13 June 2023 ·

Working Paper

🚧 Obligation upon Obligation is valid and useful

LinkedIn X

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, The role of will in the Compliance Obligation: Obligation upon Obligation is valid and useful, Working Paper, June 2023.

____

🎤  This working paper was originally drawn up as a basis for the talk, Obligation on Obligation is worth, on the first day of the conference I co-organised:🧮Compliance : Obligation, devoir, pouvoir, culture (Compliance: Obligation, duty, power, culture), on 13 June 2023.

____

It was subsequently used as the basis for an article published subsequently:

📝La part de la volonté dans l’obligation de compliance : Obligation sur Obligation vaut“.

in📕L’obligation de compliance, in the collection 📚Régulations & Compliance

📝The role of will in the Compliance Obligation: Obligation upon Obligation is valid and useful,

in📘Compliance Obligation, in the collection 📚Compliance & Regulation

____

► Summary of this Working Paper: The demonstration of the part played by the entreprises’ Will in the Compliance Obligation incumbent on them is carried out in 3 stages.

The first stage of the demonstration consists in finding the part played by the free will of companies in their Compliance Obligation by putting an end to two confusions: the first which, within the Law of Contract and Tort itself but also within Compliance Law, splits and confuses “free will” and “consent”, which would no longer require freely expressed acceptance; the second, specific to Compliance Law, which confuses “Compliance” and “conformity”, reducing the former to mechanical obedience which could exclude any free Will.

Having clarified this, the rest of the study focuses on the 2 ways in which a company subject to a Compliance Obligation by compulsory regulations expresses a part of its free Will, which the study expresses in this proposed adage: Obligation upon Obligation is valid, since the legal obligation to which the company responds by the obedience owed by all those subject to the regulations may be superimposed by its free Will, which will then oblige it.

The first case of Obligation upon Obligation, studied in a second part, concerns the means by which the compulsory Compliance Obligation is implemented, the company subject to the Monumental Goals set by the Legislator remaining free to choose the means by which the company will contribute to achieving them. Its free Will will thus be exercised over the choice and implementation of the means. This can take two legal forms: Contracts on the one hand and “Commitments” on the other.

In the third part, the second case of Obligation upon Obligation, which is more radical, is that in which, in addition to Compliance’s legal compulsory Obligation, the company draws on its free Will to repeat the terms of its legal Obligation (because it is prohibited from contradicting it), a repetition which can be far-reaching, because the legal nature (and therefore the legal regime) is changed. The judgment handed down by the The Hague Court of Appeal on 12 November 2024, in the so-called Shell case, illustrates this. What is more, the company’s free Will can play its part in the Compliance Obligation by increasing the legal Obligation. This is where the alliance is strongest. The interpretation of the specific and diverses obligations that result must remain that of the Monumental Goals in a teleological application that gives coherence to the whole.

____

🔓read the developments below⤵️

____

LinkedIn follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

Instagram follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram

LinkedIn subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

LinkedIn subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb

1. Leaving room for the power of free will to achieve goals of collective and general interest🎯 Compliance Law has sometimes been criticised for turning human beings into robotsThis is notably the view of Alain Supiot, who for this reason is hostile to it (find a reference... ; perhaps in the book he edited on companies and globalisation....).

His criticism grows stronger when the norms thus internalised no longer even have the State as their source but companies themselves, under the guise of CSR. See
, obliged to internalise regulation in advance, as the authors of the rules, whatever they may be, write mechanically, without trial and with steel, in the skin of the condemned man in In the Penal Colony📎F. Kafka, La colonie pénitentiaire (complete the reference; add one or two legal analyses of the text, notably A. Supiot, F. Kafka, Artiste de la Loi...). This criticism may be justified if the institutions and organisations in charge, the tools used, the positions targeted and the persons involved are not put in their proper place.

This proper place is measured from the goal set, which defines Compliance Law: to preserve the human beings involved, willingly or not, in present and future systems, not only so that they are not crushed by them but also so that they benefit from them🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.. This “Monumental Goal” makes it possible to identify the Compliance Obligation that weighs on the organisations best placed to achieve it On this concept, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023.: global and systemic companies🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025..

For these companies, the task is immense and the cost very high. They complain a great deal about it: Compliance is said to be yet another plague of the “regulatory mass”It also has to do with the fact that they do not understand why such a cost is being imposed on them and not on others, why it is not up to States to carry out such a public service mission. It also has to do with the fact that compliance is presented to them as a punishment, even though they have done nothing and the tools are Ex Ante, that some present it as punishment for past crimes, such as colonisation, or as crimes they will always commit, such as international corruption, in a kind of recognition of the ‘born criminal’. It's true that this is hardly encouraging...

All this is the result of an accumulation of confusions, notably between "regulations" and Law, between Compliance Law and conformity techniques... (see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Compliance and conformity: distinguishing them to articulate them, 2024 and infra n° 00 et seq.). The first part of this article aims to untangle these confusions.
. One understands that, at first sight, Compliance Law pleases no one…., neither those who face companies, nor companies themselves…. Very bold is she who seeks to explain and justify this new branch of Law….

It is true that the Goals pursued, whether it is a matter of preventing the systems concerned (banking, financial, health, energy, climate, digital, algorithmic systems, etc.) from collapsing in the future (negative Monumental Goals), or even of improving them (positive Monumental Goals), seem unattainable and yet imperative and urgent. Discussions are therefore heated. The debates on climate show this, Climate LawOn the distinction between Climate Law and Environmental Law, and the specificity of the former, see 🕴️Ch. Huglo, 📝Under what Conditions could Climate Law Constitute a Priority Monumental Goal?, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023. being only one illustration of a more general imperative: the same demonstration could be made for each of the other systems involved.

For such systemic ambitions to have a chance of being met, the question of the will of the companies subject to them is essentialThis question of the will of companies was approached from a specific angle, that of the confrontation of possible sources of action by companies with regard to systemic ambitions, either out of obedience to the orders of legislators and regulators, or out of ethical concern, or out of calculation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Will, Heart and Calculation, the three traits encercling the Compliance Obligation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.. Indeed, if companies were merely subject to laws, their will would not come into play, for it is only a manner of speaking to say that one wants to obey one’s legal obligations, La Boétie’s “voluntary servitude” being an oxymoronSee e.g. J.-L. Lantoine and C. Chevalier, La servitude volontaire. Postérité, réappropriation et perspectives critiques, 2024.. It is even more inaccurate to assert, in legal terms, that the Law makes the person subject to it a debtor of those who otherwise benefit from his or her performance of the legal obligation that is his or her own. Thus, the 2017 law which imposes a “duty of vigilance” on large companies subjects them to it, which certainly benefits other legal subjects but does not make the companies their debtorsThis is why companies subject to a ‘duty of vigilance’ under the 2017 French law do not thereby become ‘debtors’. Presenting it in this way allows those who do so to present the performance of the legal obligation as performance not with regard to the law but with regard to persons who would be ‘creditors’ (since the companies would be ‘debtors’). This is no mere quibble, as the legal regime changes completely. Numerous organisations now present themselves as ‘creditors’ of the duty of vigilance, holding both procedural rights, claiming to be able to bring cases before special courts and ordinary courts on this basis, and substantive rights, claiming to be able to obtain enforcement, whereas the duty of vigilance refers to a system of liability, which presupposes proof of a breach, damage and a causal link.

🕴️Muriel Fabre-Magnan points to this confusion in liability actions : 📝Critique de la convergence des responsabilités contractuelle et délictuelle. L'exemple du devoir de vigilance (Criticism of the convergence of contractual and tortious liability. The example of duty of vigilance), in 📗Mélanges en l'honneur du Professeur Loïc Cadiet, 2023.
. This changes factual situations and may justify liability actions, in particular for unfair competitionSee the case law holding a company liable for failing to perform its legal obligation to combat money laundering, while its competitors performed their legal obligation in this respect, which creates a factual situation of unfair competition: Com., ... (please find the judgment and possibly a commentary on it)., but it does not make third parties creditors: a legal obligation does not make the person subject to it a debtor of third partiesSee e.g. F. Terré,..., Les obligations, Précis Dalloz , ....: “§1. Moral duty and legal obligation. Confining oneself to the field of law, the word obligation does not have a single meaning either. Generally speaking, it designates everything that the legal order commands a person to do, without there necessarily corresponding to the obligation which, passively, weighs on that person, a right for the benefit of another person.” (this is a quotation from the 2019 edition; has it changed since?).

Nevertheless, for the Compliance Obligation to bear fruit, for it to be efficient, that is to say for the whole system to benefit from itOn the articulation between effectiveness, efficacy and efficiency, which marks the tools of Compliance designed and put into practice in the light of the goals, see mafr (cite one or two articles where I explain this most clearly....)., the company must be at work, since everything rests on it: it is so in two capacities. The company is first at work as a person subject to the law, able in this capacity to use its will in choosing the tools to perform its legal obligation; it is then at work by expressing its free will, which makes it possible to enhance the whole Compliance system in the light of its Monumental Goals. For the legal obligation, to which the company responds with the obedience owed by anyone subject to the law, may be overlaid by its free will, which will then make it a debtor and bind others, but in a quite different way and by widening the circle of its Compliance Obligation.

This is why, while distinguishing the two, one must think about how they combine in practice and lay down the following principle: Obligation upon Obligation is valid and useful.

2. Structure of the study🎯 To make this principle Obligation upon Obligation is valid and useful work, it is appropriate to proceed in three stages. The first stage of the demonstration consists in finding the share of companies’ free will in their Compliance Obligation by putting an end to two confusions (I): the first, which affects both the Law of Obligations and Compliance Law, confuses “free will” and “consent” (I.A.), while the second, specific to Compliance Law, confuses “Compliance” and “conformity” (I.B.).

Once this has been clarified, the study considers the various ways in which a company subject by Law to a Compliance Obligation expresses a share of free will. In the second part, Obligation upon Obligation  operates because the company chooses the means by which it fulfils its legal Compliance Obligation (II). It does so in particular through contracts (II.A) and “commitments” (II.B.).

But the figure of Obligation upon Obligation  becomes more radical when the company moves from control over the means to control over the sources (III). This may involve copying the letter of regulations, which changes the applicable legal regime (III.A.), or even setting itself up as an autonomous source of law (III.B.), which is admissible but, on the one hand, must never contradict the law and, on the other, must always be interpreted in the light of the Monumental Goals that only the Legislator sets.

I. PRESERVING FREE WILL IN THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION BY GIVING “CONSENT” AND “CONFORMITY” THEIR EXACT PLACE

3. Always preserving the free will of persons🎯 In a liberal system, whether political and/or economic, what matters most is the freedom of persons. Today more than ever, this freedom must be preserved, as technology helps even more those who wish to do away with it. To preserve everyone’s free will, “consent” must be kept in its proper place within the Compliance Obligation so that it does not eliminate free will (A). Free will is also threatened in its very existence by the frequently put forward definition of “compliance” as pure and simple “conformity”, consisting in blind and mechanical obedience, which expels all free will from the Compliance system (B). 

A. PRESERVING FREE WILL IN THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION BY GIVING ITS PLACE TO THE “CONSENT” OF THE PERSONS CONCERNED

3. At the outset, there is consent in its relationship with free will🎯 An obligation weighing on a person may arise in two ways: either because that person engages in conduct (constituting a legal fact) that departs from a standard of conduct laid down by a legal rule, a breach that will oblige him or her to make reparation; or because that person has used his or her autonomous will to bind himself or herself towards others. This is why the “Law of Obligations” identifies as sources of obligations for persons the contract, which presupposes the emission of at least 2 free wills whose consents are their expression, and liability, which arises from the combination of 3 elements: the triggering event, the damage and the causal link between the 2. A contract presupposes that the will of one person meets the will of another, the wills being bound together in a relationship of obligations through the exchange of their consents. Thus, consent is that by which the contractual bond is formed; it is that by which a trace is kept of the expression of the free will of the person who binds himself or herself. In the classical and liberal conception of the Obligation, consent is therefore inseparable from the will, being that by which the will meets the will of the otherOn the definition of the contract as the emission of two obliged wills which, in a second stage, are tied together, here is the remarkable thesis of 🕴️Grégoire Forest, 📗Essai sur la notion d'obligation en droit privé, 2012.,

4. Consent, consequently a central notion of positive Compliance Law🎯 In the same way, the texts applicable to compliance create numerous obligations for operators to obtain the consent of the persons concerned, for example when collecting or using information, either for purposes that are not immediately necessary or in order to transmit it to third partiesFor a list of the various compliance obligations, in particular those involving the obligation to obtain the consent of the person concerned, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.. Here we find the role played by consent, insofar as it expresses free will, either through the formation of a contract with the operator (a contract for the use of data in return for remuneration, for example), or in a factual situation, acceptance neutralising what would otherwise have been an event giving rise to liability, for example the capture of personal information and/or its transmission to others and/or its exploitation.

Expression by the person concerned would then suffice. This capacity of consent to carry with it the expression of the free will of the person concerned is logical as long as one sticks to the classical idea that the observation of a consent given by the other is indeed proof of his or her free will. In this conception, the company which Compliance Law obliges to take charge of the interests of others, for example the interest of the consumer or of the internet user, must, but need only, ensure that the person to be protected has consented, for example the consent of the visitor who provides information about himself or herself, since “to consent is to give proof that one has freely willed”.

Because of the evidentiary obligation that rests on companiesOn the importance of this evidential dimension of the Compliance Obligation, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025., companies should, but would only need to, have as the object of proof the consent of the person whose information they have used. Consent is thus a central notion in Compliance Law, as it is in the Law of Obligations.

5. Rejecting the proper place of consent: the destruction of humanist Compliance Law🎯 Doubt about the capacity of consent to carry with it ipso facto proof of free will arises from the observation that very often, indeed systematically, consent is expressed mechanically, digital techniques and algorithms being inseparable from it today. Clicks are treated as consents and presented as acceptances, approvals or waivers by those who benefit from them, without those who click or do not object actually measuring the extent of their acceptance, approval or waiver, or even having received the information needed beforehand to measure it.

Thus, because Compliance has a privileged field of development in the digital space, and because the handling of data in the non-digital space takes place in cyberspace, consents are not the expression of free wills but mechanical procedures accompanying the capture of information, whether or not that capture is technologically necessaryFor a description of this technological, managerial, economic and sociological phenomenon, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Having a good behavior in the digital space, 2019. . But Compliance Law, insofar as its goal is to protect the persons involved in the systems, and therefore their free will📎 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021., is thwarted by this.

6. The prior split, in support, between will and consent in Contract Law 🎯 This was possible because earlier, in the Law of Obligations and more particularly in Contract Law, Will and Consent had split apart. In 1995 I showed how, in general law, “consent” was no longer merely the trace of a free will but had become an autonomous object, thereby able to circulate on a market🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Remarques sur la distinction entre la volonté et le consentement en droit des contrats distinction entre la volonté et le consentement, 1995.. This market for consents, observed in Financial Law in its relationship with Company Law, could thus become the rule in the digital space through the massive purchase of mechanical consentsmafr, .... (article in the Liber Amicorum for Pierre Godé).

7. The gradual reaction of European Law to restore the link between the Compliance Obligation and the free will of others 🎯 The situation observed here is not the disappearance of the free will of the company subject to a legal Compliance Obligation but the disappearance of the free will of the person whose interests the company is obliged by law to protect. It is a sort of chain loss: individuals lose their freedom because consent has become an autonomous commercial object; companies lose their freedom because compliance is reduced to an obligation to conform to regulationSee infra n° 00.. Everyone loses: the individual, the company, the system. Indeed, the person consents to give up preventing the transfer of his or her data, preventing its exploitation, refusing its sale to a third party, etc. It is thus the very Monumental Goal of protecting the internet user that is transgressed, the Goal for which the Compliance system was built that is thus set aside.

Insofar as this system was first conceived by courtsOn the historical dimension of Compliance Law, which explains in particular the fundamental differences that will persist between American, European and Asian Compliance Law, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Compliance: before, now, after, 2018; 🚧Births of a branch of Law: Compliance Law, 2024., it is natural that it was first courts, notably Belgian ones, then supervisory authorities, notably the CNIL, and the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Schrems judgmentsadd the Schrems judgments and some commentary, thank you., which required that the consent given express the free will of the person whose personal information is thus exploited.

8. The proven performance of market totalitarianism: the North American and Chinese examples🎯 Here we find the profound nature of what Compliance Law must be, in the place it gives to the free will of persons: not only that of companies, which must not merely obey regulations blindlySee infra n° 10 et seq., but also that of the persons concerned, if importance is attached to them, that is to say if one has a humanist conception of Compliance Law🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧What can Compliance Law build relying on the European Humanist Tradition, 2019.. Persons must then be enabled to know, to understand, to say no or to say yes. If this is not possible, then there is totalitarianism. A certain conception of the market, what Alain Supiot calls the “Total Market”🕴️A. Supiot, 📗The Spirit of Philadelphia: Social Justice vs. the Total Market, Verso Books, 2012, 160 p., may lend itself to this, since consent, as a market object, takes the place of free will. American Law, that of a market society, may be considered to tend in this direction. For quite different reasons, Chinese Law also relies on consents that fill the place free wills should have, free wills never having had the central place they have in a Western legal system built on the legal subject. It is certain that in each of these 2 Compliance systems, performance is high. But that is precisely the point: Compliance Law must not be defined by the criterion of efficiency. This is the European way. It must be defended more than ever.

9. Defending a Compliance Obligation based on the free will of those concerned: the European conception 🎯 Because a market can certainly function with consents and powers alone, algorithms being more efficient with such objects, it is more difficult to build and win acceptance for a Compliance Obligation borne by companies that requires them to obtain the expression of the free will of the persons concerned. Yet this has been the European ambition from the outset. It inserts into the legal Compliance Obligation weighing on companies an obligation to inform, explain and teach the persons concerned, so as to enable them to say No and to say Yes knowingly, that is to say to genuinely care about them.

Proof of this care not to mechanise the person concerned, so that he or she does not give up free will but on the contrary expresses it through consent, is a legal obligation now refined by a series of processes required by the European texts of the ePrivacy packageDirective 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications - so-called "ePrivacy Directive"). Proposal for a Regulation of the european Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications - so-called "ePrivacy Regulation").. The company must demonstrate that it has enabled the internet user to express his or her free will, an evidentiary obligation of means, the demonstration of which it must pre-constitute On the preconstitution of evidence, see 🕴️M. A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025, n° 00 et seq.. This educational obligation may be contractualisedSee infra n° 20 et seq. and developed, thereby changing its natureSee infra n° 48 et seq..

B. PRESERVING FREE WILL IN THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION BY PUTTING “CONFORMITY” IN ITS PROPER PLACE: A TOOL OF COMPLIANCE AND NOTHING MORE

10. The practical consequences of an adequate definition🎯 In Law, a practical art, one must never dissociate the art of definition, to which that of characterisation is linkedThe handling and scope of this intellectual operation run through the various branches of Law. See e.g. 🕴️Fr. Terré, 📗L'influence de la volonté individuelle sur les qualifications, 1957 ; 🕴️J. A. Salmon, 📝Quelques observations sur la qualification en droit international public, 1978 ; 🕴️I. Voulgaris, 📝Réflexion sur l'approche comparative de la qualification en droit international privé, 1999., from the daily practice of dealing with situations. Just as it was the definition of “consent” as an autonomous object of the will, and no longer as its trace, that in practice allowed the constitution of markets for consents and the increased subjection of human beings through algorithmic powerSee supra n° 5 et seq., it is through the art of definition that, in practice, the place of free will can be preserved or restored: no longer only that of the persons concerned who benefit from the Compliance system, but also the free will of the companies which bear its burden through the Compliance Obligation weighing on them.

11. Fighting the market for consents at the disposal of “masters”: the example of the duty of vigilance🎯 The expression chosen by the Legislator in the 2017 so-called “Vigilance” law, “ordering company” (entreprise donneuse d’ordre), an alternative characterisation to that of parent company for imposing a duty of vigilance on it, expressly refers both to the power of the company and to the fact that it is active, its will being the very source of the value chain it has built and structured through a series of regulatory contracts with partners. The idea of the Legislator, taken up by the CS3D Directive, is not to combat the fact of this will of the powerful company but on the contrary to use it, insofar as the company has thus built, through its free will, a chain that is an alternative to the market, which draws its power from the liquidity produced by countless exchange contracts, whereas the chain is a rigid structure.

So that the alienation of consents that takes place on markets is not reproduced in the chain, which is also built on contracts, the Legislator injects a legal obligation of vigilance, which will compel the company to use its power of regulation through contract beyond its own particular interest, that is to say not only to create permanence over time of the chain of which it is master, which it has spontaneously done by building a value chain over time, but also to protect the persons involved in it, its partners and the stakeholders, and even more so external systems, such as probity or the climate balance.

This is how the principles of proportionality🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Definition of Proportionality and Definition of Compliance Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023 on the one hand and of sustainability🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Why the Texts and Practices on Sustainability Reporting will give rise to Systemic Litigation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Contentieux Systémique Émergent, 2025. on the other take on a quite different meaning, which gives the company both new powers and new constraints. Everyone stresses the new constraints, but they are correlated with new powers because the myriad of compliance obligations to which companies are subject can be grouped into a single new Compliance Obligation, namely to contribute to the achievement of Monumental Goals that they did not set themselves: preserving systems and the human beings involved in them. When companies have themselves built value chains as an alternative to the market, it is this Compliance Obligation that they bear, with all the powers necessary to fulfil it. In this respect, the duty of vigilance is the “spearhead” of the Compliance Obligation🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Systemic Articulation between Vigilance, Due Diligence, Conformity and Compliance: Vigilance, Total Share of the Compliance Obligation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025..

But the company itself, thus compelled by Law to use its power, in particular its contractual power, to protect and act over the long term for interests other than its own, must not itself be subject to an absolute obligation to obey “regulation” without any room for manoeuvre, with nothing to understand and nothing to choose: it is utterly contradictory to ask companies to do everything so that others are preserved, understand their obligations and genuinely use their rights and freedoms, while the company in charge of this would have none of the same prerogatives.

Yet in a conception that reduces Compliance Law to a conformity process, this is what is claimed: wanting both that protected individuals not be reduced to their mechanical consent (which is to be approved) while claiming to require the companies subject to the law to obey blindly, without even seeking to understand. Consoling oneself, admittedly, with the clarification that a little ethics should be added to conformity, a supplement of soul adding a little meaning to all this….

12. “Conformity” as a cascade of “consents”, so many mechanical acts of obedience, mechanically entrusted to algorithms🎯 In this confusion between “Compliance” and “conformity”For more developments, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Compliance and conformity: distinguishing them to articulate them, 2024., companies take note and treat conformity as an externality to be managed. Since it would only be a matter of “conforming” to all applicable regulations, and of showing this Ex Ante, companies face this obligation, which would then be giganticFor further developments on the impact of the confusion between ‘Compliance’ and ‘conformity’ on the definition of the Compliance Obligation, see the study on the very definition of the latter: 🕴️M. A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025, n° 00 et seq. and inhuman, by resorting to a non-human means: algorithms. These make it possible to store the whole “regulatory mass”, to store the decisions taken about it, to correlate them, to generate contractual arrangements, etc. Thus, because it would not be a matter of understanding, nor of adhering to anything, in a robotised mode where, for example, “sustainability” becomes not the solidity of a collective project and everyone’s contribution to it but the obligation to act blindly today in the light of what was decided yesterday by those who inject regulatory norms, the company applies, word for word, regulation after regulation, regulatory silo after regulatory silo. In this cascade of consents, “conformity” is the means of a system with no substantive fundamental normOn the relevance of the Kelsenian perspective, see n° 00..

It is essential not to adopt this mechanical definition and to give “conformity” its proper place: that of a tool for knowing the applicable legal rules before acting, which is always better, without this technical knowledge replacing action. The assertion that the capacity of the algorithmic tool must not replace decision-making is repeated endlessly, notably for the act of judging, but this is not always integrated into Compliance Law, because of the hold of a conformity that would replace Compliance.

It is precisely because it is asserted that companies have no other prospect than pure and simple submission to their legal Obligation to obey regulations that, this being so, they choose to outsource what would be, and would only be, a “mechanical obligation” to what an algorithm always knows better than a human being able to invent in an undetermined context. In such a conception, “compliance culture” makes no sense, since it is only a matter of obeying, and is not requiredOn the contrary, see 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Training: Content and Container of Compliance, in 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021..

13. The proper place of algorithmic systems in companies’ performance of their legal Compliance Obligation: collecting information 🎯 If, on the contrary, as one must, one considers that Compliance Law consists in asking certain companies, because they are in a position to do so, to contribute effectively, efficaciously and efficiently to the achievement of systemic Monumental Goals set by political bodies and Public Authorities, then the algorithmic system, which enables the performance of conformity, regains its proper place. Since Compliance Law is not limited to showing conformity with regulations, first by detecting “non-conformities”, then by showing “conformities”, then by imposing on oneself and then on others “conformity” with all regulations, which ends up suppressing everyone’s freedom, it must be laid down that algorithms are, but are only, tools for collecting information.

This question is developed more broadly in the study on the very definition of the Compliance Obligation🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2026.. The only point here is to stress that the free will of the company and of the persons concerned cannot be submerged by these tools. This is a major question, which courts and the first regulatory texts are beginning to address🕴🏻M. Séjean, 📝The Compliance Obligation in the Cybersecurity Field: a web of behavioural requirements to protect the System, in 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.

​II. THE COMPANY THAT BINDS ITSELF IN DUPLICATION OF ITS LEGAL COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION: “OBLIGATION UPON OBLIGATION IS VALID AND USEFUL” AS TO THE MEANS

19. The free will of the company at work in the performance of its legal Compliance Obligation⛔ As has been shown more generally and through the very definition of the Compliance Obligation, the company is obliged by law to perform its Compliance Obligation in the light of the Monumental Goals🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.. It is therefore the free will of the Legislator that prevails, by setting these Goals around which everything is organised, the legal source coming first🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Will, Heart and Calculation, the three traits encercling the Compliance Obligation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.. But the company, while it must under the laws set up this or that compliance structureOn the concept of ‘compliance structure’ and the resulting obligations to achieve results, whereas other compliance obligations are obligations of best efforts, see the classification made and the consequences drawn from it in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025., remains free to choose the means most appropriate for it to perform its obligation to contribute to the ambition of supporting systems and protecting the persons involved in them. It does so through the most classical instrument of the Law of Obligations: the contract (A). A new instrument is emerging, more familiar to Economic Law than to Civil Law: the Commitment (B). 

A. THE CONTRACT, A MEANS FOR THE COMPANY TO PERFORM ITS LEGAL OBLIGATION

20. The “compliance contract”, a service for outsourcing compliance technology⛔ The “compliance contract” is a category I proposed in 2022🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Compliance contract, compliance clauses, 2022.. It consists in a company entrusting a third party with performing its legal obligation, for example conducting internal investigations, monitoring third parties, properly managing personal data, managing a whistleblowing platform, etc. It is then a contract for the provision of services.

20. The CS3D’s incentive to use contracts ⛔ In the Vigilance mechanism, the company subject to the law, parent company or ordering company, has structured its chain of activities mainly through “regulatory contracts” which themselves structure and frame exchange contracts, which is natural since the chain in question most often corresponds to a distribution chain, a structured set of framework contracts, contracts and sub-contracts. But, more than the French 2017 law which inspired it, the CS3D encourages the use of the contract, which itself structures and operates the chain of activities, to make the Compliance Obligation of the leading company efficientSee in this way 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Duty of vigilance: the way forward, 2024..

21. “Compliance clauses”, an adjustment to cover the contours of the protected system and chain⛔ “Compliance clauses” are contractual clauses inserted in contracts whose purpose is not the implementation of the Compliance Obligation but an ordinary economic purpose, such as the provision of a service or the transfer of ownership of goods, the clause providing that a Compliance concern will be inserted into this economic transaction for the benefit of the co-contracting party, of a third party or of a collective interest, for example an obligation to cooperate in an audit, a right to raise an alert, or an obligation to transmit data in order to map risks or design remediation, etc.

Compliance clauses inserted in a bilateral contractual relationship may incorporate into it consideration of the interest of the system (energy, climate, information, etc.), for example its sustainability, which the parties undertake to take into consideration in the course of their economic exchange, thereby reinforcing the effectiveness of the legal Obligation of the company that is master of the chain of activities within which the contract produces its effects upstream (e.g. supply contracts) and downstream (e.g. transport contracts). In this way, it is the interest of systems that enters contracts through compliance clauses.

22. The CS3D and “model clauses” ⛔ This is why, in July 2024, the European Commission indicated that it would make available to companies guidelines containing model clauses to be inserted in the chain of upstream and downstream contracts of the chain of activities so that the Vigilance obligation of the leading company is achieved, giving each party the share it must take in it (which falls within an allocation of “Ex Ante responsibility”), while Ex Post liability will always remain with the leading company if it is the author of a breach that has caused damage, a demonstration that may also be made against a company that is a link in this chain. These “model clauses” may be information clauses, confidentiality clauses, audit clauses, whistleblowing clauses, mediation, conciliation or even arbitration clauses, etc.

23. The very delicate limit: the contract must not have as its object or effect the exoneration of the person subject to the law: the company must “answer for” it, by organising a fair “sharing of responsibilities” ⛔ This contractual engineering, already in place and now encouraged by the European Legislator, has a limit: it must not have as its object the setting aside of the legal obligation of the company subject to it. It is always the company that must “answer for” the fact that its contribution to the achievement of Monumental Goals is effective. These contracts cannot have as their object to organise the annihilation of this legal obligation by transferring it from the company legally subject to it to someone else; nor can they have that effect.

But the European Legislator often uses the term “responsibility” in a managerial rather than a legal sense. For example, the European Regulation of 31 May 2024  on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financingRegulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 ron the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing requires companies implementing their obligation to contribute to the fight against money laundering to allocate “responsibilities” properly within them for this purpose, that is to say powers. Indeed, “Ex Ante Responsibility” is conceived through the notion of mission and powers, in the context of the position in which the company finds itself, as this particular text recalls, but this is also a general characteristic of Ex Ante ResponsibilityMore generally, mafr, Ex Ante Responsibility, pillar of Compliance Law,.

24. The consequence: pre-constitution of evidence by the company subject to the Law⛔ The consequence of this delicate limit, namely the task of allocating “responsibilities”, that is to say functions and powers, effectively, combined with the prohibition on using contracts to empty the legal Compliance Obligation weighing on the large company of its substance (a practice that will be sanctioned, since the company cannot be allowed to turn an instrument for performing its legal obligation into an instrument for annihilating that same obligation), is that the company subject to the law must pre-constitute proof that the contracts and clauses put in place did indeed have the object of making its legal Compliance Obligation effective, efficacious and efficientOn the fact that the company's Compliance Obligation is mainly an evidential obligation, see the last part of the study 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025, n° 00 et seq.

More generally, on the evidential system and what it produces on the company subject to the Compliance Obligation, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝The Judge, the Compliance Obligation and the Company. The Compliance Evidence System, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, 2024.
. A demonstration of such an effect, constituted in advance, is the best way to prove the reality of this object.

The company must therefore bring back up to itself proof that this whole network of contracts and clauses gives it the means to answer, before all stakeholders, internal (its employees) and external (its suppliers, associations, etc.), for the proper performance of its legal obligation. It thus “answers” before all for the performance of the burden that the State has placed on it. This is why the contractual mechanisms put in place often have an evidentiary purpose, for example the transmission of information to the leading company or the making available of information for investigations it conducts throughout the chain of activities it has structured in space and time.

25. The relevance of contractually organising the pre-constitution of what should be called “distant evidence”⛔ It is proposed here to call this required information “distant evidence”, in that it concerns realities remote from the leading company, either in space, for example the working conditions of a sub-supplier operating in a distant geographical location, or in time, for example the informational or climate impact in the distant future. This distant evidence of the way in which the leading company will put in place risk prevention, establish remediation or act to obtain information on possible damage, etc., is an essential element, because distant evidence is very difficult to reach and presupposes the cooperation of those who have knowledge of “distant situations”, either because they are on the spot (for geographical distance) or because they have knowledge of the future through scientific knowledge of it.

Contracts with those who know in one capacity or another, the “experts”, whom one will meet again in systemic trials whose object is the future🕴️F. Ancel, 🎤Face au futur, la transformation de l’office du juge civil et commercial, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (coord.), Dans l’espace de justice, les pratiques juridictionnelles au service du futur, in Cour de cassation, lecture series “Penser les pratiques juridictionnelles au service d’un espace de justice”, 21 November 2024, video recording available at: https://www.courdecassation.fr/agenda-evenementiel/dans-lespace-de-justice-les-pratiques-juridictionnelles-au-service-du-futur., may organise this prior articulation of information and action Ex Ante that the leading company organises and conducts in order to perform its legal obligation.

B. THE AMBIGUITY OF “COMMITMENTS”: THE JUDGMENT OF THE HAGUE COURT OF APPEAL OF 12 NOVEMBER 2024, SHELL

26. Commitment: the means of conferring sustainability ⛔ In Regulatory Law, commitments are what give sectors security, since they make it possible to ensure that tomorrow the situation of the whole sector and of the operators carrying on their activities in it will be governed by the same terms as those governing their present situation🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les engagements dans les systèmes de régulation (Commitments in Regulatory Systems), 2006.. Commitments and legal certainty are therefore intertwined. Even more, Commitment and Sustainability are intimately linked.

The contract, the common instrument of commitment, is thus what secures the future🕴️H. Lécuyer, 📝Le contrat, acte de prévision, in 📗Mélanges en hommage à François Terré. L'avenir du droit, 1999.. But when it comes to securing a system, attention turns rather to commitments by Regulators themselves, their commitments proving more valuable than legislative acts since the Legislator, although a Law by nature takes hold of the future, has the sovereign power to change overnight what it enacts for the future, its sovereignty thus being by nature a source of insecurityfind in the book Les engagements dans les systèmes de régulation, a contribution highlighting the instability of the legislator (compared with a regulator's ability to commit).. This is why, today, the soft law of guidelines, or a framework contract, or a charter of a company that is master of a chain of activities it is in charge of regulating, produces a higher sustainability effect than a law that constantly changes, and is in this respect the basis for greater trust.

27. The non-recognition of an intrinsic legal constraint in an ethical commitment ⛔ But most often, when companies put in place a “commitment policy”, even though there may now be a general obligation to have a group “general policy” (policy) because the complex mechanism of vigilanceOn the insertion of vigilance mechanisms into the “general policy of groups”, as conceived by the CS3D, see...., of anti-money laundering or of preserving competition must be inserted in it, a commitment has no intrinsic legal effect as an isolated act.

Companies may nevertheless produce commitments, which may be of great importance, in two ways. First, in their internal human resources policy, so that their employees “commit” themselves to the collective project that constitutes the company itself, defined as a projectOn the definition of the company as a group of persons always brought together by a project, see 🕴️A. Supiot, ..., in 🕴️A. Supiot (ed.), 📗L'entreprise...... Secondly, with regard to themselves, by asserting that they “commit” to improving this or that system, for example by combating harmful climate change, promoting women or combating digital exclusion, etc. This is often done by adopting ethical charters. These “policies” bring us back to the elementary distinction between Law and Ethics, the former being binding and the latter not being so in itself. As can be seen with regard to professional ethicsOn deontology, 🕴️D. Gutmann, 📝L'obligation déontologique entre l'obligation morale et l'obligation juridique, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), 📗L'obligation, t. 44, Dalloz, pp. 115-127., which such an approach may resemble, such a practice then constitutes a fact which becomes a standard that will be taken into consideration if a liability action is brought Ex Post against the company.

28. Commitments: facts that may constitute relevant standards in a possible civil liability action against the company legally subject to the obligation⛔ Thus, when the company adopts communication documents, whatever their medium (internal or external; written, oral, digital), in which it asserts that it commits to doing this or that, this does not constitute a unilateral undertaking of will, a category which, as is well known, is subject to very strict formal requirements, in particular with regard to the addressees for whom it creates rights of claimOn the conditions for classification as a ‘unilateral act of will’ and its effects, see 🕴🏻M. Fabre-Magnan, 📗Droit des obligations, t. 1 : Contrat et engagement unilatéral, 2021, p. 877 et seq., §117 et seq., which defines a ‘unilateral undertaking of will’ as "the manifestation of the will of a person expressing his intention to bind himself towards another" (p. 877, §117, free translation) and deduces 4 conditions for its validity: the formulation of an explicit promise, the intention of the author to be bound, the existence of an advantage for the beneficiary of the promise and the latter's legitimate belief in the undertaking. See also 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝What a commitment is, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025..

But while the company’s commitments do not give rise to rights of claimFor example, in Competition Law, if the commitments taken by a company have legal effect, either in merger control or in proceedings for anti-competitive behaviour, this is not due intrinsically to the commitments themselves, but to the decision taken unilaterally by the Competition Authority which, taking into account this fact that these commitments constitute, decides, for example, to accept the merger or not to continue the proceedings for anti-competitive behaviour., they nonetheless constitute behavioural facts which may constitute standards against which a breach by the company may subsequently be established. Therefore, in a liability action, the success of which requires the threefold proof of a triggering event, damage and a causal link between the 2, the fact of a commitment may help prove the breach. Thus, even if the commitment is not a legally binding act in respect of which stakeholders would be creditorsThose who assert this are often the same ones who say that the law which obliges the company would make it a ‘debtor’. On this misunderstanding, which is perhaps deliberate, see supra n° 00 et seq., it constitutes a fact whose importance in the management of a company has great repercussions in Law.

29. Through commitment, the company crystallises external non-binding legal norms: the judgment Shell of The Hague Court of Appeal of 12 November 2024⛔ The judgment delivered by The Hague Court of Appeal on 12 November 2024 in the so-called Shell case brings a solution that is both new and nuanced🏛️Gerechtshof Den Haag (La Haye Court of Appeal), 12 November 2024, n° 200.302.332/01, Shell Plc c/ Milieudefensie et a. ; 🕴🏻M. Torre-Schaub, 📝Environnemental and Climate Compliance, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.. Indeed, the judgment overturns the much-commented judgment of The Hague District Court of ... 2021add the exact date, the reference and some commentary on the judgment.. In the very meticulous reasoning developed by the Court, seised by associations on the basis of the general law of civil liability and invoking what would be a general duty to act against harmful climate change, it is recalled that the company’s liability can only be incurred on this basis if a breach on its part, the existence of damage and a causal link are demonstrated, to which must be added standing and an interest in bringing proceedings on which the associations that brought the case must be able to rely. In the absence of this, their claims were dismissed, whereas they had been upheld by the first-instance judges. But on the terrain of commitment, The Hague Court notes that the Shell group expressly adopted as its own international standards which, in themselves, have no binding force and cannot bind companies, such as the UN standards on the matter. By adopting them as its own, Shell binds itself to “do its part in the fight against harmful climate change”Shell binds itself to “do its part in the fight against harmful climate change”: this is taken from the official English translation, by The Hague Court of Appeal, of its judgment written in Dutch (check the English texti).

30. Retained control over the implementation of external legal norms transformed by the fact of commitments⛔ This judgment shows that, by committing, the company cannot claim that it does not change its situation. It says it is going to do something: it must therefore do it. For example, “do its part” in achieving the Monumental Goals, here the fight against climate change. But it is still for the company to formulate the extent of that part.

Thus, first, and contrary to what was argued by many, notably relying on the first-instance judgment of The Hague District Court, it is indeed the will of the company which, through its commitment, transforms an international principle, which is not bindingSee contra 🕴️L. Dubin, 📝Tensions and contradictions between corporate due diligence instruments. From a due diligence process to the establishment of a standard of responsibility, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025., into what will bind it. Secondly, because the company is master of the implementation, as long as the trajectory followed is credible, it will choose its modalities and its extent. This once again highlights the evidentiary dimension of the company’s Compliance Obligation, since it will have to show at all times that it is acting freely, admittedly, but along a “credible trajectory”On the criterion of ‘credible trajectory’, a central evidential concept, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025, n° 00 et seq..

2. Corporate will, through the “raison d’être” and the mission-driven company, as points of contact with the Compliance Obligation

31. The corporate will to express a goal beyond financial interest: a point of contact with the Monumental Goals ⛔ The authors who set out what the Compliance Obligation is in its relationship with Company Law all refer both to the “raison d’être” (purpose) and the “mission-driven company” (entreprise à mission), insofar as they express what lies beyond money, the pursuit of a collective interest, concern for something else and for othersSee notably 🕴️A.-V. Le Fur, 📝Interest and “raison d’être” of the Company: How Does It Fit Together with the Compliance Monumental Goals?, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023; 📝Corporate and Financial Markets Law facing the Compliance Obligation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.. In this way, the company establishes itself through a concern to take its part in an ambition of a more political nature. In a sort of rise in power which was expressed by the rewriting of Article 1832 of the Civil Code by the so-called Pacte law, then the corporate will to insert a “raison d’être”, then the will to establish oneself as a “mission-driven” company, one finds the will to conceive of oneself as a participant in a collective internal and external project, for the achievement of which compliance tools are required, ranging from information to evaluation to remediation.

32. The superposition of corporate will and directors’ liability ⛔ Corporate will thus reinforces the legal Compliance Obligation at the very heart of the articles of association by inscribing it in them. This does not, however, transform the general principles of Company Law, in particular in its relationship with the Law of Liability. This is why, in order to engage the personal liability of a director or corporate officer, the third party acting against him or her must be able to prove that the failure to respect the incorporation of the legal Compliance Obligation into the corporate purpose or mission constitutes a “fault separable from his or her functions”, that is to say an intentional fault of particular seriousness incompatible with the normal exercise of his or her corporate mandate and functions.

III. OBLIGATION UPON OBLIGATION IS VALID AND USEFUL AS TO THE SOURCE: THE COMPANY THAT BINDS ITSELF IN EXPANSION AND THEN IN AUTONOMY OF ITS LEGAL COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

33. The exclusion of self-regulation⛔ It is sometimes argued that the company, especially the large one, can constitute a “legal order” on its own. This will be said all the more readily as laws, as the CS3D requires, oblige it to provide solutions to complaints lodged with it, a judicial function, while the general policy established through multiple charters and declarations leads some authors, notably Gunther Teubner, to regard global companies as the “neo-constituents” of the world🕴️G. Teubner, 📗Fragments constitutionnels. Le constitutionnalisme sociétal à l'ère de la globalisation, 2016 ; 📝L'auto-constitutionnalisation des entreprises transnationales ? Sur les rapports entre les codes de conduite "privés" et "publics" des entreprises, in 🕴️A. Supiot (ed.), 📗L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, 2015.. But Compliance Law opposes this hypothesis of self-regulation, because the Monumental Goals, namely the protection of human beings involved, willingly or not, in systems, are set by States and Public Authorities and not by companies. Elon Musk cannot be king of the world, in that he cannot claim to govern a social network according to the goals that suit him, nor contemplate building a planet whose Constitution he would lay down.

33. The company does not constitute an autonomous “legal order”, able and legitimate to set the Monumental Goals, the normative foundation of Compliance Law⛔ Companies are not a legal orderContra, see for example Jean-Philippe Robé's well-documented article, 📝L'entreprise en droit, 1995, which develops the thesis that the company develops a legal order. because, as Kelsen demonstrated in The Pure Theory of Law of 1931 with regard to political power🕴🏻H. Kelsen, 📗Reine Rechtslehre (Théorie pure du droit), 1934.

This is one of the essential points of opposition between Kelsen and Schmitt, since Kelsen bases the formal pyramid of norms on the ‘fundamental norm’, which is not at the disposal of the political power and must therefore be guarded by a jurisdictional body, whereas Schmitt conceives of the legal system as a system inhabited by the political and therefore hierarchically by the head of state, who ultimately disposes of it. Tragically, the opposition between the two ideas developed in Domestic Law; it also applies to International Law, where Kelsen developed his ideas after the Second World War. See, for example, 🕴🏻N. Zanon, 📝La polémique entre Hans Kelsen et Carl Schmitt sur la justice constitutionnelle, 1991.
, they cannot dispose of the essential substance, which lies beyond them, however powerful they may be. They can, and can only, extend. If they can enhance, it is only by way of extension. And this extension is measured against the Monumental Goals, the setting of which is the prerogative of States and Public Authorities.

34. Extending and enhancing the Monumental Goals set by political bodies, without ever departing from them ⛔ It is therefore excluded that the company may use its will to depart from the Monumental Goals on which Compliance Law is founded by claiming to create new obligations or new goals that would have as their object or effect to evade its Compliance Obligation (A). But first, and this is very frequent, the company copies its legal obligation, in particular by contractualising it, thereby becoming either a debtor or a creditor (B). 

A. EXCLUSION OF THE COMPANY’S OBLIGATION THAT CONTRADICTS

35. Exclusion of the contractual obligation or commitment that removes the company from its legal obligation⛔ Because Compliance Law is a teleological branch of LawOn the Teleological nature of Compliance Law, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Compliance Law, 2016 ; 🚧Births of a branch of Law: Compliance Law, 2024., a commitment by the company, a contract or a contractual clause making the company a debtor or creditor, which would have as its object or effect to thwart the principle of its contribution to the Monumental Goals that are the normative foundation of Compliance LawOn the very definition of this obligation, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025., must be regarded as contrary to public policy and absolutely null and void.

36. The difficulty of measuring whether a commitment or contractual obligation contradicts the Monumental Goals and their technical plurality⛔ Just as the Monumental Goals are that through which the tools of compliance must be used🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022. and the various laws and regulations must be interpreted🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Describing, Conceiving and Correlating Compliance Tools, in Order to Use Them Adequately, in 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021 ; 📝Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022., they exclude that the power to bind oneself and to bind others in return may thwart these goals, beyond the organisation of irresponsibility, a hypothesis expressly prohibited by the recitals of the CS3D Directive.

But technical compliance obligations are many. They may be literally contradictory, for example requiring disclosure in certain cases or certain texts and secrecy in others. It is indeed under the Compliance Obligation that one must “know one’s customer” and that one must not ask about his or her state of health. A table of these various technical compliance obligations has been drawn up in order to arrange them in the light of the general legal Compliance ObligationThe very purpose of this study is to draw up a picture of the diverse and sometimes seemingly contradictory technical compliance obligations, which must find their coherence and articulation in the context of a single, simple and clear Compliance Obligation, is the topic of the study: 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025..

It may be easy to rely on the obligation to keep information secret and to copy, in charters and cascading contracts, the obligation not to use and not to disclose personal information, possibly entrusting this to data protection officers, or even seeking opinions from the CNIL, in order to evade contrary requirements that may have been formulated by third parties, victims, sectoral regulators, prosecutors, etc.

It will no doubt be for case law to strike the balance, except that, initially, companies must justify through their commitments and contracts why one dimension prevails over the other, which may be justified for example by their activity but must not remain implicit.

B. TAUTOLOGY OF THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION COPYING THE LEGAL OBLIGATION

37. The frequency with which legal provisions are copied into the voluntary acts of companies subject to them⛔ It is very common for the provisions of compliance regulations to be copied word for word into various charters and contracts, for example the GDPR, the so-called Sapin 2 and Vigilance laws. This tautology has sometimes been mocked, in that copying the law does not change the subjection of the legal subject who would merely repeat the obligation he or she has to obey the law, perhaps expressing the pleasure he or she would take in doing so, thereby making more concrete the love of the laws that Rousseau presumes. This is not technically accurate.

38. The change of status brought about by the contractualisation of the Compliance Obligation, making the company a debtor ⛔ This is not accurate because the person subject to the law first becomes a debtor, the letter of the law becoming the letter of the contract. It is then contractual liability, or specific performance, that may be sought before the court, the conditions of civil liability not being required. There may be a cumulation of an action of a contractual nature, with its conditions, brought by some, and of an action in tort, with its conditions, brought by others. If there is no such contractualisation, the only way to make the company legally a debtor, only the civil liability action is availableOn the fact that, unless there is a contract in which the company is involved, it does not owe a Compliance Obligation, the action against it for breach of its legal Compliance Obligation takes the form of a civil liability action which requires proof of a breach, damage and a causal link, see supra n° 00..

38. The change of status brought about by the contractualisation of the Compliance Obligation, making the company a creditor⛔ But a contract most often makes the contracting party not only a debtor but also a creditor. For example, an audit clause or an information transmission clause will make the company the creditor of an obligation to act owed by its co-contracting party, which will enable it to better perform its legal Compliance Obligation, for example of Vigilance. The company will thus be able to demand all the more, in particular with regard to business secrecy, because it will be obliged to conduct internal investigations, for example to detect or prevent corruption (Sapin 2) or harassment (Vigilance law). The more it is subject to the Law, the more it can be a contractual creditor.

38. The “mission”, a notion accounting for the position of contractual creditor in order to fulfil the legal Compliance Obligation required to contribute to Goals imposed by political or public Authorities ⛔ It thus appears that, just as the notion of “mission” applied to the company puts it in contact with the Monumental Goals of ComplianceSee supra n° 31 et seq., in the same way, applied to the contract, because the Compliance Obligation gives concrete form, for the company in a position to bear it, to a “mission”, that of contributing to the achievement of these Goals, this mission transforms the large and powerful company into what characterised public undertakingsFor a more detailed demonstration, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Use of private companies by Compliance Law to serve Human Rights, 2023.. This is all the more logical since Compliance Law is the extension of Regulatory Law, which many traditionally associate with the logic of Public LawSee in this way, 🏛️Conseil d'Etat (French Administrative Supreme Court) and the 🏛️Cour de cassation (French Judicial Supreme Court), 📗De la régulation à la compliance: quel rôle pour le juge ?, 2024..

C. ADMISSION OF THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION THAT GOES FURTHER

39. Admissibility of enhancing public ambitions ⛔ Companies may also allocate their resources (information, time, money, raw materials, innovation, staff, organisation, etc.) not to copying or serving but to going further, for example by favouring a category, an area or an action. Care must then be taken not to infringe the legal principle of equality. Here too, the principle of reasoning, a trace of the Procedural Obligation🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝General Procedural Law Obligation, Prototype of the Compliance Obligation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025., must be respected by the company, which will take care to justify how its position warrants such an enhancement in relation to public ambitions.

40. Admissibility of laying down compatible autonomous non-financial goals ⛔ This principle of reasoning also supports the part that companies’ will may take in laying down Monumental Goals that the law does not impose on them. One may think in particular of the goal of education. Education is certainly central in Compliance Law🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Training: Content and Container of Compliance, in 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021., but there it is only a matter of training in compliance. Some companies devote very substantial resources to education, in particular of children. We return here to the idea of corporate citizens, education being essential in political society, banks spreading basic financial education, digital companies basic education in respect for others.

40. Accountability through the sustainability report ⛔ As long as, on the one hand, this does not thwart a Goal set by political bodies and, on the other hand, Public Authorities can supervise these activities, there is no reason not to admit it. Sustainability reports will be one of the means by which companies justify these autonomous social actions so that they do not turn into rulers, these mechanisms of rendering account (accountability) always operating under the control of the courts.

________


____

LinkedIn follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

Instagram follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram

  1. This is notably the view of Alain Supiot, who for this reason is hostile to it (find a reference... ; perhaps in the book he edited on companies and globalisation....).

    His criticism grows stronger when the norms thus internalised no longer even have the State as their source but companies themselves, under the guise of CSR. See
  2. F. Kafka, La colonie pénitentiaire (complete the reference; add one or two legal analyses of the text, notably A. Supiot, F. Kafka, Artiste de la Loi...)
  3. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  4. On this concept, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023.
  5. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  6. It also has to do with the fact that they do not understand why such a cost is being imposed on them and not on others, why it is not up to States to carry out such a public service mission. It also has to do with the fact that compliance is presented to them as a punishment, even though they have done nothing and the tools are Ex Ante, that some present it as punishment for past crimes, such as colonisation, or as crimes they will always commit, such as international corruption, in a kind of recognition of the ‘born criminal’. It's true that this is hardly encouraging...

    All this is the result of an accumulation of confusions, notably between "regulations" and Law, between Compliance Law and conformity techniques... (see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Compliance and conformity: distinguishing them to articulate them, 2024 and infra n° 00 et seq.). The first part of this article aims to untangle these confusions.
  7. On the distinction between Climate Law and Environmental Law, and the specificity of the former, see 🕴️Ch. Huglo, 📝Under what Conditions could Climate Law Constitute a Priority Monumental Goal?, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023.
  8. This question of the will of companies was approached from a specific angle, that of the confrontation of possible sources of action by companies with regard to systemic ambitions, either out of obedience to the orders of legislators and regulators, or out of ethical concern, or out of calculation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Will, Heart and Calculation, the three traits encercling the Compliance Obligation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  9. See e.g. J.-L. Lantoine and C. Chevalier, La servitude volontaire. Postérité, réappropriation et perspectives critiques, 2024.
  10. This is why companies subject to a ‘duty of vigilance’ under the 2017 French law do not thereby become ‘debtors’. Presenting it in this way allows those who do so to present the performance of the legal obligation as performance not with regard to the law but with regard to persons who would be ‘creditors’ (since the companies would be ‘debtors’). This is no mere quibble, as the legal regime changes completely. Numerous organisations now present themselves as ‘creditors’ of the duty of vigilance, holding both procedural rights, claiming to be able to bring cases before special courts and ordinary courts on this basis, and substantive rights, claiming to be able to obtain enforcement, whereas the duty of vigilance refers to a system of liability, which presupposes proof of a breach, damage and a causal link.

    🕴️Muriel Fabre-Magnan points to this confusion in liability actions : 📝Critique de la convergence des responsabilités contractuelle et délictuelle. L'exemple du devoir de vigilance (Criticism of the convergence of contractual and tortious liability. The example of duty of vigilance), in 📗Mélanges en l'honneur du Professeur Loïc Cadiet, 2023.
  11. See the case law holding a company liable for failing to perform its legal obligation to combat money laundering, while its competitors performed their legal obligation in this respect, which creates a factual situation of unfair competition: Com., ... (please find the judgment and possibly a commentary on it).
  12. See e.g. F. Terré,..., Les obligations, Précis Dalloz , ....: “§1. Moral duty and legal obligation. Confining oneself to the field of law, the word obligation does not have a single meaning either. Generally speaking, it designates everything that the legal order commands a person to do, without there necessarily corresponding to the obligation which, passively, weighs on that person, a right for the benefit of another person.” (this is a quotation from the 2019 edition; has it changed since?)
  13. On the articulation between effectiveness, efficacy and efficiency, which marks the tools of Compliance designed and put into practice in the light of the goals, see mafr (cite one or two articles where I explain this most clearly....).
  14. On the definition of the contract as the emission of two obliged wills which, in a second stage, are tied together, here is the remarkable thesis of 🕴️Grégoire Forest, 📗Essai sur la notion d'obligation en droit privé, 2012.
  15. For a list of the various compliance obligations, in particular those involving the obligation to obtain the consent of the person concerned, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  16. On the importance of this evidential dimension of the Compliance Obligation, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  17. For a description of this technological, managerial, economic and sociological phenomenon, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Having a good behavior in the digital space, 2019. 
  18. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021.
  19. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Remarques sur la distinction entre la volonté et le consentement en droit des contrats distinction entre la volonté et le consentement, 1995.
  20. mafr, .... (article in the Liber Amicorum for Pierre Godé)
  21. See infra n° 00.
  22. On the historical dimension of Compliance Law, which explains in particular the fundamental differences that will persist between American, European and Asian Compliance Law, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Compliance: before, now, after, 2018; 🚧Births of a branch of Law: Compliance Law, 2024.
  23. add the Schrems judgments and some commentary, thank you.
  24. See infra n° 10 et seq.
  25. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧What can Compliance Law build relying on the European Humanist Tradition, 2019.
  26. 🕴️A. Supiot, 📗The Spirit of Philadelphia: Social Justice vs. the Total Market, Verso Books, 2012, 160 p.
  27. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications - so-called "ePrivacy Directive"). Proposal for a Regulation of the european Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications - so-called "ePrivacy Regulation").
  28. On the preconstitution of evidence, see 🕴️M. A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025, n° 00 et seq.
  29. See infra n° 20 et seq.
  30. See infra n° 48 et seq.
  31. The handling and scope of this intellectual operation run through the various branches of Law. See e.g. 🕴️Fr. Terré, 📗L'influence de la volonté individuelle sur les qualifications, 1957 ; 🕴️J. A. Salmon, 📝Quelques observations sur la qualification en droit international public, 1978 ; 🕴️I. Voulgaris, 📝Réflexion sur l'approche comparative de la qualification en droit international privé, 1999.
  32. See supra n° 5 et seq.
  33. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Definition of Proportionality and Definition of Compliance Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023
  34. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Why the Texts and Practices on Sustainability Reporting will give rise to Systemic Litigation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Contentieux Systémique Émergent, 2025.
  35. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Systemic Articulation between Vigilance, Due Diligence, Conformity and Compliance: Vigilance, Total Share of the Compliance Obligation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  36. For more developments, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Compliance and conformity: distinguishing them to articulate them, 2024.
  37. For further developments on the impact of the confusion between ‘Compliance’ and ‘conformity’ on the definition of the Compliance Obligation, see the study on the very definition of the latter: 🕴️M. A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025, n° 00 et seq.
  38. On the relevance of the Kelsenian perspective, see n° 00.
  39. On the contrary, see 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Training: Content and Container of Compliance, in 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021.
  40. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2026.
  41. 🕴🏻M. Séjean, 📝The Compliance Obligation in the Cybersecurity Field: a web of behavioural requirements to protect the System, in 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025
  42. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  43. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Will, Heart and Calculation, the three traits encercling the Compliance Obligation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  44. On the concept of ‘compliance structure’ and the resulting obligations to achieve results, whereas other compliance obligations are obligations of best efforts, see the classification made and the consequences drawn from it in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  45. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Compliance contract, compliance clauses, 2022.
  46. See in this way 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Duty of vigilance: the way forward, 2024.
  47. Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 ron the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing
  48. More generally, mafr, Ex Ante Responsibility, pillar of Compliance Law,
  49. On the fact that the company's Compliance Obligation is mainly an evidential obligation, see the last part of the study 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025, n° 00 et seq.

    More generally, on the evidential system and what it produces on the company subject to the Compliance Obligation, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝The Judge, the Compliance Obligation and the Company. The Compliance Evidence System, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, 2024.
  50. 🕴️F. Ancel, 🎤Face au futur, la transformation de l’office du juge civil et commercial, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (coord.), Dans l’espace de justice, les pratiques juridictionnelles au service du futur, in Cour de cassation, lecture series “Penser les pratiques juridictionnelles au service d’un espace de justice”, 21 November 2024, video recording available at: https://www.courdecassation.fr/agenda-evenementiel/dans-lespace-de-justice-les-pratiques-juridictionnelles-au-service-du-futur.
  51. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les engagements dans les systèmes de régulation (Commitments in Regulatory Systems), 2006.
  52. 🕴️H. Lécuyer, 📝Le contrat, acte de prévision, in 📗Mélanges en hommage à François Terré. L'avenir du droit, 1999.
  53. find in the book Les engagements dans les systèmes de régulation, a contribution highlighting the instability of the legislator (compared with a regulator's ability to commit).
  54. On the insertion of vigilance mechanisms into the “general policy of groups”, as conceived by the CS3D, see....
  55. On the definition of the company as a group of persons always brought together by a project, see 🕴️A. Supiot, ..., in 🕴️A. Supiot (ed.), 📗L'entreprise.....
  56. On deontology, 🕴️D. Gutmann, 📝L'obligation déontologique entre l'obligation morale et l'obligation juridique, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), 📗L'obligation, t. 44, Dalloz, pp. 115-127.
  57. On the conditions for classification as a ‘unilateral act of will’ and its effects, see 🕴🏻M. Fabre-Magnan, 📗Droit des obligations, t. 1 : Contrat et engagement unilatéral, 2021, p. 877 et seq., §117 et seq., which defines a ‘unilateral undertaking of will’ as "the manifestation of the will of a person expressing his intention to bind himself towards another" (p. 877, §117, free translation) and deduces 4 conditions for its validity: the formulation of an explicit promise, the intention of the author to be bound, the existence of an advantage for the beneficiary of the promise and the latter's legitimate belief in the undertaking. See also 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝What a commitment is, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  58. For example, in Competition Law, if the commitments taken by a company have legal effect, either in merger control or in proceedings for anti-competitive behaviour, this is not due intrinsically to the commitments themselves, but to the decision taken unilaterally by the Competition Authority which, taking into account this fact that these commitments constitute, decides, for example, to accept the merger or not to continue the proceedings for anti-competitive behaviour.
  59. Those who assert this are often the same ones who say that the law which obliges the company would make it a ‘debtor’. On this misunderstanding, which is perhaps deliberate, see supra n° 00 et seq.
  60. 🏛️Gerechtshof Den Haag (La Haye Court of Appeal), 12 November 2024, n° 200.302.332/01, Shell Plc c/ Milieudefensie et a. ; 🕴🏻M. Torre-Schaub, 📝Environnemental and Climate Compliance, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  61. add the exact date, the reference and some commentary on the judgment.
  62. Shell binds itself to “do its part in the fight against harmful climate change”: this is taken from the official English translation, by The Hague Court of Appeal, of its judgment written in Dutch (check the English texti)
  63. See contra 🕴️L. Dubin, 📝Tensions and contradictions between corporate due diligence instruments. From a due diligence process to the establishment of a standard of responsibility, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  64. On the criterion of ‘credible trajectory’, a central evidential concept, see 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025, n° 00 et seq.
  65. See notably 🕴️A.-V. Le Fur, 📝Interest and “raison d’être” of the Company: How Does It Fit Together with the Compliance Monumental Goals?, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023; 📝Corporate and Financial Markets Law facing the Compliance Obligation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  66. 🕴️G. Teubner, 📗Fragments constitutionnels. Le constitutionnalisme sociétal à l'ère de la globalisation, 2016 ; 📝L'auto-constitutionnalisation des entreprises transnationales ? Sur les rapports entre les codes de conduite "privés" et "publics" des entreprises, in 🕴️A. Supiot (ed.), 📗L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, 2015.
  67. Contra, see for example Jean-Philippe Robé's well-documented article, 📝L'entreprise en droit, 1995, which develops the thesis that the company develops a legal order.
  68. 🕴🏻H. Kelsen, 📗Reine Rechtslehre (Théorie pure du droit), 1934.

    This is one of the essential points of opposition between Kelsen and Schmitt, since Kelsen bases the formal pyramid of norms on the ‘fundamental norm’, which is not at the disposal of the political power and must therefore be guarded by a jurisdictional body, whereas Schmitt conceives of the legal system as a system inhabited by the political and therefore hierarchically by the head of state, who ultimately disposes of it. Tragically, the opposition between the two ideas developed in Domestic Law; it also applies to International Law, where Kelsen developed his ideas after the Second World War. See, for example, 🕴🏻N. Zanon, 📝La polémique entre Hans Kelsen et Carl Schmitt sur la justice constitutionnelle, 1991.
  69. On the Teleological nature of Compliance Law, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Compliance Law, 2016 ; 🚧Births of a branch of Law: Compliance Law, 2024.
  70. On the very definition of this obligation, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  71. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022.
  72. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Describing, Conceiving and Correlating Compliance Tools, in Order to Use Them Adequately, in 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021 ; 📝Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022.
  73. The very purpose of this study is to draw up a picture of the diverse and sometimes seemingly contradictory technical compliance obligations, which must find their coherence and articulation in the context of a single, simple and clear Compliance Obligation, is the topic of the study: 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Obligation: building a Compliance Structure that Produces Credible Results in terms of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  74. On the fact that, unless there is a contract in which the company is involved, it does not owe a Compliance Obligation, the action against it for breach of its legal Compliance Obligation takes the form of a civil liability action which requires proof of a breach, damage and a causal link, see supra n° 00.
  75. See supra n° 31 et seq.
  76. For a more detailed demonstration, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Use of private companies by Compliance Law to serve Human Rights, 2023.
  77. See in this way, 🏛️Conseil d'Etat (French Administrative Supreme Court) and the 🏛️Cour de cassation (French Judicial Supreme Court), 📗De la régulation à la compliance: quel rôle pour le juge ?, 2024.
  78. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝General Procedural Law Obligation, Prototype of the Compliance Obligation, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Obligation, 2025.
  79. 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Training: Content and Container of Compliance, in 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021.
  80. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les engagements dans les systèmes de régulation (Commitments in Regulatory Systems), 2006.
  81. find in the book Les engagements dans les systèmes de régulation, a contribution highlighting the instability of the legislator (compared with a regulator's ability to commit).