► Full reference : M. David, « Combinaison des CRPC et des CJIP : le cas particulier des affaires de fraude fiscale » (Combining CRPCs and CJIPs: the Particular Case of Tax Fraud), in M.-A. Frison-Roche & M. Boissavy (dir.), Compliance et Droits de la défense – Enquête interne, CIIP, CRPC,
____
► English Summary of this article (made by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : The author recalls that the CJIP and the CRPC have only been available for tax fraud since a 2018 law and that both are widely used, a use encouraged by the public authorities.
The CRPC is rather used for simple cases of fraud committed by natural persons, while the CJIP concerns more complex cases involving schemes devised by companies, either for themselves or for third parties (banks and fund managers being directly concerned here). This complexity often justifies the criminal investigation being conducted in parallel with the negotiation of the CJIP.
These procedures are characteristic in that the tax administration also conducts its own procedure, the natural or legal person being subject to classifications which may differ in two procedures that do not follow the same timeline. The tax administration may already have gathered evidence, or even carried out an audit and possibly a reassessment before the case is transmitted to the public prosecutor, which has an effect on the criminal investigation in view of the “elements already established by the tax administration”. Conversely, when the preliminary investigation or the judicial investigation ends, if the tax procedure is not completed, is under appeal or has given rise to a settlement, the same influence operates. The duality of the court systems complicates these mechanisms.
The issues concern first the legal classification, since tax fraud may be classified in the same way by the tax administration and by the criminal authority, as shown by the Google case: the company challenged in 2015 before the administrative court the tax reassessment made by the tax administration, arguing before the judge that its conduct was well-founded, and concluded in 2019 with the National Financial Prosecutor’s Office a CJIP for facts liable to be classified as tax fraud under criminal law. The author concludes that, given this difference in reasoning between the tax administration and the criminal authorities, they should discuss with each other, assisted by lawyers who master both tax law and criminal law.
The issues then concern the amount and duration of fines, in particular the public interest fine, which takes into account the “benefits derived from the breaches”, here the taxes evaded. The circular of 4 October 2021 recommends that the CJIP give rise to a global and coordinated settlement of the tax and criminal procedures.
The author stresses the effectiveness of the CRPC and the CJIP in matters of tax fraud, notably because the use of these two techniques currently requires that the taxpayer has paid the taxes and the reassessments to which it may have been subject.
Moreover, the proportionality of the fine is respected, since the overall amount of the sanctions that may be imposed does not exceed the highest amount of one of the sanctions incurred. This is why the fine proposed in a CRPC takes into account the penalties incurred at tax level, generally 80% of the reassessed taxes. Likewise, for the CJIP, the ceiling of the public interest fine is set at the higher of 30% of the average annual turnover of the last three years and the 80% penalties, a ceiling from which the penalties actually paid by the company are deducted.
The author notes that, in matters of tax fraud, the CRPC remains less favourable than the CJIP, in that the CRPC remains a lengthy procedure during which the taxpayer does not know its fate and at the end of which it may suffer additional penalties. The CJIP may be a good solution for the company, which may at the same time challenge the administrative reassessment procedure or encourage the administration to settle, the judicial authority thus acting as an arbitrator between the two, pushing the company to negotiate with the administration and pushing the administration to settle.
The reduction of the CJIP fine for self-reporting and in the event of spontaneous regularisation with the tax administration enhances the effectiveness of the system. The tax technique of the advance ruling is moreover close to that of the Compliance programme, the company committing itself to future conduct, which the tax administration could acknowledge and for which it could guarantee the absence of sanction.