digital

► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Quand on s'intéresse à la Compliance, lire "La Haine"​ de Günther Anders, 1ier août 2022. - ► Introduction de l'article : Philosophe allemand, Günter Anders connut la Seconde Guerre mondiale, dût quitter l'Allemagne et vécut dans plusieurs pays. C'est avant tout un philosophe moral, habité par le pessimisme et l'idée que le nazisme n'était qu'une répétition générale, plutôt artisanale, de ce que nous attend : L'obsolescence de l'homme, son livre-maître qui en 1956 décrit le système économique comme ce qui broie les êtres humains en les réduisant à n'être plus que des êtres qui entretiennent des machines qui produisent des produits inutiles qu'ils consomment, les humains n'étant eux-mêmes que des machines désirantes. En 1985 dans un volume paru en langue allemande et composé d'articles tous consacrés au thème de La haine, il donna comme contribution les éléments de travail de ce qu'il avait conçu comme dernière partie de son oeuvre démontrant l'appareillage obtenant "l'obsolescence de l'homme", dernier livre qu'il ne publia jamais. Extrait de ce volume, ces documents de travail furent traduits en français et présentés par Philippe Ivernel : le titre en est La Haine. I. LA FABRIQUE DE LA "HAINE COMME PRODUIT DE CONSOMMATION" POUR ENGENDRER DES COMBATS, PRODUCTEURS A LEUR TOUR DE HAINE : L'ARTICULATION DES DEUX HAINES Anders est un penseur de la technique, de la technologie (comme l'est Jacques Ellul), expliquant qu'elle n'appartiendra plus à une élite mais au contraire à chacun dans notre vie quotidienne, se mettant ainsi au centre de tout, remplaçant notamment la politique, les êtres humains mécanisés devenant la matière première des machines. Le titre original, La Haine à l'état d'antiquité désigne le fait que la société de consommation réduisant l'être humain à son aptitude à entretenir des machines et à se comporter lui-même comme une machine consommant les produits fabriqués par des machines, l'être humain ayant pour seul fonction de désirer consommer ce que produisent les machines, et désirant donc finalement rien d'autres qu'entretenir et développer les machines qui l'engloutissent sous tous ces biens, n'a plus de pensée que pour ce monde entièrement voué aux machines. L'Amour et la Haine sont ainsi reléguées "à l'état d'antiquité" car pour trouver sa place dans ce système de désirs qui convergent vers les machines, il n'est besoin ni d'Amour ni de Haine. Il expose que cela se passe dans deux temps. Dans un premier temps, la Haine est fabriquée pour amener les humains à se battre contre des ennemis qu'ils ne connaissent même pas ; dans un second temps, ils sont suffisamment mécanisés pour attaquer sans que l'énergie de la Haine soit même nécessaire. Le premier fragment de ses documents de travail expose la façon dont les êtres humains "aiment la Haine" car cela donne à chacun le sentiment d'exister : la Haine. "Je hais, donc je suis. Ou plus précisément : Donc je suis quelqu'un" (p. 33). Il reprend cette idée dans le deuxième fragment dont le titre est (en français dans l'édition allemande) : L'appétit vient en mangeant. Il expose que la Haine n'est pas au départ contre une personne particulière et pousse à l'attaquer. La Haine est à l'état pur, mais c'est plutôt l'atmosphère de haine et "l'amour de la haine". Il suffit de la cultiver et la tourner ensuite à volonté contre un tel ou un tel. Il évoque ainsi une sorte d'industrie de la haine, en des termes qu'il met dans la bouche du personnage qui dirige la cité : "Sans doute est-il exact qu'ils combattent "leurs ennemis" parce qu'ils les haïssent. Sauf que cette haine envers "leurs ennemis" n'explose précisément pas en s'allumant d'elle-même-meme, ni parce que les premiers leur auraient fait quoi que ce soit. Mais uniquement par ceci que (et donc parce que) je leur livre la haine à chaque fois exigible. Ils la reçoivent de moi gratuitement à domicile. Exactement comme l'eau, le gaz et la TV. Et cette haine qui leur est acheminée, ils la consomment alors, et dans tout à fait dans mon sens à moi : car ils s'engagent, en effet, pleins de haine dans la lutte politiquement opportune. Après quoi commence aussi réellement ce dont vous venez de parler : la deuxième phase de la haine. Car à présent ils haïssent réellement du fait qu'ils combattent. La règle de la haine s'énonce comme suite : "Je combats quelqu'un – de ce fait je me mets à le haïr. L'appétit vient en mangeant, la haine vient en luttant". Ils se battent ainsi "avec appétence" et sont persuadés le faire "avec dignité", devant rester dans l'ignorance de l'absence de raison du combat (qui est la pure volonté de celui qui leur a envoyé la Haine). Günther Anders fait ensuite expliquer par le personnage politique qu'il fait cela par moralité car il ne veut pas que les hommes en tuent d'autres juste par obéissance à ses ordres, ce qu'ils trouveraient immoral. Il leur fabrique alors de la Haine, de la Haine qu'ils aiment, qu'il dirige ensuite sur des groupes de personnes et ainsi dotés de cette première haine, ils attaquent ceux qu'ils haïssent, le combat accroissant par une seconde haine la première, et tout le système fonctionne bien. Il lui fait ainsi conclure : "C'est pourquoi ils ont besoin de haïr. C'est pourquoi je leur accorde de haïr. C'est pourquoi je leur ordonne de haïr.". Le troisième fragment porte sur la guerre proprement dite. Anders expose que la Haine n'y est aujourd'hui plus requise parce que la technique permet aux soldats de n'être plus en contact avec les personnes qu'ils combattent, ni même d'être confrontés aux cadavres. La fabrique de la Haine serait donc devenue inutile. C'est pour cela aussi qu'elle aurait vocation à être rangée dans les antiquités… Les soldats sont devenus comme des robots. Le quatrième fragment développe ce point, sur des soldats "aveugles en telos", au point qu'on pourrait davantage les qualifier "d'employés" des armées que de soldats, exécutant leur travail sans savoir sur qui ou quoi ils larguent les bombes, chacun étant désormais comme à l'arrière du front. Anders souligne que dans ce combat sans haine, mené par les ordinateurs, le combat ne prend jamais fin.   II. UNE EXTRAORDINAIRE ANTICIPATION DU SYSTEME COMMERCIALE ET POLITIQUE E DE HAINE   A. DISTINCTION DES DEUX HAINES ET ROBOTISATION DES ETRES HUMAINS L'œuvre de Gunther Anders est particulièrement profitable pour comprendre le monde dans lequel nous vivons. Dans cette ébauche d'ouvrage, retenons l'idée d'une double haine : la Haine fabriquée comme un objet et apportée gratuitement à tout le monde car il y a chez chacun un "amour de la haine" qui est en soi, puisqu'en haïssant, on se sent exister. La Haine est un objet économique pur, car elle n'a pas d'objet particulier. Elle est fabriquée, cultivée, diffusée, accrue, partagée. Ce n'est que dans un second temps, après avoir ainsi inséré de la Haine pure dans l'esprit des amoureux de la Haine, que l'on peut lui affecter un objet, une personne ou un groupe de personnes et qu'un combat contre ceux-ci peut commencer, producteur d'un second type de Haine. Les deux Haines s'accroissent l'une l'autre. Le premier intérêt de cette conception est d'isoler ce premier temps de la Haine : une Haine à l'état pur, celle qui existe car haïr permet d'exister, indépendamment de l'objet de la haine. Ce n'est pas donc pas l'objet qui fait naître la Haine, mais l'amour de soi qui fait naître la Haine. Dans un second temps, c'est le hasard ou la manipulation d'un tiers (dans l'exemple pris par Anders le dirigeant politique, mais nous connaissons des influenceurs en dehors du cercle politique) qui offre à la Haine son objet. Mais Anders insiste sur le fait que ces objets sont substituables. Par cette Haine fabriquée, les êtres humains ont donc l'impression d'exister. C'est alors un stade pire et paradoxal qui s'annonce : celui des êtres humains sans haine, parce qu'on leur aura ôté l'objet de Haine, alors même qu'on leur commande (comme à des "employés") de tuer des semblables, en les mettant technologiquement à distance de l'objet à détruire (Anders prend l'exemple du lancer de bombe). Ils deviennent des robots, et la déshumanisation est ainsi achevée. C'est en cela que les 4 fragments constituent pleinement la dernière partie de l'œuvre centrale qu'est L'obsolescence de l'Homme. B. LE MONDE NUMERIQUE, LES RÉSEAUX SOCIAUX ET L' "INTELLIGENCE ARTIFICIELLE" Le travail publié en 1985 correspond à des réflexions élaborées juste après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et puisant dans les leçons de la Première. Mais si l'on regarde le monde numérique dans lequel nous vivons, il est en premier lieu construit sur des technologies "neutres", une industrie de l'information qui transforme les êtres humains en consommateurs d'information et en source d'information, constituant eux-mêmes une masse de micro-informations. En deuxième lieu, les plateformes, et plus particulièrement les réseaux sociaux, sont des espaces neutres, les entreprises qui les tiennent ne sont pas des éditeurs, et le produit pur qui y circulent le mieux est de la "Haine pure", qui est ce qui rapporte à ces entreprises le plus de revenus, les différents objets de haines étant interchangeables. La Haine est devenue un objet qui est délivré à domicile et dont nous sommes abreuvés en permanence, notre "amour de la Haine" étant alimentée en continu, et sans doute accru. En troisième lieu, les algorithmes sont présentés comme "intelligents", c'est-à-dire dotés d'une capacité non seulement d'apprentissage mais de choix et de discernement. L'intelligence artificielle serait le progrès, c'est-à-dire la disparation de la haine pour exemple pour prononcer les sanctions les plus adéquates. Les chiffres ont donc remplacé les êtres humains, ce qu'Anders visait à travers les "ordinateurs".   III. LE PROFIT QUE LE DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE PEUT FAIRE DE LA PENSÉE DE GUNTHER ANDERS A. LE DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE, DROIT AYANT LA PRÉTENTION DE RÉDUIRE LA HAINE DANS L'ESPACE NUMÉRIQUE Le Droit de la Compliance est une branche du Droit construit sur des prétentions politiques qui visent à concrétiser des "buts monumentaux". 🔴Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, 📝Les Buts Monumentaux, cœur battant du Droit de la Compliance, in Marie-Anne Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕 Les buts monumentaux de la compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance et Dalloz, coll. 📚Régulations & Compliance, 2022, pp. 21-44. La lutte contre la diffusion de ce qu'il est pertinent de désigner comme l'amour naturel de la haine pure, qui se répand d'une façon virale dans l'espace numérique permettant à la haine d'être "portée à domicile" est une des objets majeurs du Droit de la Compliance. Le Digital Services Act est imprégné de techniques de Compliance pour y parvenir. Il ne s'agit pas de compter sur la moralité des personnes, puisque le cœur des humains est d'aimer la haine, ni de les remplacer par des machines car le remède est pire que le mal (la déshumanisation) mais sur la performance technique de ceux qui tiennent ce système économique-là : les plateformes elles-mêmes. 🔴M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Se tenir bien dans l'espace numérique, in Mélanges en l'honneur de Michel Vivant, Penser le droit de la pensée, Dalloz et Lexis Nexis, 2020, pp. 155-168. En combattant le feu par le feu, c'est-à-dire en obligeant ceux qui ont construit les techniques par lesquelles se diffusent la Haine à construire et à utiliser les techniques de contrôle, de détection et de prévention de celle-ci, le Droit de la Compliance, notamment grâce à son effet naturellement extraterritorial, exprime la prétention de ne pas laisser la Haine régner. En outre, les Autorités publiques non seulement régulent mais encore supervisent les entreprises et leurs technologies, en l'espèce l'Arcom et la CNIL, dont les pouvoirs Ex Ante s'accroissent. 🔴R.-O. Maistre, Quels buts monumentaux pour le Régulateur dans un paysage audiovisuel et numérique en pleine mutation ?, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, 2022. B. LA DÉFINITION TÉLÉOLOGIQUE DU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE L'œuvre d'Anders est parcourue par le désespoir moral d'êtres humains "sans telos", c'est-à-dire sans finalités qui leur soit propres. C'est ainsi qu'ils peuvent être saisis aisément par l'amour de la Haine, puisqu'aucun projet propre n'occupe leur temps et leur force. Il peut en être de même pour la force du Droit. Si le Droit ne devait être qu'une technique "réglementaire", "neutre", visant à "l'efficacité" des désirs de chacun et des réglementations accumulées, alors le Droit ne ferait qu'ajouter à la déshumanisation décrite par Anders. Mais le Droit de la Compliance est par nature une branche du Droit téléologique : elle se définit par ses buts. Et ceux-ci sont "monumentaux". Ces buts monumentaux ponctuels peuvent tous se ramener à ceci : protéger les êtres humains, afin que la description d'Anders ne soit pas exacte en son cœur désespéré. 🔴M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧 Fonder la Compliance, 2022

🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law  - ► Full Reference: FM.-A. Frison-Roche, La responsabilité ex ante, pilier du droit de la compliance ("Ex-Ante Responsibility, Compliance Law Pillar"), D. 2022, chronique MAFR – Droit de la Compliance, Recueil Dalloz, March 31, 2022. - ► Article English Summary: The Law must help to face the future, which can be totally catastrophic in terms of climate and digital issues. Courts are s best placed for this, without “governing”, only relying on the commitments made by companies, governments, and legislators.  On the ordinary Tort Law, court decisions oblige these different entities to be consistent in the commitments they have made, obliging them to act in the future, formal “compliance” with the regulations cannot be sufficient. This ex-ante responsibility, founding the powers, thus constitutes a pillar of a substantial Compliance Law, showing the part that CSR and the companies with a raison d'être play in it. -   📝 read the article. (written in French) - 📚go to the presentation of the other articles published in this Chronique Droit de la Compliance made in the Recueil Dalloz.  -

► Full Reference: P. Akman, "Regulating Competition in Digital Platform Markets : A Critical Assessment of the Framework and Approach of the EU Digital Markets Act", (2022) 47 European Law Review 85, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3978625 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3978625 - ► Summary of the article (made by the authors): "The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) initiative, which is set to introduce ex ante regulatory rules for “gatekeepers” in online platform markets, is one of the most important pieces of legislation to emanate from Brussels in recent decades. It not only has the potential to influence jurisdictions around the world in regulating digital markets, it also has the potential to change the business models of the wealthiest corporations on the planet and how they offer their products and services to their customers. Against that backdrop, this article provides an analysis of the aims of and principles underlying the DMA, the essential components of the DMA, and the core substantive framework, including the scope and structure of the main obligations and the implementation mechanisms envisaged by the DMA. Following this analysis, the article offers a critique of the central components of the DMA, such as its objectives, positioning in comparison to competition law rules, and substantive obligations. The article then provides recommendations and proposes ways in which the DMA – and other legislative initiatives around the world, which may take the DMA as an example – can be significantly improved by, inter alia, adopting a platform-driven substantive framework built upon self-executing, prescriptive obligations.". - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: R.-O. Maistre,  "What monumental goals for the Regulator in a rapidly changing audiovisual and digital landscape?", ​in M.-A Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, p. - ► Article Summary (done by the JoRC editor):  In France, since the law of 1982 which put an end to the State monopoly on the audio-visual area, the landscape has profoundly evolved and diversified. In view of the multitude of players who are now established there, the Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel – CSA (French High Audiovisual Council) must ensure the economic balance of the sector and the respect for pluralism, in the interest of all audiences. The growing societal responsibilities of audiovisual media and new digital players have multiplied the "monumental goals" on which the Arcom is watching. Its competences have gradually been extended to the digital space and the successive laws concerning its missions aim at new objectives, in particular in terms of protection of minors, fight against online hate or against disinformation. The emergence of a new European model of Regulation makes it possible to give substance to these additional goals, the Regulator adopting a systemic perspective and calling on soft law tools to fulfill its new missions. -   📘see the general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published -

► An article from March 3, 2021, Smile for the camera: the dark side of China's emotion-recognition tech, then an article from June 16, 2021, "Every smile you fake" – an AI emotion – recognition system can assess how "happy" China's workers are in the office describes how a new technology of emotional recognition is able, through what will soon be out of fashion to call "facial recognition", to distinguish a smile that reflects a mind state of real satisfaction from a smile which does not correspond to it. This allows the employer to measure the suitability of the human being for his or her work. It is promised that it will be used in an ethical way, to improve well-being at work. But isn't it in itself that this technology is incompatible with any compensation through ethical support? The technology developed by a Chinese technology company and acquired by other Chinese companies with many employees, allows to have information on the actual state of mind of the person through and beyond his or her facial expressions and bodily behavior. Previously, the technology of emotional recognition had been developed to ensure security, by fighting against people with hostile plans, public authorities using it for example in the controls at airports to detect the criminal plans which some passengers could have. It is now affirmed that it is not about fighting against some evil people ("dangerousness") to protect the group before the act is committed ("social defense”) but that it is about helping all workers. Indeed, the use that will be made of it will be ethical, because first the people who work for these Chinese companies with global activity, like Huawaï, do it freely and have accepted the operation of these artificial intelligence tools (which is not the case with people who travel, control being then a kind of necessary evil that they do not have to accept, which is imposed on them for the protection of the group), but even and above all, the purpose is itself ethical: if it turns out that the person does not feel well at work, that they are not happy there, even before they are perhaps aware, the company can assist. Let’s take this practical case from the perspective of Law and let’s imagine that it is contested before a judge applying the principles of Western Law. Would this be acceptable? No, and for three reasons. 1. An "ethical use" cannot justify an unethical process in itself 2. The first freedoms are negative 3. "Consent" should not be the only principle governing the technological and digital space   I. AN "ETHICAL USE" CAN NEVER LEGITIMATE AN UNETHICAL PROCESS IN ITSELF These unethical processes in themselves cannot be made "acceptable" by an "ethical use" which will be made of them. This principle was especially reminded by Sylviane Agacinski in bioethics: if one cannot dispose of another through a disposition of his or her body which makes his or her very person available (see not. Agacinski, S., ➡️📗Le tiers-corps. Réflexions sur le don d’organes, 2018). Except to make the person reduced to the thing that his or her body is, which is not ethically admissible in itself, that is excluded, and Law is there in order to this is not possible. This is even why the legal notion of "person", which is not a notion that goes without saying, which is a notion built by Western thought, acts as a bulwark so that human beings cannot be fully available to others, for example by placing their bodies on the market (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝To protect human beings, the ethical imperative of the legal notion of person, 2018). This is why, for example, as Sylviane Agacinski emphasizes, there is no ethical slavery (a slave who cannot be beaten, who must be well fed, etc.). That the human being agrees ("and what about if it pleases me to be beaten?") does not change anything.   II. THE FIRST FREEDOM IS THE ONE TO SAY NO, FOR EXAMPLE BY REFUSING TO REVEAL YOUR EMOTIONS: FOR EXAMPLE HIDING IF YOU ARE HAPPY OR NOT TO WORK The first freedom is not positive (being free to say Yes); it is negative (being free to say No). For example, the freedom of marriage is having the freedom not to marry before having the freedom to marry: if one does not have the freedom not to marry, then the freedom to marry loses any value. Likewise, the freedom to contract implies the freedom not to contract, etc. Thus, freedom in the company can take the form of freedom of speech, which allows people, according to procedures established by Law, to express their emotions, for example their anger or their disapproval, through the strike. But this freedom of speech, which is a positive freedom, has no value unless the worker has the fundamental freedom not to express his or her emotions. For example if he or she is not happy with his or her job, because he or she does not appreciate what he or she does, or he or she does not like the place where he or she works, or he or she does not like people with whom he or she works, his or her freedom of speech demands that he or she have the right not to express it. If the employer has a tool that allows him or her to obtain information about what the worker likes and dislikes, then the employee loses this first freedom. In the Western legal order, we must be able to consider that it is at the constitutional level that the infringement is carried out through Law of Persons (on the intimacy between the Law of Persons and the Constitutional Law, see Marais , A., ➡️📕Le Droit des personnes, 2021).   III. CONSENT SHOULD NOT BE THE ONLY PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND DIGITAL SPACE   We could consider that the case of the company is different from the case of the controls operated by the State for the monitoring of airports, because in the first case observed people are consenting. "Consent" is today the central notion, often presented as the future of what everyone wants: the "regulation" of technology, especially when it takes the form of algorithms ("artificial intelligence"), especially in digital space. "Consent" would allow "ethical use" and could establish the whole (on these issues, see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝Having a good behavior in the digital space, 2019). "Consent" is a notion from which Law is today moving away in Law of Persons, in particular as regards the "consent" given by adolescents on the availability of their body, but not yet on digital. No doubt because in Contract Law, "consent" is almost synonymous with "free will", whereas they must be distinguished (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝Remarques sur la distinction entre la volonté et le consentement en Droit des contrats, 1995). But we see through this case, which precisely takes place in China, that "consent" is in Law as elsewhere a sign of submission. It is only in a probative way that it can constitute proof of a free will; this proof must not turn into an irrebuttable presumption. The Data Regulatory Authorities (for example in France the CNIL) seek to reconstitute this probative link between "consent" and "freedom to say No" so that technology does not allow by "mechanical consents", cut off from any connection with the principle of freedom which protects human beings, from dispossessing themselves (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., Yes to the principle of will, No to pure consents, 2018). The more the notion of consent will be peripheral, the more human beings will be able to be active and protected. -

► Full Reference: L.-M. Augagneur, "La juridictionnalisation de la réputation par les plateformes" ("The jurisdictionalisation of reputation by platforms"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 97-113.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): The large platforms are in the position of arbiter of the reputation economy (referencing, notoriety) in which they themselves act. Although the stakes are usually low on a unit basis, the jurisdiction of reputation represents significant aggregate stakes. Platforms are thus led to detect and assess reputation manipulations (by users: SEO, fake reviews, fake followers; or by the platforms themselves as highlighted by the Google Shopping decision issued by the European Commission in 2017) that are implemented on a large scale with algorithmic tools. The identification and treatment of manipulations is itself only possible by means of artificial intelligence tools. Google thus proceeds with an automated downgrading mechanism for sites that do not follow its guidelines, with the possibility of requesting a review through a very summary procedure entirely conducted by an algorithm. Tripadvisor, on the other hand, uses an algorithm to detect false reviews based on "fraud modeling to identify electronic patterns that cannot be detected by the human eye". It only conducts a human investigation in limited cases. This jurisdictionality of reputation has little in common with that defined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (legal origin, contradictory procedure, independence, application of the Rules of Law). It is characterized, on the one hand, by the absence of transparency of the rules and even of the existence of rules stated in predicative form and applied by deductive reasoning. It is replaced by an inductive probabilistic model by the identification of abnormal behaviors in relation to centroids. This approach of course raises the issue of statistical bias. More fundamentally, it reflects a transition from Rule of Law, not so much to "Code is Law" (Laurence Lessig), but to "Data is Law", that is, to a governance of numbers (rather than "by" numbers). It also comes back to a form of collective jurisdictionality, since the sanction comes from a computational apprehension of the phenomena of the multitude and not from an individual appreciation. Finally, it appears particularly consubstantial with compliance, since it is based on a teleological approach (the search for a finality rather than the application of principles). On the other hand, this jurisdictionality is characterized by man-machine cooperation, whether in the decision-making process (which poses the problem of automaticity bias) or in the contradictory procedure (which poses, in particular, the problems of discussion with the machine and the explicability of the machine response). Until now, the supervision of these processes has been based essentially on the mechanisms of transparency, a limited adversarial requirement and the accessibility of appeal channels. The French Law Loi pour une République Numérique ("Law for a Digital Republic"), the European Legislation Platform-to-Business Regulation and the Omnibus Directive, have thus set requirements on the ranking criteria on platforms. The Omnibus Directive also requires that professionals guarantee that reviews come from consumers through reasonable and proportionate measures. As for the European Digital Services Act, it provides for transparency on content moderation rules, procedures and algorithms. But this transparency is often a sham. In the same way and for the moment the requirements of sufficient human intervention and adversarial processes appear very limited in the draft text. The most efficient forms of this jurisdictionality ultimately emerge from the role played by third parties in a form of participatory dispute resolution. Thus, for example, FakeSpot detects false Tripadvisor reviews, Sistrix establishes a ranking index that helped establish the manipulation of Google's algorithm in the Google Shopping case by detecting artifacts based on algorithm changes. Moreover, the draft Digital Services Act envisages recognizing a specific status for trusted flaggers who identify illegal content on platforms. This singular jurisdictional configuration (judge and party platform, massive situations, algorithmic systems for handling manipulations) thus leads us to reconsider the grammar of the jurisdictional process and its characteristics. If Law is a language (Alain Sériaux), it offers a new grammatical form that would be that of the middle way (mesotès) described by Benevéniste. Between the active and the passive way, there is a way in which the subject carries out an action in which he includes himself. Now, it is the very nature of this jurisdictionality of compliance to make laws by including oneself in them (nomos tithestai). In this respect, the irruption of artificial intelligence in this jurisdictional treatment undoubtedly bears witness to the renewal of the language of Law. -

► Law is slow, but firm. By its judgment of June 15, 2021, Facebook , the European Union Court of Justice widely interprets the powers of National Authorities, since they serve the people protection in the digital space (➡️📝(CJEU, June 15, 2021, Facebook).    Law is slow. The reproach is so often made. But the bottom line is that, in the noise of changing regulations, it establishes clear and firm principles, letting everyone know what to stand for. The more the world is changing, the more Law is required. When Law degenerates into regulations, then it is up to the Judge to make Law. "Supreme Courts" appear, de jure as in the United States, de facto as in the European Union by the Court of Justice of the European Union which lays down the principles, before everyone else, as it did for the "right to be forgotten" in 2014 (➡️📝CJEU, Google Spain, May 13, 2014), and then with the impossibility of transferring data to third countries without the consent of the people concerned (➡️📝CJEU, Schrems, October 6, 2015). Facebook litigation is kind of a novel. The company knows that it is above all to the Courts that it speaks. In Europe, it is doing it behind the walls of the Irish legal space, from which it would like to be able not to leave before better dominating the global digital space, while national regulatory authorities want to take it to protect citizens. There is therefore a technical question of "jurisdictional competence". The texts have provided for this, but Law is clumsy because it was designed for a world still anchored in the ground: the GDPR of 2016 therefore organizes cooperation between national regulatory authorities through a "one-stop-shop", forcing the authorities to relinquish jurisdiction so that the case is only handled by the "lead" National Authority. This avoids splintering and contradiction. But before the adoption of the GDPR, the Belgian data protection regulator had opened a procedure against Facebook concerning cookies. The "one-stop-shop" mechanism, introduced in 2016, is therefore only mentioned before the Brussels Court of Appeal, which is asked to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the Irish Regulatory Authority, since the company has in Europe its head office in this country. The Court of Appeal referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. By its judgment of June 15, 2021 (➡️📝CJUE, Facebook, June 15, 2021), it follows the conclusions of its Advocate General and maintains the jurisdiction of the Belgian National Regulator because, even after the GDPR, the case still undergoes national treatment. In this decision, the most important is its reasoning and the principle adopted. The Court notes that the "one-stop-shop" rule is not absolute and that the national regulatory authority has the power to maintain its jurisdiction, in particular if cooperation between national authorities is difficult. Even more, will it not one day have to adjust Law more radically? We need to consider the fact that the digital space is not bound by borders and that the ambition of "cross-border cooperation" is ill-suited. It is of course on this observation of inefficiency, consubstantial with the digital space, that the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) was designed and set up, which is not a cooperation, nor a "one-stop shop", but a body of the Union, acting locally for the Union, directly linked to Compliance concerns (➡️📝Frison-Roche, M.-A. "The European Public Prosecutor's Office is a considerable contribution to Compliance Law", 2021 and ., European Public Prosecutor's Office comes on stage: the company having itself become a private prosecutor, are we going towards an alliance of all prosecutors ?, 2021). So that's what we should be inspired by.

► Compliance Law and Competition: for building, is it necessary to legislate ? Example of quasi-public interest judicial agreement: the French Competition Authority's Statement of June 3, 2021 on Facebook   The French law so-called "Sapin 2" of 2016, organized the "convention judiciaire d’intérêt public – CJIP" (Public Interest Judicial Agreement) which allows the prosecutor to undertake not to prosecute a company in returns for this company's commitments for the future. Is this mechanism reserved for this law, which only concerns corruption and bribery? The answer is often positive. Is it so obvious? Since the entity having the power to prosecute therefore always has the power not to prosecute. As the company always has the freedom to make commitments for the future. And everything stops. News in Competition Law illustrate this. On June 9, 2021, as part of a transaction, the Autorité de la concurrence (French Competition Authority) sanctions Google (➡️📝 Communiqué of the Autorité de la Concurrence , translated in English by the French Competition Authority) , which has not contested the facts, for abuse of dominant position for having privileged its services in the online advertising services. Similar facts were alleged against Facebook. But on June 3, 2021, the Autorité de la concurrence (French Competition Authority) published a "communiqué de presse" (➡️📝statement translated in English by the French Competition Authority) saying that Facebook has, during the investigation, proposed commitments regarding its future behavior. It is remarkable that this statement on Facebook is published as an “acte de régulation” (regulatory act). Yes, it is indeed an regulatory act about the future and structuring the online advertising area, internalized in this company which engages itself in its future behavior. With its statement, the Competition Authority invites the “acteurs du secteur” (actors of this sector) to make observations, for the development of what will be a sort of compliance program. In these negotiations which are akin to a game table, where everyone calculates without knowing if they enter into a negotiation or a confrontation, the first game assuming that one shows more cards than in the second, it is indeed towards a kind of Public Interest Judicial Agreement that they are going with a Competition Authority which is both Judge and Prosecutor, concludes the agreement and, through a later decision, gives it force. Under the various legal qualifications, it is indeed the same general mechanism of Compliance Law, well beyond the specific French law known as Sapin 2. Managed in this way, Compliance Law being an Ex Ante corpus, transforms the Competition Authority, an Ex Post Authority, into an Ex Ante Authority, openly taking "acte de régulation" (Regulatory Act), and allows it to rely on the power of companies, thus “committed”, to structure markets, which are however not regulated. Like advertising or retailing areas (➡️📝see Frison-Roche, M.-A., From Competition Law to Compliance Law: Example of French Competition Authority's decision on central purchasing body in mass distribution, 2020). Thus Compliance Law has achieved the autonomy of Regulatory Law with regards to the notion, which nevertheless seemed intimate to it, of "sector".   ► register to the French Newsletter MaFR ComplianceTech®

Full reference: CJEU, Grand chamber, Judgment Facebook Ireland e.a. v. Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit, C-645-19, June 15, 2021 Read the judgment Read the abstract of the judgment done by the Court Read the press release    

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., "Let's Use the Power of GAFAMs in the Service of General Interest!" ("Utilisons la puissance des GAFAMs au service de l'intérêt général!"), interview done by Olivia Dufour, Actu-juridiques Lextenso, 11st of January 2021 Read the interview (in French) To read the article translated in English by us, read the working paper on which this interview is based   Summary of the interview by Olivia Dufour: Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Professor of Regulation and Compliance Law, reported to the government in 2019 about Internet governance. For this expert, giving a disciplinary power to GAFAMs is the only effective solution. And the suppression of Donald Trump's account is not likely to call this analysis into question.   The three questions (translated in English here by ourselves) asked by Olivia Dufour are:  The deletion of Donald Trump's Twitter account arouses strong emotions on social networks, and not only among his supporters. What do you think about this ? However, this incident does raise concern. Are we not giving too much power to these private companies? This raises the question in France of the relevance of the Avia system … Should we therefore resolve by default to give our freedoms to private and opaque mastodons?   Read the answers to these three questions (in French)   To go further, especially about the logics that guide the Avia system, see: Frison-Roche, M.-A., "Hate on internet: we need to responsibilize digital operators" ("Haine sur internet: il faut responsabiliser les opérateurs numériques"), 2020 Frison-Roche, M.-A., The contribution of Compliance Law to Internet Governance, report to Government, 2019