Vigilance

MERABET, Samir🕴️

📝La vigilance, être juge et ne pas juger, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

► Full Reference: S. Merabet, "La vigilance, être juge et ne pas juger" ("Vigilance, to be a judge and not judging"), in [rubrique p="Présentation"]M.-A. Frison-Roche[/rubrique] (ed.), [lien a="la-juridictionnalisation-de-la-compliance"]La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance[/lien], coll. "[rubrique p='Responsabilités éditoriales > Direction de la collection "Régulations & Compliance", JoRC & Dalloz']Régulations & Compliance[/rubrique]", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 199-209.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, [lien a="la-juridictionnalisation-de-la-compliance"]La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance[/lien], in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Vigilance presents two diametrically opposed dangers. The company is caught in the crossfire. On the one hand, there is a risk that it exercises its role at a minimum, so that the obligations imposed on it are ineffective, thereby risking its own liability.   On the other hand, the danger is that the company oversteps its role and takes the place of the Judge. Does Vigilance always present the same dangers? Does it systematically involve the same role of the company? To be vigilant, is it to judge? The answer to these questions depends on the content of the obligations involved in Vigilance. However, these now seem very diverse. How to distinguish between the various duties of Vigilance? A first approach could consist in considering a formal identification which leads to distinguish stricto sensu Vigilance, that which is envisaged by the French so-called "Sapin 2" law and identified as such, and the related obligations, such as for example the duty of moderation of companies on social networks, which without being baptized "duty of vigilance", nevertheless come close. The extension of Compliance obligations blurs the line between what exactly falls under Vigilance and what not. A more substantial approach should be taken to consider the degree of control exercised by the company. Understood in this way, it is possible to distinguish two categories: Negative Vigilance, which implies the identification of a risk, and Positive Vigilance, which even more supposes the neutralization of the risk. The first assumes a limited role for the company, while the second encourages it to act positively, even before an Authority has spoken. In this case, the role of the company is closer to that of the judge. That shows that all the obligations of vigilance cannot therefore be understood in a unitary manner. As soon as the company is led - if not to take the place of the Judge - to act before the Judge even has the opportunity to pronounce himself/herself, then it seems legitimate to supervise the implementation of the company's duty of Vigilance, through a form of proceduralisation of Compliance. The company, as its employees or partners, would benefit from more Vigilance supervision. Insofar as all Vigilance obligations do not call the same role of the company, it is necessary to consider guiding principles of Vigilance, more or less intense depending on whether it is Negative or Positive Vigilance.  -

DOUVRELEUR, Olivier🕴️

📝Compliance et juge du droit, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

► Full Reference: O. Douvreleur, "Compliance et juge du droit" ("Compliance and Judge ruling only on points of Law"), in [rubrique p="Présentation"]M.-A. Frison-Roche[/rubrique] (ed.), [lien a="la-juridictionnalisation-de-la-compliance"]La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance[/lien], coll. "[rubrique p='Responsabilités éditoriales > Direction de la collection "Régulations & Compliance", JoRC & Dalloz']Régulations & Compliance[/rubrique]", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 465-471.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, [lien a="la-juridictionnalisation-de-la-compliance"]La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance[/lien], in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Compliance maintains with the judge complex relations, and even more with the judge ruling only on points of Law  (in France, the Court de Cassation in the judicial order, the one who, in principle, does not know the facts that he leaves to the sovereign appreciation of the judges ruling on the substance of the disputes. At first glance, compliance is a technique internalised in companies and the place occupied by negotiated justice techniques leave little room for intervention by the judge ruling only on points of Law However, his role is intended to develop, in particular with regard to the duty of vigilance or in the articulation between the different branches of Law when compliance meets Labor Law, or even in the adjustment between American Law and the other legal systems, especially French legal system. The way in which the principle of Proportionality will take place in Compliance Law is also a major issue for the judge ruling only on points of Law. -

🎤Audition as amica curiae by the Paris First Instance Civil Court, in summary proceedings, on the Compliance System and the place of the duty of vigilance in it

► Full Reference: [rubrique p="Présentation"]M.-A. Frison-Roche[/rubrique], Audition as amica curiae by the Paris First Instance Civil Court, in summary proceedings, on the Compliance System and the place of the duty of vigilance in it, 26 October 2022 - The hearing was held in the presence of two other amici curiae, also appointed by the Court: Professors Jean-Baptiste Racine and Bruno Deffains. The hearing was requested by and on the initiative of the Paris First Instance Civil Court in connection with a dispute between associations and TotalEnergie, the former alleging breaches of due diligence by the latter, and the Court asking highly qualified individuals to shed light on the Compliance System and its implications. - 📝read the hearing report published on 27 October 2022 by Olivia Dufour (Actu-juridique) 📝read the article reporting on the hearing of 7 December 2022, representing the presentation of Compliance Law by MaFR, published on 7 December 2022 by Mathilde Golla (Les Echos) 📝read the [lien a="lamicus-curiae-mesure-dinstruction-ordinaire"]article on the use of amicus curiae, starting with the use made in this case, published on 8 December 2022 by Nicolas Cayrol[/lien] (Recueil Dalloz) - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR. Regulation, Compliance, Law

🚧Compliance contract, compliance clauses

🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law  - ► Full Reference: [rubrique p="Présentation"]M.-A. Frison-Roche,[/rubrique] Compliance contract, compliance clauses, working paper, September 2022. - ►Summary of this working paper:  Compliance Law has multiplied obligations. However, although Tort Law is emerging in Compliance issues and contracts are multiplying in practice, for the moment the relationship between Compliance Law and Contract Law is not very visible (I). However, there are contracts whose sole purpose is to give concrete form to Compliance, which creates a specific contract and must influence its implementation (II). Moreover, there is much to learn from the diversity of compliance stipulations scattered throughout a wide range of contracts (III). - 🔓read the developments below⤵️

📝Appréciation du lancement d’alerte et de l’obligation de vigilance au regard de la compétitivité internationale, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance

► Full Reference: [rubrique p="Présentation"]M.-A. Frison-Roche[/rubrique], "Appréciation du lancement d'alerte et de l'obligation de vigilance au regard de la compétitivité internationale" ("Assessment of whistleblowing and of the obligation of vigilance with regard to international competitiveness"), in [rubrique p="Présentation"]M.-A. Frison-Roche[/rubrique] (ed.), [lien a="les-buts-monumentaux-de-la-compliance"]Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance[/lien], coll. "[rubrique p='Responsabilités éditoriales > Direction de la collection "Régulations & Compliance", JoRC & Dalloz']Régulations & Compliance[/rubrique]", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2022, pp. 413-436. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the [lien a="devoir-de-vigilance-lancement-dalerte-et-competiti"]bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article[/lien], with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read a general presentation of the book, [lien a="les-buts-monumentaux-de-la-compliance"]Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance[/lien], in which this article is published - ► English summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Taking up the legal tools of Compliance and confronting them with the concern that Law must have for the Competitiveness of companies, it is necessary that these legal instruments not harm it because Compliance Law, because of its immense ambitions, can only function through an alliance between political wills with great pretensions (save the planet) and the entities which are able to achieve these goals (the crucial economic operators : the political drawing on the compagnies" power, it would be contradictory for the legal instruments put in place by Law to harm the ability of companies to face global economic competition, or worse to favor international competitors acting under legal systems which do not integrate Compliance obligations.   From this principle, it is possible to assess these two legal techniques of whistleblowing and vigilance obligation: both consist in capturing Information, which gives them a strong uniqueness and fits them into the global competition for Information. Taking the whistleblowing, its first beneficiary is the company itself since the firm discovers a weakness and can therefore remedy it. Therefore, beyond the principle of protection of the whistleblower by their access to the legal statute, for instance the one conceived by the French 2016 law known as "Sapin 2", it is questionable that all the incentives are not put in place so that the holder of such information transmits it to the manager. It is not the European solution, even after the European Directive of 2019, national legal systems continuing to require the absence of financial compensation, the "heroic figure of the whistleblower and the refusal of their remuneration depriving the company of Information and improvement. First to the manager, with external transmission taking place if the latter does nothing, the internal manager is thus encouraged to act and put an end to the dysfunction, which increases the competitiveness of the company. But the French legislation has on the contrary developed the right incentive as to the person to whom the information is transmitted because by obliging to transmit first to the manager, the external transmission intervening if the internal management does nothing, the incentive is thus made to the internal manager to act and put an end to the dysfunction, this legal solution increasing the competitiveness of the company. Even more, and even if it seems counter-intuitive, the obligation of vigilance increases the competitiveness of the obliged companies. Indeed, Law by obliging them to prevent and fight against violations of human rights and the environment has tacitly given them all the necessary powers to do so, notably the power to collect Information on third-party companies, including (and even above all) those which are not subject to transparency obligations. In this respect, companies, as far as they are personally responsible, hold supervisory power over others, a power which allows to globalize Compliance Law and which, in the process, increases the Companies' own power. Therefore, the obligation of vigilance is in many respects a boon for the companies which are subject to it. The resumption of the mechanism by the next European Directive, itself indifferent to the territory, will only strengthen this global power of vigilant companies over possibly foreign companies which become its passive subjects. - 🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

💬 “Faire du Droit pour qu’à l’avenir le monde soit moins injuste” – à propos du projet de directive européenne sur le devoir de vigilance. (“Making Compliance Law for a world less unfair in the future” – about the draft European directive on the corporate sustainability due diligence)

► Full Reference: [rubrique p="Présentation"]Frison-Roche, M.A.[/rubrique],, "Faire du Droit pour qu'à l'avenir le monde soit moins injuste" - à propos du projet de directive européenne sur le devoir de vigilance ("Making Compliance Law for a world less unfair in the future" - about the draft European directive on the corporate sustainability due diligence), interview with Olivia Dufour, Actu-Juridique,  March 24, 2022.  - 💬 read the interview (in French)  - ► Interview English Summary: This interview comments on the draft directive presented by the European Commission aimed at unifying European Union Law about Corporate Sustainability Due diligence in global supply chains to protect environnement and human rights effectively, putting companies under same legal rules. including non-European companies. The interview emphasizes that this text and reinforces Compliance Law perspective in that the legal instruments are Ex Ante, aim at the functioning of groups, constitute incentives, and seek effectiveness to prevent violations of human rights and the environment, 80% of which taking place outside the European Union. The goal is both ethical, for example to fight against child labor and the endangerment of people, and systemic: the promoting of a sustainable economy, through the help of companies which have some power in value chains which are global.  This future directive clearly shows the difference between simple "conformity" (just obeying all applicable regulations...) and "compliance", illustrated here: aiming to achieve "monumental goals", here fighting against attacks on the climate balance and protect people, to obtain in the future these damages do not occur or are reduced.  -   

Rapport d’information sur l’évaluation de la loi du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre

► Full reference: C. Dubost and D. Potier, Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l’administration générale de la République, Rapport d'information sur l’évaluation de la loi du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre, 24th February 2022, 100 p. - ► Read the report (in french)  -

La loi sur le devoir de vigilance des sociétés multinationales : parcours d’une loi improbable

►Full Reference: Delalieu, G., La loi sur le devoir de vigilance des sociétés multinationales : parcours d’une loi improbable, Droit et Société, 2020/3, n°106, pp. 649-665. - ►English Summary of the Article (done by the Author): (Corporate Duty of Vigilance in France: The Path of an Improbable Statute). This article offers an analysis of the resistance encountered by defenders (NGOs and trade unions) of the French Law on Corporate Duty of Vigilance. These actors sought to behave as institutional entrepreneurs deploying intense advocacy and lobbying efforts to successfully have this bill tabled, examined, and ultimately passed by the French government. Considering this case, the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship” is discussed and then relativized using Machiavelli’s notion of “Fortuna,” to describe the “improbable” adoption of this statute. The results tend to put into perspective the importance that individual actors, including collective ones, can have in the explanation of institutional change, in favor of a multilevel analysis of change (micro, meso, macro). -  

🎤Appréciation du lancement d’alerte et de l’obligation de vigilance au regard de la compétitivité internationale (” (“Assessment of Whistleblowing and Vigilance Duty with regard to international competitiveness”)in 📅 “Effectivité de la Compliance et Compétitivité internationale”

  ► Référence complète: Frison-Roche, M.A., Appréciation du lancement d'alerte et de l'obligation de vigilance au regard de la  compétitivité internationale (" ("Assessment of Whistleblowing and Vigilance Duty with regard to international competitiveness"),  in Benzoni, L., Deffains, B. et Frison-Roche, M.-A.(dir.) , [lien a="effectivite-de-la-compliance-et-competitivite-inte"]Effectivité de la Compliance et Compétitivité internationale("Compliance Effectivity and International Competitiveness")[/lien], seminar co-organised by the  Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de recherche sur l'Économie et le Droit (CRED)  of the Panthéon-Assas University, November 4, 2021.  -   ►This intervention is thematic ; it is articulated with those more general carried out in introduction by Bruno Deffains particularly focused on the necessarily global scope of Compliance and in conclusion by Laurent Benzoni on Compliance as a potential new pillar of industrial policy, the whole of the colloquium having been conceived by the three of us. - 📅 [lien a="effectivite-de-la-compliance-et-competitivite-inte"]read the semirar program[/lien]    📅 this scientific event is part of [lien a="cycle-de-colloques-les-buts-monumentaux-de-la-comp"]the 2021 colloquia cycle, organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners, on the general theme of Compliance Monumental Goals[/lien]. -   🚧  [lien a="devoir-de-vigilance-lancement-dalerte-et-competiti"]read the bilingual Working Paper, basis of this conference[/lien] -   ►see the slides used during the conference -   ► Conference Summary: First of all and independently of the technical topic itself which, as the slides show, is focused on these two techniques based on Information which are the Whistleblowing and the Vigilance duty, it is essentiel to pose that the techniques themselves are conceived totally  differently depending on whether Compliance Law is conceived as a mechanical process and totally binding to fully comply with all applicable regulations and to demonstrate it in advance, under the threat of terrible fines, this definition being the both completely frightening and meaningless since what these applicable regulations contains is irrelevant, in which case the prospect of competitiveness boils down to notions of costs and also procedural considerations of foreseeability and legal certainty; or if Compliance Law is conceived as a new and substantial branch of Law Ex Ante developed to detect and prevent the systemic crises being before us, of which the climate crisis is unfortunately the epigone and which requires above all Action, an action of such magnitude which requires the alliance of all forces, that of States, companies, courts and people, in a renewal of concepts, particularly legal ones, and in the indifference of territories, which puts Compliance immediately at its right level: the world, because the scientifically emerging crisis is global, the so-called "extraterritoriality" theme now being misnamed. From this new general conception, the Vigilance obligation, about which so much was said when it was imposed in France in 2017, is the advanced point, soon taken up in Europe and whose scope must be naturally global, because that Compliance Law is consubstantially global. Taking up more technically the legal techniques of Compliance and confronting them with the Competitiveness of firms, it is necessary that these Compliance Tools do not harm this Competitiveness because Compliance Law , supporting immense ambitions, can only function through an alliance between political  wills (with great pretensions, i.e. save the planet) and the entities which are able to concretize them (the crucial economic operators): the Compliance tools designed by legal systems must preserve the companies which put them in place and never favor their competitors. On the basis of this principle, it is possible to assess these two legal techniques,  namely the whistleblowing and the Vigilance duty,  which both capture Information, which, as such, gives them a uniqueness and places them in the global Competition for Information. Taking the whistleblowing first, it appears that its first beneficiary is the company itself since it discovers a weakness and can therefore remedy it. This is why, beyond the principle of protection of the whistleblower by the access of somebody to the legal statute conceived in France by the law known as "Sapin 2", it is criticized that all the incentives are not used for that the holder of such information transmits it to the manager and that the same law continues to require the absence of financial counterpart, the "heroic figure of the whistleblower and the refusal of his remuneration depriving the company of a means information and improvement. The American solution is better and tt is regrettable that the law transposing the European Directive maintains this ineffective conception. But French legislation has on the contrary developed the right incentive as to the person whom the information must be transmitted to is the manager, then externally if the latter does nothing. The solution is better that the American solution because the incentive is thus made to push the internal manager to act and put an remedy to the internal dysfunction, which increases the competitiveness of the company. Even more, even if it seems counter-intuitive, the French Vigilance Duty greatly increases the competitiveness of the companies which are subject to it. Indeed, the 2017 Law by obliging them to prevent and fight against  human rights and environment violations has tacitly given them all the necessary powers to do so, in particular the power to capture Information on third-party companies, including ( and even above all) those which are not subject to transparency obligations. In this, companies, insofar as they are personally responsible, hold a supervisory power over others, a power which allows Compliance Law to globalize and which, in the process, increases their own power. This is why the obligation of vigilance is in many respects a boon for the companies which are subject to it. The resumption of the mechanism by the next European Directive, itself indifferent to the territory, will only strengthen this global power on other firms, even foreign ones. - ► This  conférence et le document de travail servent de base à un article dans un ouvrage : 📝This conference and the Working Paper constitute the basis for an article:  📕  in its French version in the book  [lien a="les-buts-monumentaux-de-la-compliance"]Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance[/lien], in the Series    [rubrique p='Responsabilités éditoriales > Direction de la collection "Régulations & Compliance", JoRC & Dalloz']Régulations & Compliance[/rubrique]  📘  in its English version in the book [lien a="compliance-monumental-goals"]Compliance Monumental Goals[/lien], in the Series  [rubrique p="Responsabilités éditoriales > Direction de la collection Compliance & Regulation, JoRC et Bruylant"]  Compliance & Regulation[/rubrique] -  

🚧Duty of Vigilance, Whistleblowing and International Competitiveness

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Duty of Vigilance, Whistleblowing and International Competitiveness, Working Paper, September 2021. -   🎤 this Working Paper is the basis for a [lien a="devoir-de-vigilance-et-competitivite-international"]conference [/lien], in the colloquium [lien a="effectivite-de-la-compliance-et-competitivite-inte"]Effectiveness of Compliance and International Competitiveness[/lien], co-organised  by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Center for Law and Economics of the Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II),   November 4, 2021 - 📝this Working Paper is also the basis for an article. This article is to be published ⤵ in its French version in the book 📕[lien a="les-buts-monumentaux-de-la-compliance"]Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance[/lien], in the series 📚[rubrique p='Responsabilités éditoriales > Direction de la collection "Régulations & Compliance", JoRC & Dalloz']Régulations & Compliance[/rubrique]  in its English version in the book 📘[lien a="compliance-monumental-goals"]Compliance Monumental Goals[/lien], in the series la collection 📚[rubrique p="Responsabilités éditoriales > Direction de la collection Compliance & Regulation, JoRC et Bruylant"]Compliance & Regulation[/rubrique] - ► Working Paper Summary: The "Compliance Tools" are very diverse. If it has been chosen to study more particularly among these the obligation of vigilance and the whistleblower, these rather than others and to study them together, it is because they present in the perspective of the specific topic chosen, namely "international competitiveness", and for companies, and for economic zones considered, and for legal system inseparable from them, a uniqueness: these are mechanisms which release Information.  By order of the law, the company will not only stop ignoring what it covered with the handkerchief that Tartuffe held out to it or that a conception of Company Law legitimately allowed it to ignore. This article does not examine if this revolution made by Compliance Law expresses in the legal system is on the one hand legitimate and on the other hand effective: the article measures what is happening at the regard to "international competitiveness". Compliance Law is therefore be examined here through its instruments, and not in relation to its normativity. In fact, its instruments are intended to provide Information and to make this information available, in its presentation, in its intelligibility and in the hands of those who are able to use Information in perspective of the Compliance Monumental Goals, achieving them.  Regarding this central notion of Information, international competitiveness will be more particularly concerned because Compliance Law will oblige the company itself to seek out, then expose to everyone's eyes, in particular its competitors, its weaknesses, its projects, its alliances, its flaws. This does not pose a problem if its competitors themselves are often subject to this new branch of Law, which goes far beyond transparency, which is already a new mechanism because a company is not a transparent organization and Competition Law that governs ordinary businesses never required this. But if they are not subject to this incredibly special branch of Law that is Compliance Law, then there is a distortion of competitiveness by the very fact of the Law. It is possible to pretend that the markets like virtue, that they give it credit because they are themselves based on the idea of "promise", which is ultimately based on a moral concept, but this provision of Information to others, while others remain opaque, is a major problem of competitiveness, which the legal requirement of "loyal commercial practices" only very partially considers. Therefore, it is necessary to first examine what is the economic and financial power of the information captured by the company on itself thank to Compliance Law making available to all but firstly to the compagny itself through the whistblowing mechanism, organised by the laws, differently in the US and Europe (I). Compliance Law also obliges companies to be accountable not only for what they do but also for what others do for them. Through the obligation of Vigilance, objective Ex Ante obligation and duty, the company obtains a power of Information on others which could well resolve what is often presented as the dispute aporetic of the extraterritoriality of Compliance Law, thus making accountable companies hitherto protected by their "preserved" legal system and thereby affected by the effectiveness of Compliance Law (II). - read below the developments

🎤 Devoir de vigilance pour les entreprises: vers un droit de la responsabilité ex ante? (Duty of vigilance for companies: towards an ex ante liability law?)

Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Devoir de vigilance des entreprises : vers un Droit de la responsabilité ex ante ? (Duty of vigilance for companies: towards an ex ante liability law?), conference-debate, The Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Norway, 9th of February 2021.  The conference-debate is moderated by Catherine Banet, Associate Professor, Scandinavian Insitute of Maritime Law, Department of Energy and Resources Law, University of Oslo

📝 La mise en oeuvre du devoir de vigilance : une managérialisation de la loi ?

►Full Reference: Barraud de Lagerie, P., Béthoux, E, Mias, A., Penalva Icher, E., 📝 La mise en oeuvre du devoir de vigilance : une managérialisation de la loi ?, in  Droit et Société, 2020/3 n° 106, p. 699-714. - ►English Summary of the Article:(done by the Authors) : Implementing the Corporate Duty of Vigilance: A Case of Managerialization of Law? The 2017 French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law obliges companies within its scope to draw up a “vigilance plan” and to publish it immediately in their next annual management report. The article analyzes how these first “vigilance plans” were drafted in 2018-2019. Following Lauren B. Edelman's theory of legal endogeneity, the authors question how the French law is being incorporated by companies and they examine the extent to which a process of managerialization shapes these plans. Firstly, the authors argue that companies have heavily relied on pre-existing tools and policies, while taking the drafting of the plans as an opportunity to rationalize these tools. Secondly, the authors argue that this managerialization of law occurs under the critical eye of the nongovernmental organizations that actively contributed to the statute’s adoption and that promote alternative ways for its implementation. Duty of vigilance – Endogenization of law – Implementation – Managerialization – Multinational companies.  -