Judicial Public Interest Agreement (CJIP)

► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, “What the Legislator can, or cannot, do: the example of the French judicial public interest […]

► Full reference : S-M.. Cabon, « Théorie et pratique de la négociation dans la justice pénale » (Theory and Practice of Negotiation in Criminal Justice), in M.-A. Frison-Roche & M. Boissavy (dir.), Compliance et Droits de la défense – Enquête interne, CIIP, CRPC, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2024, pp. 241-252. - ► English Summary of this article (made by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC) : The author defines the technique of “negotiation” as the one by which “each party will attempt to reconcile [interests] through a process of cooperation and mutual concessions”. French criminal justice uses it not so much because of the attraction of the American model, but in an attempt to resolve the difficulties caused by the flow of litigation, the process having been extended to punitive litigation, notably before administrative regulatory authorities. Its principle is therefore the cooperation of the offender. The author highlights the “practical” satisfactions claimed, since cases are resolved and sanctions are accepted, and the “theoretical” concerns, since fundamental principles, such as the rights of the defence, seem to be set aside, the claim being made that the practical advantages and the fact that nothing obliges companies to accept CJIPs and CRPCs justify not dwelling on these “theoretical” considerations. The article is therefore built on the confrontation between “the Useful” and “the Just”, because this is how the system is presented, utility and consent being emphasised in particular in the guidelines of the public authorities. Against this background, the author examines how the texts continue, or not, to protect the person who risks being sanctioned in fine, notably in inquiries and investigations; the fact that this person consents to waive this protection, in particular by providing the evidence that will form the basis of the finding of guilt, while the public authority does not at the same time waive prosecution, is problematic with regard to “the Just”. The second part of the article is therefore devoted to “the Useful compelled to be Just”. In this respect, the author considers that the independence of the public prosecutor should be stronger, on the model of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and that the review by the judicial courts should be deeper, since the current procedure for validating CJIPs seems governed by the principle that the parties control the proceedings, a principle ill-suited to criminal justice.

► Full Reference: B. Sillaman, “Privilege Lessons from the U.S.”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. “Compliance & Regulation“, 2024, pp. 251-255. - read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The French legal system is evolving, organizing interaction between lawyers with regulators and prosecutors, specially in investigations about corruption or corporate misconduct, adopting U.S. negotiated resolutions such as the Convention judiciaire d’intérêt public, which encourages “collaboration” between them. The author describes the evolution of the U.S. DOJ doctrine and askes French to be inspired by the U.S. procedural experience, U.S. where this mechanism came from. Indeed, the DOJ released memoranda about what the “collaboration” means. At the end (2006 Memorandum), the DOJ has considered that the legal privilege must remain intact when the information is not only factual in order to maintain trust between prosecutors, regulators and lawyers. French authorities do not follow this way. The author regrets it and thinks they should adopt the same reasoning as the American authority on the secret professionnel of the avocat, especially when he intervenes in the company internal investigation. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses -

🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law - ► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Le PNF devrait avoir ouvertement compétence en matière de CJIP environnementale : la CJIP "Guy Dauphin Environnement" du 17 mai 2023" ("The French National Financial Prosecutor’s Office should have open jurisdiction over environmental Judicial Public Interest Agreement: the "Guy Dauphin Environnement" Judicial Public Interest Agreement of 17 May 2023"), Newsletter MAFR Law, Compliance, Regulation, 20 May 2023. - 📧Read by freely subscribing other news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation - 🔴 The Judicial Public Interest Agreement GDE of 15 May 2023 or how the French National Prosecutor's Office is rightly meddling in Environmental Compliance The Parquet National Financier (French National Financial Prosecutor’s Office) does not have jurisdiction over environmental matters, and this is regrettable. For it is very well placed to obtain, in particular for the benefit of associations, adequate measures for the future, which refers to the definition of Compliance Law. This is what he is actually achieving through the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public – CJIP (Judicial Public Interest Agreement) GDE. - 📧read the article ⤵️

► Compliance Law and Competition: for building, is it necessary to legislate ? Example of quasi-public interest judicial agreement: the French Competition Authority's Statement of June 3, 2021 on Facebook   The French law so-called "Sapin 2" of 2016, organized the "convention judiciaire d’intérêt public – CJIP" (Public Interest Judicial Agreement) which allows the prosecutor to undertake not to prosecute a company in returns for this company's commitments for the future. Is this mechanism reserved for this law, which only concerns corruption and bribery? The answer is often positive. Is it so obvious? Since the entity having the power to prosecute therefore always has the power not to prosecute. As the company always has the freedom to make commitments for the future. And everything stops. News in Competition Law illustrate this. On June 9, 2021, as part of a transaction, the Autorité de la concurrence (French Competition Authority) sanctions Google (➡️📝 Communiqué of the Autorité de la Concurrence , translated in English by the French Competition Authority) , which has not contested the facts, for abuse of dominant position for having privileged its services in the online advertising services. Similar facts were alleged against Facebook. But on June 3, 2021, the Autorité de la concurrence (French Competition Authority) published a "communiqué de presse" (➡️📝statement translated in English by the French Competition Authority) saying that Facebook has, during the investigation, proposed commitments regarding its future behavior. It is remarkable that this statement on Facebook is published as an “acte de régulation” (regulatory act). Yes, it is indeed an regulatory act about the future and structuring the online advertising area, internalized in this company which engages itself in its future behavior. With its statement, the Competition Authority invites the “acteurs du secteur” (actors of this sector) to make observations, for the development of what will be a sort of compliance program. In these negotiations which are akin to a game table, where everyone calculates without knowing if they enter into a negotiation or a confrontation, the first game assuming that one shows more cards than in the second, it is indeed towards a kind of Public Interest Judicial Agreement that they are going with a Competition Authority which is both Judge and Prosecutor, concludes the agreement and, through a later decision, gives it force. Under the various legal qualifications, it is indeed the same general mechanism of Compliance Law, well beyond the specific French law known as Sapin 2. Managed in this way, Compliance Law being an Ex Ante corpus, transforms the Competition Authority, an Ex Post Authority, into an Ex Ante Authority, openly taking "acte de régulation" (Regulatory Act), and allows it to rely on the power of companies, thus “committed”, to structure markets, which are however not regulated. Like advertising or retailing areas (➡️📝see Frison-Roche, M.-A., From Competition Law to Compliance Law: Example of French Competition Authority's decision on central purchasing body in mass distribution, 2020). Thus Compliance Law has achieved the autonomy of Regulatory Law with regards to the notion, which nevertheless seemed intimate to it, of "sector".   ► register to the French Newsletter MaFR ComplianceTech®

Full reference: Serious Fraud Office, Operational Handbook about Deferred Prosecution Agreements, October 2020 Read the Operational Handbook

Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A., "La justice pénale est passée de l'inquisitoire à l'accusatoire" (By Compliance, Continental Criminal Justice Mechanisms have come from Inquisitorial Procedure to Adversarial System), Interview in French about the impact of the "conventions judiciaire d'intérêt public", the French equivalent of DPI, and Compliance Procedures in French Law, Lettre des juristes d'affaires, n°1416, October 14, 2019. Summary : In this interview and through the three questions asked, the answers show that we have gone from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial system, which is a  sort of Revolution especially in matter of proofw. The French legal system must be adapted, but also or, above all, this conception of Compliance efficiency is a mechanism without a judge. The expression of "deal of justice" is excessive, because precisely if there is a "deal", there is no a "judge" : the prosecutor was not a judge. These mechanisms are also handled by the administrative Independant Bodies of Regulation or Supervision, which act here as "prosecuting authorities", that is to say as prosecutor. They also "deal" the non-appearance of the judge, the opposite of "justice", in a classical conception which is the figure of the judge. It is true that in the case of the "convention judiciaire d'intérêt public" the French Law requires an approval by the judge of the CJIP: it is then that the stake moved. There is a change of culture: the prosecutor is in the center, the Regulator or the Supervisor are the "prosecuting authority" and it is as approval authority that the judge or the administrative Sanctions Committee intervenes. But later. When the essential are the proofs obtained in the first lapse of time. The firm or the person can be evaded by asserting his "right to the judge". This judge who seeks the truth while an authority to pursue wants something else: win. We must understand that.    Read the Interview (in French) and the answers to these three questions:  1. En quoi les mécanismes de justice négociée, relativement récents en France, bouleversent les concepts hexagonaux de l’ordre judiciaire ? /  How the negotiated justice mechanisms, relatively recent in France, upset the hexagonal concepts of the judiciary? 2. Les entreprises ont-elles véritablement le choix d’accepter ces « deals de justice » ? / Do companies really have the choice to accept these "deals of justice"? 3. En matière de lutte contre la corruption, les autorités de poursuite se comportent désormais comme des juges puisqu’ils exigent des engagements pour le futur. Quels sont les risques ? / In the fight against corruption, prosecution authorities now behave like judges since they demand commitments for the future. What are the risks ?