Methodology

Articles

📧Deliberative rationality” and the proper use of the vigilance imperative

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La "rationalité délibérative" et l'usage adéquat de l'impératif de vigilance" (""Deliberative rationality" and the proper use of the vigilance imperative"), Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 6 April 2023. - 📧Read by freely subscribing other news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation - 🔴The deliberative public space, a model method for the implementation of the duty of vigilance In this new article of April 6, 2023 of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, the political philosophy construction that Habermas exposes about social networks and the method that the implementation of the duty of vigilance requires are correlated. Indeed, Habermas continues to advocate a space for discussion, contradiction, deliberation, opinion that can act with rationality. Communication and mediation are essential to ensure that the future, which is the object of vigilance, will not be a catastrophe: this monumental goal of compliance, of which Vigilance is a part, implies it. - 📧read the article ⤵️  - 🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

Articles

COLLARD, Christophe and Roquilly, Christophe

Les risques juridiques et leur cartographie : proposition de méthodologie (Legal Risks and Their Mapping: proposition of Methodology)

Full reference: Collard, C., and Roquilly, C., Les risques juridiques et leur cartographie : proposition de méthodologie (Legal Risks and Their Mapping: proposition of Methodology), La Revue des Sciences de Gestion, vol. 263-264, no. 5, 2013, pp. 45-55. Sciences Po's students can read this article via Sciences Po's Drive in the folder MAFR – Regulation & Compliance

I-2.0: Is there a compelling need for neutral action in regulated economic sectors ? ?

TRANSLATED SUMMARIES ENGLISH “Acting in a neutral way” is an oxymoron. “Companies often require however that States use their powers in a neutral way (eg tax neutrality). In regulated sectors, some are right or even duty , of not being neutral. Firstly, it is the State, which requires the market for other purposes, other temporalities and other values​​. Secondly, they are also the “crucial operators”, which are sort of regulators of second degree, such as transmission system operators or companies capital markets firms. The difficulty increases when the systeme requires neutrality of regulators and judges, when first build economic policy and the second create jurisprudence. Their consistency, impartiality and rationality can create an objectifiable neutralitys FRENCH «Agir de façon neutre» est un oxymoron. «Les entreprises ont souvent besoin, cependant, que les États utilisent leurs pouvoirs de manière neutre (neutralité fiscale par exemple). Dans les secteurs réglementés, certains ont le droit ou même le devoir de ne pas être neutre. Tout d’abord, c’est l’État, qui insère le marché à d’autres fins, d’autres temporalités et d’autres valeurs. En second lieu, ils sont aussi les «opérateurs crucial», qui sont des sortes de régulateurs du second degré : par exemple les opérateurs de réseaux de transport ou de entreprises de marchés financiers. La difficulté augmente lorsque le systeme économique et politique exige la neutralité des autorités de régulation et des juges, alors que les premiers construisent la politique économique et les seconds construisent la jurisprudence. Le respect qu’ils doivent avoir de l’impartialité et d’une rationalité suffisamment objectivables pourra permettre cette objectivité requise.

I-1.40: Where should the regulatory intervention of the French Competition Authority in the credit/debit card sector end?

Translated Summaries In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors ENGLISH Interchange fees set by the main credit/debit card associations play an important role in the retail banking sector, however they remain largely invisible to consumers.   FRENCH Les frais d’interchange fixés par les principales associations de cartes de crédit jouent un rôle important dans le secteur des services bancaires de détail, mais ils restent largement invisibles pour les consommateurs. SPANISH Tasas de intercambio establecidas por las asociaciones principales de tarjetas de crédito/débito juegan un rol importante en el sector de negocio de bancario minorista. No obstante, permanecen por la mayor parte invisibles a los consumidores. ITALIAN Le commissioni interscambio su carte di credito/debito fissate dalle principali associazioni giocano un ruolo importante nel settore dell’attività bancaria al dettaglio, tuttavia sono ancora poco visibili ai consumatori. ARABIC  رُسوم التبادُل التي وُضِعت مِن طرفِ جمعيات بطاقة الائتمان لها دورُ أساسي في مَجال المصرفية للخدمات الافرادية, لكِنَّ بقِيت هذِهِ الرُّسُوم غيرُ ظاهِرة لِكثِير المُستهلِكين.  ……………… Other translations forthcoming.  

I-1.39: An illustration of regulation’s irony: how Moody’s downgraded 12 German banks after regulatory change.

Translated Summaries In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors ENGLISH While financial regulation aims at achieving market stability, regulating markets can sometimes take an ironic turn when regulations end up having consequences that differ from their original regulatory purpose. The article provides such an example of regulation’s irony: how a regulatory change in Germany led Moody’s to downgrade 12 banks, therefore weakening such institutions and consequently enhancing the current issues of market volatility and credit cost.   FRENCH Bien que la réglementation financière vise à assurer la stabilité du marché, la régulation des marchés peut parfois prendre une tournure ironique quand la régulation finit par avoir des conséquences qui diffèrent de son objectif de régulation d’origine. L’article fournit un exemple de l’ironie de la régulation : comment un changement de réglementation en Allemagne a conduit Moody’s à déclasser 12 banques allemandes,, donc à affaiblir ces institutions et par conséquent à accroître les problèmes actuels de la volatilité du marché et le coût du crédit. ITALIAN Quando la regolazione è volta ad ottenere la stabilità del mercato, l’evoluzione di questi mercati oggetto di tale regolazione può essere particolarmente ironica quando la regolazione ha delle conseguenze ben differenti da quelle originariamente prepostesi. Questo articolo cerca quindi di mettere in evidenza un esempio di questa ironia: in effetti, un cambio di regolatore in Germania ha portato Moody’s a tagliare il rating di 12 banche, indebolendo ancora di più tali istituzioni ed aumentando si conseguenza le questioni relative alla volatilità del mercato e del costo del credito. ………………….. Other translations forthcoming

I-1.31: The Competition Authority between “regulation” and competition policiy

Translated Summaries ENGLISH Two and a half years after having been established by the LME, the French Competition Authority has uncontestably acquired its “place in the sun” amongst the competition authorities of other countries, as demonstrated by multiple indicators.   ITALIAN Articolo: L’Autorità garante della concorrenza tra “regolazione” e politica in materia di concorrenza Due anni e mezzo dopo l’instaurazione da parte del LME, l’Autorità francese garante della libera concorrenza ha trovato il suo posto tra le diverse autorità degli altri paesi, così come è stato dimostrato da diversi indicatori. SPANISH Artículo: La Autoridad de la competencia, entre “regulación” y política competitiva.   Después de dos años y medio de haber sido establecido por el LME, la Autoridad francesa de la competencia ha incontestablemente adquirido su “lugar bajo el sol” entre las autoridades de la competencia de otros países, como demostrado por varios indicadores. ………………… Other translations forthcoming.

Books

Analyse économique du droit