Adversarial procedure

Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A., "La justice pénale est passée de l'inquisitoire à l'accusatoire" (By Compliance, Continental Criminal Justice Mechanisms have come from Inquisitorial Procedure to Adversarial System), Interview in French about the impact of the "conventions judiciaire d'intérêt public", the French equivalent of DPI, and Compliance Procedures in French Law, Lettre des juristes d'affaires, n°1416, October 14, 2019. Summary : In this interview and through the three questions asked, the answers show that we have gone from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial system, which is a  sort of Revolution especially in matter of proofw. The French legal system must be adapted, but also or, above all, this conception of Compliance efficiency is a mechanism without a judge. The expression of "deal of justice" is excessive, because precisely if there is a "deal", there is no a "judge" : the prosecutor was not a judge. These mechanisms are also handled by the administrative Independant Bodies of Regulation or Supervision, which act here as "prosecuting authorities", that is to say as prosecutor. They also "deal" the non-appearance of the judge, the opposite of "justice", in a classical conception which is the figure of the judge. It is true that in the case of the "convention judiciaire d'intérêt public" the French Law requires an approval by the judge of the CJIP: it is then that the stake moved. There is a change of culture: the prosecutor is in the center, the Regulator or the Supervisor are the "prosecuting authority" and it is as approval authority that the judge or the administrative Sanctions Committee intervenes. But later. When the essential are the proofs obtained in the first lapse of time. The firm or the person can be evaded by asserting his "right to the judge". This judge who seeks the truth while an authority to pursue wants something else: win. We must understand that.    Read the Interview (in French) and the answers to these three questions:  1. En quoi les mécanismes de justice négociée, relativement récents en France, bouleversent les concepts hexagonaux de l’ordre judiciaire ? /  How the negotiated justice mechanisms, relatively recent in France, upset the hexagonal concepts of the judiciary? 2. Les entreprises ont-elles véritablement le choix d’accepter ces « deals de justice » ? / Do companies really have the choice to accept these "deals of justice"? 3. En matière de lutte contre la corruption, les autorités de poursuite se comportent désormais comme des juges puisqu’ils exigent des engagements pour le futur. Quels sont les risques ? / In the fight against corruption, prosecution authorities now behave like judges since they demand commitments for the future. What are the risks ?

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Experts et procédure : l'amicus curiae" ("Experts and procedure: the amicus curiae"), Revue de droit d'Assas, october 2012, pp. 91-94 - 📝read the article (in French) - ► English Summary of the article: A recent thesis has argued that amicus curiae is becoming a common principle of Procedural Law. This shows its importance. The fact that the mechanism, the character, is designated by a Latin formula leads us to suspect that something is being concealed that legal technique ordinarily forbids: it is the legal expert and the party's expert, which is what the amicus curiae most often is, either one or the other, or both at the same time. Therefore, removing the prudish cloak of Latin, it is these two difficulties that must be addressed. If we exclude the legal expert, it is because "jura novit curia" ("the court knows Law". But this rule, which recalls the principle that "no one is supposed to be ignorant of the law", merely indicates a sharing of the burden of evoking facts and Law between the parties and the judge (Motulsky) and not a presumption of knowledge. Consequently, the modest, and therefore self-confident, judge has no reason, either psychological or legal, to shy away from a legal expertise. As for the party's expert, or the judge's expert who is highly influenced by a party, a profession, a social group, in short, a judge's expert who is in fact an expert held by a party, this can only be a problem if the judge cannot keep his distance from this expert whose opinion is biased by the weight of the party. But first of all, any opinion is biased. Whether it is given in bad faith or good faith, it is biased, and in rhetoric we know that an opinion biased in good faith is more dangerous than a bought opinion, because the latter is known to be twisted by self-interest. In this respect, the person who listens to it, the judge, knows the difference. Indeed, the legal system that recognises the party's expert and the amicus curiae, i.e. North American Law or European Union Law, draws the necessary procedural consequence: they include the party's expert opinion in the adversarial debate. It is the principle of adversarial debate, the principle of principles in the conduct of proceedings, that makes amicus curiae acceptable and welcome, since it provides the judge with a scientific input that the latter does not have. -