📝Compliance et Responsabilité civile : comprendre et raison garder (Compliance, Vigilance and Civil Liability: put in Order and keep the sense of Reason), in 🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕L'Obligation de Compliance

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance, Vigilance et Responsabilité civile : mettre en ordre et raison garder" (Compliance, Vigilance and Civil Liability: put in Order and keep the sense of Reason), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, forthcoming

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📝read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on which this article is based, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks

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📕real the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published

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► English summary of this article: The descriptions of the Liability incurred by large companies as a result of their compliance obligations are very diverse, even contradictory, going beyond the wishes that may be expressed as to what this liability should be. The first part of this study therefore sets out the various liabilities incurred by companies, which differ in the conditions under which they are implemented and in their scope, so as not to confuse them.

Indeed, as the various laws establish specific legal compliance obligations, they give rise to liabilities of varying conditions and scope, and it is not possible to avail of the regime of one in a situation that falls within the scope of another. It is therefore necessary to review the various bodies of compliance legislation, the GDPR, the ALM-FT regulations, the French so-called Sapin 2 law, the French so-called Vigilance law , the European IA Act , the European European DGA Act, etc., to recall the inflexion that each of these bodies of legislation has made to the liability rules applied to the companies subject to them. Nevertheless, the unicity of the Compliance Obligation, overcoming this necessary diversity of situations, regulations and liability regimes,  can provide grouping lines to indicate beyond this diversity the extent of the liability incurred by companies.

Once this classification has been made, the second part of the study develops the observation that none of this can create any principle of general liability on large companies in terms of compliance, and in particular not in terms of vigilance. It is not possible to deduce a general principle of specific obligations of liability or specific obligations to reparation, for example in the area of vigilance, as the texts creating specific vigilance obligation refer to the conditions of commun Tort Law (proof damage and causality), and International Public Law does not have the force to generate a general principle binding companies in this respect.

The third part stresses that it is nevertheless always possible to invoke Tort Law, and companies cannot claim to escape this. This may involve contractual liability, a situation  becoming increasingly frequent as companies contractualise their legal compliance obligations, reproducing them but also modifying them, and as Vigilance duty is an obligation that goes beyond the specific situations covered by the regulations. 

But it is essential, and this is the subject of the fourth part, not to make companies pure and simple guarantors of the state of the world, present and future. Indeed, if we were to transform sectoral compliances into illustrations of what would then be a new general principle, but one that applied only to them, they would consequently exercise the other side of this coin, namely power over others.

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