity by decision. It gets there through investment, training, changes of suppliers, sometimes changes of processes. The clause that demands everything, immediately, obtains declarations and not effects. The one that phases things in obtains effects – and it is on effects that the subject of the obligation will be judged.
64. Giving them Unicity, restating in Compliance clauses the time of the contract itself: integrating the stipulated duration. The contract, for its part, has an end, and this is its weakness in this field. A Compliance Obligation survives the contract that relays it; the clause does not. Hence the importance of survival stipulations, of transfer to the acquirer, of maintaining information obligations beyond termination. The clause must be lasting, even beyond itself.
65. The contract as a reservoir of evidence: contractually organising the construction of credible trajectories. The company subject to the obligation must show that it has put in place the required structures and that these have produced effects converging with the goals pursued, along a credible trajectory57M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance… », op. cit.. It must therefore pre-constitute its evidence. For this purpose, the contract is the best-placed instrument: its clauses organise the production of traces – audit reports, certificates, remediation plans, dated exchanges – which are so many items of future evidence.
66. The contractual organisation of evidence: the convergence of all timeframes and what unites all clauses, whether conformity or Compliance clauses. All clauses, conformity clauses as well as Compliance clauses, have this in common: one day they will have to be proven – before the supervisory authority, before the judge, before stakeholders. To stipulate the proof, and not merely the obligation, is to state in advance who establishes it, in what form, within what time limits and to whom it will be communicated. It is also through evidence that the four timeframes meet: the trace produced in the time of the contract, dated at the pace of the industrial project, will be read by the judge in the light of the goal set by the Legislator. The evidentiary system that the contract thus builds is what unites all clauses, beyond their diversity.
B. BUILDING IN PRACTICE AN INTERWOVEN SYSTEM OF COMPLIANCE CLAUSES
67. From the juxtaposition of clauses to the system. Recalling the goals in each clause and organising over time the convergence of their concretisation is not enough if the clauses remain juxtaposed. Juxtaposed, they may contradict each other: one requires the transmission of information that the other prohibits on grounds of secrecy; one provides for termination where the other organises support. A system must therefore be built in practice, by linking the clauses to one another (1), which makes the Compliance clause or clauses in a contract a tool that is itself systemic, capable, through its effectiveness, of becoming the future of Compliance regulation (2).
1. Establishing links and points of contact between all clauses within a contractual Compliance system specific to the company
68. Linking clauses through express cross-references. The system is built first of all through writing. Each clause refers to those with which it operates: the audit clause to the clause defining the use of its results, the whistleblowing clause to the confidentiality clause protecting the whistleblower, the sanction clause to the remediation clause that must precede it.
69. A framework clause. Implementing clauses. The framework clause sets out the common goals – both legal and specific to the company – and the order in which the stipulations fit together; it also states how to decide between two clauses that contradict each other. The implementing clauses – audit, whistleblowing, remediation, sanction – refer to it and derive their meaning from it. The judge who has to interpret one of them will read it in the light of the framework clause, just as a particular provision is read in the light of the principle on which it is founded.
70. Links between clauses housed in separate contracts. The system does not stop at the boundaries of a single contract. For one and the same value chain, a company concludes supply, subcontracting, distribution and licensing contracts, which follow one another and overlap. The Compliance clauses they contain benefit from echoing one another: the same definitions, the same cross-references, the same framework clause carried over from contract to contract. Thus emerges a contractual Compliance system specific to the company, which expresses within its value chains its way of concretising Monumental Goals.
71. Links between clauses and commitments that are not expressly contractual. Clauses may also be linked to commitments that are not, at least not expressly, contractual: code of conduct, ethics charter, vigilance plan, commitments made publicly or before an authority. By referring to them, the clause gives them a force they did not have and brings them into the system; in return, these commitments shed light on the meaning of the clauses. The reference must still be express, however, so that the co-contractor knows what it has committed to.
2. Once organised into a system, Compliance clauses are the future of Compliance regulation
72. Compliance clauses, organised into a system, as a lasting relay of a regulation that cannot and must not foresee everything. Compliance regulation cannot keep pace with the diversity of situations: it sets goals and structures, and leaves the means to operators. The contract, for its part, is closest to these situations; it is renegotiated, it adapts, it is transferred. When it is built as a system, linking clauses to one another and contracts to one another within value chains, it becomes itself systemic. It is then no longer the mere tool for implementing an external regulation: it is its extension, and doubtless its future, for it is through the contract that Monumental Goals can be concretised over time, beyond what the Legislator can foresee.
73. From a clause occupying the space conceded by an overly present regulation to an act of contractual freedom expressing adherence to shared purposes. The Compliance clause is often presented as what is left to the contract once regulation has said everything: a residual, conceded space, in which the parties merely pass on to one another obligations originating elsewhere. Once organised into a system, it changes in nature. It becomes the act by which contracting parties choose to contribute together to goals they have made their own. Compliance is then no longer endured; it is stipulated: it is through contractual freedom that it takes root over time.
CONCLUSION: THE CONTRACTUAL ART OF COMPLIANCE IS YET TO COME, ITS MATERIALS ARE AVAILABLE
74. The contractual art of Compliance is yet to come; its materials are already here. The deployment of this art is only just beginning58M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Le déploiement de l’art contractuel ne fait que commencer en matière de compliance », interview with O. Dufour, Actu-Juridique, 4 mai 2026 (https://www.actu-juridique.fr/regulation-compliance/marie-anne-frison-roche-le-deploiement-de-lart-contractuel-ne-fait-que-commencer-en-matiere-de-compliance/).. The materials, for their part, are in contracts, in a highly dynamic practice, and in the need both to regulate and to loosen excessive regulation. To that end, one must therefore take the available materials, the general law of contract, and make use of them. The regulatory force of the State and of large companies can thus be expressed through clauses which, made more dynamic by the correlation established among all of them, will be transformed into a contractual Compliance system, tailor-made for each crucial operator which today carries the spirit of European civilisation, a civilisation concerned above all with human beings and with the Rule of Law that protects them.
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- On this notion, see Fr. Buy, J. Heinich, M. Lamoureux, J. Mestre and J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), Les principales clauses des contrats d’affaires, 3rd ed., Lextenso - LGDJ, coll. « Droit et pratique professionnelle », 2025; see also F.-X. Testu, Contrats d’affaires, Dalloz Action, 2010, as well as J.-M. Mousseron, P. Mousseron, J. Raynard and J.-B. Seube, Technique contractuelle, Éd. Francis Lefebvre. The business contract may be defined as a contract concluded between professionals for the purposes of their economic activity, whose object is less a one-off exchange than the lasting organisation of a transaction, and which is recognised less by a statutory classification than by its milieu – business practice – and by the freedom of stipulation of which it is the field. This legal category is more doctrinal and practitioner-based than statutory, even though statutes refer to it when they handle notions such as the contract concluded between professionals, the standard-form contract within the meaning of Article 1110 of the French Civil Code, the established commercial relationship of Article L. 442-1 of the French Commercial Code, or the international commercial contract (Unidroit Principles, model contracts of the International Chamber of Commerce). The notion of business contract is particularly relevant, since the insertion of a Compliance clause seems conceivable only in this type of contract. For a more nuanced view, see infra § 48
- J.-Ch. Roda, « Clause de compliance », No. 17, in Fr. Buy, J. Heinich, M. Lamoureux, J. Mestre and J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), Les principales clauses des contrats d’affaires, op. cit., pp. 131-139. The entry appears to have no equivalent. No other French-language collection of clauses devotes an entry to the Compliance clause, the publisher of this one itself classing it among the stipulations “born of the most recent practice”. English-language contract-drafting works know of it no more: databases of model clauses retain under compliance clause only the commonplace formula whereby each party undertakes to comply with applicable laws. The equivalent is to be found elsewhere and in another form: the Model Contract Clauses 2.0 drawn up by the working group of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association (D. V. Snyder, S. A. Maslow and S. Dadush, « Balancing Buyer and Supplier Responsibilities : Model Contract Clauses to Protect Workers in International Supply Chains, Version 2.0 », The Business Lawyer, vol. 77, No. 1, 2021, pp. 115-182), thirty-three stipulations which translate into contractual obligations the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance; European Model Clauses are being prepared on this model. The difference in method is significant: the collection of clauses ranks the Compliance clause among the others, in alphabetical order, whereas the American work starts from the goals and builds the stipulations that serve them.
- Yet Spain is, on the contrary, one of the few countries to have written Compliance into its Criminal Code itself. Ley Orgánica 5/2010 introduced into it the criminal liability of legal persons (art. 31 bis of the Código Penal, applicable to acts committed after 24 December 2010), and Ley Orgánica 1/2015, which entered into force on 1 July 2015, turned it into a Compliance system: the legal person is exempted from liability if, before the offence was committed, it adopted and effectively implemented an “organisation and management model” capable of preventing offences of that kind or of significantly reducing the risk of them, whose requirements are listed in Article 31 bis 5 and whose supervision is entrusted to a body vested with autonomous powers. Circular 1/2016 of the Fiscalía General del Estado governs its assessment by the public prosecutor, who must verify that the programme reflects a genuine commitment on the part of the company and not a mere façade; the Tribunal Supremo has confirmed its exonerating effect (see esp. STS 316/2018 of 26 June 2018). Ley 2/2023, transposing Directive (EU) 2019/1937, added the regime of whistleblowing channels, including anonymous ones (art. 7.3), and the rights of the person implicated in the internal investigation (art. 9.2). Legal scholarship is abundant but almost entirely in Spanish (see esp. J.-L. Gómez Colomer (ed.), Tratado sobre compliance penal. Responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas y modelos de organización y gestión, Tirant lo Blanch); for an account accessible in English, see the contribution devoted to Spain in The Practitioner’s Guide to Global Investigations, Global Investigations Review, 2025 ed.
- American influence is pervasive in Compliance Law, to the point that American law is often presented as its cradle (contra, M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Compliance : avant, maintenant, après », in N. Borga, J.-Cl. Marin and J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), Compliance : l’entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, JoRC and Dalloz, coll. « Régulations & Compliance », 2018, pp. 23-36). It is Compliance that the Department of Justice formalised in its Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, and that deferred prosecution agreements turned into contractual undertakings. The contract followed, and kept its form: the American-style Compliance clause is written in representations and warranties, coupled with covenants, audit rights, rights of immediate termination, indemnification and flow-down to subcontractors, the whole preceded by due diligence on the counterparty. This architecture, born of the practice of the large law firms, has spread unchanged into contracts that no American law governs, carried by the extraterritorial reach of the FCPA and of economic sanctions. The effect is twofold. It has given the French drafter a toolkit that he lacked; it has also imposed on him a logic of warranty and risk transfer, where Compliance Law calls for a logic of structure and effects. The critical movement, moreover, comes from the United States itself: the Model Contract Clauses 2.0, op. cit., deliberately abandon the regime of representations and warranties and strict contractual liability in favour of a regime of diligence shared between buyer and supplier. This shows that the American model is not a monolith, and that it is debated in the very language in which it was written.
- On this question, see infra §§ 20 and 26.
- Which takes nothing away from the interest of observing this litigation. See also, on the same movement whereby legal scholarship observes practice, Th. Goujon-Béthan, « Les enjeux présents à venir de l’articulation des principes de procédure civile et commerciale avec la logique de compliance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, JoRC and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. « Régulations & Compliance », 2025, pp. 693-719, as well as his two contributions in this book, one arising from the conference « Le contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance : aspects procéduraux et juridictionnels » (Université Jean Moulin – Lyon 3, 29 May 2026), « La contractualisation de la mise en état, outil naturel du contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance », the other arising from the conference « La contractualisation de la Compliance : clause après clause » (Université Jean Moulin – Lyon 3, 25 September 2026), « Les clauses de Compliance relatives à la procédure, à l’expertise et à la mise en état ».
- On conformity clauses “in high winds”, see infra §§ 42 ff.
- Thus the Cour de cassation, in the judgment of its Commercial Chamber of 20 November 2019, held that, in view of the rules laid down by the Compliance programme and of the agreement concluded, the counterparty’s breach of its contractual obligations, in so far as it was liable to engage the company’s own liability as a subject of the law, was sufficiently serious to justify terminating the commercial relationship without notice (Cass. com., 20 nov. 2019, n° 18-12.817, Sté Equilibre implant chirurgical c/ Sté Zimmer Biomet France, unpublished, D. 2020, p. 913, note J.-Ch. Roda, dismissing the appeal against CA Paris, 30 nov. 2017). To the same effect, the Cour d’appel de Paris, 4 December 2024, n° 22/12973, concerning a supplier which had failed to comply with the anti-corruption programme of its principal. On this point, see J.-Ch. Roda, « Clause de compliance », op. cit., Nos. 279 and 280, and G. J. Martin, « Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit. For this, the Compliance clause must be decisive (on this point, see infra § 31). The obligee contracting party, or others, may also bring an action for liability and/or for specific performance against these actors of the Compliance clause, see infra §§ 46 ff.
- Practice gains from being described: it is by naming it, classifying it and confronting it with the categories that legal scholarship enables it to develop rather than merely repeat itself. See J. Paillusseau, « Le big bang du droit des affaires à la fin du XXe siècle (ou les nouveaux fondements et notions du droit des affaires) », JCP 1988, éd. G, I, 3330, also published in the Revue de jurisprudence commerciale, Dec. 1987, p. 377 ff.; by the same author, his contribution to the Journées René Savatier, in Le droit contemporain des contrats, Economica, 1987, p. 169 ff. (JCP 1987, éd. G, I, 3275). See also P. Didier, « Brèves notes sur le contrat-organisation », in L’avenir du droit. Mélanges en hommage à François Terré, PUF, Dalloz and Éditions du Juris-Classeur, 1999, pp. 635-642, who shows what theory gains by starting from the arrangements that practice invents; and, for the approach of contractual engineering itself, J.-M. Mousseron, P. Mousseron, J. Raynard and J.-B. Seube, Technique contractuelle, op. cit.
- L. n° 2017-399, 27 mars 2017, relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La formation : contenu et contenant de la Compliance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, JoRC and Dalloz, coll. « Régulations & Compliance », 2021, pp. 227-244.
- See esp., from the AFA: AFA, Recommandations destinées à aider les personnes morales de droit public et de droit privé à prévenir et à détecter les faits de corruption, de trafic d’influence, de concussion, de prise illégale d’intérêts, de détournement de fonds publics et de favoritisme, JORF 12 janv. 2021 (https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000042932087); see also AFA, Les recommandations de l’AFA aux entreprises assujetties à l’article 17 de la loi Sapin 2, 20 juill. 2021, pilier 3, « Évaluation de l’intégrité des tiers »: “raise the third party’s awareness of the risk of corruption”, “require from the third party a written undertaking or a contractual anti-corruption clause” (« sensibiliser le tiers au risque de corruption », « exiger du tiers un engagement écrit ou une clause contractuelle de lutte anticorruption ») (https://www.agence-francaise-anticorruption.gouv.fr/files/files/Assujetties%20article%2017.pdf).
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La formation : contenu et contenant de la Compliance », op. cit.; see also, on the extension of this pedagogy beyond the company, M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Pour un consommateur “vigilant” : l’éduquer. Analyse juridique », in Newsletter MaFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 18 April 2023 (https://mafr.fr/fr/article/pour-un-consommateur-vigilant-leduquer-analyse-jur/).
- See L. d’Avout, La cohérence mondiale du droit. Cours général de droit international privé, Leyde, Brill Nijhoff, coll. « Les livres de poche de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye », 2025, 1032 p.
- TJ Paris, 34e ch., 12 mars 2026, RG n° 22/04017, Sherpa, ActionAid France – Peuples Solidaires et a. c/ groupe Yves Rocher.
- See Association Henri Capitant, La circulation du modèle juridique français, t. XLIV/1993, Journées franco-italiennes, Litec, coll. « Travaux de l’Association Henri Capitant », 1994, 661 p.; see also M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La mondialisation du point de vue du Droit », in Association Henri Capitant, La mondialisation, t. LXVI/2016, Berlin, Bruylant, coll. « Travaux de l’Association Henri Capitant », 2017, pp. 11-30.
- For the demonstration of this, see M.-A. Frison-Roche, Déployer le Droit de la Compliance pour renforcer la souveraineté et accroître l’attractivité de la France avec l’Europe, report to the Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice, Sept. 2026.
- L. Tenreira, « La rédaction des clauses d’application du devoir de vigilance par les Global Lawyers : l’exemple des clauses de flow-down », RDAI/IBLJ, 2022, No. 5, pp. 453-466.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance », D. 2022, chron., pp. 2115-2117; see also M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 3-44.
- This is why it is technically inaccurate to say that being targeted by a body of Compliance rules, for instance the Sapin 2 Act or the Vigilance Act, establishes the person as a “debtor”: it establishes that person as a subject of the law. This matters, precisely because, not being a “debtor”, there is no “creditor” (neither the Legislator nor the State is a creditor), and the persons concerned are no more creditors than they are. For more technical developments, see M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Compliance, Vigilance et Responsabilité civile : mettre en ordre et raison garder », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 635-659.
- Cons. const., 23 mars 2017, n° 2017-750 DC, Loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre. The decision states in its § 27: “The contested provisions therefore do not establish a regime of vicarious liability, as is moreover apparent from the parliamentary debates. Consequently, and in any event, these provisions do not disregard the principle of liability” (« Les dispositions contestées n’instaurent donc pas un régime de responsabilité du fait d’autrui, ainsi que cela ressort, au demeurant, des travaux parlementaires. Par suite, et en tout état de cause, ces dispositions ne méconnaissent pas le principe de responsabilité »). On this question of personal liability and liability for others, see A. Danis-Fatôme and G. Viney, « La responsabilité civile dans la loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre », D. 2017, No. 28, pp. 1610-1618; T. Sachs and J. Tricot, « La loi sur le devoir de vigilance : un modèle pour (re)penser la responsabilité des entreprises », Droit & Société 2020, No. 106, pp. 683-698; M. Mekki, « Peut-on repenser la responsabilité à l’aune du devoir de Vigilance, pointe avancée de la Compliance ? », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 599-615; see also M. Fabre-Magnan, « Critique de la convergence des responsabilités contractuelle et délictuelle. L’exemple du devoir de vigilance », in Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Loïc Cadiet, LexisNexis, 2023, pp. 547-561.
- Developing this proposal is the purpose of the third part of this study, infra §§ 56 ff.
- L. n° 2016-1691, 9 déc. 2016, relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Le Droit de la Compliance au-delà du Droit de la Régulation », D. 2018, chron., pp. 1561-1563.
- AFA, Commission des sanctions, déc. n° 19-01, 4 juill. 2019, Société S. SAS et Mme C., § 18: the Recommendations “constitute no more than a reference framework whose use is in no way mandatory” (« ne constituent qu’un référentiel dont l’usage n’est en rien obligatoire ») (https://www.agence-francaise-anticorruption.gouv.fr/files/files/DECISION%2019-01%20COMMISSION%20DES%20SANCTIONS%20ANONYMISEE.pdf).
- See M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, JoRC and Dalloz, coll. « Régulations & Compliance », 2022, 520 p.
- See the catalogue of obligations of result and obligations of means drawn up in « Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur », op. cit.
- Ibid.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La volonté, le cœur et le calcul, les trois traits cernant l’Obligation de Compliance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 49-65.
- For further developments, see M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La clause d’audit corrélée à l’Obligation de Compliance », in this volume.
- See Th. Goujon-Béthan, « Les enjeux présents à venir de l’articulation des principes de procédure civile et commerciale avec la logique de compliance », op. cit.; see also his two contributions in this volume, op. cit.
- See supra §§ 16 to 21.
- International Chamber of Commerce, Clause anticorruption CCI, 2012 ed., since aligned with the ICC Rules on Combating Corruption of 2023: the breach must be substantial or repeated; the obligor may remedy it and may raise in defence the implementation of adequate preventive measures; only failing that may the other party suspend or terminate, the dispute resolution body provided for in the contract, in particular the arbitral tribunal, remaining competent to determine the contractual consequences of the alleged breach. The French Judge, for its part, has already ruled on the facts: Cass. com., 20 nov. 2019, n° 18-12.817, D. 2020, p. 913, note J.-Ch. Roda, holding that, in view of the rules laid down by the Compliance programme and of the agreement concluded, the contracting partner’s breach of its contractual obligations, insofar as it was liable to engage the subject company’s own liability, was sufficiently serious to justify terminating the commercial relationship without notice; to the same effect, CA Paris, 4 déc. 2024, n° 22/12973, concerning a supplier that had failed to comply with its principal’s anti-corruption programme. On the grounds of domestic law brought into the discussion, see the seriousness of the non-performance, the termination clause, the stipulation depriving the essential obligation of its substance, and mistake as to an essential quality.
- This refers to the evidentiary issues that lie at the centre of the contractual Compliance system. See infra §§ 65 ff.
- Significant imbalance may be addressed through article L. 442-1, I, 2°, of the French Commercial Code between commercial partners, and through article 1171 of the French Civil Code in standard-form contracts. On its application to Compliance clauses, see J.-Ch. Roda, « Clause de compliance », op. cit., n° 279 and 283: often imposed by a company in a position of strength and intrusive by nature, these clauses may take on “the trappings of power clauses” and be exposed to being deemed unwritten; yet the difficulty lies not so much in the unilateral character of the measure as in its discretionary and opaque dimension (Cass. com., 28 févr. 2024, n° 22-10.314, publié au Bulletin); and a stipulation that merely restates the clear and precise requirements of a text can hardly amount to a significant imbalance (Cass. com., 4 sept. 2024, n° 22-12.321, publié au Bulletin, concerning a clause reproducing in extenso article 6 of loi n° 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique). The author draws from this the advice to provide for mechanisms of dialogue between the contracting parties rather than peremptory stipulations, his model moreover characterising Compliance undertakings as “obligations essential to the conclusion and proper performance” of the contract (n° 284). To the same effect, G. J. Martin, « Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 663-678, who calls for clauses that are precise and limited in space and time so as to avoid imbalance.
- That is to say, in general terms, the protection of systems and the protection of the human beings involved in them, willingly or not, and more specifically the protection of a given system, of a given category of persons, etc. For example, for the protection of the banking and financial system threatened by money laundering, M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Obligation de compliance et gouvernance bancaire », introductory lecture at the conference « Compliance et vigilance bancaire : la participation des acteurs du secteur bancaire et financier à la LCB/FT », Université catholique de Lille, 12 March 2026, forthcoming; for the protection of the digital system threatened by cyberattacks, M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Le Droit de la compliance, voie royale pour réguler l’espace numérique », in P. Bonis and L. Castex (eds.), Compliance et nouvelles régulations, Annales des Mines, coll. « Enjeux numériques », juin 2025, pp. 69-77. This gives rise to obligations borne by everyone, including the protected persons: L. Pailler, « Les clauses de robustesse », in this volume.
- Legal scholarship has described these clauses more than it has classified them, and the approaches differ. The clause compendium places the Compliance clause among the others, under a single entry and in alphabetical order, without distinguishing its kinds (J.-Ch. Roda, « Clause de compliance », op. cit.). G. J. Martin addresses them under the common label of “CSR clauses”, in a practice he regards as still in its infancy, and makes them the means of implementing the Duty of Vigilance: he organises them around the standards to which they refer and the assessment, audit and sanction mechanisms that accompany them, stressing their articulation with the commercial stipulations and the need for clauses that are precise and limited in space and time so as to avoid imbalance (G. J. Martin, « Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance », op. cit.). The Model Contract Clauses 2.0 proceed differently, starting from the goals in order to construct the stipulations that serve them (op. cit.). Practice has put forward its own grid, which assesses each clause according to four components – detail, control, constraint, coverage – and finds that three quarters of them merely refer to general principles (Affectio Mutandi and EcoVadis, Le contrat et les clauses RSE, leviers incontournables de vigilance, étude croisée acheteurs-fournisseurs, 2018). See also, on the distinction between Compliance contract and Compliance clauses and on what the diversity of the latter teaches, M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance », op. cit.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Approche juridique des outils de la Compliance. Construire juridiquement l’unité des outils de la Compliance à partir de la définition du Droit de la Compliance par ses buts monumentaux », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, op. cit., pp. 27-38.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance », op. cit.
- J.-Ch. Roda, « Utilité comparée des clauses de conformité et des clauses de Compliance », in this volume.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Compliance et conformité : les distinguer pour les articuler », D. 2024, chron., pp. 497-499.
- See esp. M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur », op. cit.
- Thus, Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence, recital 19 (“the main obligations in this Directive should be obligations of means”) and recital 73, concerning the climate transition plan (“an obligation of means and not […] an obligation of results”).
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « La clause d’audit corrélée à l’Obligation de Compliance », in this volume.
- J.-Ch. Roda, « Les clauses relatives à la confidentialité et à la non-transmission de l’information », in this volume.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance », op. cit.
- Cass. com., 15 janv. 2025, n° 23-14.625, publié au Bulletin, Dstorage c/ Société générale; M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Le Contrat, instrument de Compliance : la clause efficacement stipulée engendrant une obligation pour une plateforme de contrôler les contenus », working paper, 29 March 2025 (https://mafr.fr/publications/documents-de-travail/le-contrat-instrument-de-compliance-lobligation-fa/).
- This is one of the issues at stake in “Emerging Systemic Litigation”. See M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Contentieux Systémique Émergent, Lextenso - LGDJ, coll. « Droit et Économie », 2027; see also M.-A. Frison-Roche, Déployer le Droit de la Compliance pour renforcer la souveraineté et accroître l’attractivité de la France avec l’Europe, op. cit.
- On the avenues that provide the Judge with this knowledge, see Th. Goujon-Béthan, « La contractualisation de la mise en état, outil naturel du contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance », in this volume.
- L. Aynès, « Comment l’arbitrage international peut être un renfort de l’Obligation de Compliance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit., pp. 503-506.
- On the convergence between corporate Purpose (“Raison d’être”), mission-driven companies and Compliance Law, see e.g., from an applied standpoint, S. Pottier, « Pour une Compliance européenne, vecteur d’affirmation économique et politique », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, op. cit., pp. 475-482.
- As expressed by the notion of “governance”, which now permeates Company Law and Financial Law, in particular in their relationship with Compliance Law. On this point, see A.-V. Le Fur, « Intérêt et raison d’être de l’entreprise : quelle articulation avec les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance ? », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, op. cit., pp. 55-67; see also M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’Obligation de Compliance, op. cit.: A.-V. Le Fur, « Le droit des sociétés et des marchés financiers face à l’Obligation de Compliance », pp. 235-258; V. Magnier, « Transformation de la gouvernance et obligation de vigilance », pp. 259-269.
- As in Chinese Compliance Law; see M.-A. Frison-Roche, interview with O. Dufour, « La nouvelle loi de protection des données en Chine est un “anti-RGPD” », Actu-Juridique, 2 septembre 2021.
- European data law, which emerged early, was merely one example of this. See M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Pour une Europe de la Compliance, JoRC and Dalloz, coll. « Régulations & Compliance », 2019: esp. K. Lenaerts, « Le juge de l’Union européenne dans une Europe de la Compliance », pp. 1-12.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Les Buts Monumentaux, cœur battant du Droit de la Compliance », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, op. cit., pp. 21-44.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance… », op. cit.
- M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Le déploiement de l’art contractuel ne fait que commencer en matière de compliance », interview with O. Dufour, Actu-Juridique, 4 mai 2026 (https://www.actu-juridique.fr/regulation-compliance/marie-anne-frison-roche-le-deploiement-de-lart-contractuel-ne-fait-que-commencer-en-matiere-de-compliance/).