State

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Globalization from the point of view of Law, working paper, May 2017. - 🎤 This working paper initially served as a basis for a synthesis report made in French in the colloquium organized by the Association Henri Capitant in the International German Days on the subject of "Le Droit et la Mondialisation" (Law and Globalization). 📝 Il sert dans un second temps de base à l'article paru dans l'ouvrage La Mondialisation. 📝 it serves as a second basis for the article (written in English, with a Spanish Summary) to be published in the Brezilian journal Rarb – Revista de Arbitragem e Mediação  (Revue d`Arbitrage et Médiation). It uses the Bilingual Dictionary of the Law of Regulation and Compliance. - ► Summary of the Working: Globalization is a confusing phenomenon for the jurist. The first thing to do is to take its measure. Once it has been taken, it is essential that we allow ourselves to think of something about it, even if we have to think about it. For example, on whether the phenomenon is new or not, which allows a second assessment of what is taking place. If, in so far as the law can and must "pretend" to defend every being, a universal claim destined to face the global field of forces, the following question – but secondary – is formulated: quid facere? Nothing ? Next to nothing ? Or regulate? Or can we still claim that the Law fulfills its primary duty, which is to protect the weak, including the forces of globalization? - read the Working Paper below⤵️

In Europe, Community Law prohibits States from providing aid to companies, which are analyzed as means for the benefit of their country which the State cares about (and sometimes wrongly)  having the effect and maybe the object of maintaining or constructing borders between peoples, thus contradicting the first European political project of a common area of peace and exchanges between the peoples of Europe. That is why this prohibition does not exist in the United States, since Antitrust Law is not intended to build such a space, which is already available to businesses and people. This essential difference between the two zones changes industrial policies because the US federal Government can help sectors where Member States can not. The European prohibition of State Aid can not be called into question because it is associated with the political project of Europe. This seems to be an aporia since Europe is handicapped against the United States. In any form it takes, Aid is prohibited because it distorts equality of opportunity in competition between  operators in the markets and constitutes a fundamental obstacle to the construction of a unified European internal market. On the basis of this simple principle, a branch of technical and specific law has developed, because States continue to support their entreprises and sectors, and many rules and cases divide this principe of prohibition into as many exceptions and nuances. Is built over the years a probation system related to it. Thus, the concept of a public enterprise was able to remain despite this principle of prohibition. But if there is a crisis of such a nature or magnitude that the market does not succeed by its own forces to overcome and / or the European Union itself pursues a-competitive objectives, exogenous Regulation, which can then take the form of legitimate State Aid. Thus a sort of synonymy exists between State Aid and Regulation. For this reason, the European institutions have asserted that State Aid becomes lawful when it intervenes either in strategic sectors, such as energy production in which the State must retain its power over assets, or the defense sector. Far from diminishing, this hypothesis is increasing. European Union Law also allows the State to intervene by lending to financial operators threatened with default or already failing, the State whose function is to fight systemic risk, directly or through its Central Bank. The aid can come from the European Central Bank itself helping States in issuing sovereign debt, the Court of Justice having admitted in 2015 the non-conventional monetary policy programs compliance with the treaties. In 2010, the European Commissioner for Competition stressed that public aid is essential tools for States to deal with crises, before regulations come to the fore in 2014 to lay the foundations of the European Banking Union.

At first glance, only areas are regulated and the State doesn't enter private enterprises. But the imperative is reversed when a company absorbs the entire area, or when a firm has the project to absorb the area, such as Google has. The firm becomes "crucial" and the State must enter the company and intervene.  It is necessary to give the definition of a "crucial firm". A firm is "crucial", in a negative sense, when its failures could cause the collapse of the system; a firm is positively "crucial" if through it the industry is facing the purpose to serve the future of the social group. The State is then legitimate to enter the company to make its voice heard, sometimes to exercise its decision-making powers. The competitive dynamism and power of property don't exclude the superimposition of the common concern for the future, which some call the general interest.

The expression "regulated company" may appear as an oxymoron : the State  regulates areas (markets, networks, etc.) because of their structural failures, but the State doesn't enter a company that develops its activities autonomously. But on reflection, it is sometimes necessary to "regulate a company" and this necessity is increasingly imposed. This is imperative if a company absorbs the entire area, because it is a monopoly or because it wants to become the heart of a crucial area, such as Google which has the project to become the future global brain. In a more general way, it is a necessity to  locate businesses which are "crucial", banks are only one example, and organize, beyond supervision, providing direct regulation of such firms. This regulatory power on critical firms must take the form of attendance of public power and policy within the company itself, so that the state interfere in decisions which social group suffers the consequences. The control can go beyond this "public presence" to take the form of "public authority", the state ruling as operator. Under such conditions of "cruciality", the neutralization of "public enterprise" by the competition law must cease, the public company must be better recognized as a regulatory instrument in distance with the simple game of competition.

TRANSLATED SUMMARIES ENGLISH “Acting in a neutral way” is an oxymoron. “Companies often require however that States use their powers in a neutral way (eg tax neutrality). In regulated sectors, some are right or even duty , of not being neutral. Firstly, it is the State, which requires the market for other purposes, other temporalities and other values​​. Secondly, they are also the “crucial operators”, which are sort of regulators of second degree, such as transmission system operators or companies capital markets firms. The difficulty increases when the systeme requires neutrality of regulators and judges, when first build economic policy and the second create jurisprudence. Their consistency, impartiality and rationality can create an objectifiable neutralitys FRENCH «Agir de façon neutre» est un oxymoron. «Les entreprises ont souvent besoin, cependant, que les États utilisent leurs pouvoirs de manière neutre (neutralité fiscale par exemple). Dans les secteurs réglementés, certains ont le droit ou même le devoir de ne pas être neutre. Tout d’abord, c’est l’État, qui insère le marché à d’autres fins, d’autres temporalités et d’autres valeurs. En second lieu, ils sont aussi les «opérateurs crucial», qui sont des sortes de régulateurs du second degré : par exemple les opérateurs de réseaux de transport ou de entreprises de marchés financiers. La difficulté augmente lorsque le systeme économique et politique exige la neutralité des autorités de régulation et des juges, alors que les premiers construisent la politique économique et les seconds construisent la jurisprudence. Le respect qu’ils doivent avoir de l’impartialité et d’une rationalité suffisamment objectivables pourra permettre cette objectivité requise.

Translated Summaries In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors ENGLISH At first sight, the notion of the neutrality of the State seems to be obvious and simple, almost a pleonasm. Being above isolated individuals, the State is responsible for the general interest, even envisioned on a long-term basis. However when one gets deeper into the analysis, this first observation, evident at first sight, must be mitigated and qualified. FRENCH A première vue, la notion de la neutralité de l’Etat semble être évidente et simple, presque un pléonasme. Etant au-dessus d’ individus isolés, l’État est responsable de l’intérêt général, même envisagé sur le long terme. Toutefois, A aller plus loin dans l’analyse, cette première observation, évidente à première vue, doivent être atténués et expliquée. SPANISH A primera vista, la noción de la neutralidad estatal parece ser obvio y simple, casi un pleonasmo. Estando por encima de los individuos aislados, el Estado es responsable por el interés general, aun cuando considerado a largo plazo. Pero cuando uno se sumerge en el análisis, esta primera observación, evidente a primera vista, puede ser mitigado y calificado. ITALIAN A prima vista, la nozione di neutralità dello Stato sembra un concetto ovvio e semplice, quasi un pleonasmo. Lo Stato, al di sopra degli individui singolarmente considerati, è responsabile dell’interesse generale, persino a lungo termine. Tuttavia, quando si analizza in modo più approfondito tale concetto, questa prima osservazione, evidente a prima vista, deve essere relativizzata e specificata. ………………… Other translations forthcoming.

Full reference: CJCE, 4th of June 2002, Decision C-483/99, Commission v/ France (Total) Read the decision

► Full reference : J. Carbonnier, "Toute loi est-elle un mal ? (Is every law a bad thing?), in Essais sur les lois (Essays on Legisation), 2nd ed., Répertoire du notariat Defrénois, 1992, pp. 317-334. - ► Summary :  Jean Carbonnier takes as his starting point the coincidence in time between the announcement of Christ’s birth and the proclamation of the census by Caesar Augustus’s edict, and goes on to ask whether, in legal matters as in religious ones, the advent of the new law might be good news. It is accepted that many new laws were bad, but is the new law bad ‘in itself’? The author does not wish to let the distinction between favourable and unfavourable laws (a sociological criterion of interest) or the distinction between old and new laws (a psychological criterion of the clash between novelty and habit) interfere, so as to address the subject as neutrally as possible: is the law an evil in itself? This pits the law against case law, custom or equity, which might be superior, but then again the author takes a broader view and prefers to contrast law with non-law and pose the question even more radically: is law in itself an evil?   To begin with, Carbonnier demonstrates the necessity, the advantages and the beneficial effects of the law, which was particularly revered by the French Revolution and, above all, by the people because of the ‘benevolence of the law’. France remains steeped in this favourable legalistic prejudice. This stems from the sense of security it affords the people, because it is clear, precise and uncompromising, permanent, and because it serves as a means of communication between people. In the second part of the article, Carbonnier refers to Lacan, who, in relation to the law, invoked the figure of the father and predicted a future society without a father. Carbonnier wonders whether a lawless society is not about to emerge, or whether psychoanalysis, seeing castration in the law, still identifies it as an evil.  In any case, he sees in this an opposition to freedom and liberalism, the rejection of the law being associated with the rejection of the state. Quoting Maurice Barrès and his 1892 work, L'ennemi des lois, he shows that for Barrès, all law is an evil, because the world must organise itself spontaneously.  For liberalism, which is less romantic, every law is an evil because it hinders the spontaneous emergence of the general interest of the social group. Thus, to take Hayek as an example, the individual knows his own interest better than the law, and the sum of these interests gives rise to the general interest. Moreover, not only is the law pernicious, but, according to liberalism, it corrupts human nature, atrophies the will and diminishes responsibility, in a perverse pedagogy. In the third part of the article, Dean Carbonnier goes on to argue that the law acts more as a safeguard and is therefore a good thing, provided the legislator remains modest. He believes that the law is necessary because man is a sinner (in a nation of righteous people, the law would be unnecessary), citing Luther and Saint Augustine. The law is therefore indispensable insofar as it wields the sword. Indeed, the law must strike because the world is inhabited by evil. The Dean states: “It is in this sense that the law appears as an evil: not because it causes harm or does harm, but because it is linked to the existence of evil. It is the revealer of sin…”. He concludes: "Knowing that the law was given to curb evil, lawyers will use it without hesitation. Knowing that it is a source of evil, they will use it with restraint." It is in this self-imposed limitation that lawlessness emerges.   -