Access to justice

► Full Reference : M.-A. Frison-Roche, Le "Grand Arrêt" de la Cour d'appel de Paris du 7 mai 2025, Dalloz et al. c/Forseti, D. 2025, p. - 📝reread the article (in French) - ► Ench presentation of this article: The first part of the article describes the Paris Court of Appeal's ruling against the company that created a Legaltech platform under the trade name 'Doctrine', which offers a large number of court rulings, particularly from lower courts. Sued for unfair competition by a group of publishers offering a similar service, they were not convicted at first instance, but were convicted by the Court of Appeal because it appeared that they had fraudulently obtained thousands of judgments, which, under Civil Law, constitutes unfair competition to the detriment of the plaintiffs. The second part of the article draws 6 lessons from this. The power of general law. On the benefits that the perpetrator has derived from the slowness of justice.  On the importance of Open Data. On the fact that the law is not mastered by accumulating data but by putting it into perspective through the thinking of authors and publishers. On the indifference for this of the financiers who built and resold the "Doctrine" website. On the very nature of a 'Grand Arrêt', such as this one.   -    

Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A., "La justice pénale est passée de l'inquisitoire à l'accusatoire" (By Compliance, Continental Criminal Justice Mechanisms have come from Inquisitorial Procedure to Adversarial System), Interview in French about the impact of the "conventions judiciaire d'intérêt public", the French equivalent of DPI, and Compliance Procedures in French Law, Lettre des juristes d'affaires, n°1416, October 14, 2019. Summary : In this interview and through the three questions asked, the answers show that we have gone from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial system, which is a  sort of Revolution especially in matter of proofw. The French legal system must be adapted, but also or, above all, this conception of Compliance efficiency is a mechanism without a judge. The expression of "deal of justice" is excessive, because precisely if there is a "deal", there is no a "judge" : the prosecutor was not a judge. These mechanisms are also handled by the administrative Independant Bodies of Regulation or Supervision, which act here as "prosecuting authorities", that is to say as prosecutor. They also "deal" the non-appearance of the judge, the opposite of "justice", in a classical conception which is the figure of the judge. It is true that in the case of the "convention judiciaire d'intérêt public" the French Law requires an approval by the judge of the CJIP: it is then that the stake moved. There is a change of culture: the prosecutor is in the center, the Regulator or the Supervisor are the "prosecuting authority" and it is as approval authority that the judge or the administrative Sanctions Committee intervenes. But later. When the essential are the proofs obtained in the first lapse of time. The firm or the person can be evaded by asserting his "right to the judge". This judge who seeks the truth while an authority to pursue wants something else: win. We must understand that.    Read the Interview (in French) and the answers to these three questions:  1. En quoi les mécanismes de justice négociée, relativement récents en France, bouleversent les concepts hexagonaux de l’ordre judiciaire ? /  How the negotiated justice mechanisms, relatively recent in France, upset the hexagonal concepts of the judiciary? 2. Les entreprises ont-elles véritablement le choix d’accepter ces « deals de justice » ? / Do companies really have the choice to accept these "deals of justice"? 3. En matière de lutte contre la corruption, les autorités de poursuite se comportent désormais comme des juges puisqu’ils exigent des engagements pour le futur. Quels sont les risques ? / In the fight against corruption, prosecution authorities now behave like judges since they demand commitments for the future. What are the risks ?