Criminal Law

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Le jugeant-jugé. Articuler les mots et les choses face à l'éprouvant conflit d'intérêts" ("The Judge-Judged. Articulating words and things in the face of the testing conflict of interest"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche, (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 59-80.  - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Since the topic of this article is part of a chapter devoted to the Company established as Prosecutor and Judge of itself by Compliance Law, chapter aiming to use the relevant qualifications, it is appropriate therefore to worry about the adjustment of words and things, of the way in which the relationship between ones and the others evolve, and of the more particular question of knowing if this evolution is radical or not when one speaks of "judge ". because "judging" is a word that the Law has disputed with other disciplines, but that it has appropriated not so much to confer more powers on those who act in its name, for example that who supervise and punish, but on the contrary to impose limits, since to the one who judges it has put the chains of the procedure under foot, thus making bearable for the other the exercise of such a power. Therefore, those who want the power to judge would often want to not have the title, because having de jure the title of judge is being subject to the correlated regime, it is to be submitted to procedural correctness. It is therefore to better limit that the Law sees who judges, for obliging this so-powerful character to the procedure. But the Law also has the power to appoint a judge and to fix the contours of all the characters in the trial. He usually does it with clarity, distinguishing the ones of the others, not confusing them. This art of distinction has constitutional value. Thus, not only the one who judges must be named "judge" but the procedural apparatus which goes with this character, and which constitutes a way of doing things and fundamental rights, are not "granted" by kindness or in a second step: it is a block. If you didn't want to have to endure procedural rights, you didn't have to want to be a judge. Admittedly, one could conclude that the procedure would therefore have become "substantial"; by this elevation, it is rather a fashion of saying that the procedure would no longer be a "servant": it is a kind of declaration of love for the procedure, as long as one affirms that at the acts of judging , or investigating, or prosecuting, are "naturally" attached the procedural rights for the one who is likely to be the object of these powers. Compliance Law, in search of allies to achieve the Monumental Goals for the aims of which it was instituted, will require, or even demand, private companies to go and seek themselves, in particular through investigations. internal or active vigilance on others, for finding facts likely to be reproached to them. Compliance Law will also require that they prosecute those who have committed these acts. Compliance La will again demand that they sanction the acts that people have committed in their name. This is clearly understood from the point of view of Ex Ante efficiency. The confusion of roles is often very efficient since it is synonymous with the accumulation of powers. For example, it is more efficient that the one who pursues is also the one who instructs and judges, since he knows the case so well… Besides, it is more efficient that he also elaborates the rules, so he knows better than anyone the "spirit" of the texts. This was often emphasized in Regulatory Law. When everything is Information and risk management, that would be necessary … But all this is not obvious. For two reasons, one external and the other internal. Externally, the first reason is that it is not appropriate to "name" a judge who is not. This would be too easy, because it would then be enough to designate anyone, or even to do it oneself to appropriate the regime that goes with it, in particular for obtain a so-called legitimate power for obtaining that others obey even though they are not subordinate or from them they transmit information, even though they would be  competitors: it would then be necessary to remember that only the Law is able to appoint judge ; in this new Compliance era, companies would be judges, prosecutors, investigators!  Maybe, if the Law says it, but if it didn't, it would be necessary to come back to this tautology … But are we in such a radicalism? Moreover, do judges have "the prerogative" of judgment and the Law has not admitted this power for companies to judge for a long time? As soon as the procedure is there in Ex Ante and the control of the judge in Ex Post? The second reason, internal to the company, situation on which the article focuses, is that the company investigates itself, judges itself, sanctions itself. However, the legal person expressing its will only through its organs, we underline in practice the difficulties for the same human being to formulate grievances, as he/she is the agent of the legal person, addressed to the natural person that he/she himself/herself is. The two interests of the two are not the same, are often opposed; how the secrets of one can be kept with respect to the other, represented by the same individual? … It is all the mystery, even the artifice of legal personality that appears and we understand better that Compliance Law no longer wants to use this strange classical notion. Because all the rules of procedure cannot mask that to prosecute oneself does not make more sense than to contract with oneself. This conflict of interest is impossible to resolve because naming the same individual X then naming him/her Y, by declaring open the dispute between them does not make sense. This dualism, which is impossible to admit when it comes to playing these functions with regard to corporate officers, can come back to life by setting up third parties who will carry secrets and oppositions. For example, by the designation of two separate lawyers for the human being agent and the human being representative of the legal person, each lawyer being able to have secrets for each other and to oppose each other. These spaces of reconstitution of the so "natural" oppositions in procedure between the one who judges and the one who is judged can also take the technological form of platforms: where there is no longer anyone, where the process has replaced the procedure, there is no longer any human judgment. We can thus see that the fear of conflicts of interest is so strong that we resign ourselves to saying that only the machine would be "impartial", a derisory conception of impartiality, against which it is advisable to fight. This then leads to a final question: can the company claim to exercise the jurisdictional power to prosecute and judge and investigate without even claiming to be a prosecutor, an investigating judge, or a court? The company's advantage would be to be able to escape the legal regime that classical Law attaches to its words, mainly the rights of the defense and the rights of action for others, the principle of publicity of justice for everyone, which expresses the link between procedure and democracy. When Facebook said on June 12, 2021 "react" to the decision of May 5, 2021, adopted by what would only be an Oversight Board to decide "as a consequence" of a 2-year suspension of Donald Trump's account, the art of qualifications seem to be used in order to avoid any regime constraint. But this art of euphemism is very old. Thus, the States, when they wanted to increase repression, presented the transformation of the system as a softening of it through the "decriminalization" of Economic Law, transferred from the criminal courts to the independent administrative agencies. The efficiency was greatly increased, since the guarantees of the Criminal Procedure ceased to apply. But 20 years later, Words found their way back to Things: under Criminal Law, slept the "criminal matter", which requires the same "Impartiality". In 1996, a judge once affirmed it and everything was changed. Let us therefore wait for what the Courts will say, since they are the masters of qualifications, as Article 12 of the French Code of Civil Procedure says, as Motulsky wrote it in 1972. Law has time. - 🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

► Full Reference: S. Schiller, "Un juge unique en cas de manquement international à des obligations de compliance ?" ("A single judge in the event of an international breach of compliance obligations?"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 453-464.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author, translated by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Given the very international nature of the topic apprehended, the actors involved and therefore the compliance disputes, it is essential to know if a person can be implicated before several judges, attached to different states or even if he can be condemned by several jurisdictions. The answer is given by the non bis in idem principle, which is the subject of a abondant case law on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol n°7 of the ECHR, clearly inapplicable for jurisdictions emanating from different States. To assess whether breaches of compliance obligations may be subject to multiple sanctions in different states, it will first be necessary to ascertain whether there is a textual basis to be invoked. At European level, Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights now allows the principle of ne bis in idem to be invoked. Applicable to all areas of compliance, it provides very strong protection which covers not only sanctions, but also prosecutions. Like its effects, the scope of Article 50 is very broad. The procedures concerned are those which have a repressive nature, beyond those pronounced by criminal courts in the strict sense, which makes it possible to cover the convictions pronounced by one of the many regulatory authorities competent in matters of compliance. Internationally, the situation is less clear. Article 14-7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may be invoked, if several obstacles are overcome, including the decision of 2 November 1987 of the Human Rights Committee which restricted it to the internal framework, requiring a double conviction by the same State. Even if these principles are applicable, two specificities of compliance situations risk hampering their application, the first related to the applicable procedural rules, in particular the rules of jurisdiction, the second related to the specificities of the situation. The application of the non bis in idem rule is only formally accepted with regard to universal jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, that is to say extraterritorial jurisdiction, which is only part of the jurisdiction. . The Cour de cassation (French Judiciary Supreme Court) confirmed this in the famous so-called “Oil for food” judgment of March 14, 2018. The refusal to recognize this principle as universal, regardless of the jurisdiction rule in question, deprives French companies of a defense. Moreover, the repression of breaches of compliance rules is more and more often resolved through transactional mechanisms. The latter will not always fall within the scope of European and international rules laying down the non bis in idem principle, for lack of being sometimes qualified as "final judgment" under the terms of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 14-7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Breaches in terms of compliance are often based on multiple acts. This results from prescriptions the starting point of which is delayed at the last event and a facilitated jurisdiction for French courts when only one of the constitutive facts is found in France. In terms of compliance, the non bis in idem principle therefore generally does not protect companies and does not prevent them from being sued before the courts of two different countries for the same case. It nevertheless grants them another protection by obliging them to take into account foreign decisions in determining the amount of the penalty. The sanction against Airbus SE in the Judicial Convention of Public Interest (CJIP) of January 29, 2020 is a perfect illustration of this. Breaches in terms of compliance are often based on multiple acts. This causes delays in the starting point of prescriptions, starting point delayed at the last event, and this facilitates judicial jurisdiction for French courts when only one of the constitutive facts is found in France. In terms of compliance, the non bis in idem principle therefore generally does not protect companies and does not prevent them from being sued before the courts of two different countries for the same case. It nevertheless grants them another protection by obliging them to take into account foreign decisions in determining the amount of the penalty. The sanction against Airbus SE in the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public -CJIP (French Judicial Convention of Public Interest)  of January 29, 2020 is a perfect illustration of this. -

► Full Reference: A. Bavitot, "Le façonnage de l'entreprise par les accords de justice pénale négociée" ("Shaping the company through negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 187-198.   - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Negotiated justice is "the situation in which the criminal conflict is the object of a trade in the etymological sense of the term negotio, i.e. a debate between the parties to reach an agreement". Thus, the French legislator has succumbed to globalized mimicry by creating the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public (Public Interest Judicial Agreement), first in matters of probity and then in environmental matters. What is the nature of this deal of justice? Validated by a judge's order, it does not entail any declaration of guilt, has neither the nature nor the effects of a judgment of conviction and is not registered in the judicial record. Possible at the investigation stage as well as at the pre-trial stage, the Public Interest Judicial Agreement is original in that it makes it possible to avoid either the prosecutor's proceedings or the judge's wrath. A detailed study of the agreements signed shows that in order to negotiate in the best possible way, the company can and must shape itself. The company will shape the facts of its agreement, shape its charge and, finally, shape its sentence. The article offers a concrete analysis of these three dimensions of corporate shaping to better approach understanding the legal nature of negotiated criminal justice agreements. -

► Full Reference: F.-X. Train, "Arbitration and parallel proceedings exercised in Compliance Procedure", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published.  - ► the summary below describes the article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021.  In the book, the article will be published in the Chapter III, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage international. - ► Article Summary:  Firstly, the article insists on the principle of the autonomy of the international arbitration procedure, in relation to which parallel procedures remain watertight, whether they are criminal or done under Compliance Law. In the arbitral proceedings taking place independently, the arbitrators before whom the facts also referred to in these parallel proceedings, in particular the facts of corruption, are alleged before them as facts through their unlawful nature: it is at this title that they can and must apprehend them, using the standard of proof which is the bundle of clues. Secondly, the article highlights the limits of the autonomy of international arbitration. These may be de facto limits because in the search for evidence by arbitrators, red flags are often insufficiently consistent evidence to establish a sentence, especially since this sentence may be subject to control by the judge of its conformity to international public order, the annulment by the judge being able to be based on external elements, even after the arbitration procedure. It may then be wise for the arbitrators, who are not forced to do so, to suspend their proceedings to wait the results of the parallel proceedings initiated under Compliance Law, so that the procedures and their results could be harmonious. - 📘 read the general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published -

► Référence complète : M. Segonds, "Compliance, proportionnalité et sanction" ("Compliance, proportionality and sanction"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2022, pp. 231-244. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Before devoting the developments of his article to the sole perspective of sanctions imposed under "Anti-corruption Compliance", the author recalls in a more general way that, as is the sanction, Compliance is in essence proportional: Proportionality is inherent to Compliance as it conditions any sanction, including a sanction imposed under Compliance. This link between Proportionality and Compliance has been underlined by the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence française anticorruption – AFA) with regard to risk mapping, which must measure risks to arrive at effective and proportional measures. This same spirit of proportionality animates the recommendations of the AFA which are intended to apply according to the size of the company and its concrete organisation. It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on one hand to Criminal Law, centered on the requirement of proportionality. Punitive sanctions It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on the other hand to the disciplinary power of the manager who, from other sources of law, must integrate the legal requirement of proportionality when he/she applies external and internal compliance norms. -

► Full Reference : G. Beaussonie, "Droit pénal et Compliance font-ils système ?" ("Do Criminal Law and Compliance form a system?"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2022, pp. 157-166. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): By nature, Criminal Law is a system that is not intended to develop, principles which limit it being internal to it. Nevertheless if Proportionality is respected, its extension may be legitimate to preserve “fundamental social values” because Criminal Law is the branch of Law concerning what is grave, grave in consequences as in causes. Not always being concerned by Efficiency, the temptation is important to supplement Criminal Law with other repressive mechanisms , not only Administrative Repression but today Compliance which pursues concordant objectives and aims by the "Goals Monumental ”to what would be most important and therefore for which Efficiency would be required, in particular because victory (for example against corruption) should be global. Efficiency is obtained by the internalisation in powerful companies, but this efficiency comes at a price and Criminal Law should not impose too many obligations to do maintaining only a potential link with the commission of a "real offense ”. Its association with Compliance can therefore also only be exceptional and must not lead to forget  that Freedom must always remain the principle. -  

🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐subscribe to the  Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law - ► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance, Artificial Intelligence and Business Management: the right measure" ("Compliance, Intelligence artificielle et gestion des entreprises : la juste mesure"), participation to the Conference coordinated by Mustapha Mekki, L'intelligence artificielle et la gestion des entreprises. July 1st, 2022.  - 🎥 see the conference (in French) -  consult the slides having been used as brief notes for deliver the lecture (inf French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper having been used as basis for this conference - 📝This work will be the basis for an article. - ► Summary of the Lecture: Of the next European Regulation on artificial intelligence, the European Commission has a quite neutral conception of AI for obtaining a consensus between the Member States, while the Regulators and certain States have a more substantial conception of technology, wanting its power to be used to protect people, firstly from these new tools themselves, secondly from what is an amplification of the evils of the classic world, such as hate or misinformation. This is the reflection of two conceptions of Compliance. Firstly, Compliance can be defined as neutral processes that increase the effectiveness of what would be the obligation for companies or their desire for efficient risk management (in particular the consideration of "legal risks") to prove being "conform" to all regulations that are applicable to itself and all persons to whom the firm is accountable. This is often referred to as the "compliance obligation" or "obligation of conformity". This conception implies considerable practical consequences for the company which, in order to succeed in this "total exploit", would then have to resort to artificial intelligence tools constituting a "total and infallible solution", which mechanically generate for it the obligation to "know " all the "regulatory mass", to detect all "non-compliances", to conceive its relationship to the Law in terms of "risk of non-compliance", fully supported by Compliance by Design which could, without human intervention , eliminate legal risk and ensure "compliance total efficiency" in Ex Ante. The "legal price" of this technological dream is extremely high because all the "regulatory" requirements will then be transformed into obligations of result, any failure generating liability. The Compliance probationary system will become overwhelming for the company, both in terms of burden of proof, means of proof, and transfers, without exemption from proof. Objective responsibilities for others will multiply. The "law of conformity" will multiply Ex Ante systemic penalties, the border with criminal law being less and less preserved. It is essential to avoid this, both for businesses and for the Rule of Law. For this, we must use Artificial Intelligence to its proper extent: it may constitute a "massive aid", without ever claiming to be a total and infallible solution, because it is the human who must be at the center of the compliance system functioning thank to the firms and not the machinery. For this, it is necessary to adopt a substantial conception of Compliance Law (and not a sort of Conformity Law or Obedience Law). It does not at all cover all the applicable regulations and it is not at all "neutral", being in no way a series of processes. This new branch of Law is substantially built on Monumental Goals. These are either of a negative nature (preventing a systemic crisis from happening, in many but specific perspectives: banking, financial, health, climate, etc.), or of a positive nature (building a better balance, in particular between human beings, in the company and beyond). In this conception which appears more and more strongly, artificial intelligence finds its place, more modest. As Compliance Law is based on information, Artificial Intelligence is essential to capture it and make first connections, first stages for successive analyses, done by human beings, making what is essential: the commitment of the company, both by the leaders and by all those who are "embarked" by a "culture of Compliance" which is at both built and common. This restores the required seal between Criminal Law and what can be asked of the mechanical use of Artificial Intelligence; this puts the obligation of means back as a principle. This restores the principal place to the lawyer and the compliance officer, so that the culture of compliance is articulated with the specificities of a sector and the identity of the company itself. Indeed, the culture of compliance being inseparable from a culture of values, Compliance by design requires a dual technique, both mathematical and legal culture. It is why European Compliance Law, because it is rooted in the European humanist tradition, is a model. - For further: 📘Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022 📘Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, 2022 📘Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, 2021 📓Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'apport du Droit de la Compliance à la Gouvernance d'Internet, 2019  📕Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019 📕Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017 📕 Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Internet, espace d'interrégulation, 2016 📝 Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance law,  2022, 📝 Frison-Roche, M.-A., Role and Place of Companies in the Creation and Effectiveness of Compliance Law in Crisis, 2022 📝 Frison-Roche, M.-A., Assessment of Whistleblowing, and the duty of Vigilance, 2022 📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Drawing up Risk Maps as an obligation and the paradox of he "compliance risks", 2021 -

► Full Reference: Segonds, M., Compliance, Proportionality and Sanction. The example of the sanctions taken by the French Anticorruption Agency, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.),Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published. - ► Article Summary:  Before devoting the developments of his article to the sole perspective of sanctions imposed under "Anti-corruption Compliance", the author recalls in a more general way that, as is the sanction, Compliance is in essence proportional: Proportionality is inherent to Compliance as it conditions any sanction, including a sanction imposed under Compliance. This link between Proportionality and Compliance has been underlined by the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence française anticorruption – AFA) with regard to risk mapping, which must measure risks to arrive at effective and proportional measures. This same spirit of proportionality animates the recommendations of the AFA which are intended to apply according to the size of the company and its concrete organisation. It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on one hand to Criminal Law, centered on the requirement of proportionality. Punitive sanctions It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on the other hand to the disciplinary power of the manager who, from other sources of law, must integrate the legal requirement of proportionality when he/she applies external and internal compliance norms. -     📘see the general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published   -

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, " Definition of Proportionality and Definition of  Compliance Law", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, p. - ► Article Summary: The use of Proportionality t always limit powers is only justified when it is about sanctions, but sanctions are only one tool among others in Compliance Law, intended moreover to have little place in this Ex Ante branch of Law. And returning to the very nature of Compliance Law, which relies on operators, private or public, because they are powerful, then using proportionality to limite powers is detrimental to Compliance Law.  However, nothing requires that. Compliance Law is not an exception that should be limited. On the contrary, it is a branch of Law which carries the greatest principles, aimed at protecting human beings and whose Normativity lies in its "Monumental Goals": detecting and preventing future major systemic crisis (financial, health and climate ones). However, literally the principle of Proportionality is: "no more powers than necessary, as many powers as necessary". The second part of the sentence is independent of the first: this must be used. Politics having fixed these Monumental Goals, the entity, in particular the company, must have, even tacitly, "all the necessary powers" to achieve them. For example, the power of vigilance, the power of audit, the power over third parties. Because they are necessary to fulfill the obligations that these "crucial operators" must perform as they are "in a position" to do so. So instead of limiting the powers, the Principe of Proportionality comes to support the powers, to legitimize them and to increase them, so that we have a chance that our future is not catastrophic, perhaps better. In this respect, Compliance Law, in its rich Definition, will itself have enriched the Principle of Proportionality. -   🚧read the Working Paper, with technical developments, references, and hypertext links. - 📘go to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published - ► read the presentations of the other Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's contributions in this book:  📝Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law,  📝 Role and Place of Companies in the Creation and Effectiveness of Compliance Law in Crisis,  📝 Assessment of Whistleblowing and the duty of Vigilance -

► Full Reference complète : Beaussonie, G., Do Criminal Law and Compliance form a system?, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.),Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published. - ► Article Summary:  By nature, Criminal Law is a system that is not intended to develop, principles which limit it being internal to it. Nevertheless if Proportionality is respected, its extension may be legitimate to preserve “fundamental social values” because Criminal Law is the branch of Law concerning what is grave, grave in consequences as in causes. Not always being concerned by Efficiency, the temptation is important to supplement Criminal Law with other repressive mechanisms , not only Administrative Repression but today Compliance which pursues concordant objectives and aims by the "Goals Monumental ”to what would be most important and therefore for which Efficiency would be required, in particular because victory (for example against corruption) should be global. Efficiency is obtained by the internalisation in powerful companies, but this efficiency comes at a price and Criminal Law should not impose too many obligations to do maintaining only a potential link with the commission of a "real offense ”. Its association with Compliance can therefore also only be exceptional and must not lead to forget  that Freedom must always remain the principle. -     📝 Read the  general presentation of the book in which this article is published.   -

► Full Reference:  André, Ch., State sovereignty, popular sovereignty: what social contract for compliance?, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published. -   ► Article Summary (done par the Author):  The “Compliance Monumental Goals” serve as vectors for “common” social values: the proposal is simple, but it seems both familiar and strange to a criminal lawyer. Familiar, because even if compliance transcends the borders of academic disciplines, it shares with criminal law a logic sanctioning attacks on social interests. Strange, because Monumental Goals convey social values by sweeping away all the learned discussions that have been going on since Beccaria about the foundations and axiological functions of punishment. Indeed, the social values promoted by Monumental Goals are “common” in every sense of the word. First, they are shared and internalized by the largest enterprises in the Western world, without the need for an international treaty on protected values. The question of sovereignty is overshadowed. Second, they are common in that they are commonplace, ordinary, approved of by most Western consumer-citizens: probity, equality, respect for the environment, who would not be in favour of respecting them? Hence it is in companies’ interest to communicate and diffuse, urbi and orbi, how they respect these Monumental Goals. The question of citizens’ consensus on values is sidestepped, as they are supposed to be derived from the obvious (even if the goals could be achieved by different means, or even contradict each other). Third, these values are common because they now enlist a multitude of communicants (the “compliance officer”, among others) who, more or less gracefully – the meticulous liturgy of compliance can put off some officiants and incite buffoonery – seek to spread the cult of these values at all levels of business. Since these values are respected, they are necessarily respectable: businesses become moralized by the multitude who respect them. Existence precedes essence, and the values conveyed contribute to the businesses’ raison d’être, beyond the pursuit of profit. The question of effectiveness vanishes, since these values are already there, regularly monitored, both internally and by public authorities. Sovereignty, citizenship, effectiveness: the logic of Compliance supplants the academic debates of criminal lawyers with practical solutions. Perhaps this is how the goals are “monumental”: vast, global, overwhelming. Compliance may not be the best of all worlds, but it is most certainly another world. -   📘  read the general presentation of the book in which this article is published -    

► It is in its "Risk and Compliance" section that the Wall Street Journal, by its article of June 18, 2021 (➡️📝Europe's Chief Prosecutor Has 300 Cases on Her Plate Already), presents the first steps of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, since June 1, 2021. This inclusion presupposes that it is through a Compliance Law perspective that this new body must be understood, in order to understand and anticipate its action. ►In this perspective : ➡️📧Frison-Roche, M.-A., European Public Prosecutor's Office comes on stage: the company having itself become a private prosecutor, are we going towards an alliance of all prosecutors?, June 2, 2021 ➡️ 💬Frison-Roche, « Le parquet européen est un apport considérable au Droit de la Compliance » (“The European Public Prosecutor's Office is a remarkable contribution to Compliance Law"), June 14, 2021   I. AN ACTION THAT WILL FOCUS ON FIGHTING THE MEANS USED TO DAMAGE THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION The article of the Wall Street Journal takes the form of an interview with the European Prosecutor. Her responses also confirm the consubstantial link between European Public Prosecutor's Office and Compliance Law. It is remarkable that she immediately says that she hopes the treatment of many cases, especially on healthcare and infrastructure sectors: "Our expectation is to have more cases, especially in the healthcare system, in public procurement, infrastructure, and also in agriculture ". However, the 2017 European Regulation which established the European Public Prosecutor’s Office said that its "mandate" is to prosecute offenses affecting the "financial interests of the European Union", without being hampered by the cumbersome procedures for cooperation between States while these offenses are most often cross-border. But one could think that, knowingly taking the means (corruption, money laundering) for the goal, the European Public Prosecutor's Office would immediately pursue not only the defense of the financial interests of the Union (admittedly financial interests damaged by corruption or money laundering) but these facts themselves: thus the European Public Prosecutor's Office works with the European Supervisory Authorities, in particular banking and financial authorities, which fight in Ex Ante against these offenses and prevent them.   II. AN ACTION THAT FOCUSES ON SECTORS NOT LEGALLY REGULATED IN EX ANTE BY SECTORAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES Moreover, it will be noted that the European Prosecutor is targeting three economic sectors which are not "regulated sectors" in the legal sense of the qualification, that is to say not monitored by a sectoral Regulatory and/or Supervision Authority: Health, Infrastructure and Agriculture. Thus, the power of Regulatory Law, which relies in its Ex Ante, and its weakness, which derives from the pre-required existence of a sectoral Authority, is compensated: the action of the Public Prosecutor's Office is not limited to legally regulated sectors. While Competition Authorities are mandated (➡️📅La concurrence dans tous ses états, June 25 and 26, 2021) to protect the competitive functioning of the markets, a Public Prosecutor's Office can deal with any infringement without having to determine a market. For instance, Infrastructures don't constitute pertinent markets but can constitute fields for criminal activities, such as corruption or money laundering, justifying Compliance Law mechanisms.  What the new European Prosecutor is aiming for, namely Health, Infrastructures and Agriculture, have undoubtedly been damaged both by the sole primacy of the Competition perspective and by a Criminal Law constrained by the difficult inter-State cooperation, even though they are not subject to a supranational Ex Ante Regulation. The European Public Prosecutor's Office aims to directly improve this, through Entreprises acting in Health, Infrastructures and Agriculture.  -   ► subscribe to the French Newsletter MaFR ComplianceTech®