Articles in a legal collective publication

Full reference : Guillaume, N., Compliance risk mapping: first insights of challenges, limits and good practices, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 73-80.   Read a general presentation of the book in which this article was published -   Summary of the article (by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche) The author gives an overview of what is risk mapping for a company, not only an obligation in certain cases, such as corruption, but also and beyond an excellent tool to design and control its strategy. He shows that this is due to the fact that legislation now incorporates the risk-based approach, companies having to use these maps, sometimes demanding to put them at the service of an overall strategy, even if their handling may lead to initiating responsibility of the company and its managers. The author emphasizes that the maps are very diverse because their objectives are themselves different, their users also being different (which implies different insights into the same risks). The author therefore identifies principles common to all maps, which always assess risks according to their probability of occurrence and the severity of their consequences if they materialize. It is also necessary to apprehend the "gross risk", seized in the absolute, and the "net risk" which integrates the company itself in this apprehension of the probability and the gravity, then release an acceptable level of risks for the company. On these common principles are superimposed specificities relating to the various risks, the author taking more particularly the risk of corruption, since Compliance Law gives it a great place. The mapping that is specific to the specific risk then becomes finer to be relevant, while the criteria used here will be abandoned in another mapping. The way of proceeding becomes common again, involving the commitment of the company's management bodies, internal surveys and interviews, benchmarks. If the company thus deploys the art of risk mapping, then they cease to be only a requirement of Law to which the company must comply in order to be a central tool in the overall risk prevention system and strategy design, feeding codes of conduct, design of training and supervision, to finally deploy in the company a "risk culture", which is essential.   -

General reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Drawing up Risk Maps as an Obligation and the paradoxe of the "Compliance Risks", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, serie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 61-72   - Summary of the article : There are few synthetic or theoretical studies on Risk Mapping even though it is in fact the Compliance central tool, perhaps because it is more a management tool than a legal one. Risk Mapping is often described but does not receive any other legal qualifications than being a "modality", suffering in this respect from an evil which affects the whole of Compliance, still little understood by Law, attention often so focused on the Ex Post (sanctions) while Compliance is by nature in the Ex Ante. Going from disarray to incomprehension, everyone can note the existence of "compliance risks" among the mapped risks, because if as so many affirm that it would be necessary to speak only of simple conformity as obedience, demonstrated in Ex Ante, to Law, how a sub-set of a tool would therefore have the same object as the set of Law that this tool serves … This aporia can only be resolved if Compliance Law is defined substantially by its "monumental goals" which exceed obedience to regulations. Consequently, Law taking up Risk Mapping, this mechanism may first appear as an ancillary obligation to the main obligation consisting in achieving "monumental goals". The ancillary obligation to draw up the maps is an obligation of result, while the main obligation to achieve the monumental goals is an obligation of means. These cartographies being very diverse and being only occasionally targeted by specific laws, it can also constitute only a legal fact or, through the play of various charters, a unilateral legal commitment. But it isnbecoming the basis of an autonomous legal obligation incumbent on enterprises in position to know certain risks, obligation referring to the existence of a subjective right tof knowing and measuring them ("right to be worried") which the third parties who are going to run them would hold, thus allowing them to choose to run them, or not. -   Read the bilingual working paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks, on which this article is based    Read a general presentation of the book in which the article is published   -

► Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Building by Law the Unicity of Compliance Tools from the Definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, serie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 35-46   Summary of the article : The "tools of Compliance" do not stack on top of each other. They form a system, thanks to a unity drawn from the goals that all these multiple and different tools serve: the "Monumental Goals" by which Compliance Law is defined. All these tools are configured by these goals and for mastering all these techniques, it is essential to put them all in perspective of what Compliance Law is, which is designed teleologically with regard to its goals. Extension of Regulatory Law and like it, Compliance Law is built on a balance between the principle of competition and other concerns that public authorities claim to take care of. Compliance Law has moreover more "pretensions" in this respect, for example in environmental matters. All the means are then good, the violence of the tools marrying without difficulty with the voluntary commitments since it is the goals which govern this branch of Law. As legal solutions adopted show, a common method of interpretation and common levels of constraint for all Compliance Tools result from this definition. Starting from the goals (in which legal normativity is housed), the interpretation of the different tools is thus unified. Moreover, the different degrees of constraint do not operate according to the consideration of sources (traditional legal criterion) but by the goals, according to the legal distinction between obligations of means and obligations of results which result from the articulation between tools, of which the establishment is an obligation of result, and the goal, of which the achievement is only an obligation of means. -   📝 Read the bilingual working paper on which rely this article. 📝 Read a general presentation of the book in which this article has been published.   -

Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A..,Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 319-342   -   Article Summary: In the traditional conception of the architecture of the sectors regulated by Law, and in Compliance Law which extends the regulatory techniques, rights have little place. But this configuration no longer takes place; on the contrary, rights are at the center of Regulatory and Compliance systems, and will be more and more so. They are and will be the primary tools of Compliance Law because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve. Because every effort must be done to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people and organizations who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goal". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools for actually achieving the goals set, so much so that they can be seen as "primary tools". But it is pertinent to have more pretension and to conceive rights as the most "natural" tools of Compliance Law. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be expressed by the protection of persons, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given as tools by Law by to persons and rights which constitute the very goal of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights becoming a "natural tool" of Compliance Law. We are only at the beginning of their deployment and it is undoubtedly on them that Digital space in which we now live would be regulated, so that we will not suffocated there and that it will constitute for people a civilized space. -   Read the bilingual working paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks, on which this article is based    Read the General Presentation of the book in which this article has been published   -

Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Incentives and Compliance, a promising couple to increase the Compliance Law utility, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 141-148   - Summary of the article: The theory of incentives targets the mechanisms which do not use directly constraint (except to present sanctions themselves as incentives) but which leads nevertheless to expected behaviors. To appreciate the links which must or must not be done between incentives and Compliance, we should proceed in two times.  First, the association appears natural between incentive mechanisms and "Compliance Law" since the later is defined in a dynamic way. Indeed, if it is defined placing its legal normativity in its "monumental goals", as the end of corruption, the detection of money laundering in order to underlying criminality disappears, or as the effective protection of environment or the concrete care of human beings, then what matters is not the means in themselves but the effective tension towards these "monumental goals". In this perspective, what was related to public policies led by States, because they are definitively not able to do it, the charge is internalized in the firms which are able to tend towards this goals: "crucial operators" because they have the geographical, technological, informational and financial means.  In this perspective, the internalization of public willingness provoking a split with the concept of State linked to a territory which deprives Politics of its constraint power, incentive mechanisms appear as the most efficient mean to reach these monumental goals. They appear as this "natural" mean both negatively and positively defined. Negatively in which they do not need in Ex Ante institutional localizable sources and sanction power in Ex Post: it is enough to substitute the interest to obligation. Positively, incentives relay through operators' strategies what was the so critical and joked form of public action: the "plan". The duration is thus injected thanks to Compliance mechanisms, as we can see it through the development of it in the care for environment ("plan climat") or through the educational mechanism, which could be conceived only in duration.   However, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. And this because of three convictions often developed and that we have to overcome. First, the idea that in a general way, there would be a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is associated to the norm. As long as the incentive is not based on obligation, then it will be nothing… Secondly, and as if that were a kind of consolation …, Compliance would not be really Law either … We so often say that it is only about a methodology, a range of processes without sense, procedures to follow without trying to understand, process that algorithms integrate in a mechanic without end and without sense or that on the contrary, Compliance would be full of sense by Ethics and Morality, which are far from Law. While incentives talk to the human spirit which calculate, Compliance would be so a process through which machines will be connected to other machines, so an extra soul, where calculation has no place… Thirdly, solutions would be to be find in Competition Law because it can do without States, submit them and approach what is a-sectorial, especially finance and digital, the world being financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which comes in Ex Ante thanks to "Compliance sanctions" applying for example to essential infrastructures Law, by continuing to deny the salience of the duration and taking care of the "market power" would be also not compatible with a marriage with incentive mechanisms which rely on duration and power of those to which it is applied, converging towards goals, which are set by what Competition Law ignores: the project. This project which pretends to build the future is the one of politics and of companies, which use their deployed power in time to concretize it. It is without any doubt there that the future of Europe is.  To overcome this triple difficulty, it is thus necessary, in a second time, to modify our conception of Law, especially thanks to Compliance Law, in which this new branch is autonomous from Competition Law, and even sometimes opposed to it, in order to the insertion of incentive mechanisms permit to unknown or against Competition Law organizations to reach "monumental goals" which are imperative to take into consideration. For example, the taking into consideration of climate challenges or the building of a sovereign identity of the data. This is expressly set by European Commission which supervises such initiatives, supervision being what is articulated with Compliance, in a couple that go beyond Regulation, and replaces in Ex Ante Competition Law, salient branch for Ex Post. All the texts which are in the process of expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive. This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as project carriers, project which is the creation of marketed wealth circulating on a market, which could be an industrial project specific to a geographical zone both economical and political. Regulation is deployed to go away from the notion of sector and to transform itself in supervision of crucial firms in the correspondance between the project and the action, what refers to the notion of "plan". In this, banking supervision is just the advanced bastion of all thematic, energetic, climatic and health plans, or more broadly industrial and technological that could by incentive be implemented, this conception of Compliance permitting to build zones which are not reduced to immediate market exchange. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the firm to reach its own political goals, for example fighting against disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environnement. This supposes that Compliance stops to be only conceived as a model of rules effectivity, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch which expresses political goals. A branch which is anchored in crucial firms whose it recognizes the autonomy with regards to markets. This makes it possible, in particular through the coupling with incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple Competition Law, inapt to bring projects to fruition. -   Read the bilingual work paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks on which this article is based   Read a general presentation of the book in which the article has been published.   -

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Resolving the contradiction between "sanction" and "incentive" under the fire of Compliance Law, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Regulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 101-112   -   Summary of the article: Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. Firstly, because sanctions have a central place in Compliance Law and that the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Thus, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one, or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the other. Resign oneself to the waste that such a necessary choice would imply. But to put the terms in this way amounts to thinking poorly about the situations and reducing the fields of the solutions they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, we can on the contrary articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between the Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators". This working document deals with the first issue. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms which do not directly resort to constraint. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But it seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the Convention Judiciaire d'Intérêt Public (non-prosecution agreement). The honest observer cannot help but be immediately uneasy. Indeed, it can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of a Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive? It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendency to think of the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law, manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons for conceiving it this way, the principles of the rule of law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). This is an essential game (II). This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. In order for Law to remain, however, we must hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person. -   Read the bilingual working paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks, on which this article is based.   Read a general presentation of the book in which this article is published.   -

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Describing, conceiving and correlating compliance tools, in order to use them adequately, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series Regulation & Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 9-32.   -   Summary of the article: The article is the general introduction to the book on Compliance tools. In its first part it develops the overall problematic. In its second part, it presents each of the contributions, placed in the overall construction of the work.   -   Read a general presentation of the book in which this article has been published.    

Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Training: content and container of Compliance Law, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 245-264   -   Summary of the article Firstly, as Training is a specific Compliance tool, it is supervised by Regulators. It becomes mandatory when it is contained in Compliance programs or sanction decisions. Since effectiveness and efficiency are legal requirements, what is the margin of companies to design them and how to measure the result? Secondly, as long as each Compliance tool includes, more and more, an educational dimension, we can take each of them to identify this perspective. So even condemnations and prescriptions are so many lessons, lessons given, lessons to be followed. The question is then to know who, in this so pedagogical Compliance Law, are the "teachers"?   -   This article is based on a bilingual Working Paper, including additional technical developments, pop-up notes and hypertext links.   Consult an overview of the volume in which the article was published.     -

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Approche juridique des outils de la Compliance. Construire juridiquement  l'unité des outils de la Compliance à partir de la définition du Droit de la Compliance par ses "buts monumentaux"" ("Legal approach to Compliance Tools. Building by Law the Unicity of Compliance Tools from the definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals""), in  M.-A. Frison-Roche, (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 27-38. - 📝read the article (in French)  - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hypertext links - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): The "tools of Compliance" do not stack on top of each other. They form a system, thanks to a unity drawn from the goals that all these multiple and different tools serve: the "Monumental Goals" by which Compliance Law is defined. All these tools are configured by these goals and for mastering all these techniques, it is essential to put them all in perspective of what Compliance Law is, which is designed teleologically with regard to its goals. Extension of Regulatory Law and like it, Compliance Law is built on a balance between the principle of competition and other concerns that public authorities claim to take care of. Compliance Law has moreover more "pretensions" in this respect, for example in environmental matters. All the means are then good, the violence of the tools marrying without difficulty with the voluntary commitments since it is the goals which govern this branch of Law. As legal solutions adopted show, a common method of interpretation and common levels of constraint for all Compliance Tools result from this definition. Starting from the goals (in which legal normativity is housed), the interpretation of the different tools is thus unified. Moreover, the different degrees of constraint do not operate according to the consideration of sources (traditional legal criterion) but by the goals, according to the legal distinction between obligations of means and obligations of results which result from the articulation between tools, of which the establishment is an obligation of result, and the goal, of which the achievement is only an obligation of means. -

Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Questionnaire de Proust (Proust's Quiz), in Droit & Littérature, n°5, pp. 37-38, Lextenso, 2021. The chosen topic for this volume is Proust.    Read (in French)   See its presentation on LinkedIn (in French)

► Full Reference: C. Kessedjian, "L'arbitrage au service de la lutte contre la violation des droits de la personne humaine par les entreprises" ("Arbitration in the service of the fight against the violation of human rights by companies"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 295-302.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done par the author): By choosing the expression "Human Rights violations by Businesses", the Author is taking sides among the many possible titles for her article, that could portrait the field of law we are talking about here.  Often acronyms are used: RBC (responsible business conduct), CSR (corporate social responsibility), ESG (environment, social and governance), to name only the three main ones. Her preference would be to use RBC by far, as CSR has been discredited by many NGOs and ESG has too much of a "financial" connotation. In any case, this article deals with the attitude of enterprises that, in the conduct of their activities, cause damage to stakeholders, whether "internal" (employees, customers, partners, subcontractors, etc.) or external (local civil society, communities in which the activity takes place, the environment, etc.). Legally, each of these cases may be characterized differently and generate the application of different procedural and substantive rules. When these disputes are submitted to arbitrators, many questions arise, the most delicate of which relate to the delimitation of the power of the arbitral tribunal, particularly if one starts from the idea that compliance aims at a proactive attitude on the part of enterprises with a clear preventive purpose. The objective of prevention will lead to changes in the conduct of the arbitration that, for example, cannot remain confidential, confidentiality being an obstacle to the preventive effect of the decision rendered. -

► Full Reference: E. Kleiman, "Les objectifs de la compliance confrontés aux acteurs de l’arbitrage" ("The goals of compliance faced with arbitration actors"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 335-353.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): L’arbitrage international, qui demeure le mode de règlement privilégié des différends nés des relations commerciales internationales, est rattrapé par la compliance dont les manifestations sont partout : centres d’arbitrage, arbitres et juridictions de contrôle de la régularité internationale des sentences sont régulièrement appelés à prendre en considération les règles de la compliance.  La compliance a indéniablement saisi les acteurs de l’arbitrage.  En tant qu’acteurs d’une activité non régulée, les institutions d’arbitrage et les arbitres doivent générer de la confiance ; leur aptitude à une autorégulation efficace conditionne le succès de l’arbitrage et passe par la transparence et l’exemplarité.  Cette compliance auto-imposée est aujourd’hui consubstantielle de l’arbitrage et s’illustre notamment dans les domaines classiques de la prévention des conflits d’intérêts et du contrôle de la disponibilité des arbitres, mais aussi dans ceux, plus nouveaux, de la parité et de la diversité ainsi que de la réduction de l’empreinte carbone.  De plus, l’activité arbitrale, et notamment le contrôle de la régularité internationale des sentences n’échappent pas à une application ex post des critères issus de la compliance, notamment en matière de lutte contre la corruption et le blanchiment : il y a là place pour le débat, notamment en France, en raison de la porosité des frontières entre les méthodes propres aux règles de compliance impératives censées prévenir les infractions les plus graves, et celles qui sont propres à la constatation des éléments constitutifs de celles-ci en matière pénale.  La question est d’importance, d’autant que l’impérativité croissante des prescriptions en matière de changement climatique et de droits humains viendra étendre le champ de ces télescopages entre méthodes de la compliance et contrôle des sentences arbitrales. Mais l’arbitrage s’empare à son tour de la compliance.  Ainsi, les arbitres sont amenés à statuer à l’occasion de controverses issues d’activités économiques qui sont nées de la compliance : contrats relatifs à la mise en place des dispositifs anticorruption et anti-blanchiment comme des obligations de vigilance, opérations relatives à la réduction de l’empreinte carbone et au changement climatique, etc.  En outre, la compliance est également une matière arbitrable, les arbitres étant conduits à appliquer ou prendre en considération les règles de compliance dans le règlement de litiges commerciaux ou d’investissement, notamment au titre des conséquences que l’on peut tirer de leur méconnaissance ou de leur observation. -

► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "Compliance et Arbitrage. Essai de problématisation" ("Compliance and Arbitration : Problematisation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 265-279.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021.  In the book, the article will be published in Title II, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage. - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Under the consideration of the "Compliance Juridictionalisation", it is necessary to study in the links between Compliance and Arbitration. The arbitrator is a judge, he is even the natural judge of international trade. Arbitration is therefore naturally intended to meet compliance which transforms the action of companies in an international context. However, the links between compliance and arbitration are not obvious. It is not a question of providing firm and definitive answers, but rather, and above all, of asking questions. We are at the start of reflection on this topic, which explains why there is, for the time being, little legal literature on the subject of the relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. It doesn't mean there aren't connections.  Quite simply, these relations may not have come to light, or they are in the making. We should research  the existing or potential bridges between two worlds that have long gravitated separately: Compliance on the one hand, Arbitration on the other. The central question is: is or can the arbitrator be a compliance judge, and, if so, how? In any event, the Arbitrator is thus in contact with matters requiring the methods, tools and logic of Compliance. In addition to the prevention and suppression of corruption, three examples can be given. Arbitration has been facing economic sanctions (notably embargoes) for several years. The link with Compliance is obvious, insofar as texts providing for economic sanctions are often accompanied by compliance mechanisms, as in the United States. The arbitrator is concerned as to the fate he reserves in the treatment of the dispute with the measures of economic sanctions. Competition Law is a branch that came into contact with Arbitration from the end of the 1980s. The arbitrability of this type of dispute is now established and arbitrators apply it regularly. At the same time, Compliance has also entered Competition Law, admittedly more strongly in the United States than in France. The existence, absence or insufficiency of a compliance program aimed at preventing violations of the competition rules are thus circumstances which may assist the arbitrator in the assessment of anti-competitive behavior. Environmental Law is also concerned. There is environmental Compliance, for example with regard to the French law of March 27, 2017 on the duty of vigilance. Companies are thus responsible for participating in the protection of the environment, by internalizing these concerns in their internal and external operations (in their sphere of influence). As soon as an arbitrator is in charge for settling a dispute relating to Environmental Law, the question of the relationship to Compliance, from this angle, naturally arises. It is therefore the multiple interactions between Compliance and Arbitration, actual or potential, which are thus open. -

► Full Reference: M. Audit, "La position de l'arbitre en matière de compliance" ("The position of the arbitrator in matters of compliance"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 303-315.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021.  In the book, the article will be published in its Title III, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): For the arbitrator to intervene in matters of Compliance, a "Compliance Obligation" must exist. The identification of this specific obligation is tricky because it cannot generally be identified per se, if it is grasped only through Criminal Law, which does not enter directly into the field of Arbitration, which has developed an autonomous conception of the facts, in particular facts of corruption, which are also criminally reproachable. But because the obligation of compliance is itself autonomous, since it is a question of detecting and preventing various offenses and breaches, the arbitrators rely on the detection and prevention mechanisms as such, distinct from the possible behaviors that the Law wants they don't happen. But the question of the source of this compliance obligation is central because it must arise from a standard that can lead to Arbitration. This is the case of the contract, for example an intermediary contract which not only prohibits any corrupt practice but also provides for audit or control, or even the case of national laws, in particular the UK Bribery Act or the so-called French "Sapin 2" law, or even decisions imposing compliance programs or the unconstrained adoption of these by the company. According to its source, the arbitrator will take the Compliance obligation into account. If a Compliance obligation, having a source giving its significance in an Arbitration proceeding, is considered by the arbitrator to be breached, the consequences often depend on this source. The solution is classic if it is the lex contractus, more difficult if it is a Law which has inserted this obligation in the lex societatis, the requirements of compliance being generally considered as mandatory laws. If the arbitrators cannot apply the sanctions attached by the repressive law, they can support their decision in consideration of the breach found to assess the legality of a behavior or the validity of a contract, the ICC Rules for combating corruption being able to serve them as an analysis guide. -

► Full Reference: M. Audit, "The arbitrator's position on compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", to be published.  - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021.  In the book, the article will be published in its Title III, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): For the arbitrator to intervene in matters of Compliance, a "Compliance Obligation" must exist. The identification of this specific obligation is tricky because it cannot generally be identified per se, if it is grasped only through Criminal Law, which does not enter directly into the field of Arbitration, which has developed an autonomous conception of the facts, in particular facts of corruption, which are also criminally reproachable. But because the obligation of compliance is itself autonomous, since it is a question of detecting and preventing various offenses and breaches, the arbitrators rely on the detection and prevention mechanisms as such, distinct from the possible behaviors that the Law wants they don't happen. But the question of the source of this compliance obligation is central because it must arise from a standard that can lead to Arbitration. This is the case of the contract, for example an intermediary contract which not only prohibits any corrupt practice but also provides for audit or control, or even the case of national laws, in particular the UK Bribery Act or the so-called French "Sapin 2" law, or even decisions imposing compliance programs or the unconstrained adoption of these by the company. According to its source, the arbitrator will take the Compliance obligation into account. If a Compliance obligation, having a source giving its significance in an Arbitration proceeding, is considered by the arbitrator to be breached, the consequences often depend on this source. The solution is classic if it is the lex contractus, more difficult if it is a Law which has inserted this obligation in the lex societatis, the requirements of compliance being generally considered as mandatory laws. If the arbitrators cannot apply the sanctions attached by the repressive law, they can support their decision in consideration of the breach found to assess the legality of a behavior or the validity of a contract, the ICC Rules for combating corruption being able to serve them as an analysis guide. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -