Regulator

► Full Reference: A. Bruneau, "L'entreprise juge d'elle-même : la fonction compliance dans la banque" ("The company judge of itself: the compliance function inside the bank"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 115-131.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published     - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance. In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as "Sapin 2" requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk. Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution. Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law. Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the "judge-judged": following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients. -

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Judge between Platform and Regulator: current example of Uber case in U.K., Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 29th of September 2020 Read by freely subscribing the other news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation   Summary of the news: On 22nd of September 2017, Transport of London (TFL), London Transport Regulator, refused to renew the licence, granted on 31st of May 2012 for 5 years, authorizing Uber to transport people because of criminal offenses committed by Uber's drivers. On 26th of June 2018, The Westminster Court prolonged Uber's licence for 15 months under the condition that the platform prevent the reproachable behaviors of its drivers. After these 15 months, the TFL refused once again to prolonge Uber's licence because of the persistence of aggressions against passengers. Uber, once again, contest this decision before the Westminster Court.  In a decision of 28th of September 2020, the Court observes that during the 15 months, the platform implemented many measures to prevent aggressions, that the level of maturity of these measures has improved over time and that the number of offenses was reduced over the period (passing from 55 in 2018 to 4 in 2020). The Court estimated the the implementation of this actions is sufficient to grant a new licence to Uber.  We can learn three lessons from this decision:  The Compliance obligation is not a result obligation but a mean obligation, which means that it is not reasonable to expect from a crucial operator (Uber, for instance) that it prevent every cases of agression but that it is salient to judge it on the effort it deploys to try to be closer to this ideal situation. Moreover, the crucial operator must be proactive, that is going away from the figure of passive subject of Law who apply measures enacted by the regulator in terms of fighting against aggressions to be an actor of the research of the best way to fight abusive behaviors, internalizing this "monumental goal.  The judge appreciates the violation committed by those whose the firm is responsible "in context", that is evaluates the concrete situation in a reasonable way.  It is the judge who decides in last resort and like the crucial operator, it must be reasonable.    Read to go further: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Firm, Regulator and Judge: thinking Compliance through these three characters, 2018 The report of the Assemblée nationale (French Parliament chamber) on the question 

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Interregulation: way of "cooperation protocol"​ between Regulatory Bodies. Example between French Financial Markets Authority and Anticorruption Agency, Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 22nd of September 2020 Read by freely subscribing other news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation   Summary of the news:  Although Regulation Law was born from the notion "sector", constant interferences between sectors and frequent interactions between some sectors and more general questions common to different sectors, make interregulation necessary. Compliance Law being the extension of Regulation Law, this interregulation mechanism is also necessary in Compliance Law.  This interregulation can take many legal paths like letters exchanges between regulators, the creation of a network of regulators and supervisors at the world level or about some specific question or the adoption of a "cooperation protocol" as the AMF (French Financial Market Regulator) and the AFA (French Anticorruption Agency) did on 16th of September 2020 to reinforce their respective fight against corruption, against market abuses and for the protection of investors.  This cooperation protocol between the AFA and the AMF has the following subjects: A more efficient methodology concerning the research and the analysis of corruption and market abuses. A more efficient prevention of corruption and market abuses. A better capacity to give recommendations of new regulations to the Legislator. A more rigorous monitoring of international works on the topic.  A more coherent information for the public. Are regulators the new teachers? 

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Risk Mapping: is it legally different when it is made by Regulatory Bodies or by Regulated Enterprises?, in  Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 17th of August 2020 Read, by freely subscribing, other news of the Newsletter, MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation   Summary of the news Each year, the Autorité des marchés financiers (French financial markets regulator), the European Central Bank and the Agence française anti-corruption (French anti-corruption agency) publish risk maps. At first glance, risk maps established by the regulator aim to both help regulator and the regulated company to face risks by anticipating them. These documents would only be an assistance brought to firms in their Compliance mission and not an injunction from the regulator to take into account the risks that it emphasizes.   However, Law forces firms to do their own risk maps under penalty of sanctions. Since the regulator has previously published its own risk map, can companies, obliged to write theirs, deviate from it? If the firm follows the map published by the regulator, can it protect itself against this if it is accused of not having fulfilled its compliance obligations? On the contrary, if the operator does not follow regulator's risk map, can this be blamed on it? Formally, regulator's risk maps do not come with an injunction to take it into account but, as everyone knows, any recommendation from a regulator or supervisor must be taken into account. The legal solution could here be the implementation of a system of "comply or explain" which would mean that if the firm decides to no follow the risk map established by the regulator, it must be able to justify its choice.    To go further, read: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Legal Theory of Risk Mapping, center of Compliance Law, working paper, 2020

Full reference : L.-M. Augagneur, "L'efficacité des programmes de compliance : l'exemple du droit de la concurrence", in N. Borga, J.-Cl. Marin et J.-Cl. Roda (dir.), Compliance : l'entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, Série Régulations & Compliance, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 137-142.   Read a general presentation of the book in which the article is published Read the other titles of the série in which the book is published

Full reference : Audit, M., Les lois extraterritoriales américaines comme facteur d'accélération de la compliance, in Borga, N., Marin, J.-Cl. et Roda, J.-Cl. (dir.), Compliance : l'entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, Série Régulations & Compliance, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 45-54.   Read a general presentation of the book in which the article is published Read the other titres offre sérieux in which the book is pubished

Complete reference: Amico, Th., La convention judiciaire d'intérêt public ou la compliance comme moyen de lutte contre la récidive, in Borga, N., Marin, J.-Cl. et Roda, J.-Cl. (dir.),  Compliance : l'entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, Série Régulations & Compliance, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 79-90. Read a general presentation of the work in which the article is published. Consult the other titles of the Series in which the work is published.        

This working paper has served  as a basis for an article written in French in the book Compliance : Entreprise, Régulateur, Juge ("Compliance: Enterprise, Regulator, Judge"), published in May 2018 in the Regulations Series of Dalloz editions (Paris). See the other books published in this collection (presentation in French), directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche (presentation in English). ABSTRACT: The Company, the Regulator and the Judge are three key figures for the construction of an emerging Compliance Law. An important risk lies in a confusion of their respective roles, the company becoming a regulator, the regulator becoming a board of a place that goes to the conquest of others, the judge standing back. It is appropriate that each plays his role and that their respective function is not distorted. If this confusion is avoided, then the points of contact can multiply and one observes it. But as soon as everyone remains in its place, we can go further than these points of contact and if they agreed, the three characters can reach common goals. This is all the more legitimate since Compliance Law, as Regulation Law, is teleological in nature, which makes these branches of law profoundly political. These common goals are technical, such as risk prevention. They can be more political and higher, if there is a shared will, without ever one of the characters being captured by another: it is then to concern by the human being. The designation of this common goal to the Company, the Regulator and the Judge can be expressed in one word: Europe.