Economic Law, Regulation and Compliance

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Legal Focus: Compliance Ex Ante, in GAIA-X, Toward Automated Compliance in the Data Economy , November 30,  2021, online -   Read the program. Listen to the intervention.   Intervention Summary: Compliance Law has two senses and GAIA-X is a perfect illustration. Firstly, to respect rules and show in Ex Ante permanently this respect (procedural definition) ; secondly, to pretend certain specific "Monumental Goals" (substantial definition). In this second sens, Compliance Law is very different from Competition Law: it required in Ex Ante collaboration, transparency, stability to reach these Monumental Goals around the respect and protection of Humans, while Competition Law is based on fighting,  mobility and trade without obligation Ex Ante, just sanction Ex Post if a prohibitive behavior occurs.  GAIA-X is based on Compliance Law, established for the purpose of a European Data Industry, a Monumental Goal linked to the Sovereignty and people's protection: it must structurally oblige its members to collabore for this goals, notably through its policy rules (first sens).  It is also a part and subject of the European Union Law. In the sense, its members must obey European Regulatory system (second sens). The both are narrowly linked because the European legal system has the same purpose of sovereignty, internalization of goals in enterprises and individuals' protection: GDPR, Cybersecurity, Digital Services Regulation, etc. : members must show permanently they do it actively. Because the purposes of GAIA-X and the purpose of the European Union Law are now the same in the Compliance Law the respect of letter's Law but also the respect of spirit's Law matters. Both are Ex Ante. Therefore, Compliance by design, which is also Ex Ante, is adequate.   Automated Compliance (and automated Certification) are tools to obey and reach the Monumental Goal. GDPR has specific dispositions (articles 24 and 42) about them, but more generally the efficiency these tools are validated by Regulatory Body, and Courts notably through the design of Smart Contrats.  It could be prudent to put in adition some human Compliance control because, by definition, an Automated Compliance is just the technological transposition (second level) of legal norme (first level) and cannot create new normes.  This is why the more important in this conception in Ex Ante of Compliance by this marriage between Law and Technology is to keep in mind not only the letters put in the algorithms but only the spirit of Compliance Law. -   Go back to the previous intervention about Compliance Law as an adequate branch of Law for GAIA-X (November 2020)

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Chair for "The temporal dimension: Imminence and Intertemporally", in Climate Change Cases before National and International Courts Cross-fertilization and Convergence", November 27, 2021, Paris.  -   read the program   Summary of the panel presentation: The specific topic of our panel is the “temporal dimension” of the judicial cases of Climate change. We shall listen to two great experts on this topic, which is Time. Listening the other previous speakers, I understand how this topic is important, because Climate Change requires an immediate action and it create a political issue, because everyone comes before courts. A basis and fundamental problem, because the times are not adjusted.  let's come back to basic notions, to have three times : “past, present, future”.   The issue of Climate Change is in the Future, the necessity of Action is in the Present and the basis temporal question is to know if Courts are the bodies adequate to responde ; maybe it is inevitable that Judge must be recreate their office because the time of the classical judicial office is the Past. Immediately, this simple et huge problem appears : in a classical repartition, the judge is the legal character to intervenir for the Past, the present (maybe is for you and me), and the future is the time for the State, and more precisely for the Parliament. But the climate change is a huge topic, not in the past, not in the present, but in the future. Therefore a gap exists between the time of the topic and the time of the court before the case is explained for obtaining a solution : how to give a good answer ? Judge maybe must travel in time, from past to future …. Maybe, he must, but might he? Classically, the judge can anticipate a very next future, but not the more distant and systemic future. Climate change belongs to the second one. This is why the title of this panel is non only about the necessity to take in consideration the “imminence” but also the “intertemporally” : maybe court are the sole able to create this intertemporality between Past and Future, and by this way to obtain from States and companies to do something immediately !   By two legal ways.    Courts can stay in Past, supervising States, if they dispose of effective legal decisions taken by States in the past about Climate Change (essentially Paris Agreement, for instance transposed in the French legal system by a formal law). This is why an efficient judicial solution would be the possibility for the courts to oblige State to implement their more or less committment they had taken in the past for the future (as the Conseil d’État did in the Commune de Grande-Synthe Cas Law). Even for that, the courts must adopt a creative notion of what is a commitment from a State through a Law… ; as they must do about private companies comitment (in their codes of conduct or soft law of corporate social responsability).    But what to do if States didn’t take such commitment ? Some can allege Courts are not Parliaments and are not legitimate to rule for the future … It is a political issue, a very classical one but very accurate for Climate change (where States and companies are face to courts…) and maybe  And as our colleague said, judicial system is quite technically weak to concretize human rights.   Therefore, the second way, more innovative, est the new use of Tort Law : no more a liability Ex Post, but a responsibility Ex Ante. In every legal system, even in Civil Law systems, Tort Law is conceived by courts (for instance in French Law).  If the new reasoning is conveived in Ex Ante, Tort Law must be a set of legal tools to reach the monumental tools to reach the "Monumental Goal" (being by nature future) which is the Climate Change stopping.  In this teleological reasoning, the admissibility and the choice remedies, must be adapted to obtain what is central : the effectivity and the efficiencicy.  In this sens, the judgement between two parties (which was an Ex Post act) may be conceived as an systemic efficient action (which was an Ex Ante act), because it must be.  -        

  ► Référence complète: Frison-Roche, M.A., Appréciation du lancement d'alerte et de l'obligation de vigilance au regard de la  compétitivité internationale (" ("Assessment of Whistleblowing and Vigilance Duty with regard to international competitiveness"),  in Benzoni, L., Deffains, B. et Frison-Roche, M.-A.(dir.) , Effectivité de la Compliance et Compétitivité internationale("Compliance Effectivity and International Competitiveness"), seminar co-organised by the  Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de recherche sur l'Économie et le Droit (CRED)  of the Panthéon-Assas University, November 4, 2021.  -   ►This intervention is thematic ; it is articulated with those more general carried out in introduction by Bruno Deffains particularly focused on the necessarily global scope of Compliance and in conclusion by Laurent Benzoni on Compliance as a potential new pillar of industrial policy, the whole of the colloquium having been conceived by the three of us. - 📅 read the semirar program    📅 this scientific event is part of the 2021 colloquia cycle, organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners, on the general theme of Compliance Monumental Goals. -   🚧  read the bilingual Working Paper, basis of this conference -   ►see the slides used during the conference -   ► Conference Summary: First of all and independently of the technical topic itself which, as the slides show, is focused on these two techniques based on Information which are the Whistleblowing and the Vigilance duty, it is essentiel to pose that the techniques themselves are conceived totally  differently depending on whether Compliance Law is conceived as a mechanical process and totally binding to fully comply with all applicable regulations and to demonstrate it in advance, under the threat of terrible fines, this definition being the both completely frightening and meaningless since what these applicable regulations contains is irrelevant, in which case the prospect of competitiveness boils down to notions of costs and also procedural considerations of foreseeability and legal certainty; or if Compliance Law is conceived as a new and substantial branch of Law Ex Ante developed to detect and prevent the systemic crises being before us, of which the climate crisis is unfortunately the epigone and which requires above all Action, an action of such magnitude which requires the alliance of all forces, that of States, companies, courts and people, in a renewal of concepts, particularly legal ones, and in the indifference of territories, which puts Compliance immediately at its right level: the world, because the scientifically emerging crisis is global, the so-called "extraterritoriality" theme now being misnamed. From this new general conception, the Vigilance obligation, about which so much was said when it was imposed in France in 2017, is the advanced point, soon taken up in Europe and whose scope must be naturally global, because that Compliance Law is consubstantially global. Taking up more technically the legal techniques of Compliance and confronting them with the Competitiveness of firms, it is necessary that these Compliance Tools do not harm this Competitiveness because Compliance Law , supporting immense ambitions, can only function through an alliance between political  wills (with great pretensions, i.e. save the planet) and the entities which are able to concretize them (the crucial economic operators): the Compliance tools designed by legal systems must preserve the companies which put them in place and never favor their competitors. On the basis of this principle, it is possible to assess these two legal techniques,  namely the whistleblowing and the Vigilance duty,  which both capture Information, which, as such, gives them a uniqueness and places them in the global Competition for Information. Taking the whistleblowing first, it appears that its first beneficiary is the company itself since it discovers a weakness and can therefore remedy it. This is why, beyond the principle of protection of the whistleblower by the access of somebody to the legal statute conceived in France by the law known as "Sapin 2", it is criticized that all the incentives are not used for that the holder of such information transmits it to the manager and that the same law continues to require the absence of financial counterpart, the "heroic figure of the whistleblower and the refusal of his remuneration depriving the company of a means information and improvement. The American solution is better and tt is regrettable that the law transposing the European Directive maintains this ineffective conception. But French legislation has on the contrary developed the right incentive as to the person whom the information must be transmitted to is the manager, then externally if the latter does nothing. The solution is better that the American solution because the incentive is thus made to push the internal manager to act and put an remedy to the internal dysfunction, which increases the competitiveness of the company. Even more, even if it seems counter-intuitive, the French Vigilance Duty greatly increases the competitiveness of the companies which are subject to it. Indeed, the 2017 Law by obliging them to prevent and fight against  human rights and environment violations has tacitly given them all the necessary powers to do so, in particular the power to capture Information on third-party companies, including ( and even above all) those which are not subject to transparency obligations. In this, companies, insofar as they are personally responsible, hold a supervisory power over others, a power which allows Compliance Law to globalize and which, in the process, increases their own power. This is why the obligation of vigilance is in many respects a boon for the companies which are subject to it. The resumption of the mechanism by the next European Directive, itself indifferent to the territory, will only strengthen this global power on other firms, even foreign ones. - ► This  conférence et le document de travail servent de base à un article dans un ouvrage : 📝This conference and the Working Paper constitute the basis for an article:  📕  in its French version in the book  Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, in the Series    Régulations & Compliance  📘  in its English version in the book Compliance Monumental Goals, in the Series    Compliance & Regulation -  

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Appréciation du lancement d'alerte et de l'obligation de vigilance au regard de la compétitivité internationale" ("Assessment of whistleblowing and of the obligation of vigilance with regard to international competitiveness"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2022, pp. 413-436. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► English summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Taking up the legal tools of Compliance and confronting them with the concern that Law must have for the Competitiveness of companies, it is necessary that these legal instruments not harm it because Compliance Law, because of its immense ambitions, can only function through an alliance between political wills with great pretensions (save the planet) and the entities which are able to achieve these goals (the crucial economic operators : the political drawing on the compagnies" power, it would be contradictory for the legal instruments put in place by Law to harm the ability of companies to face global economic competition, or worse to favor international competitors acting under legal systems which do not integrate Compliance obligations.   From this principle, it is possible to assess these two legal techniques of whistleblowing and vigilance obligation: both consist in capturing Information, which gives them a strong uniqueness and fits them into the global competition for Information. Taking the whistleblowing, its first beneficiary is the company itself since the firm discovers a weakness and can therefore remedy it. Therefore, beyond the principle of protection of the whistleblower by their access to the legal statute, for instance the one conceived by the French 2016 law known as "Sapin 2", it is questionable that all the incentives are not put in place so that the holder of such information transmits it to the manager. It is not the European solution, even after the European Directive of 2019, national legal systems continuing to require the absence of financial compensation, the "heroic figure of the whistleblower and the refusal of their remuneration depriving the company of Information and improvement. First to the manager, with external transmission taking place if the latter does nothing, the internal manager is thus encouraged to act and put an end to the dysfunction, which increases the competitiveness of the company. But the French legislation has on the contrary developed the right incentive as to the person to whom the information is transmitted because by obliging to transmit first to the manager, the external transmission intervening if the internal management does nothing, the incentive is thus made to the internal manager to act and put an end to the dysfunction, this legal solution increasing the competitiveness of the company. Even more, and even if it seems counter-intuitive, the obligation of vigilance increases the competitiveness of the obliged companies. Indeed, Law by obliging them to prevent and fight against violations of human rights and the environment has tacitly given them all the necessary powers to do so, notably the power to collect Information on third-party companies, including (and even above all) those which are not subject to transparency obligations. In this respect, companies, as far as they are personally responsible, hold supervisory power over others, a power which allows to globalize Compliance Law and which, in the process, increases the Companies' own power. Therefore, the obligation of vigilance is in many respects a boon for the companies which are subject to it. The resumption of the mechanism by the next European Directive, itself indifferent to the territory, will only strengthen this global power of vigilant companies over possibly foreign companies which become its passive subjects. - 🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, " Assessment of whistleblowing and the obligation of vigilance regarding international competitiveness", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, 2023, p. - ► Article Summary: Taking up the legal tools of Compliance and confronting them with the concern that Law must have for the Competitiveness of companies, it is necessary that these legal instruments not harm it because Compliance Law, because of its immense ambitions, can only function through an alliance between political wills with great pretensions (save the planet) and the entities which are able to achieve these goals (the crucial economic operators : the political drawing on the compagnies" power, it would be contradictory for the legal instruments put in place by Law to harm the ability of companies to face global economic competition, or worse to favor international competitors acting under legal systems which do not integrate Compliance obligations.   From this principle, it is possible to assess these two legal techniques of whistleblowing and vigilance obligation: both consist in capturing Information, which gives them a strong uniqueness and fits them into the global competition for Information. Taking the whistleblowing, its first beneficiary is the company itself since the firm discovers a weakness and can therefore remedy it. Therefore, beyond the principle of protection of the whistleblower by their access to the legal statute, for instance the one conceived by the French 2016 law known as "Sapin 2", it is questionable that all the incentives are not put in place so that the holder of such information transmits it to the manager. It is not the European solution, even after the European Directive of 2019, national legal systems continuing to require the absence of financial compensation, the "heroic figure of the whistleblower and the refusal of their remuneration depriving the company of Information and improvement. First to the manager, with external transmission taking place if the latter does nothing, the internal manager is thus encouraged to act and put an end to the dysfunction, which increases the competitiveness of the company. But the French legislation has on the contrary developed the right incentive as to the person to whom the information is transmitted because by obliging to transmit first to the manager, the external transmission intervening if the internal management does nothing, the incentive is thus made to the internal manager to act and put an end to the dysfunction, this legal solution increasing the competitiveness of the company. Even more, and even if it seems counter-intuitive, the obligation of vigilance increases the competitiveness of the obliged companies. Indeed, Law by obliging them to prevent and fight against violations of human rights and the environment has tacitly given them all the necessary powers to do so, notably the power to collect Information on third-party companies, including (and even above all) those which are not subject to transparency obligations. In this respect, companies, as far as they are personally responsible, hold supervisory power over others, a power which allows to globalize Compliance Law and which, in the process, increases the Companies' own power. Therefore, the obligation of vigilance is in many respects a boon for the companies which are subject to it. The resumption of the mechanism by the next European Directive, itself indifferent to the territory, will only strengthen this global power of vigilant companies over possibly foreign companies which become its passive subjects. - 🚧 read the bilingual Working Paper, basis for this article  - 📘​ read the general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published - ► read the presentations of the other Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's contributions in this book:  📝Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law,  📝Definition of Principe of Proportionality and Definition of Compliance Law, 📝 Role and Place of Companies in the Creation and Effectiveness of Compliance Law in Crisis,  -    

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche,  Support from Compliance Law for day-to-day management of Competition Law, Working Paper, Octobre 2021. - ► This working paper has been drawn up as a basis for a contribution to the Amicorum Liber for Professor Laurence Idot, published in 2022 - ► Working Paper Summary: Competition Law has become so huge and just "regulations" that one would give up trying to understand it as a whole, preferring to become a specialist in one of its parts. This would be to lose sight of the simple and strong reason which unites the whole and gives it its breath: Freedom. Freedom experienced by the person in his daily economic action, Freedom kept by Competition Law, always returning to its principle: Free Competition. This is why the European Union places a so great emphasis on Competition. To build it and keep it effective, "Competition Policy" is articulated with Competition Law, but if authorities and judges do not blame companies for their power, they do not rely on it. To do this, they must then be supported by Compliance Law, which strongly encourages companies to act for the effectiveness and the promotion of Competition principles. Competition Law thus slips from the Ex Post to the Ex Ante, with the commitments of companies leading them to stop being passive and punished in order to become convinced players and educators of the others. Something pleasant for a great professor of Competition Law, to whom tribute is paid here. - 🔓read the Working Paper below⤵ -  🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn  🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, " Definition of Proportionality and Definition of  Compliance Law", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, p. - ► Article Summary: The use of Proportionality t always limit powers is only justified when it is about sanctions, but sanctions are only one tool among others in Compliance Law, intended moreover to have little place in this Ex Ante branch of Law. And returning to the very nature of Compliance Law, which relies on operators, private or public, because they are powerful, then using proportionality to limite powers is detrimental to Compliance Law.  However, nothing requires that. Compliance Law is not an exception that should be limited. On the contrary, it is a branch of Law which carries the greatest principles, aimed at protecting human beings and whose Normativity lies in its "Monumental Goals": detecting and preventing future major systemic crisis (financial, health and climate ones). However, literally the principle of Proportionality is: "no more powers than necessary, as many powers as necessary". The second part of the sentence is independent of the first: this must be used. Politics having fixed these Monumental Goals, the entity, in particular the company, must have, even tacitly, "all the necessary powers" to achieve them. For example, the power of vigilance, the power of audit, the power over third parties. Because they are necessary to fulfill the obligations that these "crucial operators" must perform as they are "in a position" to do so. So instead of limiting the powers, the Principe of Proportionality comes to support the powers, to legitimize them and to increase them, so that we have a chance that our future is not catastrophic, perhaps better. In this respect, Compliance Law, in its rich Definition, will itself have enriched the Principle of Proportionality. -   🚧read the Working Paper, with technical developments, references, and hypertext links. - 📘go to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published - ► read the presentations of the other Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's contributions in this book:  📝Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law,  📝 Role and Place of Companies in the Creation and Effectiveness of Compliance Law in Crisis,  📝 Assessment of Whistleblowing and the duty of Vigilance -

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.A., Definition of Principle of Proportionality and Definition of Compliance Law ("Définition du Principe de Proportionnalité et Définition du Droit de la Compliance"),  in Frison-Roche, M.-A. et Rapp, L. (dir.), Compliance and Proportionality. From the control of Proportionality to the proportionality of the Control ("Compliance et proportionnalité. Du contrôle de proportionnalité à la proportionnalité du contrôle") Compliance et Proportionnalité. Du contrôle de proportionnalité à la proportionnalité du contrôle, juges pour la Compliance, Colloque coorganisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et la Chaire SIRIUS (IDETCOM),  14 octobre 2021.  -   📅 read the conference program  📅 this colloquium is part of the cycle of colloquia 2021 organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners on the Compliance Monumental Goals topic.  -   🚧  read the Working Paper on the basis of which the conference was done and from which the reactions took place.  -   ►see the slides supporting the conference (in French)   ► Conference Summary: The use of Proportionality t always limit powers is only justified when it is about sanctions, but sanctions are only one tool among others in Compliance Law, intended moreover to have little place in this Ex Ante branch of Law. And returning to the very nature of Compliance Law, which relies on operators, private or public, because they are powerful, then using proportionality to limite powers is detrimental to Compliance Law.  However, nothing requires that. Compliance Law is not an exception that should be limited. On the contrary, it is a branch of Law which carries the greatest principles, aimed at protecting human beings and whose Normativity lies in its "Monumental Goals": detecting and preventing future major systemic crisis (financial, health and climate ones). However, literally  the principle of Proportionality is: "no more powers than necessary, as many powers as necessary". The second part of the sentence is independent of the first: this must be used. Politics having fixed these Monumental Goals, the entity, in particular the company, must have, even tacitly, "all the necessary powers" to achieve them. For example the power of vigilance, the power of audit, the power over third parties. Because they are necessary to fulfill the obligations that these "crucial operators" have to perform as they are "in a position" to do so. So instead of limiting the powers, the Principe of Proportionality comes to support  the powers, to legitimize them and to increase them, so that we have a chance that our future is not catastrophic, perhaps better. In this respect, Compliance Law, in its rich Definition, will itself have enriched the Principle of Proportionality. -   ► the conference and the Working Paper are the basis for an article in the book⤵ ►  in its French version 📕 Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, in the Series  Régulations & Compliance ► in its English version 📘Compliance Monumental Goals , dans  la collection    Compliance & Regulation   -  

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Duty of Vigilance, Whistleblowing and International Competitiveness, Working Paper, September 2021. -   🎤 this Working Paper is the basis for a conference , in the colloquium Effectiveness of Compliance and International Competitiveness, co-organised  by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Center for Law and Economics of the Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II),   November 4, 2021 - 📝this Working Paper is also the basis for an article. This article is to be published ⤵ in its French version in the book 📕Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, in the series 📚Régulations & Compliance  in its English version in the book 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, in the series la collection 📚Compliance & Regulation - ► Working Paper Summary: The "Compliance Tools" are very diverse. If it has been chosen to study more particularly among these the obligation of vigilance and the whistleblower, these rather than others and to study them together, it is because they present in the perspective of the specific topic chosen, namely "international competitiveness", and for companies, and for economic zones considered, and for legal system inseparable from them, a uniqueness: these are mechanisms which release Information.  By order of the law, the company will not only stop ignoring what it covered with the handkerchief that Tartuffe held out to it or that a conception of Company Law legitimately allowed it to ignore. This article does not examine if this revolution made by Compliance Law expresses in the legal system is on the one hand legitimate and on the other hand effective: the article measures what is happening at the regard to "international competitiveness". Compliance Law is therefore be examined here through its instruments, and not in relation to its normativity. In fact, its instruments are intended to provide Information and to make this information available, in its presentation, in its intelligibility and in the hands of those who are able to use Information in perspective of the Compliance Monumental Goals, achieving them.  Regarding this central notion of Information, international competitiveness will be more particularly concerned because Compliance Law will oblige the company itself to seek out, then expose to everyone's eyes, in particular its competitors, its weaknesses, its projects, its alliances, its flaws. This does not pose a problem if its competitors themselves are often subject to this new branch of Law, which goes far beyond transparency, which is already a new mechanism because a company is not a transparent organization and Competition Law that governs ordinary businesses never required this. But if they are not subject to this incredibly special branch of Law that is Compliance Law, then there is a distortion of competitiveness by the very fact of the Law. It is possible to pretend that the markets like virtue, that they give it credit because they are themselves based on the idea of "promise", which is ultimately based on a moral concept, but this provision of Information to others, while others remain opaque, is a major problem of competitiveness, which the legal requirement of "loyal commercial practices" only very partially considers. Therefore, it is necessary to first examine what is the economic and financial power of the information captured by the company on itself thank to Compliance Law making available to all but firstly to the compagny itself through the whistblowing mechanism, organised by the laws, differently in the US and Europe (I). Compliance Law also obliges companies to be accountable not only for what they do but also for what others do for them. Through the obligation of Vigilance, objective Ex Ante obligation and duty, the company obtains a power of Information on others which could well resolve what is often presented as the dispute aporetic of the extraterritoriality of Compliance Law, thus making accountable companies hitherto protected by their "preserved" legal system and thereby affected by the effectiveness of Compliance Law (II). - read below the developments

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, The Hypothesis of the category of Systemic Cases brought before the Judge, Working Paper, October 2021 and April 2022. - ► This working paper has served as the basis for an introductory speech 🎤L'hypothèse de la catégorie des causes systémiques (The Hypothesis of the cateory of Systemic Cases), in a more general conference which I coordinated and moderated, 🧱L'office du juge et les causes systémiques, which is part of a general cycle covering Penser l'office du juge, specific conference attending the 9th May 2002 into the Grand Chamber of the Cour de cassation.   This Working Paper was drawn up in October 2021 to build the conference on the assumption that among the diversity of "cases" brought to the courts by litigants, some constitute a specific category: "systemic cases", justifying treatment that is both specific (in that they are systemic, calling in particular for procedural solutions common to all and distinguishable from the treatment of non-systemic cases) and common treatment beyond the diversity of judges who deal with them (judicial and administrative judges, criminal and non-criminal judges, French and non-French judges, judges of the member-States legal orders and European Union judges, etc.).  This working paper does not aim to deal with the whole subject, i.e. both to determine this category of "systemic causes" and the consequences that must be drawn from it for the judge's office, since that is the very purpose of the conference, which is built around several presentations: it aims to deal with the first part of the subject, i.e. the very existence of this new processual category, which is "systemic causes", leaving for other work the practical consequences to be drawn from it in the processual treatment that it calls for. - 📝This Working Paper is also the basis of a forthcoming article - ► Summary of the Working Paper: xx - Read below the developments⤵️ - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR. Regulation, Compliance, Law

Full  Reference: Frison-Roche, M.A., Ne jamais se passer des juges et des avocats dans le Droit de la Compliance ("Never exclude Judges and Lawyers in Compliance Law" ,  in Frison-Roche, M.-A., Morel-Maroger, J. et Schiller, S. (dir.), Quels juges pour la Compliance ("Which Judges for Compliance), Colloquium co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the CR2D of Dauphine University PSL, Raymond Aron Amphy, 23rd September  2021.  - 📅 Read the Colloquium programme 📅 This colloquium  is a part in the colloquia cycle organized in 2021 by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and it partners on the  Compliance Juridictionalisation. - ✏️A bilingual Working Paper  on the topic  "The  role of the Judge in Compliance Law has been prepared to serve a basis for this conference : read this Working Paper  But for the reason detailed below, I preferred to use the time allotted to the introduction of the colloquium to develop rather what should had be an opening element for making it the entire topic of my intervention. : "Never do without judges and lawyers in Compliance Law". Because before analyzing the role of judges, they still need to be in the Compliance system; this seems to us to be taken for granted, but it is not.   ► Conference Summary: Due in particular to the large number of students and the fact that a long time ago when I arrived at Dauphine University I had created a Master in Economic Law with Martine Lombard in which I had included a course of "Economic Procedural Law" that I was teaching, since it was the moment to make this Colloquium "general introductory report", I therefore preferred to go further and focus the subject on something other than "The role of the judge in Compliance Law" , namely the very question of "the presence of judges and lawyers in Compliance Law". This question of their presence or their absence, because they would be useless, even harmful to the Compliance effectiveness, either judges, or lawyers, or both together, is indeed the prerequisite for the reflection of " Which judges for Compliance? " because if we think of Compliance exclusively through the Ex Ante and efficiency, as it is often done in the West through artificial intelligence or in China in a system of surveillance and economic, technological and political efficiency , there is neither judge nor lawyer. It is therefore to this prerequisite that I devoted my speaking time, deferring to publication all the analyzes that I had prepared on "The role of the judge in Compliance Law", to which everyone can refer by consulting the preparatory work. It is indeed imperative to always keep in mind the need to never exclude Judges from Compliance systems, although this can be conceivable since they are Ex Ante mechanisms, which often aim by nature to avoid the trial. (example of the Deffered Prosecution Agreement), because when there is a judge, the procedural mechanisms and Due Process principle are associated with it: the power of Compliance Law does not go wrong. However, Compliance Law is the Law of the future, that which will seize the immense challenges to be resolved today for tomorrow and it is not from the specific laws against corruption, such as FCPA or the French law known as "Sapin 2 law", which are only  examples, but from two enormous "monumental" subjects that are on the one hand Data and on the other hand Climate that Compliance Law is building, with the means that are required. But so that the rule "all the means necessary for the ends", which already tended to govern Regulatory Law of which Compliance Law is the exponential extension, does not carry all, one needs lawyers. Because the lawyers contradict. And ask. Ask judges and carry the actions of ordinary people for their subjective rights to be shaped. As Motulsky affirmed it in its thesis, written during the Second World War, before after this enormous systemic disaster inventing the "general procedural law". - The Working Paper which had not be exploited during the conference will be the bais for the article in the book : 📕 in its French version La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in the Series    Régulations & Compliance  📘  in its English version  Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in the Series    Compliance & Regulation -   📅 Ce colloque s'insère dans le cycle de colloques 2021 organisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et ses partenaires autour de la Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance.   -  

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A.,  Le rôle du juge dans le Droit de la Compliance ("The role of the Judge in Compliance Law"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) & Dalloz, to be published. -   ► The summary below describe an article corresponding to a Working Papier prepared for an intervention in the colloquium Quels juges pour la Compliance ?  , coorganisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et par le Centre de Recherche en Droit de l'Université Paris Dauphine-PSL (CR2D). Ce colloque a été conçu par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Juliette Morel-Morager et Sophie Schiller,  codirectrices scientifiques, et s'est déroulé à Paris le 23 septembre 2021. Dans l'ouvrage, l'article sera publié dans le Titre IV. - ► Article Summary:  - 📕  read a general presentation of the book Compliance Juridictionnalization in which this article is published. -