A SUPPRIMER : Efficacité (tag anglais vidé)

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Compliance Obligation: build a compliance structure producing credible effects in the perspective of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator, Working Paper, March 2024. - 📝 This Working Paper is the basis of the article "Compliance Obligation: build a compliance structure producing credible effects in the perspective of the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator", in📘 Compliance 'Obligation de Compliance,   - ► Summary of this Working Paper: This article explains what companies' Compliance Obligation" is. Delving into the mass of compliance obligations, it uses the method of classification of those that are subject to an obligation of result and those that are subject to an obligation of means. It justifies the choice of this essential criterion, which changes the objects and the burden of proof of companies that are subject to an obligation of result when it comes to setting up "compliance structures" and are subject to an obligation of means when it comes to the effects produced by these compliance structures. Indeed, this article goes on to analyse each body of regulations ("Sapins 2", "Vigilance", CSRD, CS3D, DSA, NIS2, DMA, DORA, AML-FT, ….) and the technical compliance obligations they impose, dividing them into obligations of result or obligations of means, depending on the text. This table of positive law thus drawn up, with reference to all the articles of the texts, shows that in positive law the Compliance Obligation has above all an evidential dimension, which is developed in the third part of the article: the company must show that it has put in place the compliance structures (obligations of result) required by the texts and it is up to third parties who criticise it for the unsatisfactory effects that these structures would have produced, according to them, to show that there is a fault or negligence on the part of the company (obligation of means). Indeed, rather than getting bogged down in definitional disputes, given that Compliance Law is itself a nascent branch of Law, the idea of this contribution is to take as a starting point the different legal regimes of so many different compliance obligations to which laws and regulations subject large companies: sometimes they have to apply them to the letter and sometimes they are only sanctioned in the event of fault or negligence. This brings us back to the distinction between obligations of result and obligations of means. Although it would be risky to transpose the expression and regime of contractual obligations to legal obligations put by legislation, starting from this observation in the evidentiary system of compliance of a plurality of obligations of means and of result, depending on whether it is a question of this or that technical compliance obligation, we must first classify them. It would then appear that this plurality will not constitute a definitive obstacle to the constitution of a single definition of the Compliance Obligation. On the contrary, it makes it possible to clarify the situation, to trace the paths through what is so often described as a legal jumble, an unmanageable "mass of regulations". Indeed, insofar as the company obliged under Compliance Law participates in the achievement of the Monumental Goals on which this is normatively based, a legal obligation which may be relayed by contract or even by ethics, it can only be an obligation of means, by virtue of this very teleological nature and the scale of the goals targeted, for example the happy outcome of the climate crisis which is beginning or the desired effective equality between human beings. This established principle leaves room for the fact that the behaviour required is marked out by processes put in place by structured tools, most often legally described, for example the establishment of a vigilance plan or regularly organised training courses (effectiveness), are obligations of result, while the positive effects produced by this plan or these training courses (effaciety) are obligations of means. This is even more the case when the Goal is to transform the system as a whole, i.e. to ensure that the system is solidly based, that there is a culture of equality, and that everyone respects everyone else, all of which come under the heading of efficiency. The Compliance Obligation thus appears unified because, gradually, and whatever the various compliance obligations in question, their intensity or their sector, its structural process prerequisites are first and foremost structures to be established which the Law, through the Judge in particular, will require to be put in place but will not require anything more, whereas striving towards the achievement of the aforementioned Monumental Goals will be an obligation of means, which may seem lighter, but corresponds to an immeasurable ambition, commensurate with these Goals. In addition, because these structures (alert mechanisms, training, audits, contracts and clauses, etc.)  have real meaning if they are to produce effects and behaviours that lead to changes converging towards the Monumental Goals, it is the obligations of means that are most important and not the obligations of result. The judge must also take this into account. Finally, the Compliance Obligation, which therefore consists of this interweaving of multiple compliance obligations of result and means of using the entreprise's position, ultimately Goals at system efficiency, in Europe at system civilisation, for which companies must show not so much that they have followed the processes correctly (result) but that this has produced effects that converge with the Goals sought by the legislator (effects produced according to a credible trajectory). This is how a crucial company, responsible Ex Ante, should organise itself and behave. - 🔓read the developments below⤵️ - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb

► Full Reference: L. Aynès, M.-A. Frison-Roche, J.-B. Racine and E. Silva-Romero (dir.), L'arbitrage international en renfort de l'obligation de Compliance (International Arbitration in support of the Compliance Obligation), Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Institute of World Business Law of the ICC (Institute), Conseil Économique Social et Environnemental (CESE), Paris, February 9, 2024 - 🌐consult on LinkedIn a general présentation of this event, which links to a presentation and a report of each speech  - 🏗️This symposium takes place in the cycle of symposiums organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners Universities, focusing in 2023-2024 on the general theme of the Compliance Obligation - 📚The works will then be inserted in the books:  📕L'obligation de Compliance, to be published in the 📚Régulations & Compliance Serie, co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, published in French. 📘Compliance Obligation, to be published on the 📚Compliance & Regulation Serie, co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, published in English. - ► General presentation of the symposium: "Compliance Obligation" appears to be far from International Arbitration if Compliance Law is only understood in terms of binding regulations or even Criminal Law. Arbitration would only have contact with Compliance Obligation in a repulsive way, when a person claims to have enforced a contract before an arbitration court that disregards a compliance prohibition, e.g. corruption or money laundering. It is therefore from a negative angle that the cross-over has taken place. The fact that Arbitration Law respects the requisite of Criminal Law is nothing new.  Moreover, the power of Compliance in its detection and prevention tools, particularly in terms of evidence, no doubt increases the global efficiency. But Compliance Obligation is based on Monumental Goals, notably linked to global human rights and active ambitions about environment and climate which, particularly in the value chain economy, take the legal form of compliance clauses, or even compliance contracts, or various commitments and plans, which the parties can ask the international arbitrator to enforce. They will do so even more as arbitrators are often the only international, or even global, judges available. The use they will do of Contract Law, Quasi-Contract Law, Enforcement Law, Tort Law, reinforces Compliance Law in a global dimension. - - ► Interviennent :  🎤 Laurent Aynès, emeritus Professor at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University, Attorney, Darrois Villey Maillot Brochier (Paris) 🎤 Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Professor of Regulatory and Compliance Law, Director of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) 🎤 Jean-François Guillemin, former General Secretary of the Bouygues Group 🎤 Christophe Lapp, Attorney, Advant Altana (Paris) 🎤 Jean-Baptiste Racine, Full Professor at Paris Panthéon-Assas University (Paris 2) 🎤 Eduardo Silva-Romero, President of the Institute of World Business Law of the ICC (Institute), Attorney, Wordstone (Paris) - 🧮Read a detailed presentation of the event below⤵️ - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Births of a branch of Law: Compliance Law, Working Paper, November 2023. - 📕This Working Paper was drawn up as a basis for a contribution to the collective book given to Professor Louis Vogel, published in 2024 - ► Summary of this Working Paper: The study looks at the various movements that have given birth to Compliance Law, with particular emphasis on Competition Law. After a preliminary reflection on the construction of the legal system into branches of Law, their classification in relation to each other, the difficulty encountered in this respect by Economic Law, and the various movements that give birth to one of them, the diversity of which the branch subsequently keeps track of, the study is constructed in 4 parts. To find out what gave rise to Compliance Law, the first part invites us to reject the narrow perspective of a definition that is content to define it by the fact of "being conform" with all the applicable regulations. This has the effect of increasing the efficacy of the regulations, but it does not produce a branch of Law, being just a set of tools like others. The second part of the study aims to shed some light on what appears to be an "enigma", as it is often claimed that this is the result of a soft method, or of an American political decision, or of as many regulations as there are occasions to make. Instead, it appears that in the United States, in the aftermath of the 1929 crisis, it was a decision of establishing an authority and rules to prevent another atrocious collapse of the system, while in Europe in 1978, in memory of the use of files of personal and racial information, it was a question of establishing an authority and rules to prevent an atrocious attack on human rights. A common element that aims for the future ("never again") but not the same object of preventive rejection. This difference between the two births explains the uniqueness and diversity of the two Compliance Laws, the tensions that can exist between the two, and the impossibility of obtaining a global Law. The third part analyses the way in which Competition Law has given rise to conformity: a secondary branch which is a guarantee of conformity with competition rules. Developed in particular through the soft law issued by the competition authorities, the result is a kind of soft obedience, a well-understood collaboration of the procedural type through which the firm educates, monitors and even sanctions, without leaving  the cercle of Competition Law, of which conformity is an appendix. The distance between a culture of conformity and the substantial Compliance Law can be measured here. The fourth part aims to show that Competition Law and Compliance Law are two autonomous and articulated branches of Law. Since Compliance Law is a branch of Law built on Monumental Goals, in particular the sustainability of systems and the preservation of the human beings involved so that they are not crushed by them but benefit from them, the current challenge of European integration is to build the pillar of Compliance Law alongside the competitive pillar. Jurisdictions are in the process of doing this and of linking the two.   - 🔓read the Working Paper below⤵️ - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law  🌐subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb

►Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Definition of Principe of Proportionality  and  definition of Compliance Law,  Working Paper, July  2021. -   🎤 this Working Paper is the basis for a conference in the colloquium Compliance and Proportionality. From the control of Proportionality to the proportionality of the control, to be helded in Toulouse, France, on the 14th October 2021.   📝It constitutes the basis for an article:  📕 this article will be published in its French version in the book  Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, in the Series    Régulations & Compliance  📘  in its English version in the book Compliance Monumental Goals, in the Series    Compliance & Regulation - ► Working Paper Summary: Measuring the relationship between the Principle of Proportionality and Compliance Law depends entirely on the Definition chosen for Compliance Law. Let us first take the definition of Compliance Law as a simple "mode of effectiveness" of the rules to which we hold (I). The more we stick to this procedural definition of Compliance Law as a mode of effectiveness of the rules, the less it is easy to detect specificities in the application of the Principle of proportionality in compliance mechanisms. There are certainly many examples of the application of the principle of proportionality, but the addition and variety of examples are not enough to sculpt an original relationship between Proportionality and Compliance.   However, this exercise is not wasted. In fact, in the confusion which still marks the emergence of Compliance Law, the legal nature of the compliance mechanisms remains contested. However, the imposition of Proportionality, not only as it is an obligation but as a limitation of powers in this first definition focusing on Efficiency, recalls that Compliance, conceived as " process ", would then in any case be admissible at the very least as a" Procedure ", anchored in the Rule of Law Principle, therefore self-limititation expression.   But Proportionality is then like a cold shower in compliance, since it is defined by self-limitation in a Law which would be defined by effectiveness as its only definition…  Ineffectiveness In Efficiency…: it is no longer a relation, it is then an opposition which is established between the two terms … In this definition of Compliance Law, there is no other choice than to put process in this sort of  squaring circle because in this procedural Compliance Definition, as a method of effectiveness, of effectiveness and efficiency of the rules estimated more important more than others, it must however be admitted that Compliance Law, as any branch of the Law, without denying its very legal nature, must be anchored in the Rule of Law Principle. By the principle of proportionality, this new branch of Law is forced to anchor classic solutions from Constitutional, Public or Criminal Law,  the Principle of Proportionality prohibiting the Compliance of be just a process. The Repression  Law  has a large part in this conception and the Proportionality Principle reminds it of the part that Criminal Law still takes (with difficulty and for the moment …) in the admission of ineffectiveness that the Law demands, particularly in the face of Compliance technologies. In this first definition, the Proportionality Principle thus reminds Compliance, entirely held in the idea of ​​Efficiency that it is a "Law" of Compliance" and anchored in the Rule of Law Principle, it must limit its Effectiveness . It is therefore a kind of "price" that these techniques pay, with regret …, to the Rule of Law and in particular to the freedoms of human beings. There is a strong temptation not to want to pay this price. For example by affirming that there is a new technological world, which the new system, entirely in algorithms, will promote in a move away from the Law, rejected towards the Old World. Frequently proposed, or set up for instance in China. Others say that we must "do the balance". But when you balance Efficiency performance and Efficiency self-limitation, you know very well who will win …   But why not look rather on the side of a Definition of Compliance Law where, on the contrary, the two concepts, instead of opposing each other, support each other!   Indeed, Compliance Law is then defined as an extension of Regulatory Law as a set of rules, institutions, principles, methods and decisions taking their meaning and normativity for specific Goals. . In this definition, which is both specific and substantial, these "Monumental Goals" are systemic and require that all means be mobilized for them to be achieved. Future and negative in nature (events that must not happen) but also future and positive in nature (events that must occur), Compliance Law does not apply to all the rules whose  effectiveness required, but this specific type of "Monumental Goals", in an alliance between the political authorities in charge of the future of human groups and the entities in a position to mobilize its means. The method is then different. It is no longer a question of entrenching and the prospect of repression fades into the background. A reversal occurs. Proportionality ceases to be what limits Efficiency to become what increases Efficiency. As soon as Goals have be precised, Proportionality is not the consequence of the limitation (as in the principle of "necessity" of Criminal Law, insofar as the latter is an exception), it is the consequence of the fact that any legal mechanism is a "Compliance Tool", which only has meaning in relation to a "Monumental Goal". It is therefore essential to set the "Goal Monumental Goals". As this is where the legal normativity of Compliance is housed, the control must first and foremost relate to that. Then all the Compliance Tools must adjust in a "proportionate way", that is to say effective to its goals: as much as it is necessary, not more than it is necessary. According to the principle of economy (which is also called the "principle of elegance" in mathematics). In consequence, the rule contrary to the Principle of Proportionality is: the rule useless to achieve the goal. The unnecessary rule is the disproportionate rule: this is how the judicial review of excessive sanctions should be understood, not by the notion of "the limit" but not by the notion of "the unnecessary". Everything then depends on the legal quality of the goal. De jure – and this would deserve to be a requirement at constitutional level, the goal must always be clear, understandable, non-contradictory, attainable. This increases the office of the Judge. This renews the power of the Legislator in a conception which ceases to be discretionary. But the Legislator retains the prerogative of determining the Monumental Goals, while the Judge controls the quality of the formulation that he makes of them, in order to be able to measure the proportionality of the means which are put in front by the State and the Companies, while Companies can rally to the Monumental Goals of the Politics by making an alliance with them, but certainly not instituting others in an autonomous way because they are not normative political entities, whereas they are free to determine the means necessary to achieve these goals, the Judge controlling the proportionality mechanism that makes this new system work. The case law of the German Constitutional Court expresses this conception. It is fully consistent with what Compliance Law is in what is the one Monumental Goal containing all the systemic Monumental Goals: the protection of the human being. -  

► Do Compliance and Democracy have a relationship? China replies: no. Europe responds and must respond: they are intimate. The definition of Compliance Law is therefore essential. In an interview of great clarity  given in French to the Newspaper Les Echos on June 2, 2021, about Brexit, China and Russia (➡️📝 "Brexit, Chine, Russie : les confidences de la diplomate Sylvie Bermann"), Sylvie Bermann reminds the evolution of China. She sums up the situation as follows: « La Chine ne veut pas dominer le monde, elle veut être la première et surtout qu'on ne puisse pas lui imposer un système, la démocratie » ("China does not want to dominate the world, it wants to be the first and above all that no one can impose on it a system, Democracy,"). This is reflected in China's conception of Compliance Law. If one defines Compliance Law only as a "method" for the effectiveness of rules, consisting of a kind of "Ex Ante enforcement process" leading to 100% effectiveness of regulations by subjects who must show to everyone the respect they have for these regulations and who are rewarded by this proof thus given, then China, in its current use of Law, illustrates exactly this definition: subjects, individuals and companies, prove their "obedience" to rules – whatever the rules" substantial content -, which is evaluated ("rating") and rewarded, in a mechanical reign of the Ex Ante, served by technologies. Democratic mechanisms are not required; they are even disturbed, because they interfere with the efficiency of the system. The technological and purely technocratic conception of Compliance ("Regulation by data", for example) uses the same definition of Compliance Law, which leads to choose algorithms’ efficiency. Europe must keep going to make another choice: European Compliance was born out of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s case law, in the 2014 judgment, Google Spain (➡️📝CJEU, Google Spain, May 13, 2021), to protect the person by inventing a subjective right: the right to be forgotten, in a digital space with infinite memory. Based on the Rule of Law, Compliance Law is then defined by its Monumental Goals, which are the protection of people and puts the judge at the center. It is the reverse of Chinese mechanics. Therefore, they are definitions that lead the world: about the definition of Compliance Law by "Monumental Goals", see ➡️📅 the 2021 cycle of colloquia co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its university partners on Monumental Goals; on the technical influence of this definition on "Compliance tools" ➡️📕see Frison-Roche, M.-A., Legal Approach to Compliance Tools: Building by Law the unity of Compliance Tools from the definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals", 2021.   ►subscribe to the MaFR ComplianceTech® Newsletter

Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le maniement de la propriété intellectuelle comme outil de régulation et de compliance, in Vivant, M. (dir.), Les Grands Arrêts de la propriété intellectuelle, 3ième éd., 2019, 9-11, pp. 43-53. This contribution is written in French. Summary:  Intellectual Property, which comes from the State and is incorporated into public policy, can be designed not to reward the creator a posteriori, but to encourage others to innovate. It is then an Ex Ante regulatory tool, an alternative to the subsidy. If private copying is an exception, it is not in relation to the principle of Competition but in an insertion into a system of incentives, starting from the costs borne by the creator of the first innovation: the rights holder is then protected , not only according to a balance of interests involved but in order not to discourage innovative potentials and the sector itself. (1st decision) ; The sectoral policy then permeates Intellectual Property, used to regulate a sector, for example that of the drug. While it is true that a laboratory wishing to market a generic drug did not wait for the expiration of the patent for the original drug to do so, it is however not relevant to sanction this anticipation by a few days because the investments made by the holder of the Intellectual Property right have been made profitable by this one and because the public authorities favor the generics in a concern of public health (2nd decision). Systemic interest prevails and therefore Internet service providers have to bear the costs of blocking access while they are irresponsible because of the texts. This obligation to pay is internalized by Compliance Law because they are in the digital system best able to put an end to the violation of Intellectual Property rights which the ecosystem requires to be effective. (3rd decision).   Read the contribution (in French).   Read the Working Paper written in English having served as a basis for this contribution and endowed with additional developments, technical references and hypertext links.  -

The Finance Bill has proposed to the Parliament to vote an article 57 whose title is: Possibilité pour les administrations fiscales et douanières de collecter et exploiter les données rendues publiques sur les sites internet des réseaux sociaux et des opérateurs de plateformes (translation: Possibility for the tax and customs administrations to collect and exploit the data made public on the websites of social networks and platform operators). Its content is as is in the text voted on in the National Assembly as follows: "(1) I. – On an experimental basis and for a period of three years, for the purposes of investigating the offenses mentioned in b and c of 1 of article 1728, in articles 1729, 1791, 1791 ter, in 3 °, 8 ° and 10 ° of article 1810 of the general tax code, as well as articles 411, 412, 414, 414-2 and 415 of the customs code, the tax administration and the customs administration and indirect rights may, each as far as it is concerned, collect and exploit by means of computerized and automated processing using no facial recognition system, freely accessible content published on the internet by the users of the online platform operators mentioned in 2 ° of I of article L. 111-7 of the consumer code. (2) The processing operations mentioned in the first paragraph are carried out by agents specially authorized for this purpose by the tax and customs authorities.   (3) When they are likely to contribute to the detection of the offenses mentioned in the first paragraph, the data collected are kept for a maximum period of one year from their collection and are destroyed at the end of this period. However, when used within the framework of criminal, tax or customs proceedings, this data may be kept until the end of the proceedings. (4) The other data are destroyed within a maximum period of thirty days from their collection. (5) The right of access to the information collected is exercised with the assignment service of the agents authorized to carry out the processing mentioned in the second paragraph under the conditions provided for by article 42 of law n ° 78-17 of January 6, 1978 relating to data processing, the files and freedoms. (6) The right to object, provided for in article 38 of the same law, does not apply to the processing operations mentioned in the second paragraph. (7) The terms of application of this I are set by decree of the Council of State. (8) II. – The experiment provided for in I is the subject of an evaluation, the results of which are forwarded to Parliament as well as to the National Commission for Data Protection at the latest six months before its end. "   This initiative provoked many comments, rather reserved, even after the explanations given by the Minister of Budget to the National Assembly. What to think of it legally? Because the situation is quite simple, that is why it is difficult: on the one hand, the State will collect personal information without the authorization of the persons concerned, which is contrary to the very object of the law of 1978 , which results in full disapproval; on the other hand, the administration obtains the information to prosecute tax and customs offenses, which materializes the general interest itself. So what about it? Read below.

The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector. This is why the "regulator – supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them. He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators. This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying. - In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism. But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively – as would a traditional judge do – that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor – which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself. As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels. Thus, on June 18, 2019, all banks came to discuss with the Single Resolution Board to know what it wants from the banks and for the banks, in what is called a "dialogue meeting". To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank. For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ". In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services. Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service. By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces – and immediately – this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody …. That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them. - To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made: 1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation); 2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access). 3. Even without a  single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms. 4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world. -  

Full reference : L.-M. Augagneur, "L'efficacité des programmes de compliance : l'exemple du droit de la concurrence", in N. Borga, J.-Cl. Marin et J.-Cl. Roda (dir.), Compliance : l'entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, Série Régulations & Compliance, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 137-142.   Read a general presentation of the book in which the article is published Read the other titles of the série in which the book is published

Full reference : Augagneur, L.-M., La compliance a-t-elle une valeur ?, JCP E, n° 40, 5 octobre 2017, p. 1522. Sciences Po students can read the article via the drive, folder "MAFR-Régulation & Compliance".