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The market is normally self-regulated. It suffers from one-time failures when economic agents engage in anti-competitive behavior, mainly the abuse of dominant positions in the ordinary markets, or the abuse of markets in the financial markets, sanctioned ex post by the authorities in individual decisions. But some sectors suffer from structural failures, which prevent them, even without malicious intent of agents, from reaching this mechanism of adjustment of supply and demand. The existence of an economically natural monopoly, for example a transport network, constitutes a structural failure. Another agent will not duplicate once the first network has been built, which prevents competition. An a-competitive regulation, either by nationalization, by a state control or by a control by a regulatory authority, is needed to ensure everyone's access to an essential facility. Also constitutes a market failure asymmetry of information, theorized through the notion of agency that hinders the availability and circulation of exhaustive and reliable information on markets, especially financial markets. This market failure carries with it a systemic risk, against which regulation is definitely built and entrusted to financial regulators and central banks. In these cases, the implementation of regulations is a reaction of the State not so much by political rejection of the Market, but because the competitive economy is unfit to function. This has nothing to do with the hypothesis that the State is distancing itself from the Market, not because it is structurally flawed in relation to its own model, but because politics wants to impose higher values, expressed By the public service, whose market does not always satisfy the missions.    

The expression is always left in the English language even when it is used in other languages because it is not translatable. It refers to the basic institutional and political mechanism of the American system. Regulatory theorists and practitioners often refer to it as the right political and institutional framework on which to base an economic organization of Regulation. This would mean a need to reform the political systems built on another mode of separation of powers. This strong basis conforts the fact that the system of Regulation is not neutral, it is the reflection of a political organization. The shock between these different philosophical and political conceptions explains why economic regulation has been difficult to accept in Europe, and especially in France for a long time. Indeed, according to the French political scheme resulting from the Revolution, there are two powers: the executive and the legislative, the judiciary being only an authority. The executive is built on the hierarchical principle of which the head is constituted by the government, any administration ultimately coming from a minister. It is therefore a vertical system, which has the merit of simplicity. Regulatory authorities have been imposed by European directives since the 1990s, in the form of bodies which may be administrative and Under this title of the State but must be necessarily independent of the government from the moment that operated on the market of the public enterprises which also obeyed the government through the theory of the state shareholder.   Le choc entre les deux conceptions philosophiques et politiques  explique que la régulation économique ait eu du mal à être acceptée en France pendant une longue période. En effet, selon le schéma politique français issu de la Révolution, il existe deux pouvoirs : l’exécutif et le législatif, le judiciaire n’étant qu’une autorité. L’exécutif est construit sur le principe hiérarchique dont la tête est constituée par le gouvernement, toute administration relevant finalement d’un ministre. Il s’agit donc d’un système vertical, qui a pour lui le mérite de la simplicité.Les autorités de régulation ont été imposées par des directives européennes à partir des années 90, sous la forme d’organes pouvant être de nature administrative et relevant à ce titre de l’État mais devant être nécessairement indépendants du gouvernement dès l’instant qu’opéraient sur le marché des entreprises publiques qui elles aussi obéissaient au gouvernement à travers la théorie de l’État-actionnaire. This is the fundamental European rule of the impossibility of cumulation of the regulatory / operator state, a situation constituting a conflict of interests. The French State, which intends to remain owner of public operators, in particular EDF, has preferred to relax control of regulation by creating independent administrative authorities (AAI). Consequently, the vertical model of the hierarchy of the executive has been disrupted since these authorities no longer report (as free electrons) of it. For them to be held accountable, judicial review of the authorities through appeals has been increased. In the same way, through public reports to Parliament, the IAAs began reporting directly to the IAA. The political model becomes horizontal. This then refers to a completely different tradition: that of the United States. Indeed, in the United States, the executive (the White House) has both the Parliament (the Congress) and a very powerful judiciary (the Supreme Court); No one has taken over the others, each however being able to hold the others accountable. This is called Check and Balance. Not least because the Regulation has been institutionalized by economists who, through the current Law and Economics, have perceived what they consider to be the most appropriate right as American law, which must impose itself almost "by nature". Thus, through this small corner in the door that is the institutional reform introduced by regulation, the French political system evolves towards this American system of check and balance, being observed that the United States were the first historically to put in Regulators. This rapprochement of the systems can be carried out all the more so as in Europe the organs in charge of the control of the constitutionality control do not stop increasing in power. Thus, in France, since the constitutional reform of 23 July 2008, the Constitutional Council can assess the constitutionality of laws not only before their promulgation but even when they have entered the legal order, It is becoming a "Supreme Court" on the American model. The political models remain very different, in particular because the French Parliament does not have the same blocking power as the US Congress, and the Constitutional Council does not have the same doctrinal power as the US Supreme Court. Leaves France in the place of a presidential system virtually without balance, face to face Regulators and the system of the European Union, Europe more and more a Europe of Regulation.

The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer – present or future – or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism. This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system. But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law  when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory  Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture. Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed. When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization. Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.

This set of courses and seminars which today either are no longer provided by me, or are no longer provided at all, were all created on my initiative and took their meaning in relation to each other, reflecting the educational project that I conceived when I arrived at Sciences Po in 2001. This educational project was in three interacting branches, in a progression that followed the students as they went from year to year. The first step was to create a basic global legal culture, through a new "major course" (in French) in the second year, Les Grandes Questions du Droit (Major Questions of Law). This teaching was essential because the idea was in particular that these "questions" were intended to remain in the minds of the students who would later study, in particular through the Ecole Nationale d'Administration – ENA (French High Administration National School), and would perform functions where these questions would no longer be formulated in this way while they are at the heart of the techniques applied, for example procedure, contract or responsibility. The division of the course and the way of presenting it, the knowledge transmitted were conceived in this perspective. This is the first reason why I left Paris-Dauphine University to come at Sciences Po, so that the top-level Public Administration can exercise its functions with this also in perspective. In addition and later in this first cycle (later called "Collège universitaire" (difficult to translate into English)), I created two seminars, one about Droit et Littérature (Law and Literature), the other about Droit et Cinéma (Law and Cinema). The Grandes Questions du Droit course was closed in 2014/15. Both seminars were closed in 2016/17. Secondly, it was a question of awakening in the students an increased sensitivity on questions of justice (technical field in which I did my thesis), as well in undergraduate (what I taught with Guy Canivet, who was recruited as an associate professor) than in a large common course for all masters preparing for administrative competitions (course which was also conceived and created with Guy Canivet, with whom I carried out in parallel at the Cour de cassation (highest judicial court) cycles of conferences about Law and Economy of Regulation, which gave rise to works published in a collection that I created in 2003, common between Les presses de Sciences Po and Dalloz: Droit & Economie de la Régulation). This second branch of my teachings was anchored in Les Grandes Questions du Droit, which had provided the first basics about the judge and the judicial institution. These lessons about justice and the links between Law, Economy and Justice were in 2009 closed or transferred to others. Thirdly, it was a question of approaching Economic Law technically, in its basics through Les Grandes Questions du Droit, by developing it considerably through the Master of Economic Law, by focusing on Regulation Law, since I left Dauphine to come at Sciences Po, which seemed to me to be conducive to develop the "Law, Economy, State" triangle, in which Regulation Law operates. To link research, editing and educational work, I created the Forum de la Régulation (Regulation Forum), to which all the students of the Master of Economic Law attended. Having worked on the creation of this master's degree upon my arrival in 2001, it was officially created in 2004, as I had previously created a DESS (which could be translated by Superior Specialized Studies Diploma) in Economic Law at the Paris-Dauphine University (and before that a DESS in Economic Law at the University of Angers, first post after my Agrégation (French teaching diploma)). My teaching in the Master of Economic Law was placed either in lecture hall, or in seminars, either at the beginning of the cursus or at the end of the cursus. in the first year, if it was the basics of Economic Law: Droit économique général (General Economic Law) (from the start), Droit des sociétés (Company Law) (from 2004) in the second year if they were more innovative branches of Law in specialties, in particular Droit général de la Régulation (General Regulation Law) (from the start), Actualités du Droit de la Régulation (News from Regulation Law) (from 2004). The DESS in Common International Law with Paris I having been transformed into DESS in Global Law, at my request so that the points of contact are more important with the issues of Regulation Law and leading with Horatia Muir-Watt this training, special teachings were also available in this training. They were also in the specialty "Intellectual Property", for the creation of which within the Master of Economic Law I asked Michel Vivant to come. In 2009, all of these courses in Economic Law were closed or transferred to others.   - Summary   Les Grandes Questions du Droit (Major Questions of Law), Collège universitaire, 2001-2015. Read the documents available to the students during the last year of the teaching this does not correspond to the newsletter which was addressed to every students, the digital discussion group and the registering of the lessons kept by Sciences Po. Read the interview (in French) led by Sciences Po-Nancy students around Les Grandes Questions du Droit Watch the last lesson (in French) which took place on the Campus of Nancy after the closing of the course at the end of 2014.       Les Grands Enjeux de la Justice (Major Challenges of Justice), with Guy Canivet, first cycle ; course common to the different masters   Droit des sociétés (Company Law), Master of Economic Law, 2004-2009   Droit économique général (General Economic Law), Master of Economic Law, 2001-2009   Droit général de la Régulation (General Regulation Law), Master of Economic Law, 2001-2009   Actualité de Droit de la Régulation (News from Regulation Law), Master of Economic Law, 2004-2009   Littérature et Droit – Droit et Littérature (Law and Literature), Collège universitaire   Droit et Cinéma (Law and Cinema), Collège universitaire -   Read the presentation and the summary of the current teachings: Restituer économiquement l'actualité juridique (Restoring Legal News Economically)   Droit commun de la Régulation (General Regulation Law)   Droits sectoriels de la Régulation (Sectoral Regulation Law)   Droit de la Régulation bancaire et financière (Banking and Financial Regulation Law)   Droit de la Compliance (Compliance Law)