General Law and Civil Law

Organisation of events

⚙️scienfica organisation of a public manifestation

🧱Scientific Organisation of the Conference 🧮L’office du juge et les causes systémiques (“The office of the judge and systemic causes”)

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., coordination and moderation of the conference L'office du juge et les causes systémiques (""The Office of the Judge and systemic causes"), in Cycle of Conferences, Penser l'office du juge ("Thinking the Office of the Judge"), Grand Chamber of the Cour de cassation, Paris, May 9, 2021, 17h-19h. The conference is held in French. - ► General presentation of the conference: the conference is based on the intervention of three judges, Christophe Soulard, Fabien Raynaud, and François Ancel, who think and debate among themselves on a hypothesis: the existence of "systemic causes". The hypothesis is that beyond and through the diversity of disputes and cases that are submitted to the most diverse judges, there is a category of cases that are systemic, which means containing in what is submitted to the judge for resolution a system.  If such a category exists, which also raises the question of the diversity of systems and the difficulty arising from their submission to rules that are not legal (for example economic, biological, financial "laws", etc.) , then the judge should take this into account, both in the procedure and in the judgment they make on the case and in the way they formulate et restitute this judgment. - 📝read the presentation of this conference by the Cour de cassation (in French) 📝read the program of the cycle of conferences 2022 (in French) -  🎥see the conference video (in French)  🎥 see the synthesis video of the conference, made in situ by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche (in French)   - ​✏️read the notes taken during the conference to make the synthesis (in French) 📝read the article of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche restituting this conference, published in the Recueil Dalloz (in French) - ►read the works, basis of the two interventions of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche 🚧 L'hypothèse de la "cause systémique (made before the conference to prepare it), available en English 📝Synthese of the conference (made during the conference) -

Working papers

🚧 Conceiving Power

► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Conceiving Power, Working Paper, December 2021 - 📝 This Working Paper serves as the basis for an article to be published in the collective book drawn up in tribute to Professor Emmanuel Gaillard.    - ► Working Paper summary: In 1985, Emmanuel Gaillard's central work came out under the title Le pouvoir en droit privé  (The Power in Private Law)📎1Gaillard, E., Le pouvoir en droit privé, préf. Cornu. G., coll. ..., Economica, 1985., but when it was defended in 1981, his thesis directed by Dean Cornu was entitled La notion de pouvoir en droit privé (The notion of Power in Private Law) 📎2Gaillard, E., La notion de pouvoir en droit privé, thèse .... ; . Let's give full force to the original title of the thesis.   The deletion of the term notion perhaps implies that by defining something the essential is done, that there would be something of a pleonasm in aiming at The notion of Power and The Power, as Law likes to economise on words.   But it was indeed a renewed, simpler and more powerful conception of the notion of Power, containing the entire regime necessarily imputed, that this work imposed, henceforth illuminating positive Law. Emmanuel Gaillard's definition, on the other hand, goes beyond Private Law. We would gladly have argued in favour of retaining the heading for the term Notion, proposing instead to dispense with the reference to Private Law alone …. Perhaps it was because the concept is so vast that in this seminal thesis its scope was restricted to Private Law, since the author already had to account for the sheer multiplicity of manifestations in this part of the legal system; Or perhaps it was because the concept of 'Power' is so familiar in Public Law that it would have needed less definition in Public Law (which, moreover, is so diversely proposed in this more political area, which is already careful on principle to distinguish between powers, which must always be plural in order to be separated), and that it was therefore reasonable to want to arrive at a single concept of Power in Private Law, where the notion of subjective rights is more familiar.  However, Emmanuel Gaillard's definition of Power as a prerogative placed, by legal rule or contract, in the hands of the person invested with them for the benefit, at least in part, of others, covers both Public and Private Law. This even contributes to the solidity of this thesis and explains why it flourishes today in legal systems where the distinction between Private Law and Public Law is weakening. The power of this definition lies in its simplicity. Simple and brave minds are often the most fruitful. As Dean Gérard Cornu points out in his preface, the author, in particular because he bases himself more on positive law, for example that relating to the powers of corporate officers, does not get bogged down in discussions between authors only to end up preferring one over the other. He arrives at a definition that is close to our everyday experience: the one we experience when we collect an envelope on behalf of someone else and the agent asks us in what capacity we claim to be doing this on his behalf. We then show him our 'power', the legal power to do so for the benefit of the person to whom the letter is addressed, and can thus exercise the power to withdraw the letter, even though it is personal. When legal and common sense come together, it is a good omen, not only in terms of form, because everyone can understand it and the Law must remain comprehensible, but also in terms of substance, because everyone must be able to control the exercise of a power that is exercised for and over others. For this letter addressed to someone else, the person who has been able to take it by virtue of the power conferred on him/her, could just as easily open it and read it, then destroy it or give it to the worst enemy of the person to whom it was addressed. In Power, there is always might to do, and the danger to others that Power contains therefore.  This highly legal definition of Power not only distances the holder from his/her own interests, but also channels the Power thus granted to the person who benefits from it. In this respect, Emmanuel Gaillard not only distinguished between Power and subjective right, but also identified the right amount of power required for this power to effectively fulfill this 'Mission', through the notion of abuse of power, when the holder uses for other beneficiaries this power that was conferred on him/her for this sole purpose. What is more, this concept makes it possible to distinguish Power from discretionary force, because the holder of Power thereby exercises factual , by acting for others, deciding for others, deciding on others. Because Power is inseparable from might, but might must remain the means of power and no more, the Law shall produce the antibodies that are not only the theory of abuse of power but also an Ex Ante responsibility that accounts must always be rendered, either to the other for whom everything is done or to a third party. For this third party is often there from the outset, the guardianship judge for example: because the Power was put in place because of the beneficiary's weakness, both in himself/herself and because of the situation, an impartial and disinterested third party is needed to ensure proper execution from the outset, without there even being a dispute. In this respect, how useful this thesis is for thinking about what Supervision is today!   This thesis, so clear, so simple and so strong, goes beyond Private or Civil Law. It is both much more restrictive than the more factual and political definition of Oower, which would be the ability to do something, and much broader than the usual definitions, since it embraces and legitimises de jure all situations where a person acts legally for the benefit of another.  Dean Cornu shows, moreover, in two sentences that such a notion of power also captures the office of the judge, who has power over others only to serve them 📎3"En droit processuel, l'office du juge aurait donné à l'auteur un renfort. Pour le juge, il n'est point de pouvoir sans devoir. Au-delà de la distinction de ce qu'il a obligation de faire ou faculté d'apprécier, il y a toujours, au creux de ce qu'il peut, le sceau de ce qu'il doit, un devoir gardien - comme un âme - de l'exercice du pouvoir." (p.5).. The definition corresponds to the mission of one who has power only to fulfill his office. It suits so well the conception we have today of Administration, especially if it takes the form of independent authorities. Moreover, Power thus contains its own limit in its very definition, since others are present in it: the holder has power only to serve others. From then on, it is only a power because it is a kind of Charge. Emmanuel Gaillard immediately uses the term: "Un individu se voit confier une charge qu'il exerce dans un intérêt au moins partiellement distinct du sien propre"  ("An individual is entrusted with an office which he exercises in an interest at least partially distinct from his own") 📎4n°3, p.9. . Dean Carbonnier, who reformed the legislation in this area 📎5🕴️J. Carbonnier, 📗Essai sur les lois, 1992 (on the guardianship).,, emphasised that the guardian has a public duty because the State entrusts him/her with a child. In the same way parental authority is a charge on the parents for the benefit of the children. More generally, Power is a burden that the Law places on a person to satisfy the interests of another. This definition offered by Emmanuel Gaillard in 1981, anchored in Private Law only insofar as it is the entire legal system, is premonitory of the Regulatory and Compliance Law as it unfolds today. It would be enough to continue the Gaillard's sentences, as if they had been half-written, to finish them 40 years later and find in them the mechanisms of Supervision of companies by public authorities which are now in place not to reduce their power but to ensure that they exercise it for the benefit of others 📎6S. in a general way, 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017.. The whole evolution of Company Law and Financial Law is here. Between the lines of this thesis, which develops the notion of duty 📎7Cornu, préface précitée : "Tous les pouvoirs sont, à double face, des pouvoirs-devoirs" (p.5)., we can also see what positive Law is developing today, in particular through the 'duty of Vigilance', this personal responsibility for the benefit of others (I). The definition of Power thus conceived contains within itself its regime and enables us to anticipate it better today: because the holder exercises Power only for others, at least partially, he is consubstantially accountable for it, responsibility being only one form of this accountability; because this service must be effective and others must benefit fully from it, because unlike the subjective right which allows the holder freely not to use his might, Power has never been the 'most absolute' availability to use his/her might: it is even the opposite. It is the expression of a Power assigned to a purpose, compelling the holder to use his/her Power to that end.  But it is equally necessary for the holder to have all the might to do so, otherwise the very notion of 'Power' is meaningless. This is the definition that should be given to the principle of Proportionality: the person on whom the Power rests must have not more power than is necessary, but all the power necessary to achieve the Monumental Goals for which the Power has been entrusted to him/her, so that others may derive full benefit from it (II).  In today's positive Law, the definition of Power as a Duty is found not only in Private Law but also in Public Law, not least because pure might, i.e. those that do not account for the use of their might, are in decline while concern for others is on the increase. The days of discretionary powers are over, and the increased independence of those who exercise Power over others requires them to be accountable. Beyond this Accountability, the personal Responsibility of those who have the Power to serve others is being established. But, no doubt because the Law is slow to evolve, the correlative idea that the holder of Power must have all the powers required to carry out his/her mission is less entrenched:  As Emmanuel Gaillard has shown, the Law has only gone part of the way in sanctioning excesses of power, when the holder uses his/her power for other goals, but it has not yet clearly established that the holder – sometimes forced – of a Power is legitimate in using all the means required to achieve the result for which this Power, i.e. a charge and a duty, has been conferred on him/her.   No doubt we need to read Emmanuel Gaillard's thesis again in all its potential, to imagine the reading we could do today of what he could have written as if on blank pages that would write themselves, a magical thesis where everything is already there, a thesis so short (250 pages) and so beautiful, so dense that it already contains the Law of the Future. The Law of the Future 📎8On Compliance Law as a Law of the Future, s. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023. On the consequences for Liability Law, which is now looking to the Future, s. 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧Ex Ante Responsibility, 2021.  where there must be much more responsibility for the benefit of others📎9Sur la notion de "Responsabilité Ex Ante", v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., La responsabilité Ex Ante", in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La responsabilité, 2022. and powers since this notion includes others who are the beneficiaries. Droit de l'Avenir where Emmanuel Gaillard will be present, in particular thanks to this work of doctrine offered in 1981.  So that, in practical terms, those who are entrusted with looking after others – for example, today all companies obliged by Compliance Law to look after others so that they are not destroyed by hatred in the digital space, by corruption in the economic system or by climate change in a projected future – do not find themselves challenged by the same Law for the means of exercising this power for the benefit of others, for example when this involves 'judging'. Dean Cornu himself emphasised the identity of the two offices. -                         Lire les développement ci-dessous⤵ - 🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

Working papers

Working Paper

🚧The Hypothesis of the category of Systemic Cases brought before the Judge

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, The Hypothesis of the category of Systemic Cases brought before the Judge, Working Paper, October 2021 and April 2022. - ► This working paper has served as the basis for an introductory speech 🎤L'hypothèse de la catégorie des causes systémiques (The Hypothesis of the cateory of Systemic Cases), in a more general conference which I coordinated and moderated, 🧱L'office du juge et les causes systémiques, which is part of a general cycle covering Penser l'office du juge, specific conference attending the 9th May 2002 into the Grand Chamber of the Cour de cassation.   This Working Paper was drawn up in October 2021 to build the conference on the assumption that among the diversity of "cases" brought to the courts by litigants, some constitute a specific category: "systemic cases", justifying treatment that is both specific (in that they are systemic, calling in particular for procedural solutions common to all and distinguishable from the treatment of non-systemic cases) and common treatment beyond the diversity of judges who deal with them (judicial and administrative judges, criminal and non-criminal judges, French and non-French judges, judges of the member-States legal orders and European Union judges, etc.).  This working paper does not aim to deal with the whole subject, i.e. both to determine this category of "systemic causes" and the consequences that must be drawn from it for the judge's office, since that is the very purpose of the conference, which is built around several presentations: it aims to deal with the first part of the subject, i.e. the very existence of this new processual category, which is "systemic causes", leaving for other work the practical consequences to be drawn from it in the processual treatment that it calls for. - 📝This Working Paper is also the basis of a forthcoming article - ► Summary of the Working Paper: xx - Read below the developments⤵️ - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR. Regulation, Compliance, Law

Working papers

🚧Ex Ante Responsibility

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Ex Ante Responsibility, Working Paper, December 2021. - 📝This Working Paper has been the basis for an article written in French, "La responsabilité Ex Ante", published in the Archives de Philosophie du droit (APD), in the book 📗La Responsabilité (2022). - ►  Working Paper Summary: Quel est le temps auquel s'articule la responsabilité ? La question est si classique que toutes les réponses ont été dessinées : si l'on est responsable plus aisément par rapport au temps, car l'on peut alors plus aisément faire un lien entre la situation appréhendée, sa réalisation dans le passé la rendant plus facilement connaissable, et le poids de "responsabilité" que l'on impute sur une personne, l'on peut articuler la responsabilité avec le futur. Si l'on brise le poids de cette responsabilité avec un évènement ou une situation, par exemple. Le Principe Responsabilité de Jonas ou l'Ethique de la Responsabilité font ainsi voyager la Responsabilité dans le temps, par un rapport entre le Droit et l'Ethique.  D'ailleurs l'on pourrait soutenir que le Droit peut faire ce qu'il veut et imputer une responsabilité à quiconque pour le temps qu'il désigne, par exemple désigne comme porteur d'une responsabilité, c'est-à-dire d'un poids, celui qu'il veut. Le "responsable" serait alors le titulaire d'une sorte de "poids pur", qui le charge parce que le Droit l'a voulu pour le temps qu'il veut, par exemple un devoir d'agir pour que le futur soit dessiné comme le veut le Droit, alors même que le Responsable n'a rien à se reprocher dans le passé.  Mais les Cours constitutionnelle défendent un rapport minimal entre la Responsabilité et le poids que celle-ci fait porter une personne, fut-t-elle morale, gardant ainsi le lien consubstantiel entre le Droit et la Morale, la technique juridique de la Responsabilité ne pouvant équivaloir à celle d'un prélèvement obligatoire. Ainsi l'idée d'une Responsabilité Ex Ante est simple dans son principe (I). Elle est celle d'un poids juridiquement posé sur une personne soit par elle-même (engagement), soit par la Loi ou par le Juge sur une personne de faire quelque chose pour que n'advienne pas quelque chose qui adviendrait ou pour qu'advienne quelque chose qui n'adviendrait pas si elle ne le faisait pas. Mais les conditions juridiques pour admettre un tel poids alors même que le lien avec une situation passée serait brisé est plus difficile (II). On continue certes continuer à voir dans le futur le passé, ce qui facilite le voyage dans le temps, et fonda par exemple le contrôle Ex Ante du contrôle des concentrations. Mais l'on peut se briser même de cette facilité et regarder non plus le rapport entre le passé et le futur, mais le présent et le futur : ce que l'on sait déjà aujourd'hui du futur, ce qui met en jeu le rapport entre le Droit et la Science ; ce que l'on observe de l'emprise de la personne présente sur le moment présent, c'est-à-dire le Pouvoir, ce qui fait en jeu le rapport entre le Droit et l'Economie politique. Dans cette dimension-là, la contrainte de la Responsabilité Ex Ante est alors maniée par le Juge, dont l'office lui-même devient un office Ex Ante. Les pouvoirs obligés Ex Ante par une telle responsabilité maniée par le Juge étaient les personnes en situation de pouvoir, sont non seulement les entreprises, mais encore les Etats, qui perdent le privilège – partagé avec les contractants – de disposer juridiquement du futur, et notamment en leur sein le Législateur.  Une telle révolution, qui se déroule sous nos yeux, s'explique parce qu'il faut agir maintenant pour que le futur ne soit pas catastrophique. La science nous informe qu'il le sera entéléchiquement. Il est donc juridiquement requis de désigner des responsables, non pas parce qu'ils auraient fait quelque chose, la dimension Ex Post n'étant pas le sujet, mais pour qu'ils fassent quelque chose, la Responsabilité Ex Ante étant un élément central de cette nouvelle branche du Droit qu'est le Droit de la Compliance.   

Breaking news

📧 Doesn’t the Law have to intervene when Technology aims to capture thoughts by squeezing the medium of speech? Case of the implantation of a brain chip recording thoughts directly on a computer screen

►  An article published on July 14, 2021 by The Wall Street Journal, "Brain Implant Lets Man 'Speak' After Being Silent for More Than a Decade", relays the information that it is now possible, on an experimental basis, to implant in the brain a device allowing a person deprived by a neurological accident to speak to be able to express himself again by writing his thoughts directly on a computer screen, on which the words thought are displayed in sentences. - Several years of "fundamental" research, notably on the part of Facebook, which, in particular by subsidizing the French professor of neurosciences Stanislas Dehaene, in a comparison between the learning development of the brain and the development of "deep learning", have been successful. to allow people who have lost the use of the voice to write directly on screens without this vocal medium by going directly from thought to writing. This leads to three reflections, putting Law and Technology at the center: 1. at first glance, speech being only a medium between thought and expression, it would be conceivable to do without it; 2. However, it is required to draw a parallel with the new technology of "emotional recognition" by which thoughts are accessible to third parties, which thwarts the fundamental right to make one's thoughts inaccessible to others;  The news has shown precisely that this technology, making possible to capture the true thoughts of others despite feigned facial expressions, poses a problem with regard to the fundamental right to lie or to remain silent (see in this regard 📧 MaFR, "Compliance and Ethics Technologies may be inadmissible "in themselves" and conceiving of their "ethical use" is therefore not admissible: practical case on the control of workers' emotions "). 3. By anticipating the possible use of this new technology and the legal reaction to this potentiality, the same question raises whether, per se, such an implantation of a tool for "capturing thoughts directly in the brain" to obtain their "direct translation on a screen" should not be considered as the equivalent of capturing thoughts, just as infringing on everyone's fundamental right to keep their thoughts inaccessible. Here again, the fact that in one or two cases, this made it possible to cure a person does not legitimize the technology in itself. Likewise, the fact that the person "consents" is not sufficient to legitimize what may be a per se attack on the dignity of the human person if the technology has the effect of capturing thoughts with a loss of control. the person concerned. For the moment, in the description given by the researchers according to the article which relates the innovation, it is the transmitter who controls the technology but the elimination of the medium of speech or writing deserves to be conceptualized, in the loss of isolation of the individual, isolation to which the Western tradition has often associated Freedom. - ► s'inscrire à la Newsletter MaFR ComplianceTech®
Couverture – Compliance Tools

Articles in a legal collective publication

Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), “Compliance Tools”

Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A..,Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 319-342   -   Article Summary: In the traditional conception of the architecture of the sectors regulated by Law, and in Compliance Law which extends the regulatory techniques, rights have little place. But this configuration no longer takes place; on the contrary, rights are at the center of Regulatory and Compliance systems, and will be more and more so. They are and will be the primary tools of Compliance Law because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve. Because every effort must be done to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people and organizations who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goal". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools for actually achieving the goals set, so much so that they can be seen as "primary tools". But it is pertinent to have more pretension and to conceive rights as the most "natural" tools of Compliance Law. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be expressed by the protection of persons, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given as tools by Law by to persons and rights which constitute the very goal of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights becoming a "natural tool" of Compliance Law. We are only at the beginning of their deployment and it is undoubtedly on them that Digital space in which we now live would be regulated, so that we will not suffocated there and that it will constitute for people a civilized space. -   Read the bilingual working paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks, on which this article is based    Read the General Presentation of the book in which this article has been published   -

Conferences

🎤 Note taken during the colloquium “Compliance and Arbitration” for doing its conclusion: a backing (Conclusion, in “Compliance and Arbitration))

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et arbitrage. Rapport de synthèse: un adossement (Compliance and Arbitration: a Backing. Conclusion), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. & Racine, J.-B., Compliance et Arbitrage (Compliance and Arbitration), Colloquium co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de recherches sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ) of Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), with the support avec the International Court of Arbitration, Paris, 31st of March 2021 -   Read the program of this colloquium See Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's conclusion in video (in French, with English subtitles) These notes of the conclusion have been written as the colloquium took place.  See the video of the entire colloquium (in French, with English subtitles) - This colloquium is part of the Cycle of colloquium 2021 organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners around the topic Compliance Juridictionnalization.   This manifestation is in French but the interventions will be the basis for a specific chapter of the English collective book directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Compliance Juridictionnalization, co-published by the JoRC and Bruylant. An equivalent book in French, La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, will be co-published by the JoRC and Dalloz.    Read the notes established for the conclusion below ⤵️

Videos

🎤 The Potential of Compliance Law (Les potentialités du Droit de la Compliance)

Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., The Potential of Compliance Law (Les potentialités du Droit de la Compliance), conference given to Muriel Fabre-Magnan's students, Paris I, 17th of March 2021. -   This conference has been designed for Paris I's students following a Law cursus, specialized in Law of obligations and especially in Tort Law.  It therefore aims to show the technical content of Compliance Law and what it can become.  It has been followed by a debate with students.  Summary: Compliance Law is a branch of Law in the process of being born. We can be sure of its existence in the French positive Law, through the technical examination of laws called "Sapin 2" (2016) and "Vigilance" (2017). It appears at radically new. It is the reason why it is perceived as an attack, especially from United-States and we rather use legal knowledge to counter it. But if we study the historical reasons of its adoption in the United-States and the "monumental goals", whether they are negative (what should not appear in the future) or positive (what should appear in the future), we can measure that this Law, which is essentially Ex Ante could be the means through which scattered but legitimate public authorities and powerful but illegitimate big firms could ally. Therefore potentially Compliance Law could be the worst, simple tool of obedience (mechanical "conformité") or the best: what through which we could do something face to global problems, like global warming, or what we would accept to look in the face: the care for others.  Read the slides on which this conference was based (in French)

Articles

💬”Let’s Use the Power of GAFAMs in the Service of General Interest!” (“Utilisons la puissance des GAFAMs au service de l’intérêt général!”)

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., "Let's Use the Power of GAFAMs in the Service of General Interest!" ("Utilisons la puissance des GAFAMs au service de l'intérêt général!"), interview done by Olivia Dufour, Actu-juridiques Lextenso, 11st of January 2021 Read the interview (in French) To read the article translated in English by us, read the working paper on which this interview is based   Summary of the interview by Olivia Dufour: Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Professor of Regulation and Compliance Law, reported to the government in 2019 about Internet governance. For this expert, giving a disciplinary power to GAFAMs is the only effective solution. And the suppression of Donald Trump's account is not likely to call this analysis into question.   The three questions (translated in English here by ourselves) asked by Olivia Dufour are:  The deletion of Donald Trump's Twitter account arouses strong emotions on social networks, and not only among his supporters. What do you think about this ? However, this incident does raise concern. Are we not giving too much power to these private companies? This raises the question in France of the relevance of the Avia system … Should we therefore resolve by default to give our freedoms to private and opaque mastodons?   Read the answers to these three questions (in French)   To go further, especially about the logics that guide the Avia system, see: Frison-Roche, M.-A., "Hate on internet: we need to responsibilize digital operators" ("Haine sur internet: il faut responsabiliser les opérateurs numériques"), 2020 Frison-Roche, M.-A., The contribution of Compliance Law to Internet Governance, report to Government, 2019