Articles in a JoRC book

► Full Reference: A. Le Goff, "Monumental Goals Perceived by the Firm: Serene Business or Business under Pressure?", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 83-90. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article:  -

► Full Reference: I. Gavanon, "Data Protection Law in the Digital Economy Confronted to Monumental Goals", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 137-146. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article:  -

► Full Reference: A. Mendoza-Caminade, "Proportionality and Evaluation. The Example of Intellectual Property Law", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023,  pp. 221-236. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article:  -

► Full Reference: J.-Ch. Roda, "Compliance, Internal Investigations and International Competitiveness: What are Risks for the French Companies (in the Light of Antitrust Law)?", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2023, pp. 355-368. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article: The author draws on American and European Competition Law to measure whether internal investigations, as far as they provide factual elements, can provide foreign authorities and competitors, here American, with "sensitive information" (notably via leniency programs), and as such constitute a competitive handicap. But this turns out to be quite difficult, whereas compliance audits, for example under the legal duty of vigilance, can provide American litigants with useful information, drawn from internal documents, in particular the reports of compliance officers, which can be captured by procedures of discovery. French Law remains weak in the face of these dangers, due to its refusal to recognise the legal privilege mechanism concerning these internal documents, contrary to American Law and the consequent effectiveness of discovery in international procedures, concerning internal documents, in particular resulting from internal investigations. Solutions have been proposed, the activation of a new conception of blocking statutes being complex, the prospect of adopting a legal privilege being more effective, but there would remain the hypothesis of an international conflict of privilege, American Law having a strict design of legal advice justifying it and judges checking that powerful companies do not use it artificially. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: S. Lochmann, "ESG Rating Agencies and Compliance as an Effective Way of Increasing International Competitiveness", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 389-400. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article:  -

► Full Reference: L. Benzoni, "International Trade, Competitivity and Sovereignty: Towards a Political Economy of Compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 447-458. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article:  -

► Full Reference: A.-V. Le Fur, "Interest and “raison d’être” of the Company: How Does It Fit Together with the Compliance Monumental Goals?", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 69-82. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): Companies would have a soul. The legislator thinks so, since the French law called "loi Pacte"  of 22 May 2019 obliges managers to act in the Corporate Interest and allows companies to formulate themselves a « raison d'être ». Compliance Law does the same, relying on companies to save the world from corruption, slavery, terrorism and global warming, thus achieving Monumental goals. At first glance, the contours of Corporate Interest and « raison d’être » of the company are not far removed from the notion of Compliance Monumental Goals. This is not surprising, since the objective that presided over their introduction into the French Civil Code is the same as that underlying Compliance Law : to rethink the place of the company in the global Society, by affirming long-term values or concerns. This is a reason to use these corporate law concepts in the context of an X-ray of the concept of Monumental Goals. However, a comparative approach is disappointing. The divergences between corporate notions and compliance lead to the conclusion that company law is not intended to impose anything other than a corporate public order. Notions that are more philosophical than legal, Corporate Interest and « raison d'être » are assigned functions that limit their scope. The imperative nature of corporate rules, and this is a consequence of the above, cannot be compared with that of compliance: uncertain, it is also relative when compared with the "violence" of compliance rules. The impact of the notions of Interest and « raison d'être » remains thus mainly internal to the company. According to a second approach, it cannot be ruled out that Corporate Interest and « raison d'être » allow for a better understanding of higher and universal values by Company Law. Corporate Interest may incorporate Compliance Monumental Goals while the « raison d'être » may constitute a perspective for the realization of these goals. The stakes are high : when the interest of the company, as a legal person and autonomous economic agent, joins the Monumental Goals, the means of achieving the latter are multiplied by internalizing them in all companies, not just the largest ones. However, despite all good intentions, a company is only governable if the compass does not become an elusive and indecisive vane; in other words, if legal certainty is respected. This is why a legal ordering of the concepts is necessary, which ultimately leads to a suggestion of their domain, content and scope.  -

► Full Reference: B. Petit, "The Monumental Goals of (European) Labour Law: a Changing System with Balances to be Consolidated", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 147-168. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): Labor Law has been built on the pursuit of "monumental goals", many of which are now enshrined in international, european and national standards (social justice, the right to work, gender equality, the fight against discrimination, the fight against harassment, health and hygiene, etc.). The first step will be to shed light on the organization and articulation of these monumental goals, as reflected in positive international and european labor law. We then realize that from a "cardinal monumental goal" – the guarantee of the dignity of the person at work – there are distinct categories of "secondary monumental goals", depending on whether they develop a concern relating to the quality of work, its economic and financial sustainability, or the guarantee at work of civil and political rights recognized upstream to every person. On this diversity of monumental goals, forces emanating from the concerned actors (companies, trade unions, and States) are exerted and promote certain goals rather than others; one vision of labor relationships rather than others. We observe that the different categories of "monumental goals" thus highlighted are driven by different rationalities, sometimes contradictory to each other, which requires the establishment of permanent balances, allowed by a serious reflection on the cardinal monumental goal of guaranteeing the dignity of the person at work. Unfortunately, in practice, this essential approach escapes the normative actors of labour relations law. The result is "conflicts" of monumental goals that manifest themselves in particular during social dialogue, at the time of collective bargaining and the functioning of employee representative bodies. It will therefore be necessary, in a second step, to question the way in which these conflicts can be arbitrated, bearing in mind that international and European social law is plural (ILO, Council of Europe, European Union) and that the coordination links between the legal systems concerned are fluid. -

► Full Reference: B. Bär-Bouyssière, "Proportionality and Compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 213-220. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The article is based on the undisputed assertion that Proportionality is inherent in Compliance, in particular when this takes the form of a sanction, but the author compares this assertion with its practical implementation. The author notes that in all the compliance mechanisms, in particular in Competition Compliance, companies have difficulties in practice in satisfying with their obligations in Ex Ante because the standards are very heavy, expensive and difficult to understand, as they have difficulty. in Ex Post to obtain that the authorities do not make a disproportionate use of them, and to obtain that the courts effectively protect them from that. These practical difficulties are due above all to the diversity of the standards concerned, those who create them as well as those who interpret them having to do so without excess, about what it is very difficult to obtain control. In addition, the weight of the implementation of compliance standards is not correlated with the concrete and financial ability of diverses companies to do so and the design of standards does not always integrate this correlation. Faced with this, companies then tend to do more than is necessary, in order not to incur sanctions in the doubt, and moreover because the people in charge of the effectiveness of their compliance standards have in the mind not to engage their own responsibility, which encourages them to over-apply compliance obligations, when there should be a fair and strict relationship of necessity, that is to say this desired proportionality, this additional cost being a useless excess for all. Finally, a practical difficulty is due to the violence, in itself necessary, of the sanctions, in the face of which the companies seek in Ex Post to show the disproportionate nature, but do not have very sure means of proof. This is why it is often on the ground of rhetoric and of the conviction that enterprises are placed in practice, more than on that of the mathematical calculation of proportionality. -

► Full Reference: M. Segonds, "Compliance, Proportionality and Sanction. A French Perspective", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 243-257. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Before devoting the developments of his article to the sole perspective of sanctions imposed under "Anti-corruption Compliance", the author recalls in a more general way that, as is the sanction, Compliance is in essence proportional: Proportionality is inherent to Compliance as it conditions any sanction, including a sanction imposed under Compliance. This link between Proportionality and Compliance has been underlined by the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence française anticorruption – AFA) with regard to risk mapping, which must measure risks to arrive at effective and proportional measures. This same spirit of proportionality animates the recommendations of the AFA which are intended to apply according to the size of the company and its concrete organisation. It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on one hand to Criminal Law, centered on the requirement of proportionality. Punitive sanctions It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on the other hand to the disciplinary power of the manager who, from other sources of law, must integrate the legal requirement of proportionality when he/she applies external and internal compliance norms. -

► Full Reference: A. Oumedjkane, A. Tehrani and P. Idoux, "Public Norms and Compliance in Crisis Periods: Testing Monumental Goals. A Few Thoughts", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 291-313. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Authors): In this paper, compliance refers to the fact that large private firms, through internal procedures designed to abide by public norms, participate in achieving the goals set out by public authorities, as the latter cannot reach those goals without help (proper functioning of financial markets, environment protection, fight against the corruption…). While in times outside a crisis period, the need to maintain a close link between public norms and compliance to achieve those “monumental goals” has been established, the validity of this analysis must be assessed during crisis periods. Indeed, to put an end to the turmoil as soon as possible, it is tempting to rely primarily on public authorities.  Should then be studied, in the light of the health crisis, the possibility that the link between public norms and compliance be altered in times of crisis. Not only is the normative reaction of public authorities very intense during the period, but some features of the compliance could lead one to think that compliance is in no way useful in a context of emergency and instability. This paper nevertheless suggests that to achieve monumental goals, it is necessary to maintain a close link between public norms and compliance. Such a link was maintained indeed, even at the height of the health crisis, and this should probably also be the case beyond this period, as breaking the link involves some risks which are not specific to the current health crisis. In other words, despite its shortcomings, compliance may not lose all its assets in times of crisis. -

► Full Reference: J. Bonnet, "The Crisis, an Opportunity to Seize Compliance as a Mode of Communication for Public Authorities", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 315-324. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): This article is about the crisis, as an opportunity to seize Compliance as a mode of Communication by Public Authorities. Based on the French case of the ban on cycling during the health crisis issued by a simple ministerial tweet, the analysis aims to broaden the reflection on the consequences of the intensive and precious use of communication tools by public authorities. Because of the consequences and above all the risks for the legitimacy of the State and the law, public authorities could draw inspiration from the spirit and methods of compliance in order to produce communication and action that are both more effective, clearer, more in accordance with the law, all without renouncing the flexibility of the communicational means and incentive actions. -

► Full Reference: R. Bismuth, "The Ambiguous Relations between Corporate Compliance and Sovereignty", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 433-445. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): At first glance, the notion of Sovereignty is difficult to combine with Compliance. Indeed, Sovereignty is part of Public International Law in a logic of essentially territorial distribution of competences, while Compliance has developed and disseminated in companies with tools and methods which largely ignore borders. A closer look reveals more fundamentally three types of ambiguous interactions between the two. Compliance can first of all be understood as a tool allowing States, by relying on companies, to circumvent the obstacles and limits posed by a Sovereignty conceived in territorial terms and therefore to extend it. Such an approach can nevertheless lead to friction or even conflicts between Compliance and Sovereignty, the norms conveyed by the first not necessarily being in line with those imposed by the second. This is particularly true when the Compliance "Monumental Goals" are not unilaterally defined or are not intended to be. Finally, by infusing companies with instruments and methods that are reminiscent of sovereign functions, compliance can also allow us to imagine an emerging movement tending to gradually establish Corporate Sovereignty beyond that of States. - -

► Full Reference: Ch. André, "State Sovereignty, Sovereignty of the People: What Social Contract for Compliance?", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, pp. 469-486. - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Author): The “Compliance Monumental Goals” serve as vectors for “common” social values: the proposal is simple, but it seems both familiar and strange to a criminal lawyer. Familiar, because even if compliance transcends the borders of academic disciplines, it shares with criminal law a logic sanctioning attacks on social interests. Strange, because Monumental Goals convey social values by sweeping away all the learned discussions that have been going on since Beccaria about the foundations and axiological functions of punishment. Indeed, the social values promoted by Monumental Goals are “common” in every sense of the word. First, they are shared and internalized by the largest enterprises in the Western world, without the need for an international treaty on protected values. The question of sovereignty is overshadowed. Second, they are common in that they are commonplace, ordinary, approved of by most Western consumer-citizens: probity, equality, respect for the environment, who would not be in favour of respecting them? Hence it is in companies’ interest to communicate and diffuse, urbi and orbi, how they respect these Monumental Goals. The question of citizens’ consensus on values is sidestepped, as they are supposed to be derived from the obvious (even if the goals could be achieved by different means, or even contradict each other). Third, these values are common because they now enlist a multitude of communicants (the “compliance officer”, among others) who, more or less gracefully – the meticulous liturgy of compliance can put off some officiants and incite buffoonery – seek to spread the cult of these values at all levels of business. Since these values are respected, they are necessarily respectable: businesses become moralized by the multitude who respect them. Existence precedes essence, and the values conveyed contribute to the businesses’ raison d’être, beyond the pursuit of profit. The question of effectiveness vanishes, since these values are already there, regularly monitored, both internally and by public authorities. Sovereignty, citizenship, effectiveness: the logic of Compliance supplants the academic debates of criminal lawyers with practical solutions. Perhaps this is how the goals are “monumental”: vast, global, overwhelming. Compliance may not be the best of all worlds, but it is most certainly another world. -

► Full Reference: A. Bruneau, "L'entreprise juge d'elle-même : la fonction compliance dans la banque" ("The company judge of itself: the compliance function inside the bank"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 115-131.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published     - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance. In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as "Sapin 2" requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk. Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution. Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law. Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the "judge-judged": following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients. -

► Full Reference: S. Scemla and D. Paillot, "La difficile appréhension des droits de la défense par les autorités de contrôle en matière de compliance" ("The supervisory authorities face difficulties to apprehend the rights of the defence in Compliance matters"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 241-249. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the authors): Since 2016, French companies subject to the provisions of the so-called “Sapin 2” Law must implement eight stringent anti-corruption measures, such as a risk mapping, a whistleblowing procedure or a third-party due diligence procedure. To ensure their compliance with these obligations, the Sapin 2 law created the Agence française anticorruption – AFA (French Anti-Corruption Agency), which had been assigned three missions: firstly, to help any person prevent and detect corruption; secondly, to control the quality and effectiveness of the anti-corruption programs deployed by the companies; and thirdly, to sanction any breaches, through its Sanctions Committee. As pointed out by the French Conseil d’État, the powers devolved to the administrations have multiplied and became stratified. While the Conseil d'État suggests to improve both the conduct and the effectiveness of administrative controls by harmonising their practices and simplifying their prerogatives, it is urgent to remedy the numerous procedural failures that undermine the rights of defence. In fact, the AFA exercises various powers when undertaking its controls. Some of these powers are not provided for by the Law, and most of them infringe fundamental rights and freedoms among which the adversarial principle and the freedom not to self-incriminate. For instance, the AFA does not necessarily draft minutes of the interviews it conducts, thus depriving the interviewee of the possibility to challenge the statements reported by the AFA to the Sanctions Committee. From a more structural point of view, the scope of the AFA's mission is extremely broad. The Law allows the AFA to request the communication of "any professional document or any useful information", without defining the notion of usefulness. Also, the AFA considers that the entity cannot benefit from the legal privilege that would cover their documents, and considers that an entity who voluntarily hands over a document, without expressing any reserves, waives its right to the benefit of its legal privilege. Apart from the severe consequences that could arise if another proceedings was to be initiated by a foreign authority, the concept of "voluntary handover" does not faithfully reflect the reality. Indeed, the controlled entities only cooperate under the threat of being prosecuted on the basis of an obstruction to the control, which compels them to communicate documents even when facing the risk of contributing to their own incrimination. These many procedural deficiencies encountered during AFA controls must therefore be reformed, as recommended by the Conseil d’État, so as to require the authorities to take into account the rights of the defence. -

► Full Reference: E. Wennerström, "Quelques réflexions sur la Compliance et la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme" ("Some Reflections on Compliance and the European Court of Human Rights"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 479-489. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The development of the European Court of Human Rights case law, contributing to European integration, has incorporated the substantial concept of ​​"compliance" which goes beyond the idea of ​​legality with respect to which companies remain passive, and promotes legal orders as systems in interaction with another.  The author develops the spirit and scope of Protocol 15 by which both the principle of subsidiarity and the margins of appreciation the signatory States are organized, mechanisms governed by the principle of proportionality. Subsidiarity means that the States are in the best position to design the most adequate application of the Convention, the close links between the States allowing its effective application. In addition, the new opinion procedure which allows a national court to have during a case the non-binding opinion of the ECHR ensures better compliance with the objectives of the Convention. The case-law of the Court takes up this substantial requirement through its doctrine, in particular identified in the Bosphorus case, by stressing that the accession of a State to the European Union presumes its compliance when implementing EU law with the obligations arising from the ECHR, even if this presumption can be refuted if the protection is manifestly lacking, which was admitted in several cases, in particular concerning the right to an impartial tribunal in matters of economic regulation. The different legal orders are thus articulated.  The author concludes that the European Court of Human Rights, like the Court of Justice of the Union, contributes to the construction of Compliance Law in Europe, from an Ex Ante perspective favoring opinions rather than Ex Post sanctions and creating, in particular through the Bosphorus doctrine, elements of security and confidence for European integration around common values. -

► Full Reference: B. Silliman, "Secret professionnel et coopération : les leçons de procédure tirées de l’expérience américaine pour une application universelle" ("Privilege and cooperation, procedural lessons learned from the U.S for global application"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 231-234.   - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► English summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The French legal system is evolving, organizing interaction between lawyers with regulators and prosecutors, especially in investigations about corruption or corporate misconduct, adopting U.S. negotiated resolutions such as the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public, which encourages "collaboration" between them.  The author describes the evolution of the U.S. DOJ doctrine and askes French to be inspired by the U.S. procedural experience, U.S. where this mechanism came from. Indeed, the DOJ released memoranda about what the "collaboration" means. At the end (2006 Memorandum), the DOJ has considered that the legal privilege must remain intact when the information is not only factual to maintain trust between prosecutors, regulators, and lawyers. French authorities do not follow this way. The author regrets it and thinks they should adopt the same reasoning as the American authority on the secret professionnel of the avocat, especially when he intervenes in the company internal investigation. - 🦉This article is available in full text for those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

► Full Reference: E. Silva-Romero and R. Legru, "Quelle place pour la Compliance dans l'arbitrage d'investissement ?" ("What place for Compliance in investment arbitration?"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 281-293.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021.  In the book, the article will be published in Title II, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage. - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The authors emphasize the new and growing place of Compliance in International Arbitration, particularly in the requirement of respect for ethical values, since arbitrators can implement Ethics, sometimes lacking in international trade, or even must put their power only at the service of investors who respect the Rule of Law. Thus, Compliance is deployed through the classic control by the arbitrators of the legality of the investment, which applies both to the establishment of the treaty itself and to the investor. In a more recent way, the arbitrator can control about an investment project a sort of "social license to operate" of the investor, concept related to the social responsibility of the companies, appeared for the protection of the peoples indigenous. Moreover, Compliance can justify a substantial assessment by the arbitrator of the effective respect of the human rights and the environment protection via an investment treaty, the State party remaining able to act for the effectiveness of these concerns. -

► Full Reference: F. Raynaud, "Le juge administratif et la compliance" ("The Administrative Judge and the Compliance Law"), ​in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 473-478. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done par the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author studies the close relationship between Compliance Law and Soft Law, such as the Administrative Judge has made room for it in his case law. This was particularly the case with the judgments of the Conseil d'État (French Council of State) in 2016, relating to legal topic of Regulatory Law, which is extended by Compliance Law. This concern to internalize in companies what the public authorities want had also been taken into consideration by the Conseil d'État by small touches from 2010 and has continually expanded. This is particularly the case when the document issued is "de nature à produire des effets notables, notamment de nature économique, ou ont pour objet d'influer de manière significative sur les comportements des personnes auxquelles ils s'adressent" ("likely to produce significant effects, in particular of an economic nature, or are intended to significantly influence the behavior of the people to whom they are addressed"), which is related to compliance issues directly. This new concept adopted by the Conseil d'État has led it to review and control numerous "positions", "recommendations", "guidelines", etc., adopted by multiple authorities, to protect the persons on whom these acts have a "notable effect", the Conseil sometimes not hesitating to censor the issuing body. In Banking compliance, the Soft Law, more specifically issued by the European Banking Authority, gave the Administrative Judge the opportunity to adjust his control with that exercised by the Court of Justice seized by a preliminary question. Thus, "Par sa jurisprudence sur la justiciabilité des actes de droit de souple, le Conseil d’État s’affirme donc comme un acteur de la compliance en permettant aux entités visées par ces actes et soumises à leur égard à une obligation de compliance de saisir le juge administratif d’un recours en annulation contre ces actes, afin qu’ils puissent être soumis à un contrôle de légalité et, le cas échéant, annulés" ("Through its case law on the justiciability of Soft Law acts, the Conseil d'État therefore asserts itself as a compliance actor by allowing the entities covered by these acts and subject to a compliance obligation in their regard to seize the administrative judge of an action for annulment against these acts, so that these acts can be subjected to a control of legality and, if necessary, annulled"). But must the administrative judge be seized. It can be the case in new fields, for example in climate matters, as he we in the Grande Synthe case. By its decision, "Le Conseil d’État va ainsi au bout de la logique du dispositif mis en place par le législateur et par le pouvoir réglementaire pour mettre en œuvre les accords de Paris, lesquels reposent sur une forme de compliance à l’échelle mondiale, chaque Etat signataire s’engageant, en quelque sorte, à faire le nécessaire pour atteindre un objectif commun à une date donnée, à charge pour chacun de s’organiser pour l’atteindre. En l’absence d’un juge international capable de vérifier le respect de ces engagements, le juge national apparait le plus naturel pour accepter de vérifier, lorsqu’il est saisi d’un litige en ce sens, que ces engagements ne restent pas lettre morte. " ("The Conseil d'État thus goes to the end of the logic of the system put in place by the legislator and by the administrative power to implement the Paris Agreements, which are based on a form of compliance at the worldwide scale, each signatory State undertaking, in a way, to do what is necessary to achieve a common goal by a given date, it being up to each to organize itself to achieve it. to verify compliance with these commitments, the national judge seems the most natural to accept to verify, when seized of a dispute in this sense, that these commitments do not remain a dead letter".). Through this general movement,  "La compliance est devenue un nouveau mode de régulation d’un nombre croissant d’activités. " ("Compliance has become a new way of regulating a growing number of activities."). -