Articles in a legal collective publication

► Full Reference: R.-O. Maistre,  "What monumental goals for the Regulator in a rapidly changing audiovisual and digital landscape?", ​in M.-A Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, p. - ► Article Summary (done by the JoRC editor):  In France, since the law of 1982 which put an end to the State monopoly on the audio-visual area, the landscape has profoundly evolved and diversified. In view of the multitude of players who are now established there, the Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel – CSA (French High Audiovisual Council) must ensure the economic balance of the sector and the respect for pluralism, in the interest of all audiences. The growing societal responsibilities of audiovisual media and new digital players have multiplied the "monumental goals" on which the Arcom is watching. Its competences have gradually been extended to the digital space and the successive laws concerning its missions aim at new objectives, in particular in terms of protection of minors, fight against online hate or against disinformation. The emergence of a new European model of Regulation makes it possible to give substance to these additional goals, the Regulator adopting a systemic perspective and calling on soft law tools to fulfill its new missions. -   📘see the general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published -

► Full Reference: Vaquieri, J.-F.,  The "Monumental Goals" perceived by the company. The example of Enedis, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.),Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published. - ► Article Summary: The article aims to show how a particular company in that it is charged by the State to effectively distribute electricity to everyone in France participates in the Monumental Goals, makes them concrete and integrates them into its functioning itself. The firm Enedis, a French monopolistic State company, operator of the distribution network participates directly in these Goals under the express application of the French Energy Code.  Under the control of the Regulator, the company is responsible for the continuity of the electricity supply and responds to the challenges of energy transition, Enedis ensuring equal treatment at national and local level, Compliance thus extending Regulatory system to which this firm responds and which it internalizes. The management of personal data, energy being at the heart of the digital revolution, implies a particularly strong internal framework of Compliance. This articulation between this new Compliance in terms of personal information and this classic Compliance as a continuation of the Regulation to serve the citizen, both converging for the benefit of people, explains that Enedis has put Compliance at the heart of its commitments, particularly expressed in its code of conduct, its industrial and human project (Projet industriel et humain – PIH) and its environmental actions. The Compliance which is specific to Enedis is disseminated by it to various entities, in particular via concession contracts, giving these an original framework. This importance of Compliance for Enedis leads the company through the "Monumental Goals" which unite it to design and maintain balances between the diversity of these so that the values carried by the companies continue to decline, especially locally. -     📝 see the general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published -    

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.A., Le Droit de la concurrence : des choix politiques pour son état futur – rapport de synthèse – ( ("Competition Law: political choices for its future state – Conclusion") , in Claudel, E. (ed.), Le Droit de la concurrence dans tous ses états ("Competition in all its states"), special issue, Gaz. Pal. , 15 Sept. 2021. This publication is in French, but the Working Paper which is the basis of this article is bilingual.  -   📅 this article follows the colloquium of the French Association Droit & Commerce in Deauville (France), the 25th  et 26th June 2021. -   ✏️ It is based on  the bilingual Working Paper built on the notes taken during the colloquium for establishing the conclusion which has been provided. -   Article English Summary: All of these contributions on the issue of the "Competition in all its states" highlighted the choices available for what could be this branch of Law tomorrow: choice of a political nature between various possible definitions of Competition Law.  In method, the main thing is that this definition be clear. For this, this definition must be based on a principle and that the goal pursued by competition law is simple, so that in a second step, competition law can be easily articulated on the one hand with other branches of law. (by the care of the judge, in particular), on the other hand with "policies", such as "competition policy", then other policies (by the care of political authorities, especially European). In essence, two conceptions of principle are opposed: either Competition Law will want to appropriate the goals of other branches, such as those of Regulatory and Compliance Law, or Competition Law will have the modesty to remain anchored in its definition as Market Law. This is the crossroads where we are.   -

► Full Reference: Sudres, N., Gel hydroalcoolique, Covid-19 et Compliance :  des insuffisances de la démarche de conformité à l’émergence d’îlots de compliance, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published. -   ► Article Summary (done par the author):  During the Covid-19 Crisis, managing the manufacture, prices, and availability of hydro-alcoholic gel, a key product in the fight against Covid-19 transmission, provides an issue to measure both the limits and resources of Compliance Law. While the Culture of "conformity" with the Antitrust Law was insufficient to counter the surge in the issue of the prices of   hydro-alcoholic gels and masks, implying the use of tools that seem the opposite of Compliance by State (such as price fixation and requisitioning), mechanisms inspired by them have been put in place to deal with other problems linked to the availability of Essential Goods in times of Health Crisis. It remains in question whether these mechanisms should inspire the conception of stable Compliance Standards in the future. -   📘 read the the general presentation of the book in which the article is published

► Full Reference: L.-M. Augagneur, "La juridictionnalisation de la réputation par les plateformes" ("The jurisdictionalisation of reputation by platforms"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 97-113.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): The large platforms are in the position of arbiter of the reputation economy (referencing, notoriety) in which they themselves act. Although the stakes are usually low on a unit basis, the jurisdiction of reputation represents significant aggregate stakes. Platforms are thus led to detect and assess reputation manipulations (by users: SEO, fake reviews, fake followers; or by the platforms themselves as highlighted by the Google Shopping decision issued by the European Commission in 2017) that are implemented on a large scale with algorithmic tools. The identification and treatment of manipulations is itself only possible by means of artificial intelligence tools. Google thus proceeds with an automated downgrading mechanism for sites that do not follow its guidelines, with the possibility of requesting a review through a very summary procedure entirely conducted by an algorithm. Tripadvisor, on the other hand, uses an algorithm to detect false reviews based on "fraud modeling to identify electronic patterns that cannot be detected by the human eye". It only conducts a human investigation in limited cases. This jurisdictionality of reputation has little in common with that defined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (legal origin, contradictory procedure, independence, application of the Rules of Law). It is characterized, on the one hand, by the absence of transparency of the rules and even of the existence of rules stated in predicative form and applied by deductive reasoning. It is replaced by an inductive probabilistic model by the identification of abnormal behaviors in relation to centroids. This approach of course raises the issue of statistical bias. More fundamentally, it reflects a transition from Rule of Law, not so much to "Code is Law" (Laurence Lessig), but to "Data is Law", that is, to a governance of numbers (rather than "by" numbers). It also comes back to a form of collective jurisdictionality, since the sanction comes from a computational apprehension of the phenomena of the multitude and not from an individual appreciation. Finally, it appears particularly consubstantial with compliance, since it is based on a teleological approach (the search for a finality rather than the application of principles). On the other hand, this jurisdictionality is characterized by man-machine cooperation, whether in the decision-making process (which poses the problem of automaticity bias) or in the contradictory procedure (which poses, in particular, the problems of discussion with the machine and the explicability of the machine response). Until now, the supervision of these processes has been based essentially on the mechanisms of transparency, a limited adversarial requirement and the accessibility of appeal channels. The French Law Loi pour une République Numérique ("Law for a Digital Republic"), the European Legislation Platform-to-Business Regulation and the Omnibus Directive, have thus set requirements on the ranking criteria on platforms. The Omnibus Directive also requires that professionals guarantee that reviews come from consumers through reasonable and proportionate measures. As for the European Digital Services Act, it provides for transparency on content moderation rules, procedures and algorithms. But this transparency is often a sham. In the same way and for the moment the requirements of sufficient human intervention and adversarial processes appear very limited in the draft text. The most efficient forms of this jurisdictionality ultimately emerge from the role played by third parties in a form of participatory dispute resolution. Thus, for example, FakeSpot detects false Tripadvisor reviews, Sistrix establishes a ranking index that helped establish the manipulation of Google's algorithm in the Google Shopping case by detecting artifacts based on algorithm changes. Moreover, the draft Digital Services Act envisages recognizing a specific status for trusted flaggers who identify illegal content on platforms. This singular jurisdictional configuration (judge and party platform, massive situations, algorithmic systems for handling manipulations) thus leads us to reconsider the grammar of the jurisdictional process and its characteristics. If Law is a language (Alain Sériaux), it offers a new grammatical form that would be that of the middle way (mesotès) described by Benevéniste. Between the active and the passive way, there is a way in which the subject carries out an action in which he includes himself. Now, it is the very nature of this jurisdictionality of compliance to make laws by including oneself in them (nomos tithestai). In this respect, the irruption of artificial intelligence in this jurisdictional treatment undoubtedly bears witness to the renewal of the language of Law. -

► Full Reference: C. Granier, "Réflexions sur l'existence d'une jurisprudence des entreprises" ("Reflections on the existence of a "Compagnies' case law""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 81-95.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Because Compliance shakes up established frameworks, Compliance forces to look at certain concepts in a new light, which until then seemed to be well tamed. This is particularly the case with the notion of "Jurisprudence". Recent developments in Compliance indeed raise questions about the possible existence of "jurisprudence" (case law) that would be produced by companies during the implementation of compliance procedures. At first glance, the concept of "business jurisprudence" may appear unnatural because case law is traditionally understood as the fruit of the office of the Judge and, more particularly, of the State Judge. However, the observation that the company can position itself as a Judge with regard to itself and others in the context of the implementation of Compliance legitimately raises the question of the possibility for the latter. to produce case law. The example of Facebook's supervisory board and the first decisions rendered by this body increases the legitimacy of this crucial question. Thinking about the concept of "Jurisprudence of companies" implies to compare the process of emergence of the case law standard emanating from the Judge with the process of emergence of a "Jurisprudence" that would be produced by companies during their "jurisdictional functions". On the material level, an analogy between State case law and company case law seems conceivable. It then remains to overcome an obstacle of an organic nature: can an institution other than the judge be understood as producing case law? In view of contemporary developments in Law and the practical interest that exists in designing business case law, it seems appropriate to adopt a broader view of case law, which is detached from the traditional organic criterion. It therefore seems that it is possible but above all that it is necessary to think about the concept of "business case law" in order to highlight a new facet of the normative power of companies in the context of compliance, in particular with a view to its supervision. -

► Full Reference: S. Merabet, "La vigilance, être juge et ne pas juger" ("Vigilance, to be a judge and not judging"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 199-209.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Vigilance presents two diametrically opposed dangers. The company is caught in the crossfire. On the one hand, there is a risk that it exercises its role at a minimum, so that the obligations imposed on it are ineffective, thereby risking its own liability.   On the other hand, the danger is that the company oversteps its role and takes the place of the Judge. Does Vigilance always present the same dangers? Does it systematically involve the same role of the company? To be vigilant, is it to judge? The answer to these questions depends on the content of the obligations involved in Vigilance. However, these now seem very diverse. How to distinguish between the various duties of Vigilance? A first approach could consist in considering a formal identification which leads to distinguish stricto sensu Vigilance, that which is envisaged by the French so-called "Sapin 2" law and identified as such, and the related obligations, such as for example the duty of moderation of companies on social networks, which without being baptized "duty of vigilance", nevertheless come close. The extension of Compliance obligations blurs the line between what exactly falls under Vigilance and what not. A more substantial approach should be taken to consider the degree of control exercised by the company. Understood in this way, it is possible to distinguish two categories: Negative Vigilance, which implies the identification of a risk, and Positive Vigilance, which even more supposes the neutralization of the risk. The first assumes a limited role for the company, while the second encourages it to act positively, even before an Authority has spoken. In this case, the role of the company is closer to that of the judge. That shows that all the obligations of vigilance cannot therefore be understood in a unitary manner. As soon as the company is led – if not to take the place of the Judge – to act before the Judge even has the opportunity to pronounce himself/herself, then it seems legitimate to supervise the implementation of the company's duty of Vigilance, through a form of proceduralisation of Compliance. The company, as its employees or partners, would benefit from more Vigilance supervision. Insofar as all Vigilance obligations do not call the same role of the company, it is necessary to consider guiding principles of Vigilance, more or less intense depending on whether it is Negative or Positive Vigilance.  -

► Full Reference: Siproudhis, J.-B.,, C.,  Le transfert de responsabilité du régulateur et du juge vers l’entreprise : la démonstration par le système d’alerte ("The transfer of responsibility from the regulator and the judge to the company: demonstration by the whistleblowing mechanism"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, à paraître.  -   ► Article Summary (done by the Author) : From the practitioner perspective, compliance is geared towards a gradual transfer of responsibilities from both regulators and judges.   In France, the whistleblowing mechanism imposed by the so-called "Sapin 2" and "Duty of Vigilance" laws illustrates this evolution. Indeed,  internal alerts management follows key judiciary process milestones : admissibility, investigations, dismissal or sanction. This turns corporations duties into prosecutors or judges’, provided that they respect a specific framework contributing to respect the rules of a fair trial. This requirement raises several legal and sociological challenges to which the author devotes his developments. -   📝 go to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published. -     This requirement raises several legal and sociological challenges to which the author devotes his developments.    

► Full Reference: Siproudhis, J.-B.,, C., The transfer of responsibility from the regulator and the judge to the company: demonstration by the whistleblowing mechanism, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published.  -   ► Article summary (done by the author) : From the practitioner perspective, compliance is geared towards a gradual transfer of responsibilities from both regulators and judges.   In France, the whistleblowing mechanism imposed by the so-called "Sapin 2" and "Duty of Vigilance" laws illustrates this evolution. Indeed,  internal alerts management follows key judiciary process milestones : admissibility, investigations, dismissal or sanction. This turns corporations duties into prosecutors or judges’, provided that they respect a specific framework contributing to respect the rules of a fair trial. This requirement raises several legal and sociological challenges to which the author devotes his developments. -   📝 to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published  

► Full Reference: Ch. Lapp, "La compliance dans l'entreprise : les statuts du process" ("Compliance in the company: the statues of processes"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 141-150.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law) , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. During this colloquium, the intervention was shared with Jan-Marc Coulon, who is also a contributor in the book (see the summary of the Jean-Marc Coulon's  Article). In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to:  L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law ). - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): The Company is caught in the grip of Compliance Law, the jaws of which are those of Incitement (1) and Sanction that the Company must apply to ensure the effectiveness of its processes to which it is itself subject (2 ). First, the Company has been delegated to fabricate reprehensible rules that it must apply to itself and to third parties with whom it has dealings. To this end, the Company sets up "processes", that is to say verification and prevention procedures, in order to show that the offenses that it is likely to commit will not happened. These processes constitute standards of behavior to prevent and avoid that the facts constituting the infringements are not themselves carried out. They are thus one of the elements of Civil Liability Law in its preventive or restorative purposes. Second, the sanction of non obedience of Compliance processes puts the Company in front of two pitfalls. The first  dimension place the company, with regard to its employees and its partners, in the obligation to define processes which also constitute the quasi-jurisdictional resolution of their non-compliance, the company having to reconcile the sanction it pronounces with the fundamental principles of classical Criminal Law, constitutional principles and all fundamental rights. The processes then become the procedural rule. The second dimension is that the Company is accountable for the effectiveness of the avoidance by its processes of facts constituting infringements. By a reversal of the burden of proof, the Company is then required to prove that its processes are efficient. at least equivalent to the measures defined by laws and regulations, the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence Française Anticorruption – AFA), European directives and various communications on legal tools to fight breaches of probity, environmental attacks and current societal concerns. The processes then become the constitutive element, per se, of the infringement. Thus, in its search for a balance between Prevention and Sanction to which it is itself subject, the Company will not then be tempted to favor the orthodoxy of its processes over the expectations of the Agence Française Anticorruption – AFA , regulators and judges, to the detriment of their efficiency? In doing so, are we not moving towards an instrumental and conformist Compliance, paradoxically disempowering with regard to the Compliance Monumental Goals of Compliance? -

► Full Reference: J.-M. Coulon, "Le droit de la compliance dans le secteur d'activité de la construction et les contradictions, impossibilités et impasses auxquelles les entreprises sont confrontées" ("Compliance Law in the construction sector and the contradictions, impossibilities and impasses facing companies"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 133-140.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law) , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. During this colloquium, the intervention was shared with Christophe Lapp, who is also a contributor in the book (see the summary of the Jean-Marc Coulon's Article). In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to:  L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law ). - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): The construction industry is not a regulated sector. Its market is made up of a superposition of territorial strata which are all relevant markets, to which corresponds a specific microcosm of companies. Finally, the temporary association between companies for the purposes of carrying out a project or a work is consubstantial with this sector. The penetration of Compliance in this sector is inevitably very heterogeneous and results from both exogenous factors (other partners within temporary associations, influence of economic operators from other sectors of activity, capital providers and lenders, incitations from professional organizations ) the endogenous (submission to a Financial Regulatory Authority because the company is listed ; application of the laws on duty of vigilance, and French Law called "Sapin 2"). For example, subject to all these factors combined, the Bouygues group is particularly sensitive to compliance. Not only internal "legislator", the Bouygues group finds itself in turn "prosecutor and judge" both of itself and of others. Indeed, leading an investigation, filing a complaint, triggering an ethics alert, making use of the leniency program, this group is, however, no other than a sort of assistant for the Prosecutor. In addition, scrutinizing its stakeholders, sanctioning its employees, resorting to a Convention Judiciaire d'intérêt public (judicial agreement in the public interest) or negotiating its sanction within the framework of a procedure instituted by a multilateral bank, it fulfills the function of a judge. Legislator, prosecutor, judge, the Bouygues group is faced with a paradox, in a way encouraged to exercise “sovereignty”, yet it does not benefit from the attributes attached to it or from the unwavering support of the competent Public Authorities. -

► Full Reference: J. Heymann, "La nature juridique de la "Cour suprême" de Facebook" ("The legal nature of Facebook's "Supreme court""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 151-167.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to: The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law. - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Taking place in the general theme aiming at making “words and things coincide”, the article offers some thoughts on the “conditions of the discourse” – in the sense in which Foucault understood it in his Archéologie des sciences humaines – relating to the phenomenon of “jurisdictionalization” of Compliance.             The thoughts are more specifically focusing on the nature of the so-called “Supreme Court” that Facebook instituted to hear appeals of decisions relating to content on the digital social networks that are Facebook and Instagram. Is this really a “Supreme Court”, designed in order to “judge” the Facebook Group?             A careful examination of the Oversight Board – i.e. the so-called “Supreme Court” created by Facebook – reveals that the latter, in addition to its advisory mission (which consists of issuing policy advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies), exercises some form of adjudicative function. This is essentially conceived in terms of compliance assessment, of the content published on the social networks Facebook or Instagram with the standards issued by these corporations on the one hand, of content enforcement decisions taken by Facebook with the Law on the other hand. The legal framework of reference is yet rather vague, although its substantial content seems to be per se evolutive, based on the geographical realm where the case to be reviewed is located. An adjudicative function can therefore be characterized, even if the Oversight Board can only claim for a limited one.             The author can ultimately identify the Oversight Board as a preventive dispute settlement body, in the sense that it seems to aim at avoiding any referral to state courts and ruling before any court’s judgement can be delivered. Some questions are thus to be raised, relating with both legitimacy and authority of such a Board. But whatever the answers will be, the fact remains that the creation of the Oversight Board by a private law company already reveals all the liveliness of contemporary legal pluralism. -

► Full Reference: D. Latour, "Les enquêtes internes au sein des entreprises" ("Internal investigations within companies"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 169-186.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article: -

► Full Reference: J. Jourdan-Marques, "L’arbitre, juge ex ante de la compliance ?" ("The arbitrator, ex ante judge of compliance?"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 317-334.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article which follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance ("The company instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law"), co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the  Faculty of Law Lyon 3. This colloquium was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda, scientific co-directors, and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. Due to the very close proximity of the content of this article to a scientific manifestation that was held previously, in the same series of colloquia, manifestation on Compliance and Arbitration, designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, and which took place in Paris on March 31, 2021 in Paris, it was decided with the author and the scientific managers of the scientific events concerned to publish the article not in Title I of the book, devoted to the topic of the Company instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law, but in Title III, devoted to the topic of Compliance and International Arbitration. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :  The article begins with a long introduction relating to the general relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. Then the author in a first part examines the place of the Arbitration upstream of the occurrence of the dispute, aiming at the relations of the company in its organization with other companies for its economic activities, for example commercial agents. The author examines the way in which Arbitration can resolve difficulties which arise between them, including when these issues are otherwise apprehended by Compliance Law and the institutions in charge of it, in particular because of the facts of corruption are alleged and the fact is alleged by the debtor himself when payment has not yet been requested by the creditor. The legal question then becomes whether or not there is a "dispute". Being even further upstream, the author takes the hypothesis of the adoption of a compliance program in which recourse to arbitration would be inserted by the Company, insertion which could then be at the origin of exemption from criminal liability, an arbitration award being able to produce such an effect if it is recognized in the legal order.  The second part of the article considers Arbitration in the absence of multiple parties, which could correspond to the acts issued by the Oversight Board of Facebook, this kind of tribunal and judge not being seized by parties to a litigation. It might be adequate to qualify this mechanism as an arbitration, even if this qualification is difficult to retain. In any case, if we did so by admission that a unilateral request gives rise to a jurisdictional mission, there should be guarantees surrounding such institutionalization. They can go through specific bodies for Compliance cases, outside or within existing arbitration institutions, which must then become the driving force in the matter. In addition, the choice of arbitrators should undoubtedly go through the institution itself so that impartiality remains unchallenged and profiles of arbitrators would be truly varied. The procedure would also have vocation to be inflected because of the absence of real litigation, justifying the adjustment of the adversarial principle (in the narrow sense of this one, linked to the debate) in particular by the intervention of amicus curiae and to avoid the fraud through arbitration and in procedure. In the absence of an adversary, the procedural office of the arbitrator could be reconsidered: without modifying the terms of the case, it would be appropriate for the arbitrator to have more power to decide on the adequate measures to be taken to remedy the non- conformity with compliance requirements. Finally, publicity seems to the author essential so that the arbitration is not instrumentalised by the parties, publicity which could also concern the debates and the documents produced. These admittedly very high requirements would in return give great credibility to the resulting award, justifying its scope, and one could consider labeling such a result, a label that the company could claim.  The author concludes that these transformations would move away so much from Arbitration that it would denature it, in particular because of the absence of litigation, but this allows Companies to outsource the management of the more and more heavier responsibility engendered by Compliance Law, by offering Compagnies the assistance of a judicial authority, as soon as the procedural guarantees are reinforced. -

► Full Reference:  Oumedjkane,  A., Tehrani, A. & Idoux, P.,  Public Norms and Compliance in times of Crisis: Monumental Goals tested: Elements for a Problematic,  in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published.   ► Article Summary (done by the authors): In this paper, compliance refers to the fact that large private firms, through internal procedures designed to abide by public norms, participate in achieving the goals set out by public authorities, as the latter cannot reach those goals without help (proper functioning of financial markets, environment protection, fight against the corruption…). While in times outside a crisis period, the need to maintain a close link between public norms and compliance to achieve those “monumental goals” has been established, the validity of this analysis must be assessed during crisis periods. Indeed, to put an end to the turmoil as soon as possible, it is tempting to rely primarily on public authorities.  Should then be studied, in the light of the health crisis, the possibility that the link between public norms and compliance be altered in times of crisis. Not only is the normative reaction of public authorities very intense during the period, but some features of the compliance could lead one to think that compliance is in no way useful in a context of emergency and instability. This paper nevertheless suggests that to achieve monumental goals, it is necessary to maintain a close link between public norms and compliance. Such a link was maintained indeed, even at the height of the health crisis, and this should probably also be the case beyond this period, as breaking the link involves some risks which are not specific to the current health crisis. In other words, despite its shortcomings, compliance may not lose all its assets in times of crisis. -     📕 read the general presentation of the book

Full Reference : Amico, Th., Compliance or the passage from ex post to ex ante: a Compernican revolution for the criminal lawyer?, in M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 165-172.   See the General Presentation of the book   - Article Summary (done by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche) After referring to various definitions of Compliance Law, the author insists on the usefulness of the criminal lawyer in that he, familiar with the Ex Post that constitutes the sanction, can be of good advice. in the Ex Ante in which new compliance mechanisms are being developed, such as risk mapping or third party assessment. Addressing the punitive dimension of Compliance Law, the author shows that the criminal lawyer therefore naturally has a place there, whether it concerns the powers exercised by an administrative authority or the criminal law itself. In that he can "anticipate criminal proceedings", the criminal lawyer is therefore best able to ensure that the company does not expose itself to them, in particular in a good mastery of internal investigations, thus ruling out the criminal risk.   Read the other articles summaries.     -      

Full Reference : Calandri, L, Incentive(s) and Self-Regulation(s): what place for Compliance Law in the Audiovisual Sector?, in M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 131-140.   See the General Presentation of the book   - Article Summary (done by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche) The author has taken the audiovisual sector, "pilot" in the matter, to measure very precisely the way in which in France the jurisprudence of the Conseil d'État (French Council of State) has introduced a logic of Compliance by leaving the operators free to organize themselves, while supervising them. After allowing, by the 2016 decisions Fairvest and Société Numéricable, the judicial control of acts of Soft Law, in particular those issued by the French Audiovisual Regulator, the Conseil d'État has organized a more flexible relation between Sector and Regulator, the author referring the Regulator's declaration that he is not the "gendarme" of this sector. The French Council of State isolates among its acts those which are only incentive and escape the control by the judge, in the same way as acts of soft law adopted by the companies of the sector, expression of a self-regulation, They also escape litigation and are therefore also "unjustifiable". The author concludes that this completely renovates the governance of the sector, the Regulator by becoming more the arbiter and the supervisor of this new soft law.   Read the other articles summaries.     -      

Full reference : Salah, M. M., Conception and Application of Compliance in Africa , in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) / Bruylant, 2021, pp. 183-198.   Consult an overview of the volume in which the article was published.   - Summary of the article (summary done by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche) The author presents the way in which Compliance, which may seem "insurmountable" in Africa in particular with regard to corruption, even terrorism, a gravity offset by the prevalence of the group's solidarity on the Weberian conception of Law, nevertheless aims to  "deploy" in Africa. He describes the way in which in certain African countries the Compliance mechanisms have been established, under the influence of international institutions requiring first of all the autonomy of economic structures vis-à-vis social structures and then relaxing them so that they are more "human" and therefore more "sustainable". Under the aegis of the United Nations, anti-corruption programs have been particularly deployed. But the African Union and sub-regional organizations have also helped design and implement anti-corruption programs, for example through the adoption of uniform laws. In addition, the extraterritorial effect of foreign laws, in particular the FCPA, Bribery Act and Sapin 2, increases this anchoring of Compliance. The article shows that Compliance, legally translated, has  transformed classical Law branches. Firstly, banking and financial law welcomes it more readily, since it tends to be globally standardized, African legal systems participating in this globalization, and imposes on financial institutions and beyond a general obligation of vigilance, in particular as regards the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, an obligation to alert and specific criminal liability of legal persons. Secondly, all African legislation has for purpose to fight against  corruption through Compliance, which mainly requires prevention. But the author measures the Compliance tools' effectiveness ("that is to say their ability to produce the desired results") which is often still limited in Africa. This is mainly due to the conjunction between the size of the informal sector, notably hampering 'identification" of the actors, and the weakness of the State structures which, allied to the low level of banking services and the still weak culture of writing and recording, leaves the system without crucial operators who could be entrusted with the realization of Compliance Law. The author concludes that it is not the risk of national sanction that leads operators to respect the Compliance rules but the fear of losing markets by the external threat of international actors and the damage to their local and abroad reputation. The weakness of State structures affecting the effectiveness of Compliance as it affects everything thing, the author underlines that Compliance tools must be strengthened but also reinforce the more general mechanisms, such as judicial review. More specifically, Compliance should be less expensive because African States often cannot bear it cost, only the subsidiaries of large foreign private groups can do so, which leads to abandoning Compliance at the will of the private sector, a phenomenon regrettable, whereas public supervisors do not have the means to exercise their political and technical control function. -   Consult the summaries of the other articles composing the book.