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Couverture – Compliance Monumental Goals

Articles in a JoRC book

RODA, Jean-Christophe🕴️

📝Compliance, Internal Investigations and International Competitiveness: What are Risks for the French Companies (in the Light of Antitrust Law)?, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: J.-Ch. Roda, “Compliance, Internal Investigations and International Competitiveness: What are Risks for the French Companies (in the Light of Antitrust Law)?”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, “Compliance & Regulation” Serie, 2023, pp. 355-368. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article: The author draws on American and European Competition Law to measure whether internal investigations, as far as they provide factual elements, can provide foreign authorities and competitors, here American, with “sensitive information” (notably via leniency programs), and as such constitute a competitive handicap. But this turns out to be quite difficult, whereas compliance audits, for example under the legal duty of vigilance, can provide American litigants with useful information, drawn from internal documents, in particular the reports of compliance officers, which can be captured by procedures of discovery. French Law remains weak in the face of these dangers, due to its refusal to recognise the legal privilege mechanism concerning these internal documents, contrary to American Law and the consequent effectiveness of discovery in international procedures, concerning internal documents, in particular resulting from internal investigations. Solutions have been proposed, the activation of a new conception of blocking statutes being complex, the prospect of adopting a legal privilege being more effective, but there would remain the hypothesis of an international conflict of privilege, American Law having a strict design of legal advice justifying it and judges checking that powerful companies do not use it artificially. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -
Couverture – Compliance Monumental Goals

Articles in a JoRC book

LOCHMANN, Sabine🕴️

📝ESG Rating Agencies and Compliance as an Effective Way of Increasing International Competitiveness, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: S. Lochmann, “ESG Rating Agencies and Compliance as an Effective Way of Increasing International Competitiveness”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 389-400. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article: -
Couverture – Compliance Monumental Goals

Articles in a JoRC book

BENZONI, Laurent🕴️

📝International Trade, Competitivity and Sovereignty: Towards a Political Economy of Compliance, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: L. Benzoni, “International Trade, Competitivity and Sovereignty: Towards a Political Economy of Compliance”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 447-458. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article: -
Couverture – Compliance Monumental Goals

Articles in a JoRC book

📝Main Aspects of the Book. The Monumental Goals of Compliance Law, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full reference : M.-A. Frison-Roche, « Main Aspects of the Book. The Monumental Goals of Compliance Law », in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), Compliance Monumental Goals, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2023, pp. 13-31. - ► Article summary :This article constitutes the afterword of the book Compliance Monumental Goals. Its purpose is to show the consistency of the book, in that the Monumental Goals themselves, by their normativity, give Uniqueness to Compliance Law, giving it simplicity and strength. Restituting each of the contributions and articulating them all in an overall demonstration, this article highlights this consistency of the Compliance mechanisms which join the primary function of the Law: the protection of human beings, now and in the future. -  Read a general presentation of the book  Compliance Monumental Goal, in which the article is published - ► Read Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s presentations of her other contributions in this book : 📝Definition of Principe of Proportionality and Definition of Compliance Law, 📝 Role and Place of Companies in the Creation and Effectiveness of Compliance Law in Crisis, 📝 Assessment of Whistleblowing and the duty of Vigilance - This article is freely accessible. Read this article ⤵️
Couverture – Compliance Monumental Goals

Articles in a JoRC book

LE FUR, Anne-Valérie🕴️

📝Interest and “raison d’être” of the Company: How Does It Fit Together with the Compliance Monumental Goals?, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: A.-V. Le Fur, “Interest and “raison d’être” of the Company: How Does It Fit Together with the Compliance Monumental Goals?”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 69-82. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): Companies would have a soul. The legislator thinks so, since the French law called “loi Pacte” of 22 May 2019 obliges managers to act in the Corporate Interest and allows companies to formulate themselves a « raison d’être ». Compliance Law does the same, relying on companies to save the world from corruption, slavery, terrorism and global warming, thus achieving Monumental goals. At first glance, the contours of Corporate Interest and « raison d’être » of the company are not far removed from the notion of Compliance Monumental Goals. This is not surprising, since the objective that presided over their introduction into the French Civil Code is the same as that underlying Compliance Law : to rethink the place of the company in the global Society, by affirming long-term values or concerns. This is a reason to use these corporate law concepts in the context of an X-ray of the concept of Monumental Goals. However, a comparative approach is disappointing. The divergences between corporate notions and compliance lead to the conclusion that company law is not intended to impose anything other than a corporate public order. Notions that are more philosophical than legal, Corporate Interest and « raison d’être » are assigned functions that limit their scope. The imperative nature of corporate rules, and this is a consequence of the above, cannot be compared with that of compliance: uncertain, it is also relative when compared with the “violence” of compliance rules. The impact of the notions of Interest and « raison d’être » remains thus mainly internal to the company. According to a second approach, it cannot be ruled out that Corporate Interest and « raison d’être » allow for a better understanding of higher and universal values by Company Law. Corporate Interest may incorporate Compliance Monumental Goals while the « raison d’être » may constitute a perspective for the realization of these goals. The stakes are high : when the interest of the company, as a legal person and autonomous economic agent, joins the Monumental Goals, the means of achieving the latter are multiplied by internalizing them in all companies, not just the largest ones. However, despite all good intentions, a company is only governable if the compass does not become an elusive and indecisive vane; in other words, if legal certainty is respected. This is why a legal ordering of the concepts is necessary, which ultimately leads to a suggestion of their domain, content and scope. -
Couverture – Compliance Monumental Goals

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PETIT, Benoît🕴️

📝The Monumental Goals of (European) Labour Law: a Changing System with Balances to be Consolidated, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: B. Petit, “The Monumental Goals of (European) Labour Law: a Changing System with Balances to be Consolidated”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 147-168. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): Labor Law has been built on the pursuit of “monumental goals”, many of which are now enshrined in international, european and national standards (social justice, the right to work, gender equality, the fight against discrimination, the fight against harassment, health and hygiene, etc.). The first step will be to shed light on the organization and articulation of these monumental goals, as reflected in positive international and european labor law. We then realize that from a “cardinal monumental goal” – the guarantee of the dignity of the person at work – there are distinct categories of “secondary monumental goals”, depending on whether they develop a concern relating to the quality of work, its economic and financial sustainability, or the guarantee at work of civil and political rights recognized upstream to every person. On this diversity of monumental goals, forces emanating from the concerned actors (companies, trade unions, and States) are exerted and promote certain goals rather than others; one vision of labor relationships rather than others. We observe that the different categories of “monumental goals” thus highlighted are driven by different rationalities, sometimes contradictory to each other, which requires the establishment of permanent balances, allowed by a serious reflection on the cardinal monumental goal of guaranteeing the dignity of the person at work. Unfortunately, in practice, this essential approach escapes the normative actors of labour relations law. The result is “conflicts” of monumental goals that manifest themselves in particular during social dialogue, at the time of collective bargaining and the functioning of employee representative bodies. It will therefore be necessary, in a second step, to question the way in which these conflicts can be arbitrated, bearing in mind that international and European social law is plural (ILO, Council of Europe, European Union) and that the coordination links between the legal systems concerned are fluid. -
Couverture – Compliance Monumental Goals

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BÄR-BOUYSSIÈRE, Bertold🕴️

📝Proportionality and Compliance, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: B. Bär-Bouyssière, “Proportionality and Compliance”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 213-220. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The article is based on the undisputed assertion that Proportionality is inherent in Compliance, in particular when this takes the form of a sanction, but the author compares this assertion with its practical implementation. The author notes that in all the compliance mechanisms, in particular in Competition Compliance, companies have difficulties in practice in satisfying with their obligations in Ex Ante because the standards are very heavy, expensive and difficult to understand, as they have difficulty. in Ex Post to obtain that the authorities do not make a disproportionate use of them, and to obtain that the courts effectively protect them from that. These practical difficulties are due above all to the diversity of the standards concerned, those who create them as well as those who interpret them having to do so without excess, about what it is very difficult to obtain control. In addition, the weight of the implementation of compliance standards is not correlated with the concrete and financial ability of diverses companies to do so and the design of standards does not always integrate this correlation. Faced with this, companies then tend to do more than is necessary, in order not to incur sanctions in the doubt, and moreover because the people in charge of the effectiveness of their compliance standards have in the mind not to engage their own responsibility, which encourages them to over-apply compliance obligations, when there should be a fair and strict relationship of necessity, that is to say this desired proportionality, this additional cost being a useless excess for all. Finally, a practical difficulty is due to the violence, in itself necessary, of the sanctions, in the face of which the companies seek in Ex Post to show the disproportionate nature, but do not have very sure means of proof. This is why it is often on the ground of rhetoric and of the conviction that enterprises are placed in practice, more than on that of the mathematical calculation of proportionality. -
Couverture – Compliance Monumental Goals

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SEGONDS, Marc🕴️

📝Compliance, Proportionality and Sanction. A French Perspective, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: M. Segonds, “Compliance, Proportionality and Sanction. A French Perspective”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 243-257. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Before devoting the developments of his article to the sole perspective of sanctions imposed under “Anti-corruption Compliance”, the author recalls in a more general way that, as is the sanction, Compliance is in essence proportional: Proportionality is inherent to Compliance as it conditions any sanction, including a sanction imposed under Compliance. This link between Proportionality and Compliance has been underlined by the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence française anticorruption – AFA) with regard to risk mapping, which must measure risks to arrive at effective and proportional measures. This same spirit of proportionality animates the recommendations of the AFA which are intended to apply according to the size of the company and its concrete organisation. It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on one hand to Criminal Law, centered on the requirement of proportionality. Punitive sanctions It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on the other hand to the disciplinary power of the manager who, from other sources of law, must integrate the legal requirement of proportionality when he/she applies external and internal compliance norms. -

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OUMEDJKANE, Antoine🕴️, TEHRANI, Adrien🕴️ and IDOUX, Pascale🕴️

📝Public Norms and Compliance in Crisis Periods: Testing Monumental Goals. A Few Thoughts, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: A. Oumedjkane, A. Tehrani and P. Idoux, “Public Norms and Compliance in Crisis Periods: Testing Monumental Goals. A Few Thoughts”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 291-313. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Authors): In this paper, compliance refers to the fact that large private firms, through internal procedures designed to abide by public norms, participate in achieving the goals set out by public authorities, as the latter cannot reach those goals without help (proper functioning of financial markets, environment protection, fight against the corruption…). While in times outside a crisis period, the need to maintain a close link between public norms and compliance to achieve those “monumental goals” has been established, the validity of this analysis must be assessed during crisis periods. Indeed, to put an end to the turmoil as soon as possible, it is tempting to rely primarily on public authorities. Should then be studied, in the light of the health crisis, the possibility that the link between public norms and compliance be altered in times of crisis. Not only is the normative reaction of public authorities very intense during the period, but some features of the compliance could lead one to think that compliance is in no way useful in a context of emergency and instability. This paper nevertheless suggests that to achieve monumental goals, it is necessary to maintain a close link between public norms and compliance. Such a link was maintained indeed, even at the height of the health crisis, and this should probably also be the case beyond this period, as breaking the link involves some risks which are not specific to the current health crisis. In other words, despite its shortcomings, compliance may not lose all its assets in times of crisis. -

Articles in a JoRC book

BONNET, Julien🕴️

📝The Crisis, an Opportunity to Seize Compliance as a Mode of Communication for Public Authorities, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: J. Bonnet, “The Crisis, an Opportunity to Seize Compliance as a Mode of Communication for Public Authorities”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 315-324. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): This article is about the crisis, as an opportunity to seize Compliance as a mode of Communication by Public Authorities. Based on the French case of the ban on cycling during the health crisis issued by a simple ministerial tweet, the analysis aims to broaden the reflection on the consequences of the intensive and precious use of communication tools by public authorities. Because of the consequences and above all the risks for the legitimacy of the State and the law, public authorities could draw inspiration from the spirit and methods of compliance in order to produce communication and action that are both more effective, clearer, more in accordance with the law, all without renouncing the flexibility of the communicational means and incentive actions. -

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BISMUTH, Régis🕴️

📝The Ambiguous Relations between Corporate Compliance and Sovereignty, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: R. Bismuth, “The Ambiguous Relations between Corporate Compliance and Sovereignty”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 433-445. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): At first glance, the notion of Sovereignty is difficult to combine with Compliance. Indeed, Sovereignty is part of Public International Law in a logic of essentially territorial distribution of competences, while Compliance has developed and disseminated in companies with tools and methods which largely ignore borders. A closer look reveals more fundamentally three types of ambiguous interactions between the two. Compliance can first of all be understood as a tool allowing States, by relying on companies, to circumvent the obstacles and limits posed by a Sovereignty conceived in territorial terms and therefore to extend it. Such an approach can nevertheless lead to friction or even conflicts between Compliance and Sovereignty, the norms conveyed by the first not necessarily being in line with those imposed by the second. This is particularly true when the Compliance “Monumental Goals” are not unilaterally defined or are not intended to be. Finally, by infusing companies with instruments and methods that are reminiscent of sovereign functions, compliance can also allow us to imagine an emerging movement tending to gradually establish Corporate Sovereignty beyond that of States. - -
Couverture – Compliance Monumental Goals

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ANDRÉ, Christophe🕴️

📝State Sovereignty, Sovereignty of the People: What Social Contract for Compliance?, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Compliance & Regulation Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: Ch. André, “State Sovereignty, Sovereignty of the People: What Social Contract for Compliance?”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 469-486. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): The “Compliance Monumental Goals” serve as vectors for “common” social values: the proposal is simple, but it seems both familiar and strange to a criminal lawyer. Familiar, because even if compliance transcends the borders of academic disciplines, it shares with criminal law a logic sanctioning attacks on social interests. Strange, because Monumental Goals convey social values by sweeping away all the learned discussions that have been going on since Beccaria about the foundations and axiological functions of punishment. Indeed, the social values promoted by Monumental Goals are “common” in every sense of the word. First, they are shared and internalized by the largest enterprises in the Western world, without the need for an international treaty on protected values. The question of sovereignty is overshadowed. Second, they are common in that they are commonplace, ordinary, approved of by most Western consumer-citizens: probity, equality, respect for the environment, who would not be in favour of respecting them? Hence it is in companies’ interest to communicate and diffuse, urbi and orbi, how they respect these Monumental Goals. The question of citizens’ consensus on values is sidestepped, as they are supposed to be derived from the obvious (even if the goals could be achieved by different means, or even contradict each other). Third, these values are common because they now enlist a multitude of communicants (the “compliance officer”, among others) who, more or less gracefully – the meticulous liturgy of compliance can put off some officiants and incite buffoonery – seek to spread the cult of these values at all levels of business. Since these values are respected, they are necessarily respectable: businesses become moralized by the multitude who respect them. Existence precedes essence, and the values conveyed contribute to the businesses’ raison d’être, beyond the pursuit of profit. The question of effectiveness vanishes, since these values are already there, regularly monitored, both internally and by public authorities. Sovereignty, citizenship, effectiveness: the logic of Compliance supplants the academic debates of criminal lawyers with practical solutions. Perhaps this is how the goals are “monumental”: vast, global, overwhelming. Compliance may not be the best of all worlds, but it is most certainly another world. -
Couverture – La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

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📝Le jugeant-jugé. Articuler les mots et les choses face à l’éprouvant conflit d’intérêts, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Régulations & Compliance La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, “Le jugeant-jugé. Articuler les mots et les choses face à l’éprouvant conflit d’intérêts” (“The Judge-Judged. Articulating words and things in the face of the testing conflict of interest”), in M.-A. Frison-Roche, (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 59-80. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Since the topic of this article is part of a chapter devoted to the Company established as Prosecutor and Judge of itself by Compliance Law, chapter aiming to use the relevant qualifications, it is appropriate therefore to worry about the adjustment of words and things, of the way in which the relationship between ones and the others evolve, and of the more particular question of knowing if this evolution is radical or not when one speaks of “judge “. because “judging” is a word that the Law has disputed with other disciplines, but that it has appropriated not so much to confer more powers on those who act in its name, for example that who supervise and punish, but on the contrary to impose limits, since to the one who judges it has put the chains of the procedure under foot, thus making bearable for the other the exercise of such a power. Therefore, those who want the power to judge would often want to not have the title, because having de jure the title of judge is being subject to the correlated regime, it is to be submitted to procedural correctness. It is therefore to better limit that the Law sees who judges, for obliging this so-powerful character to the procedure. But the Law also has the power to appoint a judge and to fix the contours of all the characters in the trial. He usually does it with clarity, distinguishing the ones of the others, not confusing them. This art of distinction has constitutional value. Thus, not only the one who judges must be named “judge” but the procedural apparatus which goes with this character, and which constitutes a way of doing things and fundamental rights, are not “granted” by kindness or in a second step: it is a block. If you didn’t want to have to endure procedural rights, you didn’t have to want to be a judge. Admittedly, one could conclude that the procedure would therefore have become “substantial”; by this elevation, it is rather a fashion of saying that the procedure would no longer be a “servant”: it is a kind of declaration of love for the procedure, as long as one affirms that at the acts of judging , or investigating, or prosecuting, are “naturally” attached the procedural rights for the one who is likely to be the object of these powers. Compliance Law, in search of allies to achieve the Monumental Goals for the aims of which it was instituted, will require, or even demand, private companies to go and seek themselves, in particular through investigations. internal or active vigilance on others, for finding facts likely to be reproached to them. Compliance Law will also require that they prosecute those who have committed these acts. Compliance La will again demand that they sanction the acts that people have committed in their name. This is clearly understood from the point of view of Ex Ante efficiency. The confusion of roles is often very efficient since it is synonymous with the accumulation of powers. For example, it is more efficient that the one who pursues is also the one who instructs and judges, since he knows the case so well… Besides, it is more efficient that he also elaborates the rules, so he knows better than anyone the “spirit” of the texts. This was often emphasized in Regulatory Law. When everything is Information and risk management, that would be necessary … But all this is not obvious. For two reasons, one external and the other internal. Externally, the first reason is that it is not appropriate to “name” a judge who is not. This would be too easy, because it would then be enough to designate anyone, or even to do it oneself to appropriate the regime that goes with it, in particular for obtain a so-called legitimate power for obtaining that others obey even though they are not subordinate or from them they transmit information, even though they would be competitors: it would then be necessary to remember that only the Law is able to appoint judge ; in this new Compliance era, companies would be judges, prosecutors, investigators! Maybe, if the Law says it, but if it didn’t, it would be necessary to come back to this tautology … But are we in such a radicalism? Moreover, do judges have “the prerogative” of judgment and the Law has not admitted this power for companies to judge for a long time? As soon as the procedure is there in Ex Ante and the control of the judge in Ex Post? The second reason, internal to the company, situation on which the article focuses, is that the company investigates itself, judges itself, sanctions itself. However, the legal person expressing its will only through its organs, we underline in practice the difficulties for the same human being to formulate grievances, as he/she is the agent of the legal person, addressed to the natural person that he/she himself/herself is. The two interests of the two are not the same, are often opposed; how the secrets of one can be kept with respect to the other, represented by the same individual? … It is all the mystery, even the artifice of legal personality that appears and we understand better that Compliance Law no longer wants to use this strange classical notion. Because all the rules of procedure cannot mask that to prosecute oneself does not make more sense than to contract with oneself. This conflict of interest is impossible to resolve because naming the same individual X then naming him/her Y, by declaring open the dispute between them does not make sense. This dualism, which is impossible to admit when it comes to playing these functions with regard to corporate officers, can come back to life by setting up third parties who will carry secrets and oppositions. For example, by the designation of two separate lawyers for the human being agent and the human being representative of the legal person, each lawyer being able to have secrets for each other and to oppose each other. These spaces of reconstitution of the so “natural” oppositions in procedure between the one who judges and the one who is judged can also take the technological form of platforms: where there is no longer anyone, where the process has replaced the procedure, there is no longer any human judgment. We can thus see that the fear of conflicts of interest is so strong that we resign ourselves to saying that only the machine would be “impartial”, a derisory conception of impartiality, against which it is advisable to fight. This then leads to a final question: can the company claim to exercise the jurisdictional power to prosecute and judge and investigate without even claiming to be a prosecutor, an investigating judge, or a court? The company’s advantage would be to be able to escape the legal regime that classical Law attaches to its words, mainly the rights of the defense and the rights of action for others, the principle of publicity of justice for everyone, which expresses the link between procedure and democracy. When Facebook said on June 12, 2021 “react” to the decision of May 5, 2021, adopted by what would only be an Oversight Board to decide “as a consequence” of a 2-year suspension of Donald Trump’s account, the art of qualifications seem to be used in order to avoid any regime constraint. But this art of euphemism is very old. Thus, the States, when they wanted to increase repression, presented the transformation of the system as a softening of it through the “decriminalization” of Economic Law, transferred from the criminal courts to the independent administrative agencies. The efficiency was greatly increased, since the guarantees of the Criminal Procedure ceased to apply. But 20 years later, Words found their way back to Things: under Criminal Law, slept the “criminal matter”, which requires the same “Impartiality”. In 1996, a judge once affirmed it and everything was changed. Let us therefore wait for what the Courts will say, since they are the masters of qualifications, as Article 12 of the French Code of Civil Procedure says, as Motulsky wrote it in 1972. Law has time. - 🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 
Couverture – La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

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BRUNEAU, Alain🕴️

📝L’entreprise juge d’elle-même: la fonction compliance dans la banque, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Régulations & Compliance La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

► Full Reference: A. Bruneau, “L’entreprise juge d’elle-même : la fonction compliance dans la banque” (“The company judge of itself: the compliance function inside the bank”), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 115-131. - read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance. In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as “Sapin 2” requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk. Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution. Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law. Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the “judge-judged”: following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients. -
Couverture – La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

📝Ajuster par la nature des choses le Droit processuel au Droit de la Compliance, in🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Régulations & Compliance La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, “Ajuster par la nature des choses le Droit processuel au Droit de la Compliance” (“Adjusting by the nature of things General Procedural Law to Compliance Law”), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 251-262. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The principal elements of this articles had been presented during the scientific manifestation held on September 23, 2021, at Dauphine University in Paris, coorganised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Institute Droit Dauphine.  In the book this article is placed in the chapter II about the General Procedural Law in the Compliance Law. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Procedural law is an invention, essentially due to professor Motulsky, going well beyond the gain that one always has in comparing types of procedures with each other. As he asserted, there is Natural Law in General Procedural Law, in that as soon as there is the Rule of Law Principle there cannot be, whatever the “procedure”, even the “process” such and such way of doing things: for example, to decide, to seize the one who decides, to listen before deciding, to contest the one who has decided. General Procedural Law therefore depends on the nature of things. However, Compliance Law organizes things in a new way. Therefore, both the simple and iron principles of General Procedural Law creep in where we do not expect them at first sight, because there is no judge, this character around whom ordinary procedures fit together. The principles of General Procedural Law are essential in companies. Even if the regulations do not breathe a word about it, it is up to the Judges, in particular the Supreme Courts, to recognize this nature of things because on this effect of nature that General Procedural Law is built: when compliance mechanisms oblige companies to strike, General Procedural law must oblige, even in the silence of the texts, to arm those who can be hit, even stand up against devices that would set aside too much these defenses that are easily considered contrary to efficiency (I). But because it is a question of making room for this nature of the things of which the Rule of Law Principle entrusts the custody to the Judge and the Lawyer, the General Procedural Law must also adjust itself to what the extraordinary new branch of Law Compliance Law is. Indeed, Compliance Law is extraordinary in that it expresses the political pretention to act now so that the future will not be catastrophic, by detecting and preventing the realization of systemic risks, or even that it is better, by building effective equality or real concern for others. Because it is the Monumental Goals that defines this new branch of Law, a disputed systemic issue, possibly disputed by several parties before a judge, the procedural principles used by the court must be broadened considerably: they must then include civil society and the future (II). General Procedural Law thus naturally acquires an even more place than in the classic branches of Law since on the one hand it imposes itself outside of trials, particularly in companies and on the other before the courts it involves people who had hardly any place to speak and thinks themselves, especially the systems entering the “causes” of Compliance now debated before the Judge. -
Couverture – La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

SCEMLA, Sophie🕴️et PAILLOT, Diane🕴️

📝La difficile appréhension des droits de la défense par les autorités de contrôle en matière de compliance, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Régulations & Compliance La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

► Full Reference: S. Scemla and D. Paillot, “La difficile appréhension des droits de la défense par les autorités de contrôle en matière de compliance” (“The supervisory authorities face difficulties to apprehend the rights of the defence in Compliance matters”), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 241-249. - read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the authors): Since 2016, French companies subject to the provisions of the so-called “Sapin 2” Law must implement eight stringent anti-corruption measures, such as a risk mapping, a whistleblowing procedure or a third-party due diligence procedure. To ensure their compliance with these obligations, the Sapin 2 law created the Agence française anticorruption – AFA (French Anti-Corruption Agency), which had been assigned three missions: firstly, to help any person prevent and detect corruption; secondly, to control the quality and effectiveness of the anti-corruption programs deployed by the companies; and thirdly, to sanction any breaches, through its Sanctions Committee. As pointed out by the French Conseil d’État, the powers devolved to the administrations have multiplied and became stratified. While the Conseil d’État suggests to improve both the conduct and the effectiveness of administrative controls by harmonising their practices and simplifying their prerogatives, it is urgent to remedy the numerous procedural failures that undermine the rights of defence. In fact, the AFA exercises various powers when undertaking its controls. Some of these powers are not provided for by the Law, and most of them infringe fundamental rights and freedoms among which the adversarial principle and the freedom not to self-incriminate. For instance, the AFA does not necessarily draft minutes of the interviews it conducts, thus depriving the interviewee of the possibility to challenge the statements reported by the AFA to the Sanctions Committee. From a more structural point of view, the scope of the AFA’s mission is extremely broad. The Law allows the AFA to request the communication of “any professional document or any useful information“, without defining the notion of usefulness. Also, the AFA considers that the entity cannot benefit from the legal privilege that would cover their documents, and considers that an entity who voluntarily hands over a document, without expressing any reserves, waives its right to the benefit of its legal privilege. Apart from the severe consequences that could arise if another proceedings was to be initiated by a foreign authority, the concept of “voluntary handover” does not faithfully reflect the reality. Indeed, the controlled entities only cooperate under the threat of being prosecuted on the basis of an obstruction to the control, which compels them to communicate documents even when facing the risk of contributing to their own incrimination. These many procedural deficiencies encountered during AFA controls must therefore be reformed, as recommended by the Conseil d’État, so as to require the authorities to take into account the rights of the defence. -
Couverture – La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

WENNERSTRÖM, Erik🕴️

📝Quelques réflexions sur la Compliance et la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Régulations & Compliance La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

► Full Reference: E. Wennerström, “Quelques réflexions sur la Compliance et la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme” (“Some Reflections on Compliance and the European Court of Human Rights”), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 479-489. - read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The development of the European Court of Human Rights case law, contributing to European integration, has incorporated the substantial concept of ​​”compliance” which goes beyond the idea of ​​legality with respect to which companies remain passive, and promotes legal orders as systems in interaction with another. The author develops the spirit and scope of Protocol 15 by which both the principle of subsidiarity and the margins of appreciation the signatory States are organized, mechanisms governed by the principle of proportionality. Subsidiarity means that the States are in the best position to design the most adequate application of the Convention, the close links between the States allowing its effective application. In addition, the new opinion procedure which allows a national court to have during a case the non-binding opinion of the ECHR ensures better compliance with the objectives of the Convention. The case-law of the Court takes up this substantial requirement through its doctrine, in particular identified in the Bosphorus case, by stressing that the accession of a State to the European Union presumes its compliance when implementing EU law with the obligations arising from the ECHR, even if this presumption can be refuted if the protection is manifestly lacking, which was admitted in several cases, in particular concerning the right to an impartial tribunal in matters of economic regulation. The different legal orders are thus articulated. The author concludes that the European Court of Human Rights, like the Court of Justice of the Union, contributes to the construction of Compliance Law in Europe, from an Ex Ante perspective favoring opinions rather than Ex Post sanctions and creating, in particular through the Bosphorus doctrine, elements of security and confidence for European integration around common values. -
Couverture – La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

📝Conforter le rôle du juge et de l’avocat pour imposer la Compliance comme caractéristique de l’État de Droit, in🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Régulations & Compliance La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law  - ► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, “Conforter le rôle du Juge et de l’Avocat pour imposer la Compliance comme caractéristique de l’État de Droit” (“Reinforce the Judge and the Attorney to impose Compliance Law as a characteristic of the Rule of Law”), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 29-55. - ► This article is the introduction of the book. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): One can understand that the compliance mechanisms are presented with hostility because they seem designed to keep the judge away, whereas there is no Rule of Law without a judge. Solid arguments present compliance techniques as converging towards the uselessness of the judge (I). Certainly, we come across magistrates, and of all kinds, and powerful ones, but that would be a sign of imperfection: its ex-ante logic has been deployed in all its effectiveness, the judge would no longer be required… And the lawyer would disappear so with him… This perspective of a world without a judge, without a lawyer and ultimately without Law, where algorithms could organize through multiple processes in Ex Ante the obedience of everyone, the “conformity” of all our behaviors with all the regulatory mass that is applicable to us, supposes that this new branch of Law would be defined as the concentration of processes which gives full effectiveness to all the rules, regardless of their content. But supposing that this engineer’s dream is even achievable, it is not possible in a democratic and free world to do without judges and lawyers. Therefore, it is imperative to recognize their contributions to Compliance Law, related and invaluable contributions (II). First of all, because a pure Ex Ante never existed and even in the time of the Chinese legists, people were still needed to interpret the regulations because a legal order must always be interpreted Ex Post by who must in any case answer the questions posed by the subjects of law, as soon as the political system admits to attributing to them the right to make claims before the Judge. Secondly the Attorney, whose office, although articulated with the Judge’s office, is distinct from the latter, both more restricted and broader since he must appear in all cases where the judicial figure puts himself in square, outside the courts. However, Compliance Law has multiplied this since not only, extending Regulatory Law, it entrusts numerous powers to the administrative authorities, but it also transforms companies into judges, in respect of which the attorneys must deal with. Even more so, Compliance Law only takes its sense from its Monumental Goals. It is in this that this branch of the Law preserves the freedom of human beings, in the digital space where the techniques of compliance protect them from the power of companies by the way that the Compliance Law forces these companies to use their power to protect people. However, firstly, it is the Judges who, in their diversity, impose as a reference the protection of human beings, either as a limit to the power of compliance tools or as their very purpose. Secondly, the Attorney, again distinguishing himself from the Judge, if necessary, reminds us that all the parties whose interests are involved must be taken into consideration. In an ever more flexible, soft, and dialogical Law, everyone presenting himself as the “advocate” of such and such a monumental goal: the Attorney is legitimate to be the first to occupy this place. -
Couverture – La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

SILLIMAN, Bryan🕴️

📝Secret professionnel et coopération : les leçons de procédure tirées de l’expérience américaine pour une application universelle, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Régulations & Compliance La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

► Full Reference: B. Silliman, “Secret professionnel et coopération : les leçons de procédure tirées de l’expérience américaine pour une application universelle” (“Privilege and cooperation, procedural lessons learned from the U.S for global application”), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 231-234. - read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► English summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The French legal system is evolving, organizing interaction between lawyers with regulators and prosecutors, especially in investigations about corruption or corporate misconduct, adopting U.S. negotiated resolutions such as the Convention judiciaire d’intérêt public, which encourages “collaboration” between them. The author describes the evolution of the U.S. DOJ doctrine and askes French to be inspired by the U.S. procedural experience, U.S. where this mechanism came from. Indeed, the DOJ released memoranda about what the “collaboration” means. At the end (2006 Memorandum), the DOJ has considered that the legal privilege must remain intact when the information is not only factual to maintain trust between prosecutors, regulators, and lawyers. French authorities do not follow this way. The author regrets it and thinks they should adopt the same reasoning as the American authority on the secret professionnel of the avocat, especially when he intervenes in the company internal investigation. - 🦉This article is available in full text for those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses
Couverture – La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

Articles in a JoRC book

SILVA-ROMERO, Eduardo🕴🏿 and LEGRU, Raphaëlle🕴🏿

📝Quelle place pour la Compliance dans l’arbitrage d’investissement ?, in🕴🏿M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Collection Régulations & Compliance La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance

► Full Reference: E. Silva-Romero and R. Legru, “Quelle place pour la Compliance dans l’arbitrage d’investissement ?” (“What place for Compliance in investment arbitration?”), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 281-293. - read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021. In the book, the article will be published in Title II, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The authors emphasize the new and growing place of Compliance in International Arbitration, particularly in the requirement of respect for ethical values, since arbitrators can implement Ethics, sometimes lacking in international trade, or even must put their power only at the service of investors who respect the Rule of Law. Thus, Compliance is deployed through the classic control by the arbitrators of the legality of the investment, which applies both to the establishment of the treaty itself and to the investor. In a more recent way, the arbitrator can control about an investment project a sort of “social license to operate” of the investor, concept related to the social responsibility of the companies, appeared for the protection of the peoples indigenous. Moreover, Compliance can justify a substantial assessment by the arbitrator of the effective respect of the human rights and the environment protection via an investment treaty, the State party remaining able to act for the effectiveness of these concerns. -