Regulator

► Full Reference: A. Bruneau, "L'entreprise juge d'elle-même : la fonction compliance dans la banque" ("The company judge of itself: the compliance function inside the bank"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 115-131.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published     - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance. In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as "Sapin 2" requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk. Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution. Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law. Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the "judge-judged": following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients. -

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) & Dalloz, 2021, 323 p. - 📘In parallel, the English version of this book, Compliance Tools, is published in the collection co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC)  and Bruylant.  - 📅This book comes after a cycle of colloquia organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Academic Partners.  - This volume is the continuation of the books dedicated to Compliance in this collection.   ► Read the presentations of the other books in the series: the following books: 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, 2023 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche and M. Boissavy (eds.), 📕Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRPC, 2024 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕L’Obligation de Compliance, 2025 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Compliance et Contrat, forthcoming 🕴️L. Laref (ed.), 📕Compliance et vigilance bancaire, forthcoming 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📕Le système juridique de l’adressage de l’Internet. Une structure multi-acteurs, gage de durabilité (The Legal System of Internet Addressing. A Multi-Stakeholder Structure, the Pledge of its Sustainability), forthcoming 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Le système probatoire de la Compliance, forthcoming   the previous books: 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019 🕴️N. Borga, J.-Cl. Marin and J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), 📕Compliance : l’entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, 2018 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Internet, espace d’interrégulation, 2016 📚Read the presentations of the other titles of the collection. - ► General presentation of the book: The political dimension of Compliance Law resides in the monumental goals that it aims for and which define it. These goals are internalized in “crucial operators”, who willingly or by force must structure themselves and act to achieve “monumental goals”, as set by public authorities and which may coincide with the interests of the enterprise. This one designs and controls the Ex Ante reorganization that this implies, under the public authorities supervision. Enterprises, even if their activities are not regulated, thus become transparent and must show the Compliance Tools effectively deployed to effectively achieve these goals. It is a major transformation of economic life in all countries because the Compliance Tools are adopted everywhere and have a global effect. These appear to be very diverse but their unity is profound and bringing it out has the practical benefit of producing a legal regime that is as unified as possible, while allowing their adaptation country by country, sector by sector, enterprise by enterprise.  This book aims to understand these Compliance Tools to better anticipate the assessment that will be made by Regulators, Supervisors and Courts, as well as the new conceptions of the authors of legal texts which impose new ones every day, while companies must also imagine the most appropriate Compliance Tools. This collective work specifically apprehends those on which we have few studies when we handle them on a daily basis, such as risk mapping or training or rights, letting more familiar tools shine through more transversal contributions, such as compliance programs, sanctions, whistleblowing or many sorts of settlements, agreements of public interest. A first chapter takes a legal and economic approach. A second chapter emphasizes the role of risk mapping. A third chapter draws the game of incentives. A fourth chapter identifies the expertise required. A fifth chapter insists on geographic significance. A sixth chapter details the measurement of effectiveness. A seventh chapter explores training. The eighth chapter examines technological tools. The concluding article leads to rights. - ► Read the general introduction of the book (in French). - ► Understand the book through the Table of Contents and the summaries of each article:   INTRODUCTION  🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Décrire, concevoir et corréler les outils de la compliance, pour en faire un usage adéquat   I. APPROCHES JURIDIQUE ET ÉCONOMIQUE DES OUTILS DE LA COMPLIANCE (LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE TOOLS) 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Approche juridique des outils de la compliance. Construire juridiquement l’unité des outils de la compliance à partir de la définition du Droit de la compliance par ses “buts monumentaux” 🕴️L. Benzoni et 🕴️B. Deffains, 📝Approche économique des outils de la compliance : finalité, mesure, effectivité de la compliance “subie” et “choisie”   II. LA CARTOGRAPHIE DES RISQUES, OUTIL CENTRAL DE LA COMPLIANCE (RISK MAPPING, CENTRAL COMPLIANCE TOOL) 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Dresser des cartographies des risques comme obligation et le paradoxe des “risques de conformité” 🕴️N. Guillaume, 📝Cartographie des risques de compliance. Premiers aperçus des enjeux, des limites et des bonnes pratiques   III. PLACE ET MANIEMENT DES INCITATIONS DANS LES SYSTÈMES DE COMPLIANCE (PLACE AND USE OF INCENTIVES IN COMPLIANCE SYSTEMS) 🕴️L. Rapp, 📝Théorie des incitations et gouvernance des activités spatiales 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Résoudre la contradiction entre “sanction” et “incitation” sous le feu du Droit de la compliance 🕴️M. Larouer, 📝La manifestation des mécanismes incitatifs dans le droit français de la compliance 🕴️H. Tardieu, 📝Souveraineté des données et compliance 🕴️L. Calandri, 📝Incitation(s) et autorégulation(s) : quelle place pour le droit de la compliance dans le secteur audiovisuel? 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance et incitations : un couple à propulser   IV. LES EXPERTISES REQUISES EN MATIÈRE DE COMPLIANCE (THE REQUIRED EXPERTISES IN TERMS OF COMPLIANCE) 🕴️A. Gutierrez-Crespin, 📝L’audit du dispositif de compliance : un outil clé pour en vérifier la robustesse 🕴️S. Koenigsberg et 🕴️Fr. Barrière, 📝La construction de l’expertise de l’avocat en matière de compliance 🕴️Th. Amico, 📝La Compliance ou le passage de l’ex post à l’ex ante. Une révolution copernicienne pour l’avocat pénaliste ?   V. LA PRÉGNANCE GÉOGRAPHIQUE DES OUTILS DE LA COMPLIANCE (THE GEOGRAPHICAL DOMINANCE OF COMPLIANCE TOOLS) 🕴️J.-B. Racine, 📝Propos introductifs. La prégnance géographique dans le choix et l’usage des outils de la compliance 🕴️M. M. Salah, 📝Conception et application de la compliance en Afrique 🕴️R. Burlingame, 🕴️K. Coppens, N. Power et 🕴️D.H. Lee, 📝Compliance : lutte internationale contre la corruption et gestion des risques   VI. LA MESURE DE L’EFFECTIVITÉ DES OUTILS DE LA COMPLIANCE (THE MEASURE OF COMPLIANCE TOOLS EFFECTIVITY) 🕴️M. Galland, 📝Le contrôle par le régulateur de l’effectivité des instruments de compliance mis en place par l’entreprise 🕴️A. Banck, 📝La maturité de l’utilisateur d’un outil de compliance, premier critère du choix de l’outil adéquat   VII. LA FORMATION, ALPHA ET OMÉGA DE LA COMPLIANCE (TRAINING, ALPHA AND OMEGA OF COMPLIANCE) 🕴️H. Causse, 📝La compliance : par et au-delà de la formation juridique classique 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝La formation : contenu et contenant de la compliance 🕴️Th. Thouret, 📝Formation et compliance : deux outils corrélés de transmission d’information   VIII. LES OUTILS TECHNOLOGIQUES ET LA COMPLIANCE BY DESIGN (TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS AND COMPLIANCE BY DESIGN) 🕴️J.-Ch. ​Roda, 📝La compliance by design en antitrust : entre innovation et illusion 🕴️C. Granier, 📝L’originalité normative de la compliance by design 🕴️L. Pailler, 📝Les outils technologiques, la compliance by design et le RGPD : la protection des données dès la conception 🕴️S. Merabet, 📝La morale by design   CONCLUSION 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Les droits subjectifs, outils premiers et naturels du Droit de la compliance - 🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Judge between Platform and Regulator: current example of Uber case in U.K., Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 29th of September 2020 Read by freely subscribing the other news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation   Summary of the news: On 22nd of September 2017, Transport of London (TFL), London Transport Regulator, refused to renew the licence, granted on 31st of May 2012 for 5 years, authorizing Uber to transport people because of criminal offenses committed by Uber's drivers. On 26th of June 2018, The Westminster Court prolonged Uber's licence for 15 months under the condition that the platform prevent the reproachable behaviors of its drivers. After these 15 months, the TFL refused once again to prolonge Uber's licence because of the persistence of aggressions against passengers. Uber, once again, contest this decision before the Westminster Court.  In a decision of 28th of September 2020, the Court observes that during the 15 months, the platform implemented many measures to prevent aggressions, that the level of maturity of these measures has improved over time and that the number of offenses was reduced over the period (passing from 55 in 2018 to 4 in 2020). The Court estimated the the implementation of this actions is sufficient to grant a new licence to Uber.  We can learn three lessons from this decision:  The Compliance obligation is not a result obligation but a mean obligation, which means that it is not reasonable to expect from a crucial operator (Uber, for instance) that it prevent every cases of agression but that it is salient to judge it on the effort it deploys to try to be closer to this ideal situation. Moreover, the crucial operator must be proactive, that is going away from the figure of passive subject of Law who apply measures enacted by the regulator in terms of fighting against aggressions to be an actor of the research of the best way to fight abusive behaviors, internalizing this "monumental goal.  The judge appreciates the violation committed by those whose the firm is responsible "in context", that is evaluates the concrete situation in a reasonable way.  It is the judge who decides in last resort and like the crucial operator, it must be reasonable.    Read to go further: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Firm, Regulator and Judge: thinking Compliance through these three characters, 2018 The report of the Assemblée nationale (French Parliament chamber) on the question 

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Interregulation: way of "cooperation protocol"​ between Regulatory Bodies. Example between French Financial Markets Authority and Anticorruption Agency, Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 22nd of September 2020 Read by freely subscribing other news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation   Summary of the news:  Although Regulation Law was born from the notion "sector", constant interferences between sectors and frequent interactions between some sectors and more general questions common to different sectors, make interregulation necessary. Compliance Law being the extension of Regulation Law, this interregulation mechanism is also necessary in Compliance Law.  This interregulation can take many legal paths like letters exchanges between regulators, the creation of a network of regulators and supervisors at the world level or about some specific question or the adoption of a "cooperation protocol" as the AMF (French Financial Market Regulator) and the AFA (French Anticorruption Agency) did on 16th of September 2020 to reinforce their respective fight against corruption, against market abuses and for the protection of investors.  This cooperation protocol between the AFA and the AMF has the following subjects: A more efficient methodology concerning the research and the analysis of corruption and market abuses. A more efficient prevention of corruption and market abuses. A better capacity to give recommendations of new regulations to the Legislator. A more rigorous monitoring of international works on the topic.  A more coherent information for the public. Are regulators the new teachers? 

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Risk Mapping: is it legally different when it is made by Regulatory Bodies or by Regulated Enterprises?, in  Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 17th of August 2020 Read, by freely subscribing, other news of the Newsletter, MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation   Summary of the news Each year, the Autorité des marchés financiers (French financial markets regulator), the European Central Bank and the Agence française anti-corruption (French anti-corruption agency) publish risk maps. At first glance, risk maps established by the regulator aim to both help regulator and the regulated company to face risks by anticipating them. These documents would only be an assistance brought to firms in their Compliance mission and not an injunction from the regulator to take into account the risks that it emphasizes.   However, Law forces firms to do their own risk maps under penalty of sanctions. Since the regulator has previously published its own risk map, can companies, obliged to write theirs, deviate from it? If the firm follows the map published by the regulator, can it protect itself against this if it is accused of not having fulfilled its compliance obligations? On the contrary, if the operator does not follow regulator's risk map, can this be blamed on it? Formally, regulator's risk maps do not come with an injunction to take it into account but, as everyone knows, any recommendation from a regulator or supervisor must be taken into account. The legal solution could here be the implementation of a system of "comply or explain" which would mean that if the firm decides to no follow the risk map established by the regulator, it must be able to justify its choice.    To go further, read: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Legal Theory of Risk Mapping, center of Compliance Law, working paper, 2020

Full reference : L.-M. Augagneur, "L'efficacité des programmes de compliance : l'exemple du droit de la concurrence", in N. Borga, J.-Cl. Marin et J.-Cl. Roda (dir.), Compliance : l'entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, Série Régulations & Compliance, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 137-142.   Read a general presentation of the book in which the article is published Read the other titles of the série in which the book is published

Full reference : Audit, M., Les lois extraterritoriales américaines comme facteur d'accélération de la compliance, in Borga, N., Marin, J.-Cl. et Roda, J.-Cl. (dir.), Compliance : l'entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, Série Régulations & Compliance, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 45-54.   Read a general presentation of the book in which the article is published Read the other titres offre sérieux in which the book is pubished

Complete reference: Amico, Th., La convention judiciaire d'intérêt public ou la compliance comme moyen de lutte contre la récidive, in Borga, N., Marin, J.-Cl. et Roda, J.-Cl. (dir.),  Compliance : l'entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, Série Régulations & Compliance, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 79-90. Read a general presentation of the work in which the article is published. Consult the other titles of the Series in which the work is published.