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Full reference : Supiot, Alain (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, 320 p. Read the forth of cover. Read the table of contents. Read the introduction by Alain Supiot : L'entreprise face au Marché total. Read Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's contribution : Les "entreprises cruciales" et leur régulation.

► Full Reference : G. Teubner, "L'auto-constitutionnalisation des entreprises transnationales ? Sur les rapports entres les codes de conduite "privés" et "publics" des entreprises", in A. Supiot (ed.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, pp. 71-83. - 📄 Students enrolled in Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's course can access the text of these articles. -

February 17, 2015, as the previous "Contrat de Régulation Économique" (Economie Regulatory Contract), the firm Aéroport de Paris (ADP)  has made available on its site to all "for consultation" the draft  "Contrat de Régulation Economique ("Economic Regulatory Contract)  for the period 2016 -2020. Published in the wake of the meeting of the Board of ADP, the text is presented as a tool "for the Paris place", especially for air transport. This shows that the document is primarily intended for investors and financial markets, the document being placed on the company website in the section for the "investors". This illustrates the evolution from the traditional "contrats de plan" (plan contracts). But then, who are the parties to these types of contract? Indeed, the very term "Regulatory contract"  is new in public Law. It appears as a sort of  modernization of "plan contract." The Conseil d'État (French State Council) finally admitted the contractual nature of these planning contracts. In these contracts, are parties were the State and the company in charge of a public service. Because here the contract is an instrument of "economic regulation" the open public consultation draft rather expresses a global conception of  ADP, the company which manages the Paris airports,  for the future of the development of critical infrastructure that is the airport as the heart of global development of air transport. The enterprise manager of the airport in the heart of the contract (rather than the State) in setting objectives for the coming four years is the letter and spirit of the French law of 20 April 2005 about Airports, which put the apparatus of this "Contrat de Régulation Economique" in place. In this, the infrastructure manager is set by law as a "regulator of second degree", as can be a financial market enterprise. The company that manages and develops the Paris airports undoubtedly belongs to the category of " critical firms", as well it manages the future of the sector and helps to keep France a place in the world. More, A.D.P. behaves like a Regulator, since it is carrying out the "public consultation", the consultation paper prepared by it,  being placed on its site and developing its ambitions for the sector and for France. But A.D.P. also expressed as a financial and economic actor, emphasizing the competitive environment,  demanding in passing more stability and clarity in the regulation in which it moves … That is why the consultation mechanism provided by the law must be more complex. Indeed, ADP can not be judge and jury. Therefore if the project raises observations, they must be formuled not to ADP but to the Ministries of Aviation and Economy, within a month. They shall communicate theiir content to ADP . Then the Commission consultative aéroportaire (French Airport Consultative Committee) will be consulted. At the end of this process, the "Contrat de Régulation Economique" will be signed. Seing the end of the process, it remains in line with the plan contracts, since it remains the Economic Regulatory Contract is signed between the State and the essential infrastructure manager. But the consultation process shows firstly investors are the first recipients of the statements made by a privatized company presenting its draft primarily in terms of competitive context and international development and secondly the airlines that use daily services of the airports are also directly involved by theses questions of tarification. Airlines protest against the increase in the money that will be asked. This will be imposed, since it is tarification and princing public policy. We are in unilateral rules. But it is indeed a "price" they feel to pay, they also heard a speech referring to competition in what the mechanism is presented as a "contract". But then, does it take to admit that these "contracts for economic regulation" are not between two parties that are the state and the regulator of second degree that is the infrastructure manager but must be three, the State, the infrastructure manager and "stakeholders" that are mainly airlines? This practical difficulty is much to the fact that the qualification of "contract" is difficult to justify in proceeding in which prevail unilateral mechanisms.

Complete reference: Adalid, S., La Banque centrale européenne et l'Eurosystème. Recherche sur le renouvellement d'une méthode d'intégration, préf de Michaël Karpenschif et Blanche Sousi, Avant-propos de Christian Noyer, collection "droit de l'Union européenne", Bruylant, 2015, 753 p. Read the table of contents. Read the preface. Read the foreword.    

Full reference: Conseil constitutionnel, 6th of February 2015, Société Mutuelle des transports assurance, Decision n° 2014-449 QPC Read the decision (in French)

 Bank and Competition do not mix. It is not so much that the banks would act as repeat offenders on which the competition authorities should raise the tone by increasingly heavy penalties so that the competitive lesson is finally heard. It is rather two orders confronting each other, two incomprehensions face to face. Indeed, the banks find it appropriate to agree in order for the banking system to function. Moreover, governments demand them political behavior by financing the economy when the economy does not rely on financial markets. Hence, how would they themselves behave in a market consisting of selfish behavior and aggression towards their counterparts? If we plunge into this melting pot of incomprehension that engenders the violent clash between the banks, which evoke their mission, even their duty, and the competition authorities which avail themselves of theirs, we run into the pitfall of the definition even of what a bank is. It can be estimated that a bank is a provider of various services, operating in competing markets. In this perspective, the law ensures the proper functioning, the authorities that keep the efficiency of the markets seizing the banks that carry out their activities. But if we choose to insist that banks are what make the economy work and strengthen the social bond, then they are an integral part of their own system: the banking system. Moreover, the latter is an essential element of society, a perspective in which competition is merely contiguous. The more Europe manages to build banking Europe, the more it elaborates a mechanism for resolving difficulties, the more the bank is above all a matter of State and not of financial markets. In what is the political course of the history of peoples, competition ceases to be its first measure. It is therefore necessary to start from the undisputed existence of banking markets and the competitive mechanism which the law correlates with (I)). But the scale of the resistance reveals that it seems to have intentionally or not to have passed on the elementary and the essential: the very definition of what is a bank II. If it is accepted that the bank is the operator of the banking system, which fuels the economy as a whole, then competition law has only an adjacent role and can not constitute its backbone (III). The European Banking Union is demonstrating this.  

I. THE GHOST OF CHRISTMAS PAST: THE CONSIDERATION OF STAKEHOLDERS IN THE COMPANY THROUGH THE CONTINENTAL LAW A. OBSTACLE BORN […]