Competition Policy

Conferences

conference

🎥La qualification juridique du système de noms de domaine comme infrastructure et ses conséquences juridiques (“The legal status of the domain name system as an infrastructure and its legal consequence”), in 🧮Durabilité de l’Internet : le rôle des opérateurs du système des noms de domaine. Compliance et régulation de l’espace numérique (Sustainability of the Internet: the role of the operators of the domain name system. Compliance and regulation of the digital space)

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, La qualification juridique du système de noms de domaine comme infrastructure et ses conséquences juridiques ("The legal status of the domain name system as an infrastructure and its legal consequence"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche et G. Loiseau (dir.), Durabilité de l'Internet : le rôle des opérateurs du système des noms de domaine (Sustainability of the Internet: the role of the operators of the domain name system. Compliance and regulation of the digital space). Compliance et régulation de l'espace numérique, 21 février 2025, organisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance et l'Institut de la Recherche en Droit de la Sorbonne (André Tunc – IRDJS), 12 place du Panthéon, Paris. - 🧮see the full programme of this colloquium (in French) - ► Summary of this conference:  "Domain names" are a technical reality. This technical reality has come to the fore, seeming to have been both little "thought out" and little "conceived" in Law and, perhaps because it is little coveted, Competition Law, which neutralises the concreteness of things and services in order to focus on exchange, hardly qualifies them. It is rather from the 'Competition Policy' perspective that 'domain names' are apprehended. However, Competition Policy expresses wishes and perspectives, while Competition aw must make way for the perspective of Regulatory Law inside the liberal economic system. Looking at the technicalities of the domain name system, we can proceed in 3 stages. Firstly, if a domain name is taken in isolation, it may appear as property and/or a projection of a person, and has rightly been described as such by the courts. But domain names only exist in relation to each other, the addressing system on which the Internet itself and the digital space that enables everyone to spread, reach and be reached were built. In this way, they constitute an Infrastructure in their plurality, in a uniqueness (I). The legal system must take account of this technological reality through the concept of Essential Infrastructure, which is well known in Regulatory legal perspective(I). Secondly, the legal consequences of this legal qualification of Infrastructure must be detailed (II). Regulatory Law does not necessarily imply institutions, a regulatory authority being an indication rather than a criterion. Rather, it requires specific charges, powers and controls to ensure that the Infrastructure is established and operates to fulfill, now and in the future, the function that is crucially expected of it. Because the digital space was born of the Internet, an a-sectional and a-territorial space, Compliance Law, which is an extension of Regulatory Law, outside the sectors and internalised in the crucial operators, is essential as it is appropriate without diminishing the public dimension of the organisation. Thirdly, the evidential dimension should be emphasised (III). Indeed, because we need to ensure that the Domain Names Infrastructure is always solid and reliable, so as not to risk a systemic failure of the Internet, and therefore of the digital space, we must not remain with the traditional system of burden of proof that rests on the person making the complaint. Because there is a Compliance Obligation, it is up to the crucial operators to credibly show their ability to ensure the technical sustainability of this infrastructure on which the digital space in which we live is based. It shall be different if the issue is one of non-technical Sustainability, for example that which is linked to a particular societal project, in which the operators of the domain name system are not at the origin and are required on an ad hoc basis because they are in a good position to help the Authorities or because they wish to do so. - 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn 🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur Instagram 🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter en vidéo MAFR Surplomb

I-1.33: Transport, competition and competition policy

Translated Summaries ENGLISH : This article provides an economic perspective on the role played by competition policy in the development of competition in various transport sectors. After a brief reminder of some economic features that are shared by different transport modes, it mainly examines the principles and practical underpinnings of merger control as it is implemented in the present context of rapid consolidation in some transport sectors. Thereby, it stresses some potential shortcomings of the traditional merger regula tion approach in the particular context of transportation services, pointing to an excessive attention paid to potential competition issues on overly narrow relevant markets while largely ignoring global efficiency-enhancing effects of mergers and alliances. ITALIAN Articolo: Trasporti, concorrenza e politica in material di concorrenza. Questo articolo delinea una prospettiva economica del ruolo della politica in materia di concorrenza nello sviluppo della libera concorrenza in vari settori dei trasporti. Dopo un breve richiamo ad alcuni aspetti economici, comuni a diversi tipi di trasporto, l’articolo passa in esame i principi e le pratiche fondamentali del controllo delle concentrazione cosi come applicato nell’attuale contesto di consolidamento di alcuni settori dell’industria dei trasporti. Tuttavia, l’articolo mette in rilievo ugualmente alcune carenze potenziali di un approccio classico della regolazione delle concentrazioni nello specifico settore dei trasporti, tra cui l’eccessiva attenzione data alle questioni di concorrenza potenziale su mercati di dimensioni ridotte e la noncuranza generalizzata degli effetti di alleanze e fusioni in materia di efficacia e di progresso. SPANISH Artículo: Transporte, competencia y política competitiva Este artículo da una perspectiva económica sobre el rol jugador por la política de la competencia y el desarrollo de la competencia en varios sectores de transporte. Después de un breve recordatorio sobre las características económicas compartidas por diferentes modales de transporte, examina principalmente los principios y detalles prácticos de la implementación de control de uniones en el contexto presente de consolidación rápida en algunos sectores de transporte. El artículo pone énfasis algunos de los defectos potenciales del la regulación tradicional de uniones, particularmente en el contexto de los servicios de transporte, indicando un enfoque excesivo a cuestiones de competencia potencial en mercados demasiado estrechos y a la vez ignorando los efectos del mejoramiento de eficacia global de las uniones y las alianzas.    PORTUGUESE Artigo: Transporte, concorrência e política concorrencial Este artigo fornece uma perspectiva econômica sobre o papel exercido pela política concorrencial no desenvolvimento da concorrência em diversos setores de transporte. Após uma breve retomada de conceitos econômicos compartilhados por modos de transporte diferentes, ele examina principalmente os princípios e os problemas práticos do controle como implementado no contexto presente de rápida consolidação em alguns setores de transporte. Assim, ele sublinha alguns potenciais conflitos no enfoque da regulação tradicional no contexto particular de serviços de transporte, apontando para uma atenção excessiva concedida para problemas de concorrência potencial em muito relevantes mercados enquanto são amplamente ignorados os efeitos na eficiência global. Transporte aéreo – Avião – Aeroporto – Aliança – Comportamento anti-concorrencial – Falência – Concorrência – Autoridade de concorrência – Política de concorrência – Concentração – Contrato – Subsídios cruzados – Economia de escala – Eficiência – Ganho de eficiência – Barreiras de entrada – Equilíbrio – Comissão Europeia – Custo fixo – França – Londres – Incentivo – Operador incumbente – Infraestrutura – Interconexão – Investimento – Monopólio legal – Liberalização – Rede de longa distância – Estrutura de mercado – Controle – Firma de multiprodução – Rede – Mercado oligopolístico – Concorrência potencial – Preço – Elasticidade de preço – Trilho – Transporte por trilhos – Mercado relevante – Transporte rodoviário – Segmento – Serviço – Tempo – Transporte – Reino Unido – Comunidade urbana – Veículo.* * Em The Journal of Regulation, estas palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Editor e não pelo Autor. ………………… Other translations forthcoming.

I-1.31: The Competition Authority between “regulation” and competition policiy

Translated Summaries ENGLISH Two and a half years after having been established by the LME, the French Competition Authority has uncontestably acquired its “place in the sun” amongst the competition authorities of other countries, as demonstrated by multiple indicators.   ITALIAN Articolo: L’Autorità garante della concorrenza tra “regolazione” e politica in materia di concorrenza Due anni e mezzo dopo l’instaurazione da parte del LME, l’Autorità francese garante della libera concorrenza ha trovato il suo posto tra le diverse autorità degli altri paesi, così come è stato dimostrato da diversi indicatori. SPANISH Artículo: La Autoridad de la competencia, entre “regulación” y política competitiva.   Después de dos años y medio de haber sido establecido por el LME, la Autoridad francesa de la competencia ha incontestablemente adquirido su “lugar bajo el sol” entre las autoridades de la competencia de otros países, como demostrado por varios indicadores. ………………… Other translations forthcoming.