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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La formation : contenu et contenant de la Compliance" ("Training: content and container of Compliance"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp.. 227-244. - 📝read the article (in French) -   🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): Firstly, as Training is a specific Compliance tool, it is supervised by Regulators. It becomes mandatory when it is contained in Compliance programs or sanction decisions. Since effectiveness and efficiency are legal requirements, what is the margin of companies to design them and how to measure the result? Secondly, as long as each Compliance tool includes, more and more, an educational dimension, we can take each of them to identify this perspective. So even condemnations and prescriptions are so many lessons, lessons given, lessons to be followed. The question is then to know who, in this so pedagogical Compliance Law, are the "teachers"? -

► Full Reference: M. Larouer, "La manifestation des mécanismes incitatifs dans le Droit français de la Compliance" ("The Manifestation of Incentives Mechanisms in French Compliance Law"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 99-106. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author develops in the introduction the idea that Law itself accepts the notion of incentive as being consubstantial with it, relying in particular on codes of conduct. Then the article develops demonstrations of incentive Law as a tool of complicity, first of all in the fight against corruption: the decision of the Sanctions Commission of the Agency Française Anticorruption (French Anti-Corruption Agency) shows that the recommendations of this Agency encourage the company to comply, protecting it from a sanction if it submits to it but does not prevent it from organizing in any other way. In addition, the judgment of the Commercial Chamber of the Court de Cassation (cassation court) stated that the breach of a contractual obligation which is however only the resumption of a constraint lodged in a compliance program which targets a third party justifies the termination of the contract. . More generally, the author shows that the legal system encourages companies to integrate Compliance by publishing vigilance plans and extra-financial performance, while noting that companies do not always do so. The article also concludes that French Compliance Law in its use of incentives is only at its "beginnings". -

► Full Reference : Th. Amico, "La Compliance ou le passage de l'ex post à l'ex ante. Une révolution copernicienne pour l'avocat pénaliste ?" ("Compliance or the passage from ex post to ex ante: a Compernican revolution for the criminal lawyer?"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 145-154. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): After referring to various definitions of Compliance Law, the author insists on the usefulness of the criminal lawyer in that he, familiar with the Ex-Post that constitutes the sanction, can be of good advice. in the Ex-Ante in which new compliance mechanisms are being developed, such as risk mapping or third-party assessment. Addressing the punitive dimension of Compliance Law, the author shows that the criminal lawyer therefore naturally has a place there, whether it concerns the powers exercised by an administrative authority or the criminal law itself. In that he can "anticipate criminal proceedings", the criminal lawyer is therefore best able to ensure that the company does not expose itself to them, in particular in a good mastery of internal investigations, thus ruling out the criminal risk. -

► Full Reference : R. Burlingame, K. Coppens, N. Power and D.H. Lee, "Compliance : lutte internationale contre la corruption et gestion des risques" ("Compliance: international anti-corruption and risk management"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 181-192. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The authors show that the authors certainly face a diversity of legal systems due to their multiple localization, but in reality in terms of fight against corruption the French authority, the English authority and the American authority develop similar requirements in a common spirit. Indeed by reading the texts, in particular soft law, issued by the French Anticorruption Agency, the Department of Justice and the Serious Fraud Office, it appears that the primary concern is in the effectiveness of the compliance program adopted by companies. The authorities of the three countries also stress the need for the company's governing bodies to actively promote and disseminate the culture of anti-corruption compliance. For the three authorities, it is more precisely necessary that this program be adapted and tailor-made, that the governing body commits itself to its effective compliance and that a code of conduct, effective training and communication actions, the program to be based on structural internal investigation and whistleblowing mechanisms, and refer to an evaluation. The authors show that beyond the specificities of each of the systems, the three authorities are united in the fight against corruption, which reduces the insecurity of internationally exposed companies. -

► Full Reference : A. Gutierrez-Crespin, "L’audit du dispositif de compliance : un outil clé pour en vérifier la robustesse" ("Audit of Compliance system: a key tool for checking its robustness"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 133-140. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author identifies what characterizes a "Compliance audit". Different from a "Compliance program", which is an instrument of constraint, and even from an internal investigation, which aims to detect breaches, the Compliance audit aims to measure the risks of discrepancy in relation to Compliance requirements. or even identify areas for improvement. From this definition, it is explained how concretely a Compliance audit is carried out, by a risk-based approach, and who are the actors (internal and external to the company). -

► Full Reference: S. Merabet, "La morale by design" ("Morality by design"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 287-298. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): After having wondered about the relationship between Law and Morality, for which it is difficult to find points of contact, the author advances the hypothesis that the latter could find a space of concretization in the technology of artificial intelligence, even though many are worried about the deleterious effects of it. The author considering that Compliance is only a method while ethics would be the way in which morality is incorporated in a relaxed way in Law, the technology known as Artificial Intelligence could therefore express the moral rule ("compliance by design could be the appropriate tool to ensure the effectiveness of moral rules without falling into the excesses envisaged"). The author draws on examples to estimate that thus technology for on the one hand expressing the moral rule and on the other hand making it effective. The moral rule can thus be drawn up in a balanced way since it is jointly developed between the State and the economic operators, this collaboration taking the form of general principles adopted by the State using the means chosen by the company. Its content would also be characterized by the search for a "right balance", which would be found by this distribution between the primary moral principles whose expression would be the act of the State and the secondary moral principles whose expression would be delegated to companies. Taking therefore what would be the principles of Compliance, the author applies them to Artificial Intelligence, showing that these technologies include not only the principle of neutrality but also the ethical principles of non-maliciousness, even of benevolence. (first principles) that companies then decline into secondary principles. Therefore, "compliance can usefully be used to convert these fundamental moral principles into derived moral rules, a source of greater effectiveness.". Thus resulting in a "moral by design", the overall system has an additional effectiveness tool. This supposes that the fundamental and derived rules are of an acquired moral quality because for the moment the technological tool can only ensure their effectiveness and not the moral quality of the implemented rules. In determining the "moral rules of application", the company has margins of freedom, used through technological tools. -

► Full Reference: H. Causse, "La Compliance : par et au-delà de la formation juridique classique" ("Compliance: through and beyond traditional legal training"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 215-226. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author emphasizes that not only Compliance training is required by Law but also that it is necessary. To conceive and practice it, it is certainly necessary to integrate new knowledge, often outside Law, but it is also necessary to preserve the qualities of the classical teaching of classical Law. This is why training is an essential aid and asset for companies. The article shows that the international dimension specific to the subject and that the cultural confrontation it translates must be inserted into traditional legal systems, training succeeding by highlighting the practical imperatives of which Compliance relays the concern. To achieve this, the author maintains that it is above all the classical qualities of the lawyer and the teacher that are required; classical Law thus finding a revival, as teaching methods are revitalized by this new Compliance Law. Its teaching must therefore be anchored both in traditional legal principles and in techniques specific to Compliance mechanisms. -

► Full Reference : S. Koenigsberg and Fr. Barrière, "La construction de l'expertise de l'avocat en matière de Compliance" ("The development of attorney's Compliance expertise"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils  de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 141-146. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The authors observe that many law firms are now developing expertise in compliance, either in departments or in teams. They emphasize that this expertise is achieved through specialization, which makes it possible to support companies, in Ex Ante (for example in mergers) and in Ex Post (in litigation) in continuum between the two. Moreover, this expertise is built in a collaborative way between the team of lawyers and the company concerned, which reinforces this necessary continuity. -

► Full Reference : L. Rapp, "Théorie des incitations et gouvernance des activités spatiales" ("Incentive Theory and Governance of Space Activities"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 73-88. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): The article studies the conditions for an application of the theory of incentives to the problems currently posed by the governance of space activities. These activities have been enriched by the presence of numerous private operators, without the market that is being set up having yet been properly regulated. The accumulation of debris in close space highlights the difficulty of maintaining a situation where only national laws govern in the absence of a specialized international organization and in the insufficiency of the international treaties in force. This article shows the contributions of the behavioral approach in Law and economics and the interest that there would be in developing it. -

► Full Reference: H. Tardieu, "Souveraineté des données et Compliance" ("Data Sovereignty and Compliance"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 107-114. -  📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) : After having considered that Europe had in terms of power "lost the battle" of personal data, the author asks for the same error, linked to a lack of interest at the start, not be repeated concerning "company data". The European Commission having affirmed its will in 2020, it is now necessary to build a "European ecosystem" for the sharing of industrial data in confidence. For this, the author explains that it is necessary to develop "incentives for the sharing of company data", in order to increase their available volume and fuel common progress in Artificial Intelligence between European companies and to use common complementary data, which 'none could generate alone, allowing the creation of new services. These incentives can be new and adapted "regulations", but also the adoption by the industry of a "common data model". But the author stresses that it is necessary to go, by experiments allowed by the "regulatory sandboxes". This will allow the deployment of data sharing, with Compliance being able to contribute to it, a path for a sovereign Europe of shared industrial data, a monumental objective which can thus be achieved. -

► Full Reference: L. Calandri, "Incitation(s) et autorégulation(s) : quelle place pour le droit de la compliance dans le secteur audiovisuel ?" ("Incentive(s) and self-regulation(s): what place for Compliance Law in the audiovisual sector?"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 115-122. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author took the audiovisual sector, "pilot" in the matter, to measure very precisely the way in which in France case law of the Conseil d'État introduced a logic of Compliance by leaving the operators free to organize themselves while supervising them. After recalling that by the decisions of 2016 Fairvesta and Société Numéricable, the Conseil d'État allowed the judicial control of acts of soft law, in particular those issued by the Audiovisual Regulator, the author confronts this state of law with the assertion of this Regulator that he is not the "policeman" of this sector. The Conseil d'État follows it by isolating among its acts those which are only incentive and escape the control by the judge, in the same way as acts of soft law adopted by the companies of the sector, expression of a self-regulation, They also escape litigation and are therefore also "unjustifiable". The author concludes that this completely renovates the governance of the sector, the Regulator by becoming more the arbiter and the supervisor of this new soft law. -

► Full Reference: Th. Thouret, "Formation et Compliance, deux outils corrélés de transmission d'information" ("Training and Compliance, two correlated information transmission tools"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 245-254. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author is based on the fact that in general Compliance Law aims to circulate information and that training, by nature, is a process for transmitting information, to bring the two together. Insofar as Compliance Law internalizes in "crucial operators" the obligation to circulate information (within it, vis-à-vis its stakeholders and the authorities, but also between crucial operators) , it is therefore logical that they develop training programs, not in an adjacent way but in a main way, because of this identity. Indeed, training is a means of obtaining that information is "well received", that is to say understood, assimilated and used by its recipient for what it was transmitted. The regulatory and supervisory authorities therefore control the effectiveness of obtaining this effect. The author finally takes two examples, one of spontaneous adoption of a Compliance training program, operated by Total group, the other of forced adoption, operated by Johnson & Johnson group, to illustrate its general demonstration. -

► Full Reference : L. Pailler, "Les outils technologiques, la Compliance by design et le RGPD : la protection des données dès la conception" ("Technological tools, Compliance by design and GDPR: the protection of personal data from design"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 279-286. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author considers that the GDPR has changed the "paradigm" of data protection for the bearer in Compliance, in that the data controllers must ensure the effectiveness of the rules defined by the Regulation, which they make accounts. In addition, the data, processed by the algorithm, is a “means of compliance” described and is used for vigilance plans and all the other tools, this brick being common to all Compliance Law. To respect Law, and in particular to protect people, Compliance by design continues to integrate "compliance" from the design of its tools through standard techniques (Privacy Enhancing Technologies – Pet's), legalized by the GDPR. The author analyzes the technological means of data protection from the design of the tool, which complement Law and the contract. They are part of the "measures" required to protect people, for example transfers to third countries, these technological means being classified according to their degree of effectiveness. If the principle is free in the choice of technology, but Law requires and controls that it be not only effective but also robust, easy to use and compatible with the tools of use. The author emphasizes that the notion of "effectiveness" encompasses these particular requirements. This effectiveness, which must be proven a priori ("documented") is checked by the Authorities in the appropriateness of the measurement techniques, their effective implementation and their concrete effect. Even if this is only subject to the state of the art, it must develop its technical resources, helped by the authorities (cf. "compliance pack" of the CNIL (French data regulator)). Even if the powers were aimed at optimizing costs, he must bear them, the context and the purpose of the processing do not ultimately become proportional. So if the risk is very high for people, it will be necessary to insert techniques and protectors other than those of Compliance Law. -

► Full Reference: J.-Ch. Roda, "La Compliance by design en antitrust : entre innovation et illusion" ("Compliance by design in antitrust: between innovation and illusion"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 257-266. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): It is a question of studying what seems to be the requirement of the European Commission to know an "antitrust compliance by design", which seems for the moment a rather confused idea but answering the hypothesis of violation of Competition Law through so-called "smart" technologies, for example aligning prices without intervention. The Author takes up the solutions already identified, but he does not include the automatic internal reporting of a situation inciting anti-competitive behavior justifying greater vigilance on the part of the company itself because Compliance by design must, according to him, integrate the rules themselves and not just being a simple warning system. In the same way, the "transparency of algorithms" will make it possible in Ex Post to sanction those who have programmed or to consider their use as aggravating, which is not a mechanism by design in the strict sense, since this does not in itself produce respect for the rule. In Competition Law, Compliance by design is therefore "the coding of the goals of Competition Law, with relatively simple instructions: do not set prices collectively, do not exchange a particular category of information" and block access to sensitive information. It could go further, towards a kind of education, the software "learning" to refuse to perform tasks leading to offenses. Law could incite this by a responsibility, which is in germ. But the author believes that for the moment there are obstacles, not so much legal as technical. It is indeed necessary that lawyers and computer scientists understand each other …, and therefore agree to think a little differently, and both. We can do it. But the complexity of Competition Law, associated with the margins of interpretation, are such, but their binary translation is almost impossible. In economic technology, the same pitfalls will be found, for example in the calculation of market power, determining in Antitrust Compliance by design. Not to mention the ethical aspect of Competition Law, which is difficult to encode. -

► Full Reference: M. M. Salah, "Conception et application de la compliance en Afrique" ("Conception and application of Compliance in Africa"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 165-180. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author presents the way in which Compliance, which may seem "insurmountable" in Africa in particular with regard to corruption, even terrorism, a gravity offset by the prevalence of the group's solidarity on the Weberian conception of Law, nevertheless aims to to "deploy" in Africa. It describes the way in which in certain African countries the Compliance mechanisms have been established, under the influence of international institutions requiring first of all the autonomy of economic structures vis-à-vis social structures and then relaxing them so that they are more "human" and therefore more "sustainable". Under the aegis of the United Nations, anti-corruption programs have been particularly deployed. But the African Union and sub-regional organizations have also helped design and implement anti-corruption programs, for example through the adoption of uniform laws. In addition, the extraterritorial effect of foreign laws, in particular the FCPA, Bribery Act and Sapin2, increases this anchoring of Compliance. The article shows that this anchoring translates legally into a transformation of materials. In the first place, banking and financial law welcomes it more readily, since it tends to be globally standardized, African rights participating in this globalization, and imposes on financial institutions and beyond a general obligation of vigilance, in particular as regards the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, an obligation to alert and specific criminal liability of legal persons. Secondly, all African legislation is aimed at combating corruption through Compliance, which mainly aims at prevention. But the author measures their effectiveness ("that is to say their ability to produce the desired results" which is often still limited. This is mainly due to the conjunction between the size of the informal sector, notably hampering 'identification of the actors, and the weakness of state structures which, allied to the low level of banking services and the still weak culture of writing and recording, leaves the system without crucial operators who can be entrusted with the realization of Compliance Law. The author concludes that it is not the risk of national sanction that leads operators to respect the Compliance rules but the fear of losing markets by the external threat of international actors and the damage to their local reputation and to abroad. The weakness of state structures affecting the effectiveness of Compliance as it affects everything else, he underlines that they must be strengthened for this to be reinforced for the rest, in particular concerning the effectiveness of judicial control. More specifically, Compliance should be less expensive because African States often cannot bear the cost, only the subsidiaries of large foreign private groups can do so, which leads to abandoning Compliance at the will of the private sector, a phenomenon regrettable, whereas public supervisors do not have the means to exercise their control function. -

► Full Reference : N. Guillaume, "Cartographie des risques de compliance. Premiers aperçus des enjeux, des limites et des bonnes pratiques" ("Compliance risk mapping. First insights of challenges, limits and good practices"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 63-70. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author gives an overview of what is risk mapping for a company, not only an obligation in certain cases, such as corruption, but also and beyond an excellent tool to design and control its strategy. He shows that this is due to the fact that legislation now incorporates the risk-based approach, companies having to use these maps, sometimes demanding to put them at the service of an overall strategy, even if their handling may lead to initiating responsibility of the company and its managers. The author emphasizes that the maps are very diverse because their objectives are themselves different, their users also being different (which implies different insights into the same risks). The author therefore identifies principles common to all maps, which always assess risks according to their probability of occurrence and the severity of their consequences if they materialize. It is also necessary to apprehend the "gross risk", seized in the absolute, and the "net risk" which integrates the company itself in this apprehension of the probability and the gravity, then release an acceptable level of risks for the company. On these common principles are superimposed specificities relating to the various risks, the author taking more particularly the risk of corruption, since Compliance Law gives it a great place. The mapping that is specific to the specific risk then becomes finer to be relevant, while the criteria used here will be abandoned in another mapping. The way of proceeding becomes common again, involving the commitment of the company's management bodies, internal surveys and interviews, benchmarks. If the company thus deploys the art of risk mapping, then they cease to be only a requirement of Law to which the company must comply in order to be a central tool in the overall risk prevention system and strategy design, feeding codes of conduct, design of training and supervision, to finally deploy in the company a "risk culture", which is essential. -

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Dresser des cartographies des risques comme obligation et le paradoxe des "risques de conformité"" ("Drawing up risk maps as an obligation and the paradoxe of the "compliance risks""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 53-62. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): There are few synthetic or theoretical studies on Risk Mapping even though it is in fact the Compliance central tool, perhaps because it is more a management tool than a legal one. Risk Mapping is often described but does not receive any other legal qualifications than being a "modality", suffering in this respect from an evil which affects the whole of Compliance, still little understood by Law, attention often so focused on the Ex Post (sanctions) while Compliance is by nature in the Ex Ante. Going from disarray to incomprehension, everyone can note the existence of "compliance risks" among the mapped risks, because if as so many affirm that it would be necessary to speak only of simple conformity as obedience, demonstrated in Ex Ante, to Law, how a sub-set of a tool would therefore have the same object as the set of Law that this tool serves … This aporia can only be resolved if Compliance Law is defined substantially by its "monumental goals" which exceed obedience to regulations. Consequently, Law taking up Risk Mapping, this mechanism may first appear as an ancillary obligation to the main obligation consisting in achieving "monumental goals". The ancillary obligation to draw up the maps is an obligation of result, while the main obligation to achieve the monumental goals is an obligation of means. These cartographies being very diverse and being only occasionally targeted by specific laws, it can also constitute only a legal fact or, through the play of various charters, a unilateral legal commitment. But it isnbecoming the basis of an autonomous legal obligation incumbent on enterprises in position to know certain risks, obligation referring to the existence of a subjective right tof knowing and measuring them ("right to be worried") which the third parties who are going to run them would hold, thus allowing them to choose to run them, or not.   -

► Full Reference: L. Benzoni and B. Deffains, "Approche économique des outils de la Compliance: finalité, mesure, effectivité de la Compliance "subie" et "choisie"" ("Economic approach of Compliance Tools: purpose, measurement, efficiency of Compliance "undergone" and "chose""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 39-50. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published.  - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Authors refer to economic analysis of Law general works to say that firms can have an interest in showing by anticipation that they comply to Law in a long term strategy of reputation and reliability, this internalization imposed by Compliance and transformed by the Corporate Social Responsibility benefiting to the firm and its choice being related thus to rationality and not to emotion.  Thus the mechanisms of Compliance stop to be "imposed", the firm just minimizing the perspective of a future sanction, to be "chosen", the firm taking freely a responsibility, for example in the environnemental or human rights protection fields, going beyond legal requirements (what "monumental goals" corresponds to, which goes beyond the interest of partners and of the legal obligation). The investment calculus is more difficult for the second one, hardly measurable, than for the first one (probability calculus). The loi PACTE leaves room to a "chosen Compliance" but we badly measure its effectivity: we wait case law in its use of obligation Law. Moreover, if the status of "entreprise à mission" is adopted, the goal becomes statutorily binding and the governance of the firm must be modified for the internal control of means implemented. But, supposing that companies only search competitive avantages, it is only about, through this general interest service, conquering new benefits, the lucrative purpose of chosen Compliance showing the liberal character of Compliance.  The authors underline that this "chosen Compliance" implies evaluation and analysis tools different from those used for "imposed Compliance". In "imposed Compliance", it is about, taking back Gary Becker's works, considering risk aversion, the firm calculating its likelihood to be punished or not with regards to the gain obtained with the infringement (dependent on those who conceive Law to design it according to the model of incentives) and to the cost generated by the intern Compliance tools. The authors underline that the uncertainty of legal solutions, and there the importance of soft law, makes these calculus harder and that rationality of agents is not total, the perspective of being punished being rejected in itself while the respect of the rule is rather natural, the firms being so "honest" (theory of cognitive bias) and not wanting to be singled out (name and shame). Behavioral economics thus privileges "imposed Compliance", beyond cost-advantage calculus.  In the case of "chosen Compliance", it is competition economics which draws solutions, because the firm imposes to itself a constraint to get a competitive advantage of it, in that these self-imposed constraints meet societal demands, external (for example, environnement) or internal (for example, cohesion into the firm). The external gains are the positive image of the firm with regards to the reputation of its competitors. These investments lose their efficacy because all the firms adopt the same, what by the way transform these practices in common legal norms. Internal gains are measured in organizational sociology by the adhesion to the firm's project, reducing the internal inefficiency in a superior to investment profit.   -

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Approche juridique des outils de la Compliance. Construire juridiquement  l'unité des outils de la Compliance à partir de la définition du Droit de la Compliance par ses "buts monumentaux"" ("Legal approach to Compliance Tools. Building by Law the Unicity of Compliance Tools from the definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals""), in  M.-A. Frison-Roche, (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 27-38. - 📝read the article (in French)  - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hypertext links - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): The "tools of Compliance" do not stack on top of each other. They form a system, thanks to a unity drawn from the goals that all these multiple and different tools serve: the "Monumental Goals" by which Compliance Law is defined. All these tools are configured by these goals and for mastering all these techniques, it is essential to put them all in perspective of what Compliance Law is, which is designed teleologically with regard to its goals. Extension of Regulatory Law and like it, Compliance Law is built on a balance between the principle of competition and other concerns that public authorities claim to take care of. Compliance Law has moreover more "pretensions" in this respect, for example in environmental matters. All the means are then good, the violence of the tools marrying without difficulty with the voluntary commitments since it is the goals which govern this branch of Law. As legal solutions adopted show, a common method of interpretation and common levels of constraint for all Compliance Tools result from this definition. Starting from the goals (in which legal normativity is housed), the interpretation of the different tools is thus unified. Moreover, the different degrees of constraint do not operate according to the consideration of sources (traditional legal criterion) but by the goals, according to the legal distinction between obligations of means and obligations of results which result from the articulation between tools, of which the establishment is an obligation of result, and the goal, of which the achievement is only an obligation of means. -

► Full Reference: M. Galland, "Le contrôle par le régulateur de l’effectivité des instruments de Compliance mis en place par l’entreprise", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 195-208. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author underlines the complexity of the measure of the effectivity of compliance tools because the measure of the risks cannot be mechanical, the exercise is a cost whose the advantage does not appear immediately, the essential is in the behaviors that the firm masters with difficulty while these are results that are evaluated, because Compliance tools must be effective and produce tangible results.  To do that, the regulator intervenes in Ex Ante in order to the applicable texts are understandable by the firm and in order to the tool is working. When a noncompliance occurs, the regulator must beyond the sanction build on this measure of ineffectiveness to lead operators to improve their systems. Thus, it is in terms of "Compliance effort" that the regulator's control works, especially through the observation of an "embodied exemplarity".  -