Complexity

► Full reference : M.-A. Frison-Roche,  ""Ordonner la Compliance : pourquoi le faire et comment le faire ? (Organising Compliance: why do it and how to do it?)", interview Focus on… conducted for Dalloz Actu Étudiants, 13 November 2025 - ► read the interview : 💬 Read the interview (in French) - 🌐read the interview presentation on LinkedIn (in French) 🌐read the interview presentation through the MAFR Newsletter Law, Compliance, Regulation, (in English) - ► presentation  of the interview by Dalloz Actu-Étudiants  : Compliance can be defined as a new branch of law that mobilises major economic players and their stakeholders to ensure that the large systems in which we live do not collapse, but remain solid and sustainable. Sanctions, contracts, ethical principles, court decisions and corporate cultures all converge to achieve this. The ambition is great, some contest it, many want to escape it. It is still difficult to define compliance, which seems to be going in all directions. Who? What? Why? How? These are all questions addressed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, professor of law and editor-in-chief of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC), together with the contributors to the collective works in the Régulations & Compliance series under her scientific direction. Compliance (JoRC), together with the contributors to the collective works in the "Regulations & Compliance" collection under her scientific direction, sheds light on with her imaginative power combined with her legal precision. - Q.Why do the fundamental objectives of compliance unify all legal compliance techniques? Summary of MAFR's response: because all these regulatory frameworks, which large companies are required to enforce effectively and which appear disparate, creating as many specific requirements as there are regulatory compliance blocks, find their unity when we consider the following reality: whatever the body of regulations in question (Sapin 2, Vigilance, Nis2, Dora, IAA, etc.), the aim is always to identify and prevent systemic risks so that these systems do not collapse.   Q. How can we define the obligation of compliance? Summary of MAFR response: the company concerned is therefore obliged to put in place "compliance structures", such as mapping, plans, alert structures and programmes (obligation of result), but of course, and this is the key point, to achieve this goal, namely to ensure that the system in question (banking, financial, climate, digital, algorithmic, etc.) does not collapse. This is an obligation of means. This is the exact, simple definition that unifies all the regulations of the Compliance Obligation for which subject companies are responsible.   Q. What conflicts arise around the source of compliance standards and their implementation?  Summary of MAFR's response: It must remain a matter of law. However, many argue that because it is only a matter of "compliance" and "ticking all the boxes", algorithms (which do not think or know anything) will do this, eliminating the need for lawyers and the law. This must be avoided. Furthermore, given the immense ambition of safeguarding systems, political and public authorities, businesses and stakeholders must join forces. They must not fight to bring each other down.   Q. What are the complexities of compliance law?  Summary of MAFR's response: I would not say "complexity", because although the regulations are complicated, compliance law is fairly simple and unified around its monumental goals of safeguarding systems, ensuring their future sustainability and protecting the people involved in them. However, it is a new branch of law that is still poorly understood and therefore sometimes poorly mastered. It therefore needs to be organised.   Q. What is your proposal for ordering it?  Summary of MAFR's response: Teaching more about compliance law will facilitate its organisation. The courts, to which all regulations converge through litigation, will participate in this organisation, which is necessary to ensure that regulations do not remain in silos and do not contradict each other when they have the same purpose, which constitutes their legal normativity. This new branch of law must also be articulated with all other branches of law. This is notably what the recently published book, L'obligation de compliance (The Obligation of Compliance), does. - 🌐Follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐Subscribe to the video newsletter MAFR Overhang 🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Law & Art

Reference: Patrick BOLTON – Morgan DESPRES – Luiz Awazu PEREIRA DA SILVA – Frédéric SAMAMA – Romain SVARTZMAN, The green swan: central banking and financial stability in the age of climate change, Banque des Règlements Internationaux, Janvier 2020 Accede to article

Translated Summaries In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors ENGLISH While financial regulation aims at achieving market stability, regulating markets can sometimes take an ironic turn when regulations end up having consequences that differ from their original regulatory purpose. The article provides such an example of regulation’s irony: how a regulatory change in Germany led Moody’s to downgrade 12 banks, therefore weakening such institutions and consequently enhancing the current issues of market volatility and credit cost.   FRENCH Bien que la réglementation financière vise à assurer la stabilité du marché, la régulation des marchés peut parfois prendre une tournure ironique quand la régulation finit par avoir des conséquences qui diffèrent de son objectif de régulation d’origine. L’article fournit un exemple de l’ironie de la régulation : comment un changement de réglementation en Allemagne a conduit Moody’s à déclasser 12 banques allemandes,, donc à affaiblir ces institutions et par conséquent à accroître les problèmes actuels de la volatilité du marché et le coût du crédit. ITALIAN Quando la regolazione è volta ad ottenere la stabilità del mercato, l’evoluzione di questi mercati oggetto di tale regolazione può essere particolarmente ironica quando la regolazione ha delle conseguenze ben differenti da quelle originariamente prepostesi. Questo articolo cerca quindi di mettere in evidenza un esempio di questa ironia: in effetti, un cambio di regolatore in Germania ha portato Moody’s a tagliare il rating di 12 banche, indebolendo ancora di più tali istituzioni ed aumentando si conseguenza le questioni relative alla volatilità del mercato e del costo del credito. ………………….. Other translations forthcoming

At first glance, associating the terms regulation and neutrality seems to be an oxymoron, to cite Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s expression*. Before […]