Articles in a legal collective publication

Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Penser le monde à partir de la notion de "donnée", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Internet, espace d'interrégulation, série "Régulation", 2016, pp. 7-16.   English summary : Law is a reconstruction of the world through definitions and categories, expressed in words, to which are imputed rules. There is always a share of invention in Law, articulated to a share of fidelity to the concrete world that it retranscribes, a combination enabling Law to regulate the latter. Law is put in difficulty by what the term "data", quite new, is not easy to define. The fact that it is strangely formulated in Latin to show that there is plurality, the data, before associating it with an English adjective when there are many, the "big data", does not advance us more on what a "data" is. Law is a practical art that works well only if it manipulates categories whose definition is mastered. This is why, in a first stage, we must recognize the uncertainties of the very notions of "data" (I), in order to orientate the adequate rules in the second step towards what is a given, namely a "pure" value in our consumer information society (II).   Read the article (in French)   This article is linked to another article published in the same book : Les conséquences régulatoires d'un monde repensé à partir de la notion de "donnée" ("the regulatory consequences of a word redesigned from the notion of "data")

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Experts et procédure : l'amicus curiae" ("Experts and procedure: the amicus curiae"), Revue de droit d'Assas, october 2012, pp. 91-94 - 📝read the article (in French) - ► English Summary of the article: A recent thesis has argued that amicus curiae is becoming a common principle of Procedural Law. This shows its importance. The fact that the mechanism, the character, is designated by a Latin formula leads us to suspect that something is being concealed that legal technique ordinarily forbids: it is the legal expert and the party's expert, which is what the amicus curiae most often is, either one or the other, or both at the same time. Therefore, removing the prudish cloak of Latin, it is these two difficulties that must be addressed. If we exclude the legal expert, it is because "jura novit curia" ("the court knows Law". But this rule, which recalls the principle that "no one is supposed to be ignorant of the law", merely indicates a sharing of the burden of evoking facts and Law between the parties and the judge (Motulsky) and not a presumption of knowledge. Consequently, the modest, and therefore self-confident, judge has no reason, either psychological or legal, to shy away from a legal expertise. As for the party's expert, or the judge's expert who is highly influenced by a party, a profession, a social group, in short, a judge's expert who is in fact an expert held by a party, this can only be a problem if the judge cannot keep his distance from this expert whose opinion is biased by the weight of the party. But first of all, any opinion is biased. Whether it is given in bad faith or good faith, it is biased, and in rhetoric we know that an opinion biased in good faith is more dangerous than a bought opinion, because the latter is known to be twisted by self-interest. In this respect, the person who listens to it, the judge, knows the difference. Indeed, the legal system that recognises the party's expert and the amicus curiae, i.e. North American Law or European Union Law, draws the necessary procedural consequence: they include the party's expert opinion in the adversarial debate. It is the principle of adversarial debate, the principle of principles in the conduct of proceedings, that makes amicus curiae acceptable and welcome, since it provides the judge with a scientific input that the latter does not have. -

Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., "L’hypothèse de l’interrégulation", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.) Les risques de régulation, coll. « Droit et Économie de la Régulation », t.3, Dalloz / Presses de Sciences-Po, 2005, pp. 69-80. The topic of of this article is to propose a new notion, already presented in 2001 in the article "Regulation Law": "Interregulation". This mechanism will makes more easier a unified decision when several autonomous, even contradictory, regulations are legitimate to rule a situation. This creation therefore responds to a gap in the general system, of which the antimony is a variant. Political power no longer has the means to unify these disparate sources because it is "overtaken by the globalization of sectors and markets. Likewise, the hierarchical mode of traditional law cannot be suitable for autonomous sectorial regulations. There is therefore a need for interregulation between regulators, for the creation of a common "doctrine", or by procedural means, such as "authorized advice". Read the article. (written in French) Read the general presentation, written in English, of the collective book, Les risques de régulation, in which this article has been published.   Below, read the article Summary.   

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche & R. Sève, "L’art législatif et la personne située dans la législation française relative aux femmes" ("Legislative art and the situated person in French legislation relating to women"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche & R. Sève (ed.), Le Droit au féminin, L'Année Sociologique, vol. 53, PUF, 2003, No. 1, pp. 55-88. - 📝read the article (in French) - 📕read a general presentation of the volume, Le Droit au féminin, in which this article is published -

Documents 77-_le_juge_et_le_droit_de_l_eco.pdf