Financial market

Articles in The Journal of Regulation & Compliance « JoRC »

LOCHMANN, Sabine🕴️

📝ESG Rating Agencies and Compliance as an Effective Way of Increasing International Competitiveness, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals

► Full Reference: S. Lochmann, "ESG Rating Agencies and Compliance as an Effective Way of Increasing International Competitiveness", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 389-400. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article:  -

Articles in The Journal of Regulation & Compliance « JoRC »

LOCHMANN, Sabine🕴️

📝Les agences de notation ESG et l’effectivité de la Compliance face à la Compétitivité internationale, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance

► Full Reference: S. Lochmann, "Les agences de notation ESG et l'effectivité de la compliance face à la compétitivité internationale" ("ESG Rating Agencies and Compliance as an effective way of increasing international competitiveness"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2022, pp. 401-412. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The purpose of this article is to show that the markets, those who provide them with financing and those who draw on them, need information on the environmental, social and governance dimensions of the companies involved, ESG rating agencies are companies that contribute to the overall performance of the system and converge on the Monumental Goals that drive Compliance Law. From this perspective, and taking Moody's as a concrete example, the article first explains the role played by an ESG rating agency and its evaluation methodology, in particular the criteria used and the way in which companies inform the markets and stakeholders in this area, particularly with regard to climate change, converging in this respect with the public authorities and with the various international texts, treaties and texts of soft law that follow one another. This convergence between the activity of ESG rating agencies and Compliance Law in that it is organised normatively around Monumental Goals is particularly marked in the organisation of a "just transition", with the agency's activity being inserted into the construction of European texts. It thus appears that the ESG investment ecosystem is in full evolution, implying full collaboration between all participants in the financing industry for sustainable financing and, ultimately, the permanence of democracy. -

Jurisprudence

Cour d'Appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal)

Decision of 11th of February 2021, Veolia v. Suez

Full reference: Cour d'appel de Paris, Pole 5 – chamber 7, 11th of February 2021, Veolia/Suez, n° 20/13807

Reports

US Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC)

Whistleblower Program

Full reference: US Securities and Exchanges Commission, Whistleblower Program. 2020 Annual Report to Congress, 16th of November 2020 Read the report   Read, to go further on the question of whistleblowers: Frison-Roche, M.-A., The impossible unicity of the legal category of whistleblowers, working paper, 2019  

Reports

Financial Stability Board

The Use of Supervisory and Regulatory Technology by Authorities and Regulated Institutions

Full reference: Financial Stability Board, The Use of Supervisory and Regulatory Technology by Authorities and Regulated Institutions. Market Developments and Stability Implications, Report of 9th of October 2020, 36 p.  Read the report Read the presentation of the report by the Financial Stability Board To go further on the question of the use of new technologies in regulatory processes, read Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's working paper: Analysis of blockchains with regards with the uses they can fulfill and the functions that the ministerial officers must ensure  

Articles

Interregulation: way of “cooperation protocol”​ between Regulatory Bodies.Example between French Financial Markets Authority and Anticorruption Agency

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Interregulation: way of "cooperation protocol"​ between Regulatory Bodies. Example between French Financial Markets Authority and Anticorruption Agency, Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 22nd of September 2020 Read by freely subscribing other news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation   Summary of the news:  Although Regulation Law was born from the notion "sector", constant interferences between sectors and frequent interactions between some sectors and more general questions common to different sectors, make interregulation necessary. Compliance Law being the extension of Regulation Law, this interregulation mechanism is also necessary in Compliance Law.  This interregulation can take many legal paths like letters exchanges between regulators, the creation of a network of regulators and supervisors at the world level or about some specific question or the adoption of a "cooperation protocol" as the AMF (French Financial Market Regulator) and the AFA (French Anticorruption Agency) did on 16th of September 2020 to reinforce their respective fight against corruption, against market abuses and for the protection of investors.  This cooperation protocol between the AFA and the AMF has the following subjects: A more efficient methodology concerning the research and the analysis of corruption and market abuses. A more efficient prevention of corruption and market abuses. A better capacity to give recommendations of new regulations to the Legislator. A more rigorous monitoring of international works on the topic.  A more coherent information for the public. Are regulators the new teachers? 

Working papers

Compliance Law, Health crisis and Future

This interview was conducted in French with Olivia Dufour, for an article published in French in the digital publication Actualité Juridique. Its subject is  the confrontation between the current health crisis situation and the Compliance Law.    Summary. After defining Compliance Law, distinguishing the procedural and poor definition and the substantial and rich definition, the starting point is to admit the aporia: the type of health crisis caused by Covid-19 will be renewed and it is imperative to prevent it, even to manage it, then to organize the crisis exit. Public Authorities are legitimate to do so, but because this type of crisis being global and the State being consubstantially linked to borders, States are hardly powerful. Their traditional International Law shows their  limits in this current crisis and one cannot hope that this configulration will improve radically. In contrast, some companies and markets, notably the financial markets, are global. But the markets are not legitimate to carry out such missions and counting on the generosity of certain large companies is far too fragile in front of the "monumental goal" that is the prevention of the next health crisis, crisis which must never happen. How to get out of this aporia? By Compliance Law, basis of, in a literal and strong sense, the "Law of the Future".  We need to be inspired by the Banking and Financial Compliance Law. Designed in the United States after the 1929 crisis to tend towards the "monumental goal" of the absence of a new devastating crisis in the country and the world,  this set of new legal mechanisms gave duty and power of supervision, regulation and compliance to market authorities and central bankers. These are independent of governments but in constant contact with them. Today, they claim to have as first priority the fight against climate change. Now and for the future, they must also be given the responsibility and the powers to prevent a global health disaster, similar to a global ecological disaster, similar to a global financial disaster. This does not require a modification of the texts because their mandate consists in fighting instability. Stability must become a primary legal principle, of which the fight against monetary instability was only a first example. By the new use that central banks must make of it by preventing and managing health crises, Compliance Law will ensure that the future will be not catastrophic.

Books

Patrick BOLTON - Morgan DESPRES - Luiz Awazu PEREIRA DA SILVA Frédéric SAMAMA - Romain SVARTZMAN, The Green Swan

The Green Swan

Reference: Patrick BOLTON – Morgan DESPRES – Luiz Awazu PEREIRA DA SILVA – Frédéric SAMAMA – Romain SVARTZMAN, The green swan: central banking and financial stability in the age of climate change, Banque des Règlements Internationaux, Janvier 2020 Accede to article

Reports

Autorité des marchés financiers (French financial markets regulator)

La cybercriminalité boursière. Définition, cas et perspectives (Stock market cybercriminality. Définition, cases and perspectives)

Full reference: Alexandre Neyret, La cybercriminalité boursière. Définition, cas et perspectives (Stock market cybercriminality. Définition, cases and perspectives), Report to l'AMF, 10th of October 2019, 70p. Read the report (in French)

Articles in The Journal of Regulation & Compliance « JoRC »

JUVIGNY, Benoît de🕴️

📝La compliance, bras armé de la régulation financière, in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed), 📕Régulation, Supervision, Compliance

► Full Reference: B. de Juvigny, "La compliance, bras armé de la régulation financière" ("Compliance, the arm of financial regulation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes & Commentaires", "Régulations" Serie, 2017, pp. 17-28 - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, in which this article is published - ► English summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC):  - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

Jurisprudence

Cour de Cassation (French Judicial Supreme Court)

Decision of 22nd of November 2016, BLCM

Full reference: Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre commerciale, 22nd of November 2016, BLCM, 15-11.063   Read the decision (in French)

Articles in The Journal of Regulation & Compliance « JoRC »

What is the nature of the “Economic Regulatory Contract”, open to “consultation” February 19, 2015 by the privatized company “Aéroports de Paris (ADP)”?

February 17, 2015, as the previous "Contrat de Régulation Économique" (Economie Regulatory Contract), the firm Aéroport de Paris (ADP)  has made available on its site to all "for consultation" the draft  "Contrat de Régulation Economique ("Economic Regulatory Contract)  for the period 2016 -2020. Published in the wake of the meeting of the Board of ADP, the text is presented as a tool "for the Paris place", especially for air transport. This shows that the document is primarily intended for investors and financial markets, the document being placed on the company website in the section for the "investors". This illustrates the evolution from the traditional "contrats de plan" (plan contracts). But then, who are the parties to these types of contract? Indeed, the very term "Regulatory contract"  is new in public Law. It appears as a sort of  modernization of "plan contract." The Conseil d'État (French State Council) finally admitted the contractual nature of these planning contracts. In these contracts, are parties were the State and the company in charge of a public service. Because here the contract is an instrument of "economic regulation" the open public consultation draft rather expresses a global conception of  ADP, the company which manages the Paris airports,  for the future of the development of critical infrastructure that is the airport as the heart of global development of air transport. The enterprise manager of the airport in the heart of the contract (rather than the State) in setting objectives for the coming four years is the letter and spirit of the French law of 20 April 2005 about Airports, which put the apparatus of this "Contrat de Régulation Economique" in place. In this, the infrastructure manager is set by law as a "regulator of second degree", as can be a financial market enterprise. The company that manages and develops the Paris airports undoubtedly belongs to the category of " critical firms", as well it manages the future of the sector and helps to keep France a place in the world. More, A.D.P. behaves like a Regulator, since it is carrying out the "public consultation", the consultation paper prepared by it,  being placed on its site and developing its ambitions for the sector and for France. But A.D.P. also expressed as a financial and economic actor, emphasizing the competitive environment,  demanding in passing more stability and clarity in the regulation in which it moves … That is why the consultation mechanism provided by the law must be more complex. Indeed, ADP can not be judge and jury. Therefore if the project raises observations, they must be formuled not to ADP but to the Ministries of Aviation and Economy, within a month. They shall communicate theiir content to ADP . Then the Commission consultative aéroportaire (French Airport Consultative Committee) will be consulted. At the end of this process, the "Contrat de Régulation Economique" will be signed. Seing the end of the process, it remains in line with the plan contracts, since it remains the Economic Regulatory Contract is signed between the State and the essential infrastructure manager. But the consultation process shows firstly investors are the first recipients of the statements made by a privatized company presenting its draft primarily in terms of competitive context and international development and secondly the airlines that use daily services of the airports are also directly involved by theses questions of tarification. Airlines protest against the increase in the money that will be asked. This will be imposed, since it is tarification and princing public policy. We are in unilateral rules. But it is indeed a "price" they feel to pay, they also heard a speech referring to competition in what the mechanism is presented as a "contract". But then, does it take to admit that these "contracts for economic regulation" are not between two parties that are the state and the regulator of second degree that is the infrastructure manager but must be three, the State, the infrastructure manager and "stakeholders" that are mainly airlines? This practical difficulty is much to the fact that the qualification of "contract" is difficult to justify in proceeding in which prevail unilateral mechanisms.