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Bilan Infox, 2019

Articles in a non-legal collective publication

Data Sovereignty and Compliance, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), “Compliance Tools”

Full Reference : Tardieu, H.., Data Sovereignty and Compliance, in M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance et Dalloz, 2020, à paraître.   See the General Presentation of the book   - Article Summary (done by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche) L   Read the other articles summaries.     -      

Articles in a legal collective publication

Points d’ancrage de la cartographie des risques dans le système juridique, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), “Les outils de Compliance”

Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Points d'ancrage de la cartographie des risques dans le système juridique , in M.-A. (ed.), Les outils  de la Compliance, serie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Dalloz, 2020, to be published.   Read a general presentation of the book in which the article has been published   - Summary of the article : is the consideration by Law of the mechanism of risk mapping so new?  First, yes and we can even be surprised of it because this rational anticipation of risks should be considered for a long time. But this is perhaps because of the broader fact that risk has itself become an autonomous legal object in economic Law only recently, especially because the risk has not the same status in Competition Law and in Regulation Law (I). The status is even opposed in this two branches of Law and risk is central in Regulation. Compliance Law being the prolongation of Regulation Law, it is also built on the concern of the risk and the internalization of it takes the shape of mapping in firms.  If we look at this closely, before the special laws called "Sapin 2" and "Vigilance" and beyond them, decisions of case law give a general scope to maps elaborated by operators, or increase their obligation to do it (II). In this, general positive Law offers points of support to Compliance Law, enforcing it in its tools.    -   Read the summaries of the other articles of the book     -

Articles in a legal collective publication

Anchor points of the risk mapping process in the legal system, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), “Compliance Tools”

Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A.., Anchor points of the risk mapping process in the legal system, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, serie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Bruylant, 2020, to be published.   Read a general presentation of the book in which the article is published   - Summary of the article Is the consideration by Law of the Risk Mapping mechanism so new? At first glance yes, and one might even be surprised at this novelty, since this rational anticipation of risks should have been recognized for a long time. But this is perhaps due to the more general fact that Risk itself has only recently become an autonomous legal object in Economic Law, in particular because Risk does not have at all the same position in Competition Law and in Regulation Law (I) .. Its position is even opposed in the both, Risk becoming central in Regulation Law. Compliance Law being the extension of Regulatory Law, it is also built on the "concern" of Risk and the internalization of this consideration in enterprises therefore takes the form of mapping. A closer look maybe not,even  before the specific  French laws, called "Sapin 2" and "Vigilance" and beyond them, case law decisions giving a general scope to maps drawn up by operators, or increasing the obligation that 'they have to do it (II). In this, general and precise technical Law offers points of support for Compliance Law, strengthening it in its tools.   Read the summaries of the other articles of the book   -

Working papers

🚧 Building by Law the unity of Compliance tools from the definition of Compliance Law by its “monumental goals”

Référence : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Building by Law the unity of Compliance Tools from the definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals"", Working Paper 2020.  This Working Paper has been the basis for an article in the collective book Compliance Tools, 2020 - Working Paper summary: The "tools of Compliance" do not stack on top of each other. They form a system, thanks to a unity drawn from the goals that all these multiple and different tools serve: the "Monumental Goals" by which Compliance Law is defined. All these tools are configured by these goals and in order to master all these techniques, it is essential to put them all in perspective of what Compliance Law is, which is designed teleologically with regard to its goals. Extension of Regulatory Law and as, Compliance Law is built on a balance between the principle of competition and other concerns that public authorities claim to take care of. Compliance Law has moreover more "pretensions" in this respect, for example in environmental matters. All the means are then good, the violence of the tools marrying without difficulty with the voluntary commitments since it is the goals which govern this branch of Law. As adopted legal solutions show, a common method of interpretation and common levels of constraint for all Compliance Tools result from this definition. Starting from the goals (in which legal normativity is housed), the interpretation of the different tools is thus unified, without the necessity of a legislation including all these Compliance tools. Moreover, the different degrees of constraint do not operate according to the consideration of sources (traditional legal criterion) but by the goals, according to the legal distinction between obligations of means and obligations of results which result from the articulation between tools, of which the establishment is an obligation of result, and the goals, of which the achievement is only an obligation of means.

Working papers

Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools

Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, Working Paper, July  2020. This Working paper is the basis for an article published in the collective book  Compliance Tools . - There was a time when Regulatory techniques  were above all only calculations of the best tarifications, taken up by monopolistic companies, while Compliance techniques were only obedience to all rules governing us. All this could therefore only be business of abacus and badine, used by engineers and consisted only of mechanical reflexes of "conformity" to all kinds of rules with the corset ensuring that everyone is bent in front of them1Contre cela, la critique radicale, savante et fondée d'Alain Supiot, dans l'ensemble de son oeuvre et plus particulièrement dans La gouvernance par les nombres, 2015. . In the perspective of a Regulation and Compliance thus conceived, that is to say effective, it would not be necessary to insert prerogatives for people, since these could only be sources of inefficiency, of cost. and protest, where the order would come from figures set in advance and controlled processes. Systems have since evolved to integrate these prerogatives of each person: rights. Is this evolution really acquired? Maybe more effectively in Regulation Law than in its extension which is Compliance Law. This may be surprising since Compliance Law, in that it extends Regulatory Law in enterprises should, on the contrary, promote rights by meeting the enterprise, which is a group of people ….2Sur la définition de l'entreprise comme un groupe de personnes qui se réunissent pour entreprise, v. le travail de référence d'Alain Supiot, par exemple son article d'introduction "L'entreprise...", dans l'ouvrage qu'il a dirigé L'entreprise dans la mondialisation ...., 2015 ... . But the modern reluctance to define the enterprise (and the company) as a group of people and the preference given to a definition of the company (and the enterprise) as an "asset", a "good" of which investors would be the owners, maybe explains the sidelining of rights not only in Regulatory Law but also in Compliance Law even though it is being deployed in the space of the enterprise3Si l'entreprise pouvait renaître comme idée de cristallisation d'une idée commune entre des personnes, naturellement titulaires de droits subjectifs, exerçant ensemble leur liberté d'entreprendre pour réaliser un projet commun, ce qui correspond à la définition classique du contrat d'entreprise donnée à l'article 1832 du Code civil, cela renforcerait considérablement la présence des droits subjectifs dans le Droit de la Compliance et conforterait la nature humaniste de celui-ci. En outre, dans une telle définition la loi de la majorité, qui n'est qu'une loi de fonctionnement d'une catégorie de sociétés que sont les sociétés de capitaux, deviendrait moins puissante, au profit des "droits propres" de tout associé (au-delà du cercle des sociétés de personnes), sans qu'il soit besoin d'aller chercher au-delà du cercle des associés ou titulaires de titres émis par la société ou l'entreprise (dit shareholders) et d'aller donner le "droit à la parole" à des personnes qui, parce qu'elles sont "concernées" (les "parties prenantes", les skateholders) ont désormais de plus en plus le "droit à la parole". . In addition, if Regulation has long been the subject of a branch of Law in which rights have full place, the presentation of Compliance as "conformity", that is to say the proven assurance of obedience to all the applicable rules, leaves no space for the prerogatives of people, which appear rather as resistance to the obedience that would be expected of them. There again, the expectation of what would be a good ratio of conformity between behaviors and prescriptions would be obtained by a "design", data processing being the new form of calculation, improved by precision tools where the being human is not required4La Compliance by Design reflète ces tensions. Elles sont particulièrement bien décrites par Cécile Granier. V. ..... His fallibility and the little confidence which one can place in him leads even to exclude the people and to conceive Compliance system between machines, not only to alert of the failures, but also to manufacture the "regulations" and to connect those. here, in a "regulatory fabric" without a jump stitch, entirely enveloping human beings5Contre cette conception de la légalité, qui prévoit tout et à laquelle il faudrait prouver par avance et que l'on se "conforme" entièrement, ce qui est contraire aux principes mêmes du libéralisme dont le principe est la liberté d'agir et non pas l'obéissance, Carbonnier affirme que les règles sont faites ne pas s'appliquer et qu'elles ne sont que le "mince vernis" des choses, qu'il convenait de se méfier de la "passion du Droit". V. not. son dernier ouvrage Droit et passion du droit sous la Vième République, 1995. Carbonnier est considéré comme le plus grand juriste français du XXième siècle. Il rédigea les lois qui réformèrent en profondeur le Code civil et publia des ouvrages sur "l'art législatif". . It would therefore be with regret, and probably because some constitutional jurisdictions still attach some value to fundamental rights that the systems of "conformity" of behavior to the rules make some room for the prerogatives of people, their more essential rights. It is sometimes said that this is part of the cost. It would therefore be as by "forcing" that rights would exist in Compliance systems, a kind of price that the effectiveness of Compliance must pay as a tribute to the Rule of Law principle6Au contraire, l'Etat de Droit n'est pas un coût extérieur au système de Compliance efficace, que celui-ci doit internaliser. Il est le fondement même du Droit de la Compliance. Voir dans ce sens la démonstration faite par le président de la Cour de Justice de l'Union européenne, Koen Laearnt, ..., in Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019. . If in a poor definition Compliance is conceived in this only "conformity", leading to a landscape in which the behaviors of the people adjust to the rules governing the situations, Compliance being only the most "effective way" to ensure the application of the rules, in a mechanical perspective of Law, then it would effectively be necessary to reduce the prerogatives of people to a minimal part, because any "additional cost" is intended to disappear, even if it is produced here by constitutional requirements. In the looming battle between the effectiveness of the application of rules and the concern for the legal prerogatives of people who should above all obey and not claim their rights, especially their right not to obey , or their right to keep secret in Compliance techniques which is based on the centralization of information, the effectiveness of efficiency could only, by the very power of this tautology, prevail7Sur la démonstration comme quoi la Constitution, en ce qu'elle contient de l'incalculable, est broyée dans cette façon de faire, v. Alain Supiot, Intervention 2019. …  The defeat would not be total, however, collaboration would still be possible and active between people availing themselves of their rights and Compliance Law. Indeed, in many respects, if rights have been recognized in Compliance systems, it is not only because Compliance Law, like any branch of Law, can only be deployed with respect for fundamental rights. kept by fundamental legal texts, but also because of the effectiveness of rights as " Compliance Tools". Indeed, because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve, because every effort must be made to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goals". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools to effectively achieve the goals set, to such an extent that they can be considered as "primary tools"  (I). But it is necessary to be more ambitious, even to reverse the perspective. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be reduced to the protection of people, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given by Law to persons and the rights which constitute the very purpose of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights become a "natural tool" of Compliance Law (II). Rights are the Compliance Law future. 

Working papers

🚧 Resolve the contradiction between “sanction” and “Incentive” under the fire of Compliance Law

This Working Paper has been the basis for the first conference of the two conferences in the colloquium in Toulouse (France) under the scientific direction of Lucien Rapp, about Les incitations, outils de la Compliance ("Incitations, as Compliance Tools"), on December 12, 2019, the first one about The sanction as incitation and the second one about Incitations and Compliance Law (synthesis of this colloquium).  Then, it has been the basis for the article, to be published in the books Les outils de la Compliance and Compliance Tools in the Series Régulations & Compliance. Read a general presentation of this book.     Summary and Introduction of this Working Paper: At first glance, Compliance and Incentives appear to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. In the first place, because the sanctions have a central place in the Law of Compliance and the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Taking the first reason, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the others. Resign oneself to the loss that such a necessary choice would involve. But to put the terms thus amounts to think poorly about the situations and reduce the fields of the solutions which they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, it is possible on the contrary to articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators".  This working document deals with the first issue1La seconde problématique est analysée in "Compliance et Incitation : un couple à propulser", 2020.. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms that do not directly use coercion. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But Compliance seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the D.P.O… An honest observer can only feel immediately uneasy. Indeed, he can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive? It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was firstly designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendancy to think about the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law. It manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons are to conceive it this way, the principles of the Rule of Law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). It’s an essential adjustment. This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. For Law to remain, however, it is necessary to hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.

Articles in a legal collective publication

BOURSIER, M.-E.🕴️

📝Qu’est-ce que la compliance ? Essai de définition

► Full reference: M.-E. Boursier, "Qu'est-ce que la compliance ? Essai de définition", D. 2020, Chron., p. 1419-1424.  - ► Summary of the article (done by the author, in French): Au-delà de la diversité de ses sources et de ses finalités, de la variabilité de sa valeur normative et des sanctions encourues, apparaît un élément commun à toutes les déclinaisons de la compliance : la méthode par laquelle elle se déploie. La compliance se définit avant tout comme une méthode, inspirée des théories de la procéduralisation du droit. Elle consiste en une « internalisation », par l'entreprise et dans l'entreprise, de systèmes de conformité (cartographie des risques, procédures, vigilance, alerte) qui conduisent in fine les opérateurs économiques à assister les États dans la réalisation de leurs missions (lutte contre les grandes infractions du droit pénal des affaires internationales comme le blanchiment et la corruption, respect des droits humains, etc.). -