Compliance Law

► An article from March 3, 2021, Smile for the camera: the dark side of China's emotion-recognition tech, then an article from June 16, 2021, "Every smile you fake" – an AI emotion – recognition system can assess how "happy" China's workers are in the office describes how a new technology of emotional recognition is able, through what will soon be out of fashion to call "facial recognition", to distinguish a smile that reflects a mind state of real satisfaction from a smile which does not correspond to it. This allows the employer to measure the suitability of the human being for his or her work. It is promised that it will be used in an ethical way, to improve well-being at work. But isn't it in itself that this technology is incompatible with any compensation through ethical support? The technology developed by a Chinese technology company and acquired by other Chinese companies with many employees, allows to have information on the actual state of mind of the person through and beyond his or her facial expressions and bodily behavior. Previously, the technology of emotional recognition had been developed to ensure security, by fighting against people with hostile plans, public authorities using it for example in the controls at airports to detect the criminal plans which some passengers could have. It is now affirmed that it is not about fighting against some evil people ("dangerousness") to protect the group before the act is committed ("social defense”) but that it is about helping all workers. Indeed, the use that will be made of it will be ethical, because first the people who work for these Chinese companies with global activity, like Huawaï, do it freely and have accepted the operation of these artificial intelligence tools (which is not the case with people who travel, control being then a kind of necessary evil that they do not have to accept, which is imposed on them for the protection of the group), but even and above all, the purpose is itself ethical: if it turns out that the person does not feel well at work, that they are not happy there, even before they are perhaps aware, the company can assist. Let’s take this practical case from the perspective of Law and let’s imagine that it is contested before a judge applying the principles of Western Law. Would this be acceptable? No, and for three reasons. 1. An "ethical use" cannot justify an unethical process in itself 2. The first freedoms are negative 3. "Consent" should not be the only principle governing the technological and digital space   I. AN "ETHICAL USE" CAN NEVER LEGITIMATE AN UNETHICAL PROCESS IN ITSELF These unethical processes in themselves cannot be made "acceptable" by an "ethical use" which will be made of them. This principle was especially reminded by Sylviane Agacinski in bioethics: if one cannot dispose of another through a disposition of his or her body which makes his or her very person available (see not. Agacinski, S., ➡️📗Le tiers-corps. Réflexions sur le don d’organes, 2018). Except to make the person reduced to the thing that his or her body is, which is not ethically admissible in itself, that is excluded, and Law is there in order to this is not possible. This is even why the legal notion of "person", which is not a notion that goes without saying, which is a notion built by Western thought, acts as a bulwark so that human beings cannot be fully available to others, for example by placing their bodies on the market (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝To protect human beings, the ethical imperative of the legal notion of person, 2018). This is why, for example, as Sylviane Agacinski emphasizes, there is no ethical slavery (a slave who cannot be beaten, who must be well fed, etc.). That the human being agrees ("and what about if it pleases me to be beaten?") does not change anything.   II. THE FIRST FREEDOM IS THE ONE TO SAY NO, FOR EXAMPLE BY REFUSING TO REVEAL YOUR EMOTIONS: FOR EXAMPLE HIDING IF YOU ARE HAPPY OR NOT TO WORK The first freedom is not positive (being free to say Yes); it is negative (being free to say No). For example, the freedom of marriage is having the freedom not to marry before having the freedom to marry: if one does not have the freedom not to marry, then the freedom to marry loses any value. Likewise, the freedom to contract implies the freedom not to contract, etc. Thus, freedom in the company can take the form of freedom of speech, which allows people, according to procedures established by Law, to express their emotions, for example their anger or their disapproval, through the strike. But this freedom of speech, which is a positive freedom, has no value unless the worker has the fundamental freedom not to express his or her emotions. For example if he or she is not happy with his or her job, because he or she does not appreciate what he or she does, or he or she does not like the place where he or she works, or he or she does not like people with whom he or she works, his or her freedom of speech demands that he or she have the right not to express it. If the employer has a tool that allows him or her to obtain information about what the worker likes and dislikes, then the employee loses this first freedom. In the Western legal order, we must be able to consider that it is at the constitutional level that the infringement is carried out through Law of Persons (on the intimacy between the Law of Persons and the Constitutional Law, see Marais , A., ➡️📕Le Droit des personnes, 2021).   III. CONSENT SHOULD NOT BE THE ONLY PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND DIGITAL SPACE   We could consider that the case of the company is different from the case of the controls operated by the State for the monitoring of airports, because in the first case observed people are consenting. "Consent" is today the central notion, often presented as the future of what everyone wants: the "regulation" of technology, especially when it takes the form of algorithms ("artificial intelligence"), especially in digital space. "Consent" would allow "ethical use" and could establish the whole (on these issues, see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝Having a good behavior in the digital space, 2019). "Consent" is a notion from which Law is today moving away in Law of Persons, in particular as regards the "consent" given by adolescents on the availability of their body, but not yet on digital. No doubt because in Contract Law, "consent" is almost synonymous with "free will", whereas they must be distinguished (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝Remarques sur la distinction entre la volonté et le consentement en Droit des contrats, 1995). But we see through this case, which precisely takes place in China, that "consent" is in Law as elsewhere a sign of submission. It is only in a probative way that it can constitute proof of a free will; this proof must not turn into an irrebuttable presumption. The Data Regulatory Authorities (for example in France the CNIL) seek to reconstitute this probative link between "consent" and "freedom to say No" so that technology does not allow by "mechanical consents", cut off from any connection with the principle of freedom which protects human beings, from dispossessing themselves (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., Yes to the principle of will, No to pure consents, 2018). The more the notion of consent will be peripheral, the more human beings will be able to be active and protected. -

🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law  - ► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law, Working Paper, August 2021 - 📝This Working Paper is the basis for the article, "Les buts monumentaux, cœur battant du droit de la compliance", constituting the introduction ⤵ 📕in its French version, of the book Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, in  the Series 📚Régulations & Compliance  📘in its English version, of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in the Series 📚Compliance & Regulation - ► Summary of the Working Paper: Compliance Law can be defined as the set of processes requiring companies to show that they comply with all the regulations that apply to them. It is also possible to  define this branch of Law by a normative heart: the "Monumental Goals". These explain the technical new legal solutions, thus made them clearer, accessible and anticipable. This definition is also based on a bet, that of caring for others that human beings can have in common, a universality.  Through the Monumental Goals, appears a definition of Compliance Law that is new, original, and specific. This new term "Compliance", even in non-English vocabulary, in fact designates a new ambition: that a systemic catastrophe shall not be repeated in the future. This Monumental Goal was designed by History, which gives it a different dimension in the United States and in Europe. But the heart is common in the West, because it is always about detecting and preventing what could produce a future systemic catastrophe, which falls under "negative monumental goals", even to act so that the future is positively different ("positive monumental goals"), the whole being articulated in the notion of "concern for others", the Monumental Goals thus unifying Compliance Law. In this, they reveal and reinforce the always systemic nature of Compliance Law, as management of systemic risks and extension of Regulation Law, outside of any sector, which makes solutions available for non-sector spaces, in particular digital space. Because wanting to prevent the future (preventing evil from happening; making good happen) is by nature political, Compliance Law by nature concretizes ambitions of a political nature, in particular in its positive monumental goals, notably effective equality between human beings, including geographically distant or future human beings. The practical consequences of this definition of Compliance Law by Monumental Goals are immense. A contrario, this makes it possible to avoid the excesses of a "conformity law" aimed at the effectiveness of all applicable regulations, a very dangerous perspective. This makes it possible to select effective Compliance Tools with regard to these goals, to grasp the spirit of the material without being locked into its flow of letters. This leads to not dissociating the power required of companies and the permanent supervision that the public authorities must exercise over them. We can therefore expect a lot from such a definition of Compliance Law by its Monumental Goals. It engenders an alliance between the Political Power, legitimate to enact the Monumental Goals, and the crucial operators, in a position to concretize them and appointed because they are able to do so. It makes it possible to find global legal solutions for global systemic difficulties that are a priori insurmountable, particularly in climate matters and for the effective protection of people in the now digital world in which we live. It expresses values that can unite human beings. In this, Compliance Law built on Monumental Goals is also a bet. Even if the requirement of "conformity" is articulated with this present conception of what Compliance Law is, this conception based on Monumental Law is based on the human ability to be free, while conformity law supposes more the human ability to obey. Therefore Compliance Law, defined by the Monumental Goals, is essential for our future, while conformity law is not. - Read the developments below⤵️

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A, Reinforce the judge and the lawyer to impose Compliance Law as a characteristic of the Rule of Law, Working Paper, August 2021. - 🎤 this working document has been made to prepare some elements of the opening intervention in the symposium Quels juges pour la Compliance) ? (Which judges for Compliance?), co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance and the Institut Droit Dauphine, held at the Paris Dauphine University on September 23, 2021, constituting the first part of the intervention. - 📝it has been also the basis for an article:  📕 published in its French version in the book La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in the collection📚Régulations & Compliance  📘published in its English version in the book Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in the collection 📚Compliance & Regulation - ► Summary of the Working Paper: One can understand that the compliance mechanisms are presented with hostility because they seem designed to keep the judge away, whereas there is no Rule of Law without a judge. Solid arguments present compliance techniques as converging towards the uselessness of the judge (I). Certainly, we come across magistrates, and of all kinds, and powerful ones, but that would be a sign of imperfection: its ex-ante logic has been deployed in all its effectiveness, the judge would no longer be required… And the lawyer would disappear so with him… This perspective of a world without a judge, without a lawyer and ultimately without Law, where algorithms could organize through multiple processes in Ex Ante the obedience of everyone, the "conformity" of all our behaviors with all the regulatory mass that is applicable to us, supposes that this new branch of Law would be defined as the concentration of processes which gives full effectiveness to all the rules, regardless of their content. But supposing that this engineer's dream is even achievable, it is not possible in a democratic and free world to do without judges and lawyers. Therefore, it is imperative to recognize their contributions to Compliance Law, related and invaluable contributions (II). First of all, because a pure Ex Ante never existed and even in the time of the Chinese legists¹ L’empire chinois n’a semble-t-il jamais apprécié les juges, ne leur faisant place que sous la forme de serviteurs purs de l’Etat, qu’ils soient des enquêteurs, des punisseurs et de gardiens de l’ordre public. Sur cet aspect du Droit chinois, v. … ; sur cette période particulièrement sanglante des légistes, où le principe de « certitude » de la législation a été portée à ses nues, v. …, people were still needed to interpret the regulations because a legal order must always be interpreted Ex Post by who must in any case answer the questions posed by the subjects of law, as soon as the political system admits to attributing to them the right to make claims before the Judge. Secondly the Attorney, whose office, although articulated with the Judge's office, is distinct from the latter, both more restricted and broader since he must appear in all cases where the judicial figure puts himself in square, outside the courts. However, Compliance Law has multiplied this since not only, extending Regulatory Law, it entrusts numerous powers to the administrative authorities, but it also transforms companies into judges, in respect of which the attorneys must deal with. Even more so, Compliance Law only takes its sense from its Monumental Goals²🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), 📘​Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022.. It is in this that this branch of the Law preserves the freedom of human beings, in the digital space where the techniques of compliance protect them from the power of companies by the way that the Compliance Law forces these companies to use their power to protect people. However, firstly, it is the Judges who, in their diversity³The topic of this study is general. For a more analytical perspective, s.. 🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A., « The function of the Judge in Compliance Law », in 🕴️Frison-Roche, M.A. (ed.), 📘Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, 2023. , impose as a reference the protection of human beings, either as a limit to the power of compliance tools⁴🕴️Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021.  or as their very purpose. Secondly, the Attorney, again distinguishing himself from the Judge, if necessary, reminds us that all the parties whose interests are involved must be taken into consideration. In an ever more flexible, soft and dialogical Law, everyone presenting himself as the "advocate" of such and such a monumental goal: the Attorney is legitimate to be the first to occupy this place. - 🔓read the Working Paper developments below⤵️

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Programme de mise en conformité (Compliance), Dictionnaire de droit de la concurrence, Concurrences, Art. N° 12345, 2021 Read the definition (in French)

►Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Definition of Principe of Proportionality  and  definition of Compliance Law,  Working Paper, July  2021. -   🎤 this Working Paper is the basis for a conference in the colloquium Compliance and Proportionality. From the control of Proportionality to the proportionality of the control, to be helded in Toulouse, France, on the 14th October 2021.   📝It constitutes the basis for an article:  📕 this article will be published in its French version in the book  Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, in the Series    Régulations & Compliance  📘  in its English version in the book Compliance Monumental Goals, in the Series    Compliance & Regulation - ► Working Paper Summary: Measuring the relationship between the Principle of Proportionality and Compliance Law depends entirely on the Definition chosen for Compliance Law. Let us first take the definition of Compliance Law as a simple "mode of effectiveness" of the rules to which we hold (I). The more we stick to this procedural definition of Compliance Law as a mode of effectiveness of the rules, the less it is easy to detect specificities in the application of the Principle of proportionality in compliance mechanisms. There are certainly many examples of the application of the principle of proportionality, but the addition and variety of examples are not enough to sculpt an original relationship between Proportionality and Compliance.   However, this exercise is not wasted. In fact, in the confusion which still marks the emergence of Compliance Law, the legal nature of the compliance mechanisms remains contested. However, the imposition of Proportionality, not only as it is an obligation but as a limitation of powers in this first definition focusing on Efficiency, recalls that Compliance, conceived as " process ", would then in any case be admissible at the very least as a" Procedure ", anchored in the Rule of Law Principle, therefore self-limititation expression.   But Proportionality is then like a cold shower in compliance, since it is defined by self-limitation in a Law which would be defined by effectiveness as its only definition…  Ineffectiveness In Efficiency…: it is no longer a relation, it is then an opposition which is established between the two terms … In this definition of Compliance Law, there is no other choice than to put process in this sort of  squaring circle because in this procedural Compliance Definition, as a method of effectiveness, of effectiveness and efficiency of the rules estimated more important more than others, it must however be admitted that Compliance Law, as any branch of the Law, without denying its very legal nature, must be anchored in the Rule of Law Principle. By the principle of proportionality, this new branch of Law is forced to anchor classic solutions from Constitutional, Public or Criminal Law,  the Principle of Proportionality prohibiting the Compliance of be just a process. The Repression  Law  has a large part in this conception and the Proportionality Principle reminds it of the part that Criminal Law still takes (with difficulty and for the moment …) in the admission of ineffectiveness that the Law demands, particularly in the face of Compliance technologies. In this first definition, the Proportionality Principle thus reminds Compliance, entirely held in the idea of ​​Efficiency that it is a "Law" of Compliance" and anchored in the Rule of Law Principle, it must limit its Effectiveness . It is therefore a kind of "price" that these techniques pay, with regret …, to the Rule of Law and in particular to the freedoms of human beings. There is a strong temptation not to want to pay this price. For example by affirming that there is a new technological world, which the new system, entirely in algorithms, will promote in a move away from the Law, rejected towards the Old World. Frequently proposed, or set up for instance in China. Others say that we must "do the balance". But when you balance Efficiency performance and Efficiency self-limitation, you know very well who will win …   But why not look rather on the side of a Definition of Compliance Law where, on the contrary, the two concepts, instead of opposing each other, support each other!   Indeed, Compliance Law is then defined as an extension of Regulatory Law as a set of rules, institutions, principles, methods and decisions taking their meaning and normativity for specific Goals. . In this definition, which is both specific and substantial, these "Monumental Goals" are systemic and require that all means be mobilized for them to be achieved. Future and negative in nature (events that must not happen) but also future and positive in nature (events that must occur), Compliance Law does not apply to all the rules whose  effectiveness required, but this specific type of "Monumental Goals", in an alliance between the political authorities in charge of the future of human groups and the entities in a position to mobilize its means. The method is then different. It is no longer a question of entrenching and the prospect of repression fades into the background. A reversal occurs. Proportionality ceases to be what limits Efficiency to become what increases Efficiency. As soon as Goals have be precised, Proportionality is not the consequence of the limitation (as in the principle of "necessity" of Criminal Law, insofar as the latter is an exception), it is the consequence of the fact that any legal mechanism is a "Compliance Tool", which only has meaning in relation to a "Monumental Goal". It is therefore essential to set the "Goal Monumental Goals". As this is where the legal normativity of Compliance is housed, the control must first and foremost relate to that. Then all the Compliance Tools must adjust in a "proportionate way", that is to say effective to its goals: as much as it is necessary, not more than it is necessary. According to the principle of economy (which is also called the "principle of elegance" in mathematics). In consequence, the rule contrary to the Principle of Proportionality is: the rule useless to achieve the goal. The unnecessary rule is the disproportionate rule: this is how the judicial review of excessive sanctions should be understood, not by the notion of "the limit" but not by the notion of "the unnecessary". Everything then depends on the legal quality of the goal. De jure – and this would deserve to be a requirement at constitutional level, the goal must always be clear, understandable, non-contradictory, attainable. This increases the office of the Judge. This renews the power of the Legislator in a conception which ceases to be discretionary. But the Legislator retains the prerogative of determining the Monumental Goals, while the Judge controls the quality of the formulation that he makes of them, in order to be able to measure the proportionality of the means which are put in front by the State and the Companies, while Companies can rally to the Monumental Goals of the Politics by making an alliance with them, but certainly not instituting others in an autonomous way because they are not normative political entities, whereas they are free to determine the means necessary to achieve these goals, the Judge controlling the proportionality mechanism that makes this new system work. The case law of the German Constitutional Court expresses this conception. It is fully consistent with what Compliance Law is in what is the one Monumental Goal containing all the systemic Monumental Goals: the protection of the human being. -  

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance Law Big Bang, talk show with Jean-Philippe Denis, July 3,  2021.  -   🎥 watch the emission totally in French  🎥 watch the emission with English subtitles

► Full Reference: L.-M. Augagneur, "La juridictionnalisation de la réputation par les plateformes" ("The jurisdictionalisation of reputation by platforms"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 97-113.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): The large platforms are in the position of arbiter of the reputation economy (referencing, notoriety) in which they themselves act. Although the stakes are usually low on a unit basis, the jurisdiction of reputation represents significant aggregate stakes. Platforms are thus led to detect and assess reputation manipulations (by users: SEO, fake reviews, fake followers; or by the platforms themselves as highlighted by the Google Shopping decision issued by the European Commission in 2017) that are implemented on a large scale with algorithmic tools. The identification and treatment of manipulations is itself only possible by means of artificial intelligence tools. Google thus proceeds with an automated downgrading mechanism for sites that do not follow its guidelines, with the possibility of requesting a review through a very summary procedure entirely conducted by an algorithm. Tripadvisor, on the other hand, uses an algorithm to detect false reviews based on "fraud modeling to identify electronic patterns that cannot be detected by the human eye". It only conducts a human investigation in limited cases. This jurisdictionality of reputation has little in common with that defined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (legal origin, contradictory procedure, independence, application of the Rules of Law). It is characterized, on the one hand, by the absence of transparency of the rules and even of the existence of rules stated in predicative form and applied by deductive reasoning. It is replaced by an inductive probabilistic model by the identification of abnormal behaviors in relation to centroids. This approach of course raises the issue of statistical bias. More fundamentally, it reflects a transition from Rule of Law, not so much to "Code is Law" (Laurence Lessig), but to "Data is Law", that is, to a governance of numbers (rather than "by" numbers). It also comes back to a form of collective jurisdictionality, since the sanction comes from a computational apprehension of the phenomena of the multitude and not from an individual appreciation. Finally, it appears particularly consubstantial with compliance, since it is based on a teleological approach (the search for a finality rather than the application of principles). On the other hand, this jurisdictionality is characterized by man-machine cooperation, whether in the decision-making process (which poses the problem of automaticity bias) or in the contradictory procedure (which poses, in particular, the problems of discussion with the machine and the explicability of the machine response). Until now, the supervision of these processes has been based essentially on the mechanisms of transparency, a limited adversarial requirement and the accessibility of appeal channels. The French Law Loi pour une République Numérique ("Law for a Digital Republic"), the European Legislation Platform-to-Business Regulation and the Omnibus Directive, have thus set requirements on the ranking criteria on platforms. The Omnibus Directive also requires that professionals guarantee that reviews come from consumers through reasonable and proportionate measures. As for the European Digital Services Act, it provides for transparency on content moderation rules, procedures and algorithms. But this transparency is often a sham. In the same way and for the moment the requirements of sufficient human intervention and adversarial processes appear very limited in the draft text. The most efficient forms of this jurisdictionality ultimately emerge from the role played by third parties in a form of participatory dispute resolution. Thus, for example, FakeSpot detects false Tripadvisor reviews, Sistrix establishes a ranking index that helped establish the manipulation of Google's algorithm in the Google Shopping case by detecting artifacts based on algorithm changes. Moreover, the draft Digital Services Act envisages recognizing a specific status for trusted flaggers who identify illegal content on platforms. This singular jurisdictional configuration (judge and party platform, massive situations, algorithmic systems for handling manipulations) thus leads us to reconsider the grammar of the jurisdictional process and its characteristics. If Law is a language (Alain Sériaux), it offers a new grammatical form that would be that of the middle way (mesotès) described by Benevéniste. Between the active and the passive way, there is a way in which the subject carries out an action in which he includes himself. Now, it is the very nature of this jurisdictionality of compliance to make laws by including oneself in them (nomos tithestai). In this respect, the irruption of artificial intelligence in this jurisdictional treatment undoubtedly bears witness to the renewal of the language of Law. -

► Full Reference: S. Merabet, "La vigilance, être juge et ne pas juger" ("Vigilance, to be a judge and not judging"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 199-209.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Vigilance presents two diametrically opposed dangers. The company is caught in the crossfire. On the one hand, there is a risk that it exercises its role at a minimum, so that the obligations imposed on it are ineffective, thereby risking its own liability.   On the other hand, the danger is that the company oversteps its role and takes the place of the Judge. Does Vigilance always present the same dangers? Does it systematically involve the same role of the company? To be vigilant, is it to judge? The answer to these questions depends on the content of the obligations involved in Vigilance. However, these now seem very diverse. How to distinguish between the various duties of Vigilance? A first approach could consist in considering a formal identification which leads to distinguish stricto sensu Vigilance, that which is envisaged by the French so-called "Sapin 2" law and identified as such, and the related obligations, such as for example the duty of moderation of companies on social networks, which without being baptized "duty of vigilance", nevertheless come close. The extension of Compliance obligations blurs the line between what exactly falls under Vigilance and what not. A more substantial approach should be taken to consider the degree of control exercised by the company. Understood in this way, it is possible to distinguish two categories: Negative Vigilance, which implies the identification of a risk, and Positive Vigilance, which even more supposes the neutralization of the risk. The first assumes a limited role for the company, while the second encourages it to act positively, even before an Authority has spoken. In this case, the role of the company is closer to that of the judge. That shows that all the obligations of vigilance cannot therefore be understood in a unitary manner. As soon as the company is led – if not to take the place of the Judge – to act before the Judge even has the opportunity to pronounce himself/herself, then it seems legitimate to supervise the implementation of the company's duty of Vigilance, through a form of proceduralisation of Compliance. The company, as its employees or partners, would benefit from more Vigilance supervision. Insofar as all Vigilance obligations do not call the same role of the company, it is necessary to consider guiding principles of Vigilance, more or less intense depending on whether it is Negative or Positive Vigilance.  -

► Full Reference: Siproudhis, J.-B.,, C.,  Le transfert de responsabilité du régulateur et du juge vers l’entreprise : la démonstration par le système d’alerte ("The transfer of responsibility from the regulator and the judge to the company: demonstration by the whistleblowing mechanism"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, à paraître.  -   ► Article Summary (done by the Author) : From the practitioner perspective, compliance is geared towards a gradual transfer of responsibilities from both regulators and judges.   In France, the whistleblowing mechanism imposed by the so-called "Sapin 2" and "Duty of Vigilance" laws illustrates this evolution. Indeed,  internal alerts management follows key judiciary process milestones : admissibility, investigations, dismissal or sanction. This turns corporations duties into prosecutors or judges’, provided that they respect a specific framework contributing to respect the rules of a fair trial. This requirement raises several legal and sociological challenges to which the author devotes his developments. -   📝 go to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published. -     This requirement raises several legal and sociological challenges to which the author devotes his developments.    

► Full Reference: Siproudhis, J.-B.,, C., The transfer of responsibility from the regulator and the judge to the company: demonstration by the whistleblowing mechanism, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published.  -   ► Article summary (done by the author) : From the practitioner perspective, compliance is geared towards a gradual transfer of responsibilities from both regulators and judges.   In France, the whistleblowing mechanism imposed by the so-called "Sapin 2" and "Duty of Vigilance" laws illustrates this evolution. Indeed,  internal alerts management follows key judiciary process milestones : admissibility, investigations, dismissal or sanction. This turns corporations duties into prosecutors or judges’, provided that they respect a specific framework contributing to respect the rules of a fair trial. This requirement raises several legal and sociological challenges to which the author devotes his developments. -   📝 to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published  

► Full Reference: Ch. Lapp, "La compliance dans l'entreprise : les statuts du process" ("Compliance in the company: the statues of processes"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 141-150.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law) , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. During this colloquium, the intervention was shared with Jan-Marc Coulon, who is also a contributor in the book (see the summary of the Jean-Marc Coulon's  Article). In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to:  L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law ). - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): The Company is caught in the grip of Compliance Law, the jaws of which are those of Incitement (1) and Sanction that the Company must apply to ensure the effectiveness of its processes to which it is itself subject (2 ). First, the Company has been delegated to fabricate reprehensible rules that it must apply to itself and to third parties with whom it has dealings. To this end, the Company sets up "processes", that is to say verification and prevention procedures, in order to show that the offenses that it is likely to commit will not happened. These processes constitute standards of behavior to prevent and avoid that the facts constituting the infringements are not themselves carried out. They are thus one of the elements of Civil Liability Law in its preventive or restorative purposes. Second, the sanction of non obedience of Compliance processes puts the Company in front of two pitfalls. The first  dimension place the company, with regard to its employees and its partners, in the obligation to define processes which also constitute the quasi-jurisdictional resolution of their non-compliance, the company having to reconcile the sanction it pronounces with the fundamental principles of classical Criminal Law, constitutional principles and all fundamental rights. The processes then become the procedural rule. The second dimension is that the Company is accountable for the effectiveness of the avoidance by its processes of facts constituting infringements. By a reversal of the burden of proof, the Company is then required to prove that its processes are efficient. at least equivalent to the measures defined by laws and regulations, the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence Française Anticorruption – AFA), European directives and various communications on legal tools to fight breaches of probity, environmental attacks and current societal concerns. The processes then become the constitutive element, per se, of the infringement. Thus, in its search for a balance between Prevention and Sanction to which it is itself subject, the Company will not then be tempted to favor the orthodoxy of its processes over the expectations of the Agence Française Anticorruption – AFA , regulators and judges, to the detriment of their efficiency? In doing so, are we not moving towards an instrumental and conformist Compliance, paradoxically disempowering with regard to the Compliance Monumental Goals of Compliance? -

► Full Reference: J. Heymann, "La nature juridique de la "Cour suprême" de Facebook" ("The legal nature of Facebook's "Supreme court""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 151-167.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to: The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law. - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Taking place in the general theme aiming at making “words and things coincide”, the article offers some thoughts on the “conditions of the discourse” – in the sense in which Foucault understood it in his Archéologie des sciences humaines – relating to the phenomenon of “jurisdictionalization” of Compliance.             The thoughts are more specifically focusing on the nature of the so-called “Supreme Court” that Facebook instituted to hear appeals of decisions relating to content on the digital social networks that are Facebook and Instagram. Is this really a “Supreme Court”, designed in order to “judge” the Facebook Group?             A careful examination of the Oversight Board – i.e. the so-called “Supreme Court” created by Facebook – reveals that the latter, in addition to its advisory mission (which consists of issuing policy advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies), exercises some form of adjudicative function. This is essentially conceived in terms of compliance assessment, of the content published on the social networks Facebook or Instagram with the standards issued by these corporations on the one hand, of content enforcement decisions taken by Facebook with the Law on the other hand. The legal framework of reference is yet rather vague, although its substantial content seems to be per se evolutive, based on the geographical realm where the case to be reviewed is located. An adjudicative function can therefore be characterized, even if the Oversight Board can only claim for a limited one.             The author can ultimately identify the Oversight Board as a preventive dispute settlement body, in the sense that it seems to aim at avoiding any referral to state courts and ruling before any court’s judgement can be delivered. Some questions are thus to be raised, relating with both legitimacy and authority of such a Board. But whatever the answers will be, the fact remains that the creation of the Oversight Board by a private law company already reveals all the liveliness of contemporary legal pluralism. -

► Full Reference: J. Jourdan-Marques, "L’arbitre, juge ex ante de la compliance ?" ("The arbitrator, ex ante judge of compliance?"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 317-334.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article which follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance ("The company instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law"), co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the  Faculty of Law Lyon 3. This colloquium was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda, scientific co-directors, and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. Due to the very close proximity of the content of this article to a scientific manifestation that was held previously, in the same series of colloquia, manifestation on Compliance and Arbitration, designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, and which took place in Paris on March 31, 2021 in Paris, it was decided with the author and the scientific managers of the scientific events concerned to publish the article not in Title I of the book, devoted to the topic of the Company instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law, but in Title III, devoted to the topic of Compliance and International Arbitration. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :  The article begins with a long introduction relating to the general relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. Then the author in a first part examines the place of the Arbitration upstream of the occurrence of the dispute, aiming at the relations of the company in its organization with other companies for its economic activities, for example commercial agents. The author examines the way in which Arbitration can resolve difficulties which arise between them, including when these issues are otherwise apprehended by Compliance Law and the institutions in charge of it, in particular because of the facts of corruption are alleged and the fact is alleged by the debtor himself when payment has not yet been requested by the creditor. The legal question then becomes whether or not there is a "dispute". Being even further upstream, the author takes the hypothesis of the adoption of a compliance program in which recourse to arbitration would be inserted by the Company, insertion which could then be at the origin of exemption from criminal liability, an arbitration award being able to produce such an effect if it is recognized in the legal order.  The second part of the article considers Arbitration in the absence of multiple parties, which could correspond to the acts issued by the Oversight Board of Facebook, this kind of tribunal and judge not being seized by parties to a litigation. It might be adequate to qualify this mechanism as an arbitration, even if this qualification is difficult to retain. In any case, if we did so by admission that a unilateral request gives rise to a jurisdictional mission, there should be guarantees surrounding such institutionalization. They can go through specific bodies for Compliance cases, outside or within existing arbitration institutions, which must then become the driving force in the matter. In addition, the choice of arbitrators should undoubtedly go through the institution itself so that impartiality remains unchallenged and profiles of arbitrators would be truly varied. The procedure would also have vocation to be inflected because of the absence of real litigation, justifying the adjustment of the adversarial principle (in the narrow sense of this one, linked to the debate) in particular by the intervention of amicus curiae and to avoid the fraud through arbitration and in procedure. In the absence of an adversary, the procedural office of the arbitrator could be reconsidered: without modifying the terms of the case, it would be appropriate for the arbitrator to have more power to decide on the adequate measures to be taken to remedy the non- conformity with compliance requirements. Finally, publicity seems to the author essential so that the arbitration is not instrumentalised by the parties, publicity which could also concern the debates and the documents produced. These admittedly very high requirements would in return give great credibility to the resulting award, justifying its scope, and one could consider labeling such a result, a label that the company could claim.  The author concludes that these transformations would move away so much from Arbitration that it would denature it, in particular because of the absence of litigation, but this allows Companies to outsource the management of the more and more heavier responsibility engendered by Compliance Law, by offering Compagnies the assistance of a judicial authority, as soon as the procedural guarantees are reinforced. -

► It is in its "Risk and Compliance" section that the Wall Street Journal, by its article of June 18, 2021 (➡️📝Europe's Chief Prosecutor Has 300 Cases on Her Plate Already), presents the first steps of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, since June 1, 2021. This inclusion presupposes that it is through a Compliance Law perspective that this new body must be understood, in order to understand and anticipate its action. ►In this perspective : ➡️📧Frison-Roche, M.-A., European Public Prosecutor's Office comes on stage: the company having itself become a private prosecutor, are we going towards an alliance of all prosecutors?, June 2, 2021 ➡️ 💬Frison-Roche, « Le parquet européen est un apport considérable au Droit de la Compliance » (“The European Public Prosecutor's Office is a remarkable contribution to Compliance Law"), June 14, 2021   I. AN ACTION THAT WILL FOCUS ON FIGHTING THE MEANS USED TO DAMAGE THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION The article of the Wall Street Journal takes the form of an interview with the European Prosecutor. Her responses also confirm the consubstantial link between European Public Prosecutor's Office and Compliance Law. It is remarkable that she immediately says that she hopes the treatment of many cases, especially on healthcare and infrastructure sectors: "Our expectation is to have more cases, especially in the healthcare system, in public procurement, infrastructure, and also in agriculture ". However, the 2017 European Regulation which established the European Public Prosecutor’s Office said that its "mandate" is to prosecute offenses affecting the "financial interests of the European Union", without being hampered by the cumbersome procedures for cooperation between States while these offenses are most often cross-border. But one could think that, knowingly taking the means (corruption, money laundering) for the goal, the European Public Prosecutor's Office would immediately pursue not only the defense of the financial interests of the Union (admittedly financial interests damaged by corruption or money laundering) but these facts themselves: thus the European Public Prosecutor's Office works with the European Supervisory Authorities, in particular banking and financial authorities, which fight in Ex Ante against these offenses and prevent them.   II. AN ACTION THAT FOCUSES ON SECTORS NOT LEGALLY REGULATED IN EX ANTE BY SECTORAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES Moreover, it will be noted that the European Prosecutor is targeting three economic sectors which are not "regulated sectors" in the legal sense of the qualification, that is to say not monitored by a sectoral Regulatory and/or Supervision Authority: Health, Infrastructure and Agriculture. Thus, the power of Regulatory Law, which relies in its Ex Ante, and its weakness, which derives from the pre-required existence of a sectoral Authority, is compensated: the action of the Public Prosecutor's Office is not limited to legally regulated sectors. While Competition Authorities are mandated (➡️📅La concurrence dans tous ses états, June 25 and 26, 2021) to protect the competitive functioning of the markets, a Public Prosecutor's Office can deal with any infringement without having to determine a market. For instance, Infrastructures don't constitute pertinent markets but can constitute fields for criminal activities, such as corruption or money laundering, justifying Compliance Law mechanisms.  What the new European Prosecutor is aiming for, namely Health, Infrastructures and Agriculture, have undoubtedly been damaged both by the sole primacy of the Competition perspective and by a Criminal Law constrained by the difficult inter-State cooperation, even though they are not subject to a supranational Ex Ante Regulation. The European Public Prosecutor's Office aims to directly improve this, through Entreprises acting in Health, Infrastructures and Agriculture.  -   ► subscribe to the French Newsletter MaFR ComplianceTech®

► Compliance Law is essential for the future of Africa: this is also a lesson from the Juin 2021 G7 Summit in its Infrastructure Plan.  It emerges from the G7 summit which ends on June 13, 2021 in Carbis Bay in the United Kingdom, a common desire to increase infrastructures in Africa, in itself and because otherwise China will do it, and will do it differently. Compliance Law will be determinant in this common action for three reasons. First and because the issue is about infrastructures, the construction and the management of infrastructures falling more under Regulatory Law than Competition Law (📕Chevalier, J.-M., Frison-Roche, M.-A, Keppler, J.EPPLER, J.H. et Noumba, P. (ed.), Économie et droit de la régulation des infrastructures. Perspectives des pays en voie de développement, 2009). However, Compliance Law is not a simple process for the effectiveness of rules which are external to it, it is the extension in companies of Regulatory Law. Where companies must implement regulatory goals within themselves, they develop Compliance rules (➡️📝see Frison-Roche, M.A., From Regulation Law to Compliance Law, 2017.  Secondly and because the issue is about Africa, the Rule of Law is sometimes not very solid there. By internalizing Regulatory Law in companies (or even by associating Arbitration with it), Compliance Law makes it possible to get out of this dead end (➡️📝Salah, MM, Conception and Application of Compliance in Africa, in 📕 Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, 2021. Thirdly and because the topic si about China, Compliance Law in its European conception has the Monumental Goal of defending individuals while in its Chinese conception it aims to obtain their obedience to the rules (➡️📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., In China, Compliance Law deploys without, and even against democracy, China seeing Compliance only as an "efficiency process"; in Europe, it deploys with and even for democracy, 2021). On construction sites and in the human management of infrastructures, this changes everything. G7 members share the first conception. They must now implement it by their companies and thanks to them, private sector being in alliance with the political authorities which just expressed. Because Compliance Law is an alliance between political authorities and crucial economic operators.   ► register to French Newsletter MaFR ComplianceTech®

►  Money Laundering, Cryptocurrency and the Art of Saying It: the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) statement of June 3, 2021 and the Art of Saying It. Law is softer than ever.   The English have their way of saying things: thus the Financial Conduct Authority -FCA, the British financial market regulator, published on June 3, 2021 a press release whose expression is remarkable. Its subject matter is crypto-assets and, like in an essay plan à la française, it is built in two parts.  In the part I, it is just mentioned that the deadline for companies in this industry to obtain a registration, which was due to end soon, will be postponed to March 2022. Why? Because almost all of them have not been able to demonstrate their ability not to be resistant to money laundering and other criminal activities. This is in no way presented as a conviction, just the objective cause of a postponement of the date, the time for the Financial Regulatory Authority to better examine the files, themselves to be completed by applicants. The part II concerns consumer protection. The Authority point out that the consumer can lose everything in an extremely risky products and underlines that it is unlikely that this ruined layman will even be able to access the ombudsman to obtain anything. It is purely informative. This is how the English bodies formulate their opinion on cryptoasset. It's elegant (the press is more direct). This also makes it possible not to be covered with insults by the worshipers of these objects: are expressed just a technical delay granted and not a conviction that cryptoasset could be per se  an instrument of criminality, just a probationary difficulty ; and just a regret on the non-access to the ombudsman for these cryptoassets consumers. But if the evolution of the bubble leads these investors to ruine shows, the Regulator will have warned and expressed in advance the regrets he had of the lack of legal technique to protect them. And if the facts show that it is massively through cryptocurrency that the crime is whitewashed, the Regulator has shown everyone his prudence, the delay it will have take to examine the files  and its kind foresight. No one more than a British knows what Liability is.    -        

► Do Compliance and Democracy have a relationship? China replies: no. Europe responds and must respond: they are intimate. The definition of Compliance Law is therefore essential. In an interview of great clarity  given in French to the Newspaper Les Echos on June 2, 2021, about Brexit, China and Russia (➡️📝 "Brexit, Chine, Russie : les confidences de la diplomate Sylvie Bermann"), Sylvie Bermann reminds the evolution of China. She sums up the situation as follows: « La Chine ne veut pas dominer le monde, elle veut être la première et surtout qu'on ne puisse pas lui imposer un système, la démocratie » ("China does not want to dominate the world, it wants to be the first and above all that no one can impose on it a system, Democracy,"). This is reflected in China's conception of Compliance Law. If one defines Compliance Law only as a "method" for the effectiveness of rules, consisting of a kind of "Ex Ante enforcement process" leading to 100% effectiveness of regulations by subjects who must show to everyone the respect they have for these regulations and who are rewarded by this proof thus given, then China, in its current use of Law, illustrates exactly this definition: subjects, individuals and companies, prove their "obedience" to rules – whatever the rules" substantial content -, which is evaluated ("rating") and rewarded, in a mechanical reign of the Ex Ante, served by technologies. Democratic mechanisms are not required; they are even disturbed, because they interfere with the efficiency of the system. The technological and purely technocratic conception of Compliance ("Regulation by data", for example) uses the same definition of Compliance Law, which leads to choose algorithms’ efficiency. Europe must keep going to make another choice: European Compliance was born out of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s case law, in the 2014 judgment, Google Spain (➡️📝CJEU, Google Spain, May 13, 2021), to protect the person by inventing a subjective right: the right to be forgotten, in a digital space with infinite memory. Based on the Rule of Law, Compliance Law is then defined by its Monumental Goals, which are the protection of people and puts the judge at the center. It is the reverse of Chinese mechanics. Therefore, they are definitions that lead the world: about the definition of Compliance Law by "Monumental Goals", see ➡️📅 the 2021 cycle of colloquia co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its university partners on Monumental Goals; on the technical influence of this definition on "Compliance tools" ➡️📕see Frison-Roche, M.-A., Legal Approach to Compliance Tools: Building by Law the unity of Compliance Tools from the definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals", 2021.   ►subscribe to the MaFR ComplianceTech® Newsletter

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) & Bruylant, 2021. This book in English is the first title of this collection integrally dedicated to Compliance Law, in that it is the extension of Regulation Law.  - 📚  Read the titles of this series in English co-published by Bruylant.  📚   This collection in English is articulated with a collection co-published between the Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Dalloz. 📕Thus, in parallel, a book in French, Les Outils de la Compliance is published.  - 📅   This book is published after a  cycle of colloquiums organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Partners Universities. -   ► General Presentation of the collective book: The political dimension of Compliance Law lies in the goals it aims to achieve. To achieve them, the concern for these goals is internalized in "crucial operators", which may be obliged to concretize "monumental goals" set by public authorities. These public bodies control the Ex Ante reorganization that this implies for these companies and sanction Ex Post the possible inadequacy of the companies, which have become transparent to this end. The effectiveness and efficiency of this internalization, without which the statement of these goals is worth nothing, is based on the Compliance tools that are deployed. These appear to be very diverse but their substantial unity (topic which will be the subject of a forthcoming book) makes it possible to study the tools put in place from a unique perspective, by not isolating them in a particular branch of Law, Criminal law or International Law for example, but by measuring what is common to them, notably Anticipation, Trust, Commitment, Responsibility, Incentive, and so on. If the Compliance tools vary, it is rather not only according to the sectors, finance and banking appearing then as the advanced point of the general Compliance Law, for example in environmental matters, but also according to the countries and the cultures. It is in fact about them that legal cultures seem to oppose. The book aims to understand these "tools" by going beyond the description of each instrument, for which we already have many monographs, for analyzing them through the issues of Risks, required Expertises, Training. Sovereignty claims, Incentives, mechanical aptitude of Technologies. It is through these themes that are analyzed by the authors, experts in the field, what we always want to understand better: Compliance Programs, Whistle blowing, Mapping, Sanctions, Extraterritoriality, etc.   -     Read the summary of the book.    Read the foreword, summarizing all the contributions.     Présentation of the book contributions: 📝Amico, Th., Compliance or the passage from ex post to ex ante: A Copernican revolution for the criminal lawyer? 📝Banck, A., The maturity of the Compliance tool’s user, first criterion of the choice of the salient tool 📝Burlingame, Coppens R., Power, N, Lee, D.H., Anti-Corruption Compliance: Global Dimension of Enforcement and Risk Management 📝Calandri, L., Incentive(s) and Self-Regulation(s): which place for Compliance Law in the Audiovisual Sector?  📝Causse, H., Compliance Training: Through and Beyond Traditional Legal Training 📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Describing, designing and correlating Compliance Tools to have a better use of it 📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Building by Law the Unicity of Compliance Tools from the Definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals" 📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Drawing up Risk Maps as an obligation and the paradox of the "Compliance risks" ​ 📝 Frison-Roche, M.-A., Incentives and Compliance, a couple to propel 📝 Frison-Roche, M.-A., Resolving the contradiction between sanctions and incentives under the fire of Compliance Law 📝 Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rights, primary and natural Compliance tools 📝 Frison-Roche, M.-A., Training: content and container of Compliance Law​ 📝 Galland, M., The Regulator's Inspection of the Effectiveness of the Compliance Tools Implemented by the Company 📝 Granier, C., The Normative Originality of Compliance by Design 📝 Guillaume, N., Compliance risk mapping: first insights of challenges, limits and good practices 📝Guttierez-Crespin, A., Audit of Compliance Systems​ 📝 Koenigsberg, S. and Barrière, F., The Development of Attorney's Compliance Expertise 📝 Larouer, M., The Manifestation of Incentives Mechanisms in French Compliance Law 📝 Merabet, S., Morality by Design 📝 Pailler, L., Technological Tools, Compliance by Design and GDPR: the Protection of Personal Data from Design 📝 Racine, J.-B., Geographical dominance in the choice and the use of Compliance Tools. Introductory remarks 📝Rapp, L., Incentive Theory and Governance of Space Activities 📝 Roda, J.-C., Compliance by design in antitrust: between innovation and illusion 📝 Salah, M., Conception and Application of Compliance in Africa 📝 Tardieu, H., Data Sovereignty and Compliance 📝 Thouret, T., Training and Compliance, Two Correlated Information Transmission Tools