Information

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Appréciation du lancement d'alerte et de l'obligation de vigilance au regard de la compétitivité internationale" ("Assessment of whistleblowing and of the obligation of vigilance with regard to international competitiveness"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2022, pp. 413-436. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► English summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Taking up the legal tools of Compliance and confronting them with the concern that Law must have for the Competitiveness of companies, it is necessary that these legal instruments not harm it because Compliance Law, because of its immense ambitions, can only function through an alliance between political wills with great pretensions (save the planet) and the entities which are able to achieve these goals (the crucial economic operators : the political drawing on the compagnies" power, it would be contradictory for the legal instruments put in place by Law to harm the ability of companies to face global economic competition, or worse to favor international competitors acting under legal systems which do not integrate Compliance obligations.   From this principle, it is possible to assess these two legal techniques of whistleblowing and vigilance obligation: both consist in capturing Information, which gives them a strong uniqueness and fits them into the global competition for Information. Taking the whistleblowing, its first beneficiary is the company itself since the firm discovers a weakness and can therefore remedy it. Therefore, beyond the principle of protection of the whistleblower by their access to the legal statute, for instance the one conceived by the French 2016 law known as "Sapin 2", it is questionable that all the incentives are not put in place so that the holder of such information transmits it to the manager. It is not the European solution, even after the European Directive of 2019, national legal systems continuing to require the absence of financial compensation, the "heroic figure of the whistleblower and the refusal of their remuneration depriving the company of Information and improvement. First to the manager, with external transmission taking place if the latter does nothing, the internal manager is thus encouraged to act and put an end to the dysfunction, which increases the competitiveness of the company. But the French legislation has on the contrary developed the right incentive as to the person to whom the information is transmitted because by obliging to transmit first to the manager, the external transmission intervening if the internal management does nothing, the incentive is thus made to the internal manager to act and put an end to the dysfunction, this legal solution increasing the competitiveness of the company. Even more, and even if it seems counter-intuitive, the obligation of vigilance increases the competitiveness of the obliged companies. Indeed, Law by obliging them to prevent and fight against violations of human rights and the environment has tacitly given them all the necessary powers to do so, notably the power to collect Information on third-party companies, including (and even above all) those which are not subject to transparency obligations. In this respect, companies, as far as they are personally responsible, hold supervisory power over others, a power which allows to globalize Compliance Law and which, in the process, increases the Companies' own power. Therefore, the obligation of vigilance is in many respects a boon for the companies which are subject to it. The resumption of the mechanism by the next European Directive, itself indifferent to the territory, will only strengthen this global power of vigilant companies over possibly foreign companies which become its passive subjects. - 🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Duty of Vigilance, Whistleblowing and International Competitiveness, Working Paper, September 2021. -   🎤 this Working Paper is the basis for a conference , in the colloquium Effectiveness of Compliance and International Competitiveness, co-organised  by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Center for Law and Economics of the Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II),   November 4, 2021 - 📝this Working Paper is also the basis for an article. This article is to be published ⤵ in its French version in the book 📕Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, in the series 📚Régulations & Compliance  in its English version in the book 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, in the series la collection 📚Compliance & Regulation - ► Working Paper Summary: The "Compliance Tools" are very diverse. If it has been chosen to study more particularly among these the obligation of vigilance and the whistleblower, these rather than others and to study them together, it is because they present in the perspective of the specific topic chosen, namely "international competitiveness", and for companies, and for economic zones considered, and for legal system inseparable from them, a uniqueness: these are mechanisms which release Information.  By order of the law, the company will not only stop ignoring what it covered with the handkerchief that Tartuffe held out to it or that a conception of Company Law legitimately allowed it to ignore. This article does not examine if this revolution made by Compliance Law expresses in the legal system is on the one hand legitimate and on the other hand effective: the article measures what is happening at the regard to "international competitiveness". Compliance Law is therefore be examined here through its instruments, and not in relation to its normativity. In fact, its instruments are intended to provide Information and to make this information available, in its presentation, in its intelligibility and in the hands of those who are able to use Information in perspective of the Compliance Monumental Goals, achieving them.  Regarding this central notion of Information, international competitiveness will be more particularly concerned because Compliance Law will oblige the company itself to seek out, then expose to everyone's eyes, in particular its competitors, its weaknesses, its projects, its alliances, its flaws. This does not pose a problem if its competitors themselves are often subject to this new branch of Law, which goes far beyond transparency, which is already a new mechanism because a company is not a transparent organization and Competition Law that governs ordinary businesses never required this. But if they are not subject to this incredibly special branch of Law that is Compliance Law, then there is a distortion of competitiveness by the very fact of the Law. It is possible to pretend that the markets like virtue, that they give it credit because they are themselves based on the idea of "promise", which is ultimately based on a moral concept, but this provision of Information to others, while others remain opaque, is a major problem of competitiveness, which the legal requirement of "loyal commercial practices" only very partially considers. Therefore, it is necessary to first examine what is the economic and financial power of the information captured by the company on itself thank to Compliance Law making available to all but firstly to the compagny itself through the whistblowing mechanism, organised by the laws, differently in the US and Europe (I). Compliance Law also obliges companies to be accountable not only for what they do but also for what others do for them. Through the obligation of Vigilance, objective Ex Ante obligation and duty, the company obtains a power of Information on others which could well resolve what is often presented as the dispute aporetic of the extraterritoriality of Compliance Law, thus making accountable companies hitherto protected by their "preserved" legal system and thereby affected by the effectiveness of Compliance Law (II). - read below the developments

Full reference: Luguri, J. and Strahilevitz, L. J., Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2021, 67p.  Sciences Po's students can read this article via Sciences Po's Drive in the folder MAFR – Regulation & Compliance. 

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., The always in expansion "Right to be Forgotten"​: a legitimate Oxymore in Compliance Law built on Information. Example of​ Cancer Survivors Protection, Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 25th of August 2020  Read by freely subscribing other news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation   Summary of the news The "right to be forgotten" is an invention of the Court of Justice of the European Union during the case Google Spain in 2014. It implies that digital firms block the access to personal data of someone who asks it. This "right to be forgotten", which permits to impose secret to third parties has largely been generalized by GDPR in 2016. This new fundamental subjective right is a very political and European right. United-States which, on the contrary of Europe, did not experience nazism, links the "right to be forgotten" to the protection of consumer, conception which especially leads California Consumer Privacy Act adopted in 2018 to link this right to a situation of absence of necessity of this data for the firm which obtained it.  In Europe, this willingness to protect directly the person increases the scope of such a subjective right. Thus, in France and in Luxembourg, since 2020, a cancer survivor can thus ask that such an information is not accessible among his or her health data, especially for insurance companies which use them in their risk calculus to set premium amount. Netherlands will do the same in 2021 to fight against discrimination between banks' and insurances' clients.  The "monumental goal" is therefore not so much here the protection of individual freedoms as the protection of the vulnerable person, which is bye the way the keystone of a Compliance Law, concealing sometimes prohibition to circulate information (as here) and sometimes obligation to circulate information (in other cases, where the alert must be given) depending on whether vulnerable people are protected either by one or by the other.

► Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et personnalité, in Recueil Dalloz, n°11/7812, avril 2019, pp. 604-606 -   ► Chronique English Summary: Compliance is often presented as a set of mechanical procedures, in which human beings are absent. It's the opposite. It is an Information Law, in its function of preventing systemic risks and a markets protection Law, which poses the requirement of knowing “truly” the person who is “relevant”, generalizing what Company or Competition Law had partially admitted. Even more, beyond systems, Compliance Law, insofar as it is a Protection Law, aims to protect human beings, directly or indirectly concerned, establishing them as legal persons, true final subjects of law of this new branch of Law. - 📝read the chronique (in French). - 🚧  read the bilingual Working paper, Compliance and Personality, basis of this chronique,    working paper including footnotes, technical references and hyperlink - 📖 read the other chroniques Chronique MAFR Droit de la Compliance -

► Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Droit de la concurrence et droit de la compliance ("Competition Law and Compliance Law), November 2018,  in Revue Concurrences n° 4-2018, Art. n° 88053, pp. 1-4.  -   ► Summary: Compliance Law is a new branch of Law, still under construction. One can have a “narrow definition” of seeing it as the obligation of businesses to show that they are constantly and actively complying with the law. One can have a richer definition, of a substantive nature, defining it as the obligation or the own will of certain companies to achieve “monumental goals” that go beyond economic and financial performance. Competition Law partly integrates its two conceptions of Compliance: Precursor, Competition Law concretizes dynamically the first conception of Compliance Law. It is with more difficulties but also much more future that Competition Law can express in dialectic the second conception of Compliance Law as internationalization of these “monumental goals”, especially in the digital space. -   📝 read the article (in French) - 🚧read the Working Paper on which this Article is based, with footnotes, technical references and hypertext links.     -

In principle, the very mechanism of the market is governed by freedom, the freedoms of the agents themselves – the freedom to undertake and contract – and the competitive freedom that marks the market itself, the convergence of these freedoms allowing the self-regulated functioning of The "market law", namely the massive encounter of offers and demands that generates the right price ("fair price"). For this to work, it is necessary but it is enough that there is no barrier to entry the market and there is no behavior by which operators can hinder this competitive market law, by abuse of dominant position and cartel.   But in the case of financial markets, which are regulated markets, "market abuses" are sanctioned at the very heart of regulation. Indeed, the regulation of the financial markets presupposes that the information is distributed there for the benefit of investors, or even other stakeholders, possibly information not exclusively financial. This integrity of the financial markets which, beyond the integrity of information, must achieve transparency, justifies that information is fully and equally shared. That is why those who hold or must hold information that is not shared by others (privileged information) must not use it in the market until they have made it public. Similarly, they should not send bad information to the market. Neither should they manipulate stock market prices. These sanctions were essentially conceived by the American financial theory, concretized by the American courts, then taken back in Europe. To the extent that they sanction both reproachable behavior and constitute a public policy instrument of direction and protection of markets, the question of cumulation of criminal law and administrative repressive law can only be posed with difficulty in Europe.  

► Référence complète: Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 22 October 2014, amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (called "NFRD" (Non Financial Reporting Directive)). - ► Read the text  -