Financial Market Authority

Conferences

participation in a Round-Table

🎥Adéquation et inadéquation de la sanction comme outil de régulation financière et sa transformation par la Compliance (Adequacy and inadequacy of sanctions as a tool of Financial Regulation and its transformation through Compliance), in🧮Quel rôle pour la sanction dans la Régulation ? (what role for the Sanction in the Financial Regulatory System?)

► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Adéquation et inadéquation de la sanction comme outil de régulation financière et sa transformation par la Compliance" (Adequacy and inadequacy of sanctions as a tool of Financial Regulation and its transformation through Compliance)", contribution to the round-table discussion on"Quel rôle pour la sanction dans la Régulation ? (What role for sanctions in Regulatory System)", Annual conference of the Commission des sanctions (Enforcement Committee) of the Autorité des marchés financiers – AMF (French Financial Markets Authority), Paris,  14 October 2025. - ► see the general programme of this manifestation (in French) The event comprises two round tables. The theme of the first round table is: La preuve des abus de marché entre l’AMF et le juge pénal : vers une convergence ? (Proof of market abuse between the AMF and the criminal courts: towards convergence?) 🪑🪑🪑AutresOther participants in this 2nd round table, moderated by Sophie Schiller, member of the Enforcement Committe on the topic: Quel rôle pour la sanction dans la Régulation ? (What role for sanctions in Regulatory System?) 🕴🏻Sébastien Raspiller, Secretary General of the AMF 🕴🏻Martine Samuelian, Partner, Jeantet Law Firm 🕴🏻Vincent Villette, Secretary General of the CNIL (French Personal Data Regulatory Body) - ► Summary of this intervention : In the round-table discussion on the role of sanctions, a number of contributions will be made, depending on the nature of the discussion itself. They will be brief in nature and will be aimed at an audience with a good knowledge of financial regulation. It is the occasion for me to insist on 2 things, the first naturely and probably for ever attached to the role of sanctions in all Regulatory Systems, the secund very new. The first is the indissociability between Criminal Law and Sanction, even if sanctions is defined as a regulatory tools. The secund is the conception and the use of sanctions through Compliance Law. Therefore, in the first idea, my first intervention, aimed more at establishing the subject and describing the Intangible, is on the very idea that sanctions have a role to play in financial regulation. By its very nature. But this does not make it any less difficult. It is not obvious, because if penalties are seen as a 'regulatory tool', then it is the regulatory perspective that predominates and 'colours' the tool that is the penalty. Regulation, of which the texts on the basis which sanctions are issued are only one tool and which is not the set of applicable rules, Regulation which is an apparatus of institutions, rules and decisions aimed at establishing the equilibrium of a sector and maintaining this equilibrium, which is by nature unstable, over time, which the sector could not do by its own efforts alone (Regulatory Law, which is Ex Ante Law, thus distinguishing itself from Competition Law, which is Ex Post Law). From the perspective of Financial Regulatory System, as in other sectoral regulatory systems, and in the general Regulatory Law, sanctions are a tool (and a tool like any other, simply more powerful than the others. This is the pragmatic perspective adopted by the State and the Regulatory body itself, which will use it in conjunction with other tools, such as an Information, Education and Incentive mechanism. Moreover, it shall use sanction as informative tool, as educational tool, as incentive tool. However, the principle of the autonomy of Criminal Law, and the European concept of "Criminal Matters" mean that the sanction can be seen in terms of the autonomous criteria of the seriousness of the act imputed and the sanction imposed on the legal person. In this respect, the penalty is inseparable from the way in which it is imposed (Criminal Law is constitutionally inseparable from Criminal Procedure). In this respect, the sanction is not a tool coloured by the overall objective served by the Financial Markets Regulatory Body: the sustainability of the financial system. The Enforcement Committee is not the AMF's "armed wing"; it is a "court", as the Oury ruling reminded us. Therefore, the question is and I would like to ask it directly to the Enforcement Committed: Can you be both?   As they say, could you be both carp and rabbit? Depending on whether you are viewed from one angle or another, you will be seen as the body that makes financial markets effective (a tool among the tools) or as the body that punishes misconduct (a court among the courts). It is possible, and in practice it is often true. But if we are honest, we will admit that regulation feeds on information and that the procedure before a criminal court is built on secrecy and the weapons of those who, innocent or guilty, are at risk because they are, or will be, prosecuted. We've never got out of this difficulty. We always try to strike a balance between the fact that it is in itself a repressive sanction for a person who will suffer and the fact that it is also a systemic tool: there is a 'balance' between the search for systemic benefit (which reduces the protection of individuals for the benefit of the system) and the concern for the people involved (which reduces the present and future protection of the system). The balance goes more or less in one direction. It is often public opinion, the place, the legislator and, even above all,  the civil appeal judge (vertical dialogue) and those in dialogue, between the regulator and the criminal judge (horizontal dialogue) which cause the scales of diverse technical solutions. It is also the way in which the Enforcement Committee, in defining itself as the armed wing of the AMF (carp) or as a repressive court (rabbit), chooses in its procedural behaviour the role of sanctions in Financial Regulatory System, more or less instrumentalised (carp) or jurisdictionalised (rabbit). - The second point, if there is to be one, concerns the development of the role of sanctions in Financial Regulatory System . On the basis of these fundamentals, an evolution in the role of sanctions in financial regulatory system (an evolution that can be observed in all sectoral regulatory systems) consists of internalising sanctions (in their conception by the texts, their elaboration by the Sanctions Committees, their application) in the economic operators sanctioned, in the economic sectors concerned, in the opinion concerned (the figure of Peelmanian circles of the audiences applying). This internalisation transforms Regulatory mission of the administrative body (which deals with market structures) into Rupervision (which deals directly with market operators) since the sanction penetrates the operator, the operator adopting commitments. This concept corresponds to the new branch of Law known as Compliance Law.  Compliance Law uses sanctions as an "incentive like any other", and (we must be careful on this point), because it is systemic in nature, the concern for the system being internalised in the operator, it is relatively insensitive to procedural rights. With the emphasis on information, it is the principle of adversarial debate (which provides information) rather than the rights of the defence that is valued. The cooperation of the person being prosecuted is highly valued, and non-cooperation becomes incomprehensible. The internalisation of sanctions by operators has led to two major changes. Firstly, these economic operators themselves must sanction, detect and prevent market abuse. The number of special obligations of vigilance is increasing. The obligation of vigilance of operators themselves is becoming a pillar of Regulation, transformed in Supervision.  The other development is the liberalisation of regulatory system in relation to territory, thank to Compliance Law. As operators are less dependent on borders than are regulators and authors of legal texts (but soft law is spreading, including repression), market abuses can be apprehended in several jurisdictions at the same time, notably through global compliance programmes. - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the VideoNews  MAFR Surplomb 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Law & Art

Jurisprudence

Cour d'Appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal)

Decision of 11th of February 2021, Veolia v. Suez

Full reference: Cour d'appel de Paris, Pole 5 – chamber 7, 11th of February 2021, Veolia/Suez, n° 20/13807

Reports

AMF (French financial markets authority) and AFM (Dutch financial markets authority)

Position paper : Call for a European Regulation for the provision of ESG data, rating, and relate services

Full reference: AMF / AFM, Position paper : Call for a European Regulation for the provision of ESG data, rating, and relate services, 15th of December 2020  Read the press release by AMF In this document, AMF and AFM analyses the perspective to supervise ESG rating agencies and the perspective to make ESMA supervisor of these agencies. 

Articles

Interregulation: way of “cooperation protocol”​ between Regulatory Bodies.Example between French Financial Markets Authority and Anticorruption Agency

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Interregulation: way of "cooperation protocol"​ between Regulatory Bodies. Example between French Financial Markets Authority and Anticorruption Agency, Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 22nd of September 2020 Read by freely subscribing other news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation   Summary of the news:  Although Regulation Law was born from the notion "sector", constant interferences between sectors and frequent interactions between some sectors and more general questions common to different sectors, make interregulation necessary. Compliance Law being the extension of Regulation Law, this interregulation mechanism is also necessary in Compliance Law.  This interregulation can take many legal paths like letters exchanges between regulators, the creation of a network of regulators and supervisors at the world level or about some specific question or the adoption of a "cooperation protocol" as the AMF (French Financial Market Regulator) and the AFA (French Anticorruption Agency) did on 16th of September 2020 to reinforce their respective fight against corruption, against market abuses and for the protection of investors.  This cooperation protocol between the AFA and the AMF has the following subjects: A more efficient methodology concerning the research and the analysis of corruption and market abuses. A more efficient prevention of corruption and market abuses. A better capacity to give recommendations of new regulations to the Legislator. A more rigorous monitoring of international works on the topic.  A more coherent information for the public. Are regulators the new teachers? 

Lessons

Leçon 1 : Le symptôme : le Régulateur

Reports

Autorité des marchés financiers (French financial markets regulator)

La cybercriminalité boursière. Définition, cas et perspectives (Stock market cybercriminality. Définition, cases and perspectives)

Full reference: Alexandre Neyret, La cybercriminalité boursière. Définition, cas et perspectives (Stock market cybercriminality. Définition, cases and perspectives), Report to l'AMF, 10th of October 2019, 70p. Read the report (in French)

Glossary

Market Abuse

In principle, the very mechanism of the market is governed by freedom, the freedoms of the agents themselves – the freedom to undertake and contract – and the competitive freedom that marks the market itself, the convergence of these freedoms allowing the self-regulated functioning of The "market law", namely the massive encounter of offers and demands that generates the right price ("fair price"). For this to work, it is necessary but it is enough that there is no barrier to entry the market and there is no behavior by which operators can hinder this competitive market law, by abuse of dominant position and cartel.   But in the case of financial markets, which are regulated markets, "market abuses" are sanctioned at the very heart of regulation. Indeed, the regulation of the financial markets presupposes that the information is distributed there for the benefit of investors, or even other stakeholders, possibly information not exclusively financial. This integrity of the financial markets which, beyond the integrity of information, must achieve transparency, justifies that information is fully and equally shared. That is why those who hold or must hold information that is not shared by others (privileged information) must not use it in the market until they have made it public. Similarly, they should not send bad information to the market. Neither should they manipulate stock market prices. These sanctions were essentially conceived by the American financial theory, concretized by the American courts, then taken back in Europe. To the extent that they sanction both reproachable behavior and constitute a public policy instrument of direction and protection of markets, the question of cumulation of criminal law and administrative repressive law can only be posed with difficulty in Europe.  

Articles

MARECHAL, Anne and LEGRIS, Bertrand

La composition administrative de l’AMF: un premier bilan très positif (The Administrative composition of AMF: a very positive first appraisal)

Full reference: Marechal, A. and Legris, B., La composition administrative de l'AMF: un premier bilan très positif  (The Administrative composition of AMF: a very positive first appraisal), Bulletin Joly Bourse, December 2016, pp. 539-542 Read the article (in French)